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In the 1990s, the fact that Hong Kong cinema thrived in the world market, with 
both art and commercial films, is a theoretical anomaly. Despite its petite size and lack of 
government support and protection, it has survived both colonial administration and 
Hollywood domination. Hong Kong has a long history of prolific filmmaking, and has 
flourished during a decade full of challenges, and out of proportion to the size of the city 
and the industry. Hong Kong film is now recognized for its directors‟ personal style and 
action aesthetic. How did this happen?  How did Hong Kong filmmaking develop into an 
efficient system that could survive the harsh conditions of its past and thrive in the 
competitive environment of the 1990s? Hong Kong‟s story is one of paradox and Hong 
Kong cinema relates that story by embracing paradox in both its industrial system and 
cultural ideology. This project is a formal, cultural and industrial analysis of Hong Kong 




other national cinema models, Hong Kong cinema, like bamboo surviving by bending 
with the wind, has developed a flexible system adapted to its habitat, but that also 
simultaneously created a space for a unique style of filmmaking with a transnational 
perspective. I will investigate how the cinematic system worked, and how individual 
filmmakers devised tactics to both work within and push the limits of the system. I will 
explore what they reveal about the local condition I call “orphan island anxiety”, a deep 
sense of insecurity underneath the economic miracle, and a paradoxical state that people 
from a non-conventional nation state experience in an age of universal and normative 
ideas of the nation. The case of Hong Kong cinema will illuminate for us an industrial 
model substantially different from that of Hollywood, and a voice that was missing from 
official Sino-British talks, which reveals a cultural sensibility not found in either 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: To Live 
―Notice that the stiffest tree is most easily cracked, while the bamboo or 
willow survives by bending with the wind.‖ 
– Bruce Lee 
 
Can Hong Kong cinema‘s model change the world‘s media power structure?  
What does the exuberant vitality of Hong Kong cinema tell us about the factors needed 
for resisting Hollywood domination? What does the study of Hong Kong cinema tell us 
about the problems in the current modes for studying the Hollywood studio system, 
global media and national cinemas? 
The creative energy of Hong Kong movies is mesmerizing, but the fact that it 
survives and flourishes out of proportion to the size its industry and city is even more 
intriguing. In the 1990s, Hong Kong cinema seemed to suddenly emerge as a world-class 
cinema of a world-class city, with both art and commercial films thriving in the world 
market. In this decade Hong Kong movies were spreading the fastest around the world, 
entering mainstream theater in the West and collecting the most awards in international 
film festivals despite the petite size of the industry, intensified global competition, and a 
lack of government support and protection. Only a couple of decades earlier, the public‘s 
impression of the movies by this same industry and same city was that they were un-
differentiable chop suey and kung-fu flicks from a colonial backwater. In its previous 
history, Hong Kong cinema was rarely dominated by Hollywood features, unlike its 
neighbors. In the 1990s, filmmakers like John Woo, Jackie Chan, Chow Yun Fat, 
Michelle Yeo, Jet Li and Yuan Woo Ping, etc. became household names in Hollywood, 





Maggie Cheung collected awards in Cannes, Berlin and Venice film festivals, the Meccas 
of art cinema. The stylish action aesthetics of Hong Kong cinema was likened to the 
aesthetics of other national cinemas like German Expressionism, and Soviet Montage 
Italian Neo-realism and American Film Noir, etc (Bordwell "Aesthetic"). The motif of 
protagonists with double allegiances (or literally double faces) was replicated in 
Hollywood films like Face/Off (John Woo, 1997) and The Departed (Scorsese, 2006).  
The success of Hong Kong cinema is a theoretical anomaly: media theories generally 
predict cultural homogenization or early death for unprotected culture industries in 
colonial territories. Flanked by Hollywood on one side and Chinese State on the other, 
Hong Kong cinema should easily have succumbed to these larger powers. Instead, it 
flourished as both popular and art cinema.  How did it accomplish this? How did it even 
survive?  
Hong Kong cinema arose in relation to specific local, regional, and global 
contexts. In the 1990s, Hong Kong occupied an interstitial space between British 
colonialism, Chinese nationalism, and global capitalism. My dissertation investigates 
Hong Kong cinema‘s industrial system and cultural ideology in relation to these contexts.  
My ultimate concern in this project is whether Hong Kong‘s cinematic system 
encourages a genuine voice and intercultural communication. Can the local speak? Can 
Hong Kong cinema present a local voice in a context dominated by competing national 
politics and global economics? 
Hong Kong‘s story is one of paradox, and Hong Kong cinema spoke that story by 
embracing paradox in both its industrial system and its cultural ideology. I would argue 
that, instead of mechanically imitating the Hollywood studio system, Hong Kong cinema 
survived by developing a system that was well adapted to its multiple contexts, but that 





perspective. While Hollywood is situated as a superpower, Hong Kong cinema is situated 
as a non-sovereign entity, which cannot exclude external actors from its domestic 
authority structure. In Chinese culture, bamboo is a symbol of vitality and longevity.  It 
survives by bending with the wind.  Hong Kong cinema developed a flexible system, like 
the bamboo, that enabled it to withstand disruptive external forces. The system of Hong 
Kong cinema was so efficient that it not only enabled this local-culture industry to resist 
Hollywood domination, survive political chaos, and a colonial economic system for 
almost a hundred years, but also to flourish in the world market in the 1990s, a time when 
Hollywood dominated the Asian markets. At that time, Hong Kong‘s small and open 
economy was most vulnerable to international and speculative economic activities, and 
the society was susceptible to political anxiety, due to the sovereignty change.  In the late 
1990s the sojourn of Hong Kong filmmakers in Hollywood helped give Hollywood a 
face-lift.  Partnership with Hong Kong cinema, and the proliferation of autonomous film 
industries like Hong Kong cinema eating away at Hollywood‘s overseas markets, forced 
Hollywood to respond. But most importantly, the films this system produced spoke with 
a local voice to its Asian audience. It told the story of what I call ―Orphan Island 
Anxiety,‖ a paradoxical condition in which political anxiety is combined and 
commensurate with economic prosperity, a deep sense of insecurity that also plagues 
people living in Taiwan and other Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) in East Asia, 
which were the target markets of Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s.  Hong Kong cinema 
sold ―Hong Kong Wonder‖: the fiction that economic wealth can be used to bargain for 
political rights and autonomy. Together, this unique cultural ideology and adaptive 






The Hong Kong the world was seeing at this time was a mythical city. Popular 
images amplified its laissez-faire policy and obscured the colonial character of its 
government. It was often depicted as a postmodern city without a history. In the 
imperialist narrative of colonial tranquility it is described as transforming miraculously 
from a barren rock to a world-class city. The 1990s is a decade of paradox in Hong Kong 
history, and its society was characterized by contradiction and confusion. Hong Kong 
was scheduled to return from Britain to China on July 1, 1997. In that year Hong Kong‘s 
per capita GDP was higher than that of Britain,
1
 contrary to dependency theory‘s standard 
prediction of devastation and continuing economic dependency of a former colony on its 
former colonial master. Instead of gladly anticipating Hong Kong ending its attachment 
to its colonizer, Hong Kong‘s citizens expressed, in various public polls, their anxiety 
about returning to the motherland. The ―1997 factor‖ overshadowed everyday life from 
the global to the personal: international politics such as the Sino-British conflict, the 
colonial government‘s plan to completely sino-ize the sizable civil service team, 
conglomerates‘ relocation of their headquarters overseas, to personal choices such as the 
massive migration of the middle class. On the one hand there was the euphoric 
atmosphere celebrating a phenomenal economic achievement. On the other hand, there 
was a despair induced by political uncertainty, economic insecurity and social instability 
in the wake of the 1989 violent crackdown of the student movement in Beijing that had 
aggravated the public‘s fears over the years as Hong Kong approaching 1997. During the 
transitional period, the government was ―a lame duck‖ in its domestic administration and 
―a toothless tiger‖ in international affairs. In the 1990s Hong Kong was modern and 
powerful economically, but was backward and powerless politically as a colony. 
Hong Kong cinema, situated in such a fairy-tale land, was no less mythologized. 





―anything-goes‖, it was as if Hong Kong cinema operated in a political vacuum: a free-
market nirvana and a culturally hybrid wonderland in a borderless world governed by 
unfettered global capitalism. In this decade Hong Kong cinema was also characterized by 
paradox. It was a booming cinema in a busting film industry; a commercial system 
enabling the rise of homegrown art-house cinema. In the mid-1990s while Hong Kong 
cinema was at its peak in the Western market, the film industry was already in dire 
situation.  Local media pronounced Hong Kong cinema‘s death in 1995
2
, but in 1996 the 
colonial government still organized a tour titled ―Hong Kong Wonders Never Cease‖ 
with award winning actress Josephine Siao
3
 and Raymond Chow (head of Golden 
Harvest) as cultural ambassadors to the United States to promote trade and tourism. In the 
past, auteur directors like King Hu
4
 and Cecile Tang (Tang Shu Shuen)
5
 were rare. In the 
1990s, a decade when filmmakers had no safety within the comfortable bubble of the 
studio, the system of Hong Kong cinema was extremely commercial in its perfect 
competition market structure populated mostly by small size independent production 
houses. Interestingly it was this commercial system that accommodated homegrown 
award-winning film directors like Wong Kar Wai, Fruit Chan, Ann Hui and Stanley 
Kwan, who enjoyed longer careers than their predecessors and their films were 
commercially viable and shown side by side with mainstream entertainment films. Hong 
Kong cinema is known in the world for its stylish films, with neurotic energy, kinetic 
action, fast-paced editing and unabashedly commercial orientation. Paradoxically, the 
Hong Kong directors‘ personal style was best showcased in this decade of intensified 
global competition. 
Like bamboo, Hong Kong cinema‘s strength came from the flexibility that 
enabled it to adapt to its volatile habitat. Its autonomy can be seen in the way it adapted 





space for filmmaking distinctive from Hollywood and Hollywood-dominated cinemas.  
Its art cinema, promoting the cult status of the auteur directors who engage in formal 
experiment and social and political criticism, followed the rules of the game in 
international film festival circuit.  But it basically operated as a commercial system with 
the matching of star, genre and market. While it did not replicate the Hollywood studio 
system exactly, it did have something in common with classical-era Hollywood that 
Schatz describes: various historical forces struck a delicate balance to provide a 
consistent system, and thus a body of work with a uniform style (Genius). In Hollywood 
there is the symbiosis of art and industry, and auteur directors were limited by the 
constraints of the studio system and yet enabled by having a structure. Each filmmaker 
had to play on his strengths and come up with his individual tactics to work within and 
beyond the system. In Hong Kong, filmmakers also had to work within and beyond the 
system in order to work efficiently in this industry, where art is embedded in a global 
commercial system. To produce movies that are politically feasible, commercially viable, 
institutionally practicable, and culturally accessible, they needed to ―think inside the 
box.‖ They needed to be aware of hard boundaries that cannot be changed, factor in the 
specific, enduring parameters of production, know what different stakeholders will 
accept, and recognize a variety of written and unwritten rules. They had to understand the 
specific, enduring political, economic, social, and ideological parameters set by 
governments, financiers, industry sectors, and opinion leaders, including the colonial 
context, small domestic market, and dependence on foreign markets, as well as rules and 
conventions of overseas ―host‖ systems such as the Hollywood studios and European film 
festivals, the unpredictability of audience tastes and foreign governments‘ film policies.   
To compete with Hollywood features and national cinema in overseas markets 





imagine beyond Hollywood convention and national cinema principle in order to offer 
audiences a new perspective, novel filmic style, and a unique ideological appeal. The 
conceptual framework of nations lead to the notion of Hong Kong as a subaltern in a 
vertical relationship to the two dominant cultures – Britain and China, denied of 
representation. Such a view delimits us to examine the ideological appeal of Hong Kong 
cinema, which was never a national cinema.  Instead of searching for its cultural roots in 
China, or examining the differences between China and the West, Hong Kong cinema, 
dealing with Chinese characters from various Chinese and non-Chinese societies, 
exemplifies a horizontal vision of an intra-locally and inter-locally related Hong Kong, an 
inward examination of the non-hierarchical intra-Chinese relationship. It provides a 
transnational space to convey a Chinese-islander cultural sensibility – the limbo condition 
between the confusion of Diaspora and the solidarity of an eternal China; the interstitial 
space between China and the West – that was absent in Hollywood and Chinese national 
cinema and that appealed particularly to audiences in East Asia. Hong Kong‘s art and 
popular movies not only tell us where we escape from – the inevitable vertical 
relationship to the cultures and traditions of China and Britain, but also where we escape 
to – an imagined cosmopolitan city populated by marginal characters, instead of world-
saving superheroes or nation-saving political moguls, a cultural sensibility on sale only in 
the supermarket of Hong Kong cinema.    
The case of Hong Kong cinema reveals problems in existing modes of studying 
the Hollywood studio system, global media and colonial/cultural studies in East Asia. 
Hong Kong cinema is neither global like Hollywood, nor national like Chinese cinema.  
At present Hollywood is the most dominant cinema in the world, and its studio system is 
the most studied industrial model. With Hollywood cinema regarded as the norm for 





cultural. With the Hollywood studio system as the industry standard, Hong Kong 
cinema‘s cottage-like industrial model is regarded as sub-standard. With the concept of a 
national cinema as the norm, Hong Kong‘s transnational cinema being situated in a sub-
sovereign territory is regarded as a sub-national.   
Traditional modes of studying the film industry assert the centrality of the 
Hollywood studio system; film industries other than Hollywood are under-researched.  
Existing theories and methodologies, often Western-centered, are unable to conceptualize 
the mechanisms of Hong Kong‘s transnational film industry. In recent years in Europe 
there has been the rise of the new field of film festival research, which adopts modern 
system theories to understand the operating mechanisms of film festivals. In recent 
decades major European film festivals have played prominent parts in the system of 
Hong Kong cinema, and catapulted and sustained the careers of art film directors who 
might otherwise have faded away quickly in the commercial system of Hong Kong 
cinema like their predecessors. Some of these festivals‘ operations are no less 
commercial than that of the Hollywood studio system. Hong Kong‘s transnational cinema 
accentuates Hollywood‘s national specificity. Taking it seriously enables us to 
reformulate the traditional mode of studying the film industry, broadening its national 
focus to include comparative perspectives.   
Global media studies often group together the other cinemas for generalization 
purposes in theory-led research, but Hong Kong cinema does not fit easily into existing 
group categories. As Poshek Fu and David Desser point out, the peculiarity of Hong 
Kong cinema is that it is ―a cinema without a nation, a local cinema with transnational 
appeal‖ (5). The binary conception of ―Hollywood global cinema vs. the other‘s national 
cinemas‖ blinds us to see the increasing interconnectivity of the world‘s cinemas and 





tightly knit filmmaking community like the Hong Kong film industry, personal factors 
such as individual filmmakers‘ particular practices and interpersonal relationships play a 
major role in the system. In studying the system of Hong Kong cinema, the ―who‖ is as 
important as the ―how‖ and ―what‖ of the machine‘s operation. As pioneer of modern 
business management Peter Drucker says, ―It is only managers – not nature or laws of 
economics or governments – that make resources productive!‖ (Turbulent Times 14) The 
glocalization theory (local adaptation of the global) in global media studies stops at the 
local level and doesn‘t go further to the personal level. By adopting an authorship 
approach in the last section of this dissertation, I will demonstrate not only the 
commercial value of the charisma of the global auteur, but also the importance of human 
agency in the capitalist machine of transnational cinema.   
While Hollywood is studied in media studies departments, national cinemas of the 
rest of the world are often consigned to area studies which usually adopt a cultural studies 
approach. Although Hong Kong was a colony, Hong Kong cinema does not fit 
comfortably in Subaltern Studies which adopts the approach of history from below. The 
Hong Kong film industry was not attached to a political or economic power bloc, but the 
spreading of Hong Kong movies around the world cannot be regarded as a case for 
globalization from below. Annexed by the trade-oriented British Empire as its Far East 
outpost, Hong Kong was integrated into the international trade system ahead of its 
neighbors, and gained a privileged position in the world capitalist system. Situated in 
such a city, Hong Kong cinema was neither a subaltern in a vertical relationship nor an 
equal partner in a horizontal level playing field. The last three decades of British 
administration was characterized by ―velvet colonialism‖ (Mitchell), a combination of 
soft authoritarianism with enforced economic growth, a condition shared by other East 





experiencing the British Empire‘s imperialism of free trade in the region. Hong Kong 
cinema, symptomatic of ―colonialism with Hong Kong characteristics‖ accentuates the 
peculiarity of East Asia experience in post-colonial studies. This project will help 
broaden and deepen Asian cinema studies by adding a global and comparative 
perspective to historical and industrial studies.  
Besides being flexible, Hong Kong cinema also shares the paradoxical double-
sided characteristic with bamboo. At some point Hong Kong cinema was akin to a 
Diaspora cinema like ―Jūksīng‖ (bamboo cane), a term referring to young Chinese born 
overseas who experience double alienation: considered as less than satisfactorily Chinese 
and not fully integrated into the mainstream culture. And yet they are also exalted as a 
model minority and overachievers in American culture. As a Jūksīng, Hong Kong cinema 
occupied a double position: it occupied a subordinate position in relation to Hollywood, 
but dominated other cinemas in Asia. Traditionally bamboo has been used as a symbol of 
positive cultural values such as longevity, unity, modesty and integrity. But less 
commonly it is also used as a negative symbol for the hypocrisy of intellectuals or the 
ferocity of a dominant group. Bamboo, despite its elegant outlook, is like the plant 
version of a cockroach. It survives shamelessly, endures tough conditions and spreads 
everywhere. Similarly Hong Kong cinema was applauded for its creativity, vitality, and 
survival, but the majority of its movies were also criticized for their vulgarity, sloppy 
production, and purported threat to the survival of the others‘ cinemas. In this project I‘ll 
illustrate the cultural chauvinism embedded in the cultural ideology of Hong Kong 
cinema.    
In this research process, I realize the importance of critical dialogue between the 
academic community and industry practitioners and agree with John Caldwell‘s call for 





higher one travels up the industrial food chain for insights, the more suspect and spin-
driven the personal disclosures tend to become‖ (3). In the 1990s the organization 
structure of the Hong Kong film industry was relatively horizontal, instead of 
hierarchical, and power was less concentrated. While in the academy there are observed 
occasions of local scholars‘ dependency on Western scholarship, in the industry there are 
also incidents of executives who internalize the Hollywood model as the standard. 
Descriptions and explanations by executives of high rank, educated in the West, perfectly 
fluent in English and generally quite eloquent, should be taken with a grain of salt since 
what they said may reflect more of their ideals than the reality of what the other workers 
were doing and experiencing. In this project, besides the archival work, I got my 
information mostly from extensive interviews with veteran industry practitioners of 
various ranks, such as executive producer, financial controller, director, writer, and art 
director, to cinematographer and stuntmen, etc. Some of them are my friends from 
college who literally connect the dialogue between the academy and industry. I will use 
theoretical paradigms from the fields of cultural studies, global media studies, and the 
Hollywood studio system. I will adopt an integrated cultural-industrial analysis approach 
to investigate how the Hong Kong cinema system worked and what story it told. 
CHAPTER REVIEW 
This dissertation has nine chapters divided into three sections. Section one, ―The 
Curious Case of Hong Kong Cinema,‖ includes a literature review (chapter two) and a 
theoretical discussion (chapter three) and asks: ―Why and how should we develop our 
own set of theories and methodologies?‖ Most existing literatures look at Hong Kong 
cinema only through standard frames of reference and see it as a miniature version of 
global Hollywood or a subordinate branch of Chinese cinema. But Hong Kong cinema is 





on foreign markets, including the Sinophone territories (Southern China and overseas 
Chinese communities), Chopstick Culture (Chinese-influenced Southeast Asia and East 
Asia), and Western markets. It presents a unique case of a local culture industry that is 
closely regulated by a colonial government, while at the same time interacting with 
Chinese, Asian, American, and local cultures on a global stage. Over the years, Hong 
Kong filmmaking has been a sub-national dialect cinema in southern China, a Diaspora 
cinema for Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, a regional cinema in East Asia, and a 
transnational cinema in the West. Hong Kong cinema needs to be understood from 
multiple perspectives. Theories from the West were not generated to solve the problems 
of understanding Hong Kong cinema in its specific historical cultural setting. To 
understand Hong Kong cinema, I need to begin from its specific historical and cultural 
circumstances, instead of from models based on the Hollywood system.  
Section two, ―The Bamboo Cinema,‖ discusses Hong Kong cinema in its 
historical cultural setting and asks: ―How did Hong Kong cinema survive and thrive in a 
hostile and competitive environment?‖ Chapter four describes the development of Hong 
Kong cinema as characterized by interruption and alternation between the studio system 
and independent productions, in contrast to Hollywood‘s continual expansion. The 
industry survived its early years by developing an adaptive defense system: it devised 
special practices in financing, production, distribution, exhibition, and marketing, and 
maintained a flexible industry structure. In the 1990s, the industry switched to survival 
mode. Chapter five describes how, in response to the volatile environment of the 1990s, 
Hong Kong cinema switched to a cottage-industry system with skeleton crews, cash-
based financing, and artisanal modes of production. What was perceived as signs of 
regression, was in fact the reinvigoration and modernization of the old system. A detailed 





interviews and archival research of magazines and government documents. This chapter 
discusses aspects of the macro-political economic context, such as film policy, 
censorship, and the financing and exhibition sector, as well as aspects of the micro-
cultural production context, such as the dual-department organizational structure, the 
housekeeping role of the producer, and the role of scriptwriter as the director‘s service 
provider.   
Section three, ―The Supermarket of Hong Kong Cinema,‖ presents case studies of 
three directors, from the most commercial to the most artistic, to show the spectrum of 
Hong Kong cinema. It asks: ―By integrating itself into an international market and 
claiming a collective cultural identity, did Hong Kong cinema inscribe itself into a 
subordinate position in relation to Hollywood? Can the local have a voice, a collective 
locus of agency to speak for its condition, without assuming cultural solidarity among a 
heterogeneous people?‖ This section describes how Hong Kong filmmakers depicted a 
peculiar local condition I call ―orphan island anxiety,‖ a paradoxical condition in which 
political anxiety is combined and commensurate with economic prosperity. Hong Kong, 
as a colony, a forever-dependent territory, and a sub-sovereign entity with high degree of 
autonomy, is an oddity in an age of the universal and normative ideas of the nation. 
Operating within the same industrial structure and breathing the same culture, these 
directors share this thematic concern and a common approach to production. But each 
differentiates himself with a personal style, and special filmmaking practices to find his 
unique position in the market. The directors‘ interpretations of the myth of ―Hong Kong 
Wonders‖ range from Wong Jing‘s vision of illusive autonomy in his God of Gambler 
series, to Tsui Hark‘s re-imagination of history and rethinking of Chinese nationalism in 
his Once Upon A Time in China series, to Wong Kar Wai‘s cynicism in his oeuvre 





Interestingly, all of their protagonists are either orphans or without a mother. The 
motif of the absent mother or loss of a maternal presence runs through their films in the 
decade when Hong Kong was returning to the motherland. While Hong Kong cinema 
enjoyed the advantage of hybrid vigor, in the new millennium it has declined without 
fostering a new generation of stars and filmmakers. It experiences a hybrid sterility, like 
Bauhinia, the floral emblem of Hong Kong.
6
 Hybrid and sterility have negative cultural 
meanings in traditional Chinese society. In Chinese culture, the most commonly used 
curse phrase involves the other‘s mother. And calling the other person a mixed-blood 
hybrid (zhazhong) and wishing him to never have male offspring (juezhong; juehou) is 
considered insulting. For various reasons Hong Kong cinema has been denigrated and 
neglected in the past. Academic study on Hong Kong cinema and Hong Kong culture 
only started in recent decades. Most of the existing literature cannot adequately explain 
the mechanisms of Hong Kong cinema. What dimensions and questions do these scholars 
overlook in their analysis? And how can we rectify this? The following two chapters are 
about the lacunae of existing literature on Hong Kong cinema, and reflections on the 







―Whenever a theory appears to you as the only possible one, take this as a sign 
that you have neither understood the theory nor the problem which it was intended to 
solve.‖              
          - Karl Popper 
 
SECTION I  
THE CURIOUS CASE OF HONG KONG CINEMA 
WHY AND HOW SHOULD WE DEVELOP OUR THEORETICAL MODEL?  
Hong Kong cinema was born under unusual circumstances. While other national 
cinemas at their infant stage were shielded from foreign competition by their state 
governments, Hong Kong cinema has had to stand on its own since its inception. While 
Chinese cinema is going through marketization now, at its centenary, Hong Kong cinema 
was commercial and transnational from its beginning. What is more curious is that Hong 
Kong cinema has a long history of prolific filmmaking despite British colonization and 
Hollywood domination. Since the 1920s, Chinese intellectuals have denigrated Hong 
Kong cinema as mass entertainment devoid of social and aesthetic values from a city they 
labeled a ―cultural desert.‖ But in the 1990s, Hong Kong cinema was transformed into a 
competitive world-class industry with commercial films succeeding in Western 
mainstream markets and art films collecting awards in international film festivals. The 
doomsday of the colony became the heyday of Hong Kong cinema. Hong Kong cinema is 





Since the 1990s, there has been a surge of scholarly interest in the industry. Much 
of this literature has adopted Western media or cultural theories, and none of it provides a 
satisfactory analysis or explanation of the success of Hong Kong cinema. Why are 
existing theories unable to adequately explain how Hong Kong cinema survived and 
thrived? Since theory is hypothetical and generated to solve problems that have arisen in 
specific historical-cultural setting, theories from the West are not completely applicable 
to Hong Kong cinema, situated as it is in the very different context of the East. Most of 
the scholarship on Hollywood and Hong Kong cinema has based its analysis on the 
conceptual framework of the nation-state, a modern concept that has remained the 
dominant and hegemonic ideological basis of intellectual and academic development. 
This literature assumes that nationalism is an answer to imperialism and that national 
cinemas are a defense against Hollywood domination. Hong Kong cinema, situated in a 
colonial city that is a limbo entity between China and the West, does not fit into either 
side of the binary opposition and so is a conceptual anomaly that inevitably becomes a 
theoretical conundrum.  
In most scholarship on Hong Kong cinema, there is a misrecognition of the 
industry as a petite-sized Hollywood or a branch of Chinese cinema. Studies of national 
cinemas subsume Hong Kong cinema under Chinese cinema; most early studies are 
atheoretical and over-politicized, while recent studies mechanically apply Western 
theories and depoliticize Hong Kong cinema. Orientalist studies are informed by theory 
but often describe the business as chaotic, implying that Hong Kong cinema just muddled 
through without a system. Some Hong Kong scholars who have received a Western 
education also overlook Hong Kong cinema‘s historical specificity and indiscriminately 





perpetuate an intellectual dependency of local scholarship upon Western scholarship and 
situate Hong Kong cinema in the shadow of the West.  
In this dissertation, I will explore theoretical issues in the fields of cultural 
studies, global media, Hollywood, and film festival research. Even though these 
disciplines share a parallel move from generality towards specificity, their disconnection 
from one another hinders the understanding of Hong Kong cinema. Studying the history 
of Hong Kong cinema with a focus on its industrial aspect is daunting given the scanty 
research material and available resources. Theorizing the system of Hong Kong cinema is 
almost impossible without sizable research material. It is not an established path with 
tested methodologies and theories adapted to local context. The story of Hong Kong 
cinema is situated in an interstitial culture of a cosmopolitan city; this kind of lived 
experience is common in East Asia but peculiar to most part of the world. Instead of 
assuming that one theory can provide a comprehensive explanation of all historical 
experience and knowledge, I propose the use of localized theories and an integrative 
approach. I will adopt a bricolage approach, piecing together a methodology that 
integrates the generalizing approach of political-economy models with the specificity of 
cultural studies. The following two chapters are literature reviews and theoretical 
discussions that cover works by media scholars, historians, and literature scholars that 
range from topics as broad as global media studies to topics as specific as an itinerant 







Chapter 2 The Blind Men’s Moving Elephant 
Hong Kong cinema is a century old but systematic documentation and academic 
study have only just begun. Despite its longevity and popularity, until recently in the 
public and private sectors it was a nonexistence. Scholarly interest started only in the 
1990s and most are textual studies. There is only a handful systematic studies of 
industrial operations, a far cry from the scope and depth of studies on the Hollywood 
studio system despite the fact that this petit industry has a long history of prolific 
filmmaking second only to Hollywood in terms of exports. Outsiders may be curious as 
to why and how Hong Kong cinema suddenly became so fascinating and came to occupy 
the international limelight. But for those growing up in Hong Kong, breathing the culture 
and working in the local media industry, the real concern is why it took scholars so long 
to take Hong Kong cinema seriously and why, despite being so badly neglected in the 
past, it was put on a pedestal by the end of the millennium. There seems to be a huge 
difference in the perspectives on Hong Kong cinema of outsiders and insiders. This 
brings up the question: what is Hong Kong cinema? It is not global or national. It does 
not fit easily into existing categories and cannot be neatly defined. It is like the blind 
men‘s elephant, meaning different thing to different people. But unlike the stable 
pachyderm of the original Indian fable, it is a moving elephant. For those who view it 
from a historical perspective or from a distance through multiple cultural perspectives, 
the multifaceted and ever-shifting characteristics of Hong Kong cinema will become 
quickly apparent. This chapter is a literature review on Hong Kong cinema: how it was 





INCOGNITO: NEGLECTED BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN HONG KONG  
Until recently, Hong Kong cinema was seriously neglected in the private and 
public sectors of Hong Kong. Documentation was rare and sporadic, and in the public 
sector the colonial government had no stated film policy. Local film school education 
started in the late 1960s, but film education became noticeable only after the rise of the 
overseas-educated Hong Kong ―New Wave‖ generation in the late 1970s.  In the 1980s, 
there was no course on Hong Kong cinema in college. Local cultural studies were begun 
in the academy only in the last decade, but film study remains mostly confined to textual 
readings. Despite the commercial nature of both Hong Kong at large and its film industry, 
film as business or the operation of the industry was not a course in college.
7 
Published 
memoirs and autobiographies by older veteran filmmakers were limited to the few who 
were literate
8
, outspoken and famous. The Hong Kong Film Archive was only officially 
opened in 2001. Before that there was no systematic collection and restoration of Hong 
Kong movies and publications. Most pre-war movies were destroyed during the Japanese 
occupation, and reels of post-war movies were often lost with the closing down of film 
companies. The Hong Kong Film Archive‘s oral history project is an attempt to acquire 
and save valuable historical information from veteran filmmakers.
9
 In 1997, Hong Kong 
Film Archive began publishing the Hong Kong Filmography series starting with the 
period of 1913-1941. The series was published in both English and Chinese and 
documented basic information, but gave no box office data (local or overseas) and no 
film company or theater chain information. In recent years, the Hong Kong Film Archive 
has published anthologies on filmmakers, eras and studios,
10
 And the Hong Kong 
International Film Festival started in 1977. The retrospective section of the film festival 
shows old Hong Kong movies and publishes essays in its annual bilingual (English and 





filmmaking practice, especially after the migration of Hong Kong filmmakers to 
Hollywood in the mid-1990s. Despite these efforts, publication on the industrial or 
institutional aspects of Hong Kong cinema remained sporadic and piecemeal. In 1996, the 
Trade Development Council (TDC) of Hong Kong organized a tour to the U.S. with 
Josephine Siao serving as the cultural ambassador. At the time there was no government 
film organization and no official documentation of the industry‘s development except for 
the crude annual estimate by the Census and Statistics department under a ―film 
entertainment industry‖ section.  In 2001, when Hong Kong film industry was declining, 
Hong Kong Trade Development Council, inspired by the phenomenal success of 
Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (Ang Lee 2000), published a research paper entitled 
―The North American Market for Hong Kong Films‖
11
. The paper recognizes Hong Kong 
cinema‘s competitive edge in the action genre in the U.S. market, but in its adoption of a 
conventional marketing research approach without any historical perspective or analysis 
of the industrial system, the report makes clear that the government has no idea how this 
culture industry truly works.       
In the private sector, there were no independent trade journals like those in the 
U.S.  Film Bi-weekly (aka City Entertainment) is the only long-lasting Chinese language 
local film magazine (1979-2007), offering coverage of the 1980s and 1990s. Industry 
news and personnel changes were published sporadically by newspapers and there were 
no local journalists that specialized in covering the field. In the 1990s, due to the petit 
size
12
 and tightly knit social character of the filmmaking community, industry news was 
mostly circulated informally and orally.
13
 The Hong Kong Film Yearbook, published by 
Hong Kong Kowloon and New Territories Motion Picture Industry Association (MPIA), 
was founded in 1989 and ran until 1998. It is published in both English and Chinese and 





synopses, release dates, cast and crew, production and distribution companies, theater 
chains, local box office and film awards. Yu Mo-wan, a private collector, started 
collecting Hong Kong film-related materials on his own long before the local 
government. His Hong Kong Cinema Chronology series covers Hong Kong cinema from 
1896 to 1949, but is only a chronological listing of raw data with no interpretation or 
analysis. Without footnotes or a bibliography, the series is difficult to use for scholarly 
research. However Yu‘s huge collection and donation of film-related publication to Hong 
Kong Film Archive provide invaluable primary research material for constructing an 
accurate timeline of the local film industry‘s history. Scanty material and unverifiable 
information always pose serious problems for researchers of Hong Kong cinema.  
MISRECOGNITION: OFFICIAL AND ACADEMIC STUDIES ON HONG KONG CINEMA  
The misrecognition of Hong Kong cinema in scholarly and official publications 
may be one reason why Hong Kong cinema remained so neglected for so long. For 
convenience‘s sake I classify these scholars and their work into four broad categories -- 
the nationalist, the orientalist, the overseas Chinese scholars, and Hong Kong-based 
scholars -- though most are more complex and do not fit neatly under one such heading. 
In the nationalist narrative Hong Kong cinema is a sub-national cinema subsumed under 
Chinese cinema. While early nationalist studies mostly are not informed by any film 
industry theory, disregard the commercial system and over-politicize, recent studies in 
this vein mechanically apply Western economic theories and completely depoliticize the 
industry. Orientalists are informed by film industry theory but with Hollywood studio 
system assumed as the standard, Hong Kong cinema often is described as lacking a 
system and the cottage-like industry is depicted as sub-standard. Some Western-educated 
Hong Kong scholars also overlook Hong Kong cinema‘s historical specificity and 





cinema. Such intellectual dependency by local scholars on Western scholarship is 
intellectually debilitating and places Hong Kong cinema in the shadow of the West. 
Overseas Chinese scholars, armed with post-colonial theories, problematize essential 
Chineseness and question Chinese national cinema. Hong Kong-based scholars, educated 
mostly in the West, have the advantage of growing up with the culture and point out the 
dual-character of Hong Kong cultural production. These last two groups elucidate the 
socio-cultural force of Hong Kong cinema as an in-between cinema with no stable 
definition or status.  They ask the reflexive question, ―What is Hong Kong cinema?‖   
Nationalist 
If all senses of nationhood are narrativized (Bhabha), so too is the sense of 
national cinema-hood. In the Cold War-era nationalist narrative, Hong Kong cinema was 
deemed too colonial and westernized for assimilation. Later the official history of Hong 
Kong cinema shifted from one extreme to another – from a political inferior pariah to an 
economic success model. Their approach shifts from Cultural Revolution era practice of 
binary inclusion-exclusion to Reform Era genealogical hierarchization. Then, in the post-
Socialist Era, ―It‘s the economy‖ became the new political mantra. In line with these 
successive mindsets, studies on Hong Kong cinema change from a reluctant acceptance 
of commercialism to total worship of market power. Everything is explained in and 
reduced to terms of economics. 
The first two Chinese film history books from opposite political camps offer 
extreme examples of how early Chinese film histories were written with a strong political 
slant. Cheng Jihua et al‘s The Development History of Chinese Cinema published in 
China in 1963,
14
 covers Chinese cinema from 1896 to 1949. Hong Kong cinema is 
denounced as regressive and chaotic in the post war years prior to the arrival of the 





commercial entertainment-oriented cinema is disavowed. Under the Communist Party‘s 
ideological guidance, the Chinese film history that Cheng et al narrate establishes Leftist 
cinema as the orthodox, and popular cinema from colonial Hong Kong or Japanese 
occupied Shanghai is dismissed as periphery. Taiwanese cinema is not mentioned by 
Cheng, but in Taiwan Tu Yun-chih‘s Chinese Film History covers cinema in China until 
1971.  This series won awards in Taiwan and was appreciated by the Cultural Bureau in 
Taiwan. Tu was born in China, moved to Taiwan and worked for a while at Hong Kong-
based Shaw studio. Coming as he does from the opposite political camp, Tu denounces 
Leftist movies and organizations. But his work fills the gaps left by Cheng Jihua et al, 
particularly Shanghai cinema during Japanese occupation, postwar Hong Kong Mandarin 
cinema produced by Shanghai émigrés and Hong Kong cinema‘s connections with 
Taiwan and Southeast Asia. The Chinese film history that Tu narrates parallels the 
movement of the KMT regime: it started in China, branched out in Hong Kong and 
settled in Taiwan. Taiwanese dialect films, despite their popularity and the fact that the 
language was spoken by the majority of the island‘s population, takes up only one 
chapter (20 pages) among the 29 chapters. Tu describes the dialect film industry as 
chaotic, lacking in industry planning, aimed at low-class mass audiences from rural areas, 
having low budgets, sloppy production and poor, uncreative scripts. Dialect films had 
been produced during Japanese colonization, but were suspended until 1955 following 
the KMT takeover of Taiwan. Tu gives no reason for the hiatus and does not mention the 
KMT‘s language policy, which established Mandarin as the island‘s only official 
language. Taiwan films made during Japanese colonization are either dismissed as 
Japanese political propaganda shoddy productions. Political labeling and demeaning 
descriptions are common. For example, in the chapter on Taiwanese cinema under 





culture was low‖ (3:21:1). It also implies that Taiwan had no culture before the arrival of 
the KMT regime. The Hong Kong films that Tu includes are exclusively Mandarin films, 
and Cantonese cinema is mentioned in only a few sentences. Cheng et al and Tu‘s books 
are typical of publications of rival political camps in that era, but both regard Mandarin 
cinema as the orthodox national cinema and view dialect films (Cantonese and 
Taiwanese) as peripheral and dismissible.   
The study of Hong Kong cinema started in China in 1979 after the end of the 
Cultural Revolution. It began with a few scholars organizing a social group for the study 
of Taiwanese and Hong Kong cinema.  In the introduction to the anthology Eighty Years 
of Hong Kong Cinema, Cai Hongsheng asserts the significance of studying Hong Kong 
cinema, saying that since 1913 Hong Kong has produced over 8,000 films, more than 
Taiwan and ―surpasses that of Mainland China, the motherland (―muti‖).‖ In Chinese 
―muti‖ literally means the mother‘s body. Cai‘s conception of the relationship between 
mainland Chinese cinema and Hong Kong cinema is that of a parent-child hierarchy. The 
sheer impressive quantity of production may not be the reason that Hong Kong cinema, 
once labeled as politically inferior, was accepted as a legitimate research topic. As Cai 
states in the following paragraphs, ―Without the study on Hong Kong cinema (and 
Taiwan cinema), the study of Chinese cinema is incomplete.‖ In contrast to Cheng et al‘s 
disavowal of Hong Kong cinema, Cai embraces Hong Kong cinema, but with caution. 
―The production, distribution and actor systems of Hong Kong cinema are very different 
from ours. Anyhow, this is an existing social cultural phenomenon…we can borrow their 
successful experience and beware their defects‖ (101). Cai‘s conception of Chinese 
cinema coincides with the current state guiding principle of a national unitary plan: 
Taiwan and Hong Kong are parts of China despite their differences. In their Hong-Kong 





Li Yizhuang—themselves both natives of Guangzhou (aka Canton), a province that 
shares its dialect and Southern Chinese culture with Hong Kong—point out the need for a 
volume on the history of Hong Kong Cinema recognizing its distinctive character and 
peculiar developmental path. Li began researching on her own in 1982 after being 
rejected to include Hong Kong cinema as a course at her university. Zhou and Li are 
meticulous in correcting the factual errors of their predecessors. Like Cai, Zhou and Li 
also argue that the study of Chinese cinema cannot be considered complete without the 
inclusion of Hong Kong and Taiwanese films. Their conception of Chinese cinemas is 
also not one of plurality. These Cantonese scholars‘ perspective avoids the 
condescending ―Central Plain‖
15
 view which regards those from China‘s periphery as 
inferior;but their conception is also a genealogical hierarchy. While Cai‘s conception of 
the relationship between mainland Chinese and Hong Kong cinema is maternal, Zhou and 
Li‘s cinematic family tree has branches. In their preface they state, ―…in China, 
researchers limit their scope of study to movies made in China proper. They overlook 
Hong Kong and Taiwan cinemas which should be included in the studies of Chinese 
cinema. This is replacing the whole with the principal part (―zhuti‖)
16
, attaching 
importance to the mainstream and overlooking the branches.‖ Mainland China scholars 
like Cai, Zhou and Li refer China‘s cinema as the subject (―muti‖, ―zhuti‖), and Hong 
Kong and Taiwan cinema as branches. In the realm of popular culture, Hong Kong 
cinema is not simply a variant of China‘s cinema. The underlying China-centric 
conception is shown in Zhou and Li‘s periodization of Hong Kong cinema. Their book 
was published in 2005, but they end their coverage at 1997, the year Hong Kong‘s 
sovereignty returned to China. They conflate political integration with cultural fusion. 
Neither is the year 1997 necessarily a dividing point in the development of Hong Kong 





may be, since it intensified co-production between China and Hong Kong and shifted 
Hong Kong cinema‘s target market mainly to China. Situated in a small cosmopolitan 
city, Hong Kong cinema has been heavily influenced by multiple international forces and 
its trajectory is not solely determined by the China factor. Given Guangzhou‘s 
―periphery‖ position in the traditional ―Central Plain‖ Chinese world view, Zhou and Li‘s 
reading of a Chinese language cinema outside Mainland China provides an intriguing 
perspective. On the one hand, they are keen on asserting Hong Kong cinema‘s 
distinctiveness as a Cantonese cultural media. On the other, they are keen to emphasize 
Hong Kong cinema‘s connection with China‘s cinema. For example, in their section on 
KMT government banning of Cantonese dialect films in the 1930s, Zhou and Li, instead 
of accepting the apparent political reason of national linguistic unity, explore an 
alternative explanation: the conflict between the Shanghai and Hong Kong film 
industries. They argue that Shanghai Mandarin cinema‘s support of the banning actually 
was a conspiracy to seize the Southern China market where Hong Kong Cantonese films 
were most popular. Zhou and Li‘s research is rich in detail on the exchange between 
Hong Kong and Guangzhou, as well as between Cantonese opera and Cantonese cinema. 
But they also emphasize the close connection between Hong Kong cinema and China‘s 
cinema. Besides the description of involvement of southbound Shanghai filmmakers in 
Hong Kong cinema, Zhou and Li have a chapter specifically on the exchange between 
Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Shanghai in 1923-1941. They do not touch upon the 
international dimension of Hong Kong cinema and this is especially noticeable when 
compared to works by writers from Hong Kong and other countries. Zhou and Li‘s 
perspective on Hong Kong cinema is inward looking and anti-commercialist, counter to 
the current popular trend of reading Hong Kong and Chinese cinema. While Cai 







Zhou and Li are very critical of the commercial and entertainment-oriented aspects.
18
 
Historically, Southern China has developed regional culture distinctive from that of the 
North, and Guangzhou had long developed as the preeminent provincial center and the 
locus of international trade in the centuries before the Western imperialist invasion. Since 
the 1980s, thanks to China‘s coastal development strategy to attract capital from Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, Guangzhou has become one of the fastest growing provinces.
19
 Living 
a prudent life as retired academics in a fast growing coastal province and working on a 
scholarly project without state support, Zhou and Li‘s perspective on Hong Kong cinema 
is distinctive among Chinese intellectuals, particularly amidst the contemporary discourse 
of market power and China‘s integration into the world system.    
In the Post-Socialist era when ―getting on the global track‖ became China‘s 
national goal, Hong Kong, which rose to a world class city under a Western power‘s 
administration, became a model unit for China. The conception of an efficient ―Hong 
Kong System‖ as a mechanism operated in a purely economic (i.e. de-politicized) 
environment is extended to the study of Hong Kong film industry. In an era when the 
return of Hong Kong‘s sovereignty was narrated as a story of national redemption and the 
national goal was to integrate the developing motherland into global economy, Hong 
Kong cinema, shamed in the past for its cultural impurity, was now celebrated as a 
transnational phenomenon. The city was extolled as an East-meets-West hybrid 
wonderland; an outpost to magnify the nation‘s international image. Popular and official 
discourses from the West, Hong Kong and China together contributed to the construction 
of the ―Hong Kong Wonder‖ myth. Hong Kong as a model city of Chinese 
cosmopolitanism and the Hong Kong lifestyle as an exemplar of modern living provided 
Chinese citizens with new values and direction the new age of Chinese consumerism. 





official discourse. Mainland scholar Wang Xiaoming describes that in the 1980s there 
was common support and high hope for the state‘s ―Four Modernization‖ projects among 
Chinese intellectuals who believed in linear historical progress and national 
revitalization. Their hopes were dashed in 1989 by the violent crackdown in Tiananmen 
Square and again in 1992 by Market Economy Reform. The heated debates on 
―humanism‖ that followed revealed Chinese intellectuals‘ predicament of self-
identification and their diminished role in national development. They either became 
frustrated and despaired in face of the overwhelming marketization or went into business 
themselves.  Chinese scholars coined the term ―shiyu‖, or ―loss of speech,‖ to describe 
the loss of voice or lack of critical perspective in the academy. They either remained 
silent or parroted what the others say. The loss of centralized value and the popularity of? 
Mao Zedong‘s icon in the 1990s is described by Mainland China scholar Dai Jinhua as 
―consumerism with Chinese characteristics.‖ While in the post-World War II years China 
posited itself as the leader of the Third World against Western imperialists and Mao 
Zedong was idolized as leader of national redemption on the road to Socialist Nirvana, in 
the Post-Socialist Era Hong Kong was idealized as a model city of Modernization to 
spearhead China‘s capitalist-style economic reform. During his 1992 Southern China 
Tour Chinese late leader Deng Xiaoping affirmed the region‘s economic progress and 
promised not only to quicken the pace of economic reform, but also to build more cities 
in China modeled after Hong Kong. Western media and academia also played a role in 
consolidating the image of Hong Kong as a role model. Andrew Scobell‘s
20
 1988 article 
―Hong Kong‘s influence on China: the tail that wags the dog?‖ exemplifies Western 
scholars‘ optimistic view of Hong Kong‘s significance and impact on China in the 1980s. 
Scobell not only lists and extols Hong Kong‘s massive economic contributions to China, 





position to propel China‘s political reform. Referring to Hong Kong‘s unique system of 
consultative bodies and referendums on issues of broad public concern, Scobell writes, 
―Should such a system prove workable in Hong Kong, it could become appealing to 
Chinese intellectuals who feel that China needs political reforms that permit greater 
democracy in order to become a truly advanced country. It may also be attractive to the 
CCP [Chinese Communist Party], which might find the ‗Hong Kong system‘ moderate 
enough to implement on the Mainland‖ (32-33). Scobell‘s ―Hong Kong system‖, which 
he describes as ―the prototype for a limited and distinctly Chinese form of democracy or 
consultation in government‖ (32) is the colonial government‘s policy of soft 
authoritarianism in the late colonial era.  Robert E. Mitchell calls the final 30 years‘ of 
British administration ―Velvet Colonialism.‖ The colonial government faced serious 
challenge to their legitimacy in the 1966-1967 riots and softened their governing 
approach in order to maintain their rule. The administration redefined anti-colonial 
activities in the mid-1960s as a non-political issue. They framed it as people‘s livelihood 
issue and implemented various measures to improve the economy and living standards. 
Even American politicians overlooked Hong Kong‘s colonial status in their 
understanding of ―Hong Kong system‖. In their respective Republican presidential and 
vice-presidential campaigns in 1996, Steve Forbes pitched a Hong Kong–style income 
tax regime and Jack Kemp‘s idea of turning Washington D.C into an enterprise zone was 
dubbed ―Hong Kong on the Potomac‖. As Hong Kong scholar C. K. Lau points out, both 
candidates overlooked the fact that execution of this economic policy depends on the lack 
of democratic election: ―For the truth is that the successful implementation of Hong 
Kong‘s economic policy under British rule has had much to do with its status as a colony, 
which was run by civil servants who did not need to worry about pleasing an electorate to 





citizens, as C. K. Lau laments: ―…over time Hong Kong‘s economic prosperity, despite 
the absence of democracy, has given rise to a view that the colony‘s governmental system 
has been a crucial factor in its success…It holds that Hong Kong‘s formula for success 
comprises three elements: no democracy, laissez-faire, and little welfare‖ (32). Hong 
Kong scholars also played a role in the construction of ―the de-politicized efficient Hong 
Kong system‖. In ―Spinning Colonialism to Managerialism‖ Law Wing-sang 
("Spinning")critiques certain Hong Kong scholars‘ justification of the colonial 
governmental system through managerial efficiency.
21
 The notion of Hong Kong 
government‘s peculiar ―colonial democracy‖ being unique and valuable was so 
influential that in the Sino-British Talk it was asserted that after Hong Kong detached 
from its colonizer its colonial governmental features would be retained. Situated in such a 
capitalist fairy-tale city, the Hong Kong film industry is no less mythologized. Every year 
in China numerous books and scholarly articles mechanically borrow pure economic 
theories to explain the commercial system of Hong Kong cinema. Regional politics, 
government policy and censorship are completely omitted in their descriptions, as if 
colonial administration was not an issue and Hong Kong filmmakers operated in a 
political vacuum. The nationalists‘ description of Hong Kong cinema tells us more about 
political climate in China and Chinese intellectual‘s loss of critical perspective than about 
what Hong Kong cinema is and how it works. Nationalist scholars did not ask the 
fundamental question, ―What is Hong Kong cinema?‖ 
Orientalist 
The Orientalist brand is theory informed but tends to use Hollywood as its 
standard.  In their description, Hollywood‘s position as a global cinematic giant located 
in a superpower country is never reconciled with the difficulties of Hong Kong‘s film 





from a domestic authority structure. Some Hong Kong scholars intend to affirm Hong 
Kong cinema but inadvertently end up diminishing it by mechanically applying Western 
theory.   
Hong Kong historian Chung Po-yin, in her book One Hundred Year‘s of Hong 
Kong Cinema is keen on understanding the commercial system and exploring the 
international dimension of Hong Kong cinema. The title of her opening chapter ―Film as 
a commercial product‖ sets the tone of the book. In the first paragraph Chung clearly 
asserts that ―film is a transnational commercial product.‖ Chung, born and raised in Hong 
Kong and with a Ph.D. from the UK, weaves the hundred-year history of Hong Kong 
cinema into a coherent narrative—a first of its kind. As a history major with special 
interests in South China‘s society and economy, Chung richly contextualizes the film 
industry in its specific political and economic milieu and meticulously details the 
connections of its power players. She gives an impressive overview of Hong Kong 
cinema in historical connection with the East and the West. However there is no textual 
or formal analysis, nor does it describe any cultural dimension of the films or their 
production. In short, Chung does not factor in cultural and aesthetic forces in the 
operation of Hong Kong film industry. Chung‘s work exemplifies the continual problem 
of segregation between the political economy and cultural studies approaches in film 
studies in Hong Kong. Her understanding of how the system of commercial cinema 
works is mechanical, marking this cultural industry no different in theory from other 
material industries. As she states at the outset, ―The competition of film is not just about 
the quality of films. The fiercest battle actually is at the distribution and exhibition 
sectors….however well made a movie, without the distribution and exhibition channel, it 
cannot escape being a money loser‖(One Hundred Years 14). Her conception of the 





Hollywood in the classical era exclusively as the reference model, Chung asserts that 
Hollywood studios‘ system of vertical integration that combined production, distribution 
and exhibition is ―extremely effective for market control‖ (One Hundred Years 18). In 
her previous work on MP & GI studio she makes the same assertion about the Hollywood 
studio system ("Tycoon"). Then she goes on to describes that, ―in Chinese cinema, 
Motion Pictures and General Investment Film Co (MP & GI) was a typical attempt to 
adopt vertical integration in Asia‖ ("Tycoon" 36). MP & GI declined with the accidental 
death of its owner in 1964, and Shaw studio gave way to the independent Golden Harvest 
in the 1970s. Chung describes hot money, instead of being a means saving the industry, 
as a disruptive force to the established production-distribution order. The history of Hong 
Kong cinema that Chung narrates is one which assumes the studio system as the norm 
and order and independent production as the interim or temporary. But in the 1990s there 
was no monopoly of the market, concentration of power and the bureaucracy of the 
studio has long faded and no studios lasted long. If Hollywood is the standard, then the 
failure to adopt vertical integration is synonymous with the failure of the industry. But 
Chung‘s argument cannot explain why Hong Kong cinema is long-lasting despite the lack 
of long-lived studios. It cannot explain why Hong Kong cinema thrived in the 
international market in the 1990s, an era characterized not by tight control of the market 
and vertically integrated studios but by small and medium-scale independent productions. 
By assuming Hollywood studio system as the standard, Chung inadvertently depicts 
Hong Kong cinema as an incompetent imitator.   
While Hong Kong historian Chung Po-yin mechanically applies Western theory, 
American film scholar David Bordwell separates the theory in the West and cultural 
practice in the East. In Planet Hong Kong: Popular Cinema and the Art of Entertainment, 





recognized for his seminal work analyzing the system of Hollywood (Bordwell, Staiger 
and Thompson). Nevertheless, Planet Hong Kong is vigorously researched and Bordwell 
is perceptive to recognize certain characteristics of Hong Kong cinema, for example, it 
was a director-centric cinema; the film companies are generally of small to medium 
scale; the source of financing is the bamboo network—overseas Chinese communities; 
films were funded much like independent productions, without lengthy bureaucratic 
procedures or bank loans. Instead of weaving the development of Hong Kong cinema into 
a coherent narrative, he organizes the book around directors. But he does not go beyond 
description and explain why Hong Kong cinema did not evolve into a producer system, 
the implications of Hong Kong cinema‘s special mode and source of financing, or why 
this seemingly crude financing practice is endures despite the sophistication of Hong 
Kong economy and the expansion of Hong Kong film business in the world. In short, he 
makes no attempt to study why the system of Hong Kong cinema works. In his 
collaborative book on the Hollywood studio system he analyzes the connection between 
structure and text; that is, how the mode of production influences film style and thus how 
the system regenerates itself. But in his book on Hong Kong cinema, he fondly relishes 
the film style and describes the productions without applying his own theory to connect 
the two. Instead, he reasserts that in terms of market share ―Hollywood of the East is 
Hollywood‖, not Hong Kong (Planet Hong Kong 82-83). The significance of Hong Kong 
cinema lies not in the size of its market or industry, but in its ability to survive and tell 
local stories. Bordwell only includes directors whose movies are more accessible in the 
American market with the exception of Wong Jing, the top box office director at the time 
of his research. Wong Jing‘s movies might not be accessible to Western audience, but 
they are formalized: uniform style and standardized storytelling. Bordwell‘s descriptions 





frantic method of filmmaking and the yo-yo pattern of a film company‘s development. It 
gives the impression that the industry just muddled through for one hundred years.  
Michael Curtin proposes a groundbreaking concept of city cinema that averts the 
problems of national cinema paradigm.  He applies it in his book Playing to the World‘s 
Biggest Audience – The Globalization of Chinese Film and TV. Curtin‘s observation is 
exceptionally insightful and relevant to the rising cinemas in the region, and must be 
discussed at length here. Curtin analyzes objective factors—logic of accumulation, 
trajectories of creative migration and forces of socio-cultural variation—that enable 
certain cities to emerge as centers of cultural production. His answer to the question ―why 
do some places become centers of cultural production?‖ is location and timing: the media 
industry located at the right place at the right time. However, in the application of his 
theory on Hong Kong film industry, Curtin assumes that the difference between 
Hollywood and Hong Kong cinema is just a quantitative one: Hong Kong cinema is a not 
yet fully-expanded version of Hollywood. By assuming size is an advantage, he is led to 
conclude that while Hollywood has the biggest studio at the production end, Chinese 
media industries have the biggest audience at the reception end. However, Hong Kong 
cinema had neither big studios nor a big audience. In the 1990s, when it was most 
spreading in the world, Hong Kong cinema did not have full access to audiences in China 
due to the mainland‘s foreign quota restriction (this ended in 2003 with the signing of 
CEPA). It had been lucrative since the introduction of sound in the 1930s, but its 
popularity was limited to Cantonese speaking audiences in Southern China and overseas 
Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and North America. In the period Curtin covers 
(mostly post war years to 2000) it never had the advantage he claims. In contrast to 
Hollywood, Hong Kong cinema globalized not by expanding the size of the industry but 





expansion, assuming the goal of other media capitals is also to expand the size of their 
film industry (like Hollywood). Without considering the structural constraints of a culture 
industry operating in a colony or the volatile regional environment, Curtin reads Hong 
Kong cinema‘s streamlining as a dysfunctional maladjustment instead of a practical 
survival strategy. The history of Hong Kong cinema that Curtin narrates is one of a film 
industry going downhill as it further deviates from the Hollywood model. Curtin starts 
chapter one with Shaw Studio, as if Hong Kong‘s commercial transnational cinema 
began there. But Hong Kong cinema was commercial and transnational since its 
inception, and independent production was the norm rather than the exception.   
In the second chapter on Hong Kong independent studios during the 1970s to 
1980s Curtin lists the flaws in business practices such as a non-transparent financing 
system, decision making based on hunches or on the basis of limited information, sloppy 
bookkeeping, lack of tracking overseas ticket sales, and deal making based on personal 
allegiance instead of shopping around in a competitive market—to name a few. He calls 
these practices ―mercantile capitalism‖, an operation relying on personal relationships. To 
Curtin the Hong Kong film industry, unlike Hollywood, did not graduate to ―industrial 
capitalism‖ which ―predicated on a managerial revolution that tends to create distinction 
between owners and managers…minimize the importance of personality and to regularize 
the return on capital through the establishment of rational systems at each link in the 
chain…‖ Curtin goes on to lament that, ―Although the Hong Kong movie industry during 
the 1970s and 1980s happily appropriated element of Hollywood‘s poststudio mode of 
disintegrated production, it also retained many features of mercantile capitalism, and this 
has proven to be a crucial weakness of the industry…the industry‘s inability to institute 
transparent practices that might regularize production, distribution, and financing, 





Curtin sees chaos and defects. To him reliance on personality is a problem and a sign of 
weakness. Filmmaking is inherently a high risk business due to the unpredictability of 
trend and taste. The risk was higher in a small city with an unprotected open economy, 
and much more so in the decades of changing sovereignty when the city was in a political 
limbo under a lame duck government. In a city facing an uncertain future with no paved 
runway, crash landings are the norm. During a crisis experienced pilots and crew 
members provide the needed flexibility and assurance. Personality counts. Curtin‘s 
suggestion of expanding film companies at the production end but ignoring securing 
bigger markets at the reception end also fails to reducing risk. Curtin does not see that in 
the system of Hong Kong cinema flexibility is advantageous and reliance on personality 
is strength.   
In chapter three, ―Hyperproduction erodes overseas circulation,‖ Curtin attributes 
the decline of Hong Kong film industry to overproduction and a decline in quality. 
However, he does not give hard data and market analysis to explain how much is too 
much or specify the criteria of quality production.  In his analysis, Hong Kong cinema‘s 
lack of forward motion is due more to Hong Kong filmmakers‘ expansion-inhibiting 
behavior than to structural impediments. It is their dysfunctional maladjustment which 
holds the Hong Kong film industry back. Curtin infers that while the success of Hong 
Kong cinema was due to objective structural factors such as the city‘s status as a financial 
center and its concentration of production resources, its failure was due to subjective 
factors like mismanagement. However the 1990‘s is the decade in which Hong Kong 
cinema won more international film awards than ever and produced films with high 
enough quality to enter competitive Western mainstream markets. As detailed in later 
chapters of this dissertation, the greatest contributor to Hong Kong cinema‘s survival is 





is the location and occasion that provide a favorable environment for the gathering of 
media capital, but it is the people factor that keeps the industry flexible and maintains its 
creative competitive edge. In regards to the question ―What is Hong Kong cinema?‖ 
Curtin is sharp in distinguishing Hong Kong cinema as a city cinema, but he does not see 
that it is a ―people‘s cinema‖. In this petit Chinese filmmaking colony with only about 
one thousand active members there is always a heavy reliance on personality and close 
interpersonal relationships. 
In his media capital model, Curtin asserts Hollywood as ―a global media capital 
par excellence‖ and the sole occupant of the top tier of a four level media agglomeration 
hierarchy. He overlooks Hong Kong‘s status as a dependent territory and this factor alone 
can fatally hamper the city from ever becoming a powerful global media capital; it is a 
potential challenge to its sovereign state‘s authority, whether it is the illegitimate British 
colonial government or the one-party Chinese government keen on ―building harmonious 
society‖. Curtin is unaware of Hong Kong‘s colonial politics and cultural policy and that 
can be seen in his description of the role of the colonial government: ―…the city‘s 
relative political stability and the colonial government‘s benign neglect of Chinese media 
industries provided artistic freedom that seemed likely to endure for some time, unlike 
the prospects for Singapore or Taipei‖ (Playing 270-71). Curtin seems to get caught up in 
the British imperialist narrative of tranquility of colonization. In fact, Hong Kong cinema 
was always under the watchful eyes of censors despite the official rhetoric of ―active non-
intervention policy‖. The ―benign neglect‖ remark is particularly odd coming from 
Curtin, who analyzed the role of government in shaping the film industry in a democracy 
like the U.S. In his article ―Beyond the Vast Wasteland: the Policy Discourse of Global 
Television and the Politics of American Empire‖, Curtin analyses the context of the 





of the U.S. government in creating a market-driven system ("Beyond"). He coins the 
phrase ―official internationalism‖ to describe the U.S.'s unstated media policy and 
analyses how U.S. economic and foreign policy influenced U.S. broadcast policy. 
However, in his application of media capital theory on Hong Kong cinema he emphasizes 
geography at the expense of politics. It is striking that Curtin could read politics and find 
the unstated media policy of the television industry in a democracy like the U.S. but did 
not do so with colonial Hong Kong's film industry. The extreme apolitical character of 
Hong Kong entertainment movies is symptomatic of the extremely political nature of the 
industry. The Orientalists are theory-informed, but the theories assert supremacy of 
Hollywood system rather than enlightening us to the system of Hong Kong cinema.   
In the nationalists‘ genealogical view and the Orientalists hierarchical view Hong 
Kong cinema is framed as the subordinate Others. In the writing of Leftist Chinese 
scholars from China's closed-door period like Cheng et al, Hong Kong cinema becomes 
the politically inferior Other due to Hong Kong's colonial status. In Rightist scholarly 
writings from KMT-ruled Taiwan like those of Tu, Hong Kong cinema becomes the 
socially inferior Other due to dialect.  In the writings of the open-door-policy generation, 
like Cai, Zhou and Li, Hong Kong cinema becomes the culturally or aesthetically inferior 
Other because it is commercial. In the Hong Kong scholar Chung‘s writing, Hong Kong 
cinema becomes the economically inferior Other because it does not have lasting 
integrated studios. In American film scholar Bordwell‘s view, the industry is anarchic. In 
media scholar Curtin‘s eyes, Hong Kong cinema is stuck in the second tier due to over-
reliance on personality. By regarding Hong Kong cinema either as an adjunct of mainland 
Chinese cinema or a lesser version of Hollywood these scholars have limited their 
comprehension of the fact that local practice is indeed an indication of adaptive 





assumption of a unified standard of modernity, the nationalists see Hong Kong‘s 
transnational cinema as a proven case of modernity with Chinese flavor, a model for 
national redemption. To the Orientalists Hong Kong cinema is a second-tier version of 
Hollywood. By adopting the other‘s beauty standards, Hong Kong cinema is either 
overrated as a swan or underrated as an ugly duck. Straddling multiple cultures, overseas 
Chinese scholars and Hong Kong-based scholars educated in the West avoid this 
singleminded perspective and see the dual character of Hong Kong cinema. 
Overseas Chinese scholars 
Overseas Chinese scholars tackle the national cinema paradigm, challenge the 
notion of a monolithic China and assert the distinctiveness of Hong Kong cinema. 
Yingjin Zhang‘s Chinese National Cinema, which covers films produced in mainland 
China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, is an impressive archival work. Zhang points out the 
inadequacy of the national cinema paradigm in understanding Chinese cinema, which is 
―‗fundamentally dispersed‘ – historically, politically, territorially, culturally, ethnically 
and linguistically‖ (3). However, despite his lengthy discussion of the problems in 
defining the term ―Chinese‖, Zhang does not go beyond instructing the readers to ―keep 
in mind all problematic or messiness (of the term Chinese)– theoretical as well as 
geopolitical – surrounding ‗China‘ and ‗Chineseness‘‖ (5) to explain why he keeps using 
the term ―Chinese national cinema‖ instead of another pluralistic term. He aims at 
constructing a complete, all-inclusive picture of Chinese cinema. He states, ―…we must 
be patient and willing to conduct primary research and complete the constructive phase of 
film historiography before we can proceed with deconstruction and reconstruction in any 
confident, meaningful way‖ (12, original emphasis). In his archival efforts Zhang leaves 
out many types of film production other than those of feature films and yet says, ―These 





following chapters. As new archival material surfaces, a more comprehensive history will 
surely arrive to further our knowledge of Chinese cinema in all its diversity and 
complexity‖ (12, emphasis mine). He does not explain why those omissions and 
imbalances will not impact the overall picture or even distort our view. He assumes that 
the history of Chinese national cinema is a history of narrative cinema. His goal of 
constructing a more comprehensive history depends on the availability of archival 
material. But archiving is another touchy issue involving state policies, public and private 
collectors, money and politics in deciding what to restore or neglect as well as what to 
include or exclude given limited resources. His inclusion and exclusion of territories is 
also confusing. On page one he writes, ―China today consists of three territories‖ 
referring to Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. He includes Taiwan, a former 
Japanese colony at present not officially integrated into China, but excludes Macau, a 
former Portuguese colony, which was already officially integrated into China as of 1999. 
The first and last European colony in China, Macau used to enjoy a high level of 
autonomy under Portuguese administration and is now also governed under the ―one 
country two systems‖ principle. Along Zhang‘s line of logic the omission of Macau 
should not impact our overall picture of the nation. Macau may not have impressive film 
industry with which to project its image to the world, but it having overtaken Las Vegas 
as the world‘s number one gambling market is a significant sign of the extent of China‘s 
incorporation of capitalism. This affirms the Chinese government‘s commitment to a 
capitalist style of economic reform and has significant implications for its policy on 
marketization of the Chinese film industry and the types of films encouraged.     
In opposite to Zhang‘s explicit questioning of national cinema paradigm, Yingchi 
Chu in Hong Kong Cinema – Coloniser, Motherland and Self adopts it. Referencing 





responds to Hollywood domination in the world market and operates under the rules and 
standards set by Hollywood. It creates a space nationally and internationally for non-
Hollywood film-making. Chu argues that Hong Kong cinema exhibits many 
characteristics of a national cinema and concludes that it is a ―quasi-national cinema‖. 
Paradoxically, by applying the national cinema paradigm and creating the term ―quasi-
national cinema‖ - a cinema which is neither like Hollywood and Hollywood-dominated 
cinema, nor exactly a national cinema - she is able to assert the distinctiveness of Hong 
Kong cinema. With regards to the question ―What is Hong Kong cinema?‖ Chu exposes 
the inadequacy of existing categories to define it. In the chapters on history she reveals 
the ameboid character of Hong Kong cinema: over the years Hong Kong cinema changes 
its identity and outlook as the political situation changed and its target markets shifted. 
Before China closed its doors in the mid-1950s, Hong Kong cinema was a sub-national 
regional cinema, a part of Chinese national cinema. From the mid-1950s to 1979, before 
Hong Kong's economy took off, Hong Kong cinema was a Chinese Diaspora cinema 
since it depended heavily on overseas Chinese communities. From 1979 to 1997, with 
power structure between Britain, China and Hong Kong altered, Hong Kong became a 
distinctive community with high degree of autonomy atypical of a colony (Chu argues 
that Hong Kong at that time was a ―quasi-nation‖). Chu concludes that ―Hong Kong 
cinema as a distinct cinema in its own right‖ (xvii). By exploring the triangular 
relationship between Britain, China and Hong Kong, Chu identifies Hong Kong‘s 
evolving political economic context as the key determinant of the mode of Hong Kong's 
film industry.   
While Chu hangs onto the concept of national cinema, Stephen Teo, himself an 
overseas Chinese, is particularly responsive to the Diaspora sensitivity in Hong Kong 





proposes the concept of non-territorial based cultural nationalism and attributes Bruce 
Lee‘s appeal to Chinese audiences to this sentiment (Lee was born and educated in the 
United States). It is ―an emotional wish among Chinese people living outside China to 
identify with China and things Chinese, even though they may not have been born there 
or speak its national language or dialects‖ (Hong Kong Cinema 111). Teo argues that 
Hong Kong filmmakers were in a unique position to show abstract loyalty to China 
because Hong Kong is not or does not claim to be a country. He says the sentiment on 
Hong Kong screen is an ―abstract and apolitical type of nationalism‖ based on double 
denial - dislike of China‘s communism and distrust of Britain. However, Teo‘s book is 
more descriptive than analytical or theoretical and he does not further explain the term 
―cultural nationalism.‖    
While Teo takes pride in Hong Kong cinema‘s transcendental position of double 
denial, Poshek Fu studies Hong Kong cinema‘s interstitial position of double 
marginalization. In contrast to Zhang‘s attempt to construct a total Chinese national 
cinema, Fu‘s works focus on the margins. His reconstructs and rewrites the history of 
wartime cinemas in Shanghai and Hong Kong, which have been peripheralized or in the 
official narrative of the history of Chinese cinema. Fu illustrates how Shanghai cinema, 
even under the Japanese militarists' watchful eye, managed to produce popular and 
patriotic films ("Struggle"), and how Hong Kong popular cinema, even at the peak of 
patriotism during the Sino-Japanese war in China, showed ambivalence towards the 
motherland ("Between Nationalism"). In contrast to Zhang‘s dismissal of worries about 
imbalance and omissions, Fu continues his mission to de-construct ―Chinese cinema‖ and 
recover the suppressed voice in history in Between Shanghai and Hong Kong – The 
Politics of Chinese Cinemas. He finds that since the 1990s Chinese Studies scholars have 





childhood experience of the unequal coexistence of Cantonese films and diasporic 
Mandarin cinema in Hong Kong leads him to question the conception of Chinese cinema 
with monolithic, essentialist implications that suppress the plurality of cinematic sites and 
traditions. Fu‘s pluralistic view goes beyond Teo‘s binary notion of Diaspora cinema 
versus Chinese cinema. To Fu, Hong Kong cinema is one of multiple Chinese language 
cinemas.  
Rey Chow in ―Between Colonizers: Hong Kong‘s postcolonial self-writing in the 
1990s‖ also positions Hong Kong between British colonialism and Chinese nationalism.  
While Fu tries to recover repressed history, Chow argues that ―Hong Kong‘s 
postcoloniality is marked by a double impossibility‖ (153) referring to the futility of 
Hong Kong‘s quest for a Chinese identity and the illusion of liberatory postmodern 
hybridity. On the one hand, due to its inerasable colonial taint, the more Hong Kong tries 
to seek its cultural roots, ―the more it reveals its lack of ‗Chineseness,‘ and the more it is 
a deviation from the norm of the folk. The past would follow Hong Kong like an 
unshakable curse of inferiority‖ (163). On the other hand ―(t)he enormous seductiveness 
of the postmodern hybridite‘s discourse lies … in its invitation to join the power of global 
capitalism by flattening out past injustices‖ (157). Chow‘s in-betweenness discourse 
provides a useful analytical tool to bring to the foreground the denied presence of Hong 
Kong cultural identity. While arguing for a third space between the colonizer and the 
dominant native culture Chow asks an interesting rhetorical question: ―…in being a 
colony, is Hong Kong not in fact a paradigm of Chinese urban life in the future?...Hong 
Kong has for the past 150 years lived in the forefront of ‗Chinese‘ consciousness of 
‗Chinese‘ modernity…‖ (158). The notion of Hong Kong, being a modern Chinese city, 
is a subversive force to China is picked up by Leo Ou-fan Lee on his observation of 





While Fu and Chow are pessimistic in tone, Leo Ou-fan Lee cheerily embraces 
Hong Kong‘s peculiar marginality. He notices that Hong Kong eventually reversed the 
cultural impact from China and Britain. In exploring the historical context of Hong 
Kong‘s hybrid culture, he illustrates how this marginal city provides a fertile ground for a 
vibrant popular cinema. He attributes Hong Kong cinema‘s appeal to Chinese 
cosmopolitanism and projects Hong Kong as a harbinger of the 21st century city. In ―A 
preliminary study of the marginality of Hong Kong culture,‖ he sees the significance of 
Hong Kong‘s marginal culture challenging the center ("Preliminary"). In Chinese history 
Hong Kong is an important littoral city in relation to the heartland. In modern time 
reforms started mostly from the coastal and were gradually adopted by the center and 
became legitimized. For years the hybridized culture in the coastal cities was despised by 
the Chinese Communists until the Reform Era.  For almost a hundred years in the late 
19th and mid-20th century Hong Kong, under the shadow of both Shanghai and British 
colonization, did not have a distinctive identity. The intellectuals of May Fourth 
movement (1919), positing themselves as the voice of the nation, had no genuine interest 
in Hong Kong culture or history. After 1949, while Hong Kong was situated between the 
Communist regime in China and the KMT regime in Taiwan, Lee notices that it became a 
sort of ―public space‖ for expressing opinions that were censored by the competing 
Chinese governments.  n Hong Kong intellectuals do not posit themselves as the voice of 
the people, and there is no ingrained distinction between elitist culture and popular 
culture. Lee argues that Hong Kong, situated at the margin, constantly re-invents itself, 
challenges the center and changes the culture of the mainland instead of playing the role 
of a weak minority. In In Search of Hong Kong Culture, he explores the Chinese-ness of 
the culture and cosmopolitan character of the city (In Search). He writes that given the 





culture) and Hong Kong‘s deep roots in Chinese culture, any invading foreign culture 
would eventually be ―sino-nized‖. He predicted that after 1997 Hong Kong would not 
simply transition from colonialism to nationalism because both are models of the 20th 
century. He observes that nationalism is the flip side of colonialism, since nation-state is 
a product of Western modernization and national independence is a result of colonial 
invasion. He argues that Hong Kong after World War II, though politically still a colony, 
had already surpassed that status in terms of economy, society and culture. He 
optimistically predicted that Hong Kong, which had been a metropolitan city since the 
1970s, would be one of those post-capitalism international cities which are equals to or 
even surpass nations in the 21
st
 century. In City Between Worlds – My Hong Kong 
published in 2008, Lee further explores the specialness of Hong Kong a decade after its 
change in sovereignty. While Rey Chow is apprehensive about Hong Kong‘s double 
impossibility in self-writing, Leo Lee embraces the locals‘ creativity in inventing history 
in order to claim their histories as distinct from the colonial record before their political 
fate as part of China was sealed. Locals could only uncover fragment of a dismembered 
past, but colonial historians had the advantage of massive official archives to support 
their construction of a coherent ―master narrative‖.  Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s is as 
Lee describes, ―As if to compensate for their obvious disadvantage, creative writers rose 
to the occasion by inventing their own imaginative histories of the city‖ (City Between 
18). Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s illustrates this peculiar third local self-writing and 
we shall see in chapter seven Tsui Hark‘s Once Upon A Time in China series is the best 
example of such buoyant creative history writing even though the story is set at time 
when the country was on the verge of disintegration due to the double threat of foreign 





cinema?‖ Lee‘s answer would be: it is a subversive cinema in a city of peculiar 
marginality.   
Hong Kong-based scholars   
While Leo Lee sees the double subversiveness and Rey Chows sees the double 
impossibility, Hong Kong-based scholar Marana May Szeto calls attention to the double 
positioning of Hong Kong in mainstream cultural imaginary. She points out how Rey 
Chow‘s discursive strategy of double impossibility can backfire, ―… these studies end up 
assisting in the simulation and stigmatization of what culture can be for different subjects 
and communities in Hong Kong.  In the process, voices that do not fall into these set 
categories would be elided and silenced‖ (259-60). She proposes a counterintuitive 
concept, ―Petit-grandiose Hong Kongism‖ which is ―a kind of inferiority-superiority 
response to Hong Kong‘s coloniality.‖ She describes it as ―a kind of Hong Kong 
inferiority complex developed under multiple colonial experiences, both British and 
Chinese. It is expressed in mainstream Hong Kong culture in terms of an economic 
chauvinism often with sexist and even xenophobic overtones, especially against 
economically disadvantaged people and places in China.‖ Hong Kong‘s relation to China 
is imagined in two opposite directions: the northbound cultural imaginary and the 
southbound cultural imaginary. The northbound refers to ―Hong Kong‘s mainstream 
cultural imaginary that posits its claim to cosmopolitanism and capitalist expertise as a 
justification for an implied economic and cultural expansion towards China.  People 
sharing this imaginary identify Hong Kong as capitalist entity.‖
22
 The southbound 
cultural imaginary is ―resentful of a real and imagined Chinese cultural snobbery against 
Hong Kong, and fearful of a real and imagined threat from an imposing Chinese political 
regime. Hong Kong‘s popular cultural imaginary bears a grudge against Chinese people‘s 







 Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s illustrates this double positioning, and 
Wong Jing‘s God of Gamblers series is the best example of Petit-grandiose Hong 
Kongism. His gambler protagonist, an honorable man in a base profession, is an 
embodiment of this inferiority-superiority complex. In regard to the question ―What is 
Hong Kong cinema?‖ Szeto‘s response would be ambivalent. 
Hong Kong-based scholars Law Wing-sang goes beyond ambivalence. In Re-
theorizing Colonial Power he questions the state‘s monopoly on political allegiance, 
explores the issue of double political allegiance that characterizes Hong Kong history and 
concludes that Hong Kong identity is a performance ("Spinning"). He uses the 1980s-
1990s popular genre ―undercover cop‖ to illustrate the complexity of Hong Kong‘s 
identity crisis. In the early colonial years the British-groomed native gentlemen were bi-
lingual bi-cultural elitists who were loyal to both the British Empire and the Qing Court. 
In the following century both Britain and China insisted on maintaining Hong Kong‘s 
colonial status in order to serve the interests of both nations despite multiple occasions 
for China to take back Hong Kong before 1997. Law calls this ―collaborative 
colonialism‖ and thinks it is this condition that deters Hong Kong from forming political 
subjectivity. In the 1970s the local-born generation rejected the previous generation‘s 
political dogma and explored Hong Kong‘s position in this complex and overlapping 
political and cultural imaginary. Cinema became a medium to express their unique 
perspective on identity conflict, and the Hong Kong New Wave generation is known for 
their local-oriented perspective. Law traces the development of the genre from the early 
1980s when the undercover cop was a tragic hero caught between the modern law and 
traditional moral code. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the undercover cop 
becomes marginalized and the moral rectitude of the grand narrative of the nation is 





of the ―Lack‖ of Hong Kong culture in the past, such as ―vulgarity‖, was overturned and 
celebrated as the reason for Hong Kong‘s success. Stephen Chow‘s undercover cop is no 
longer a tragic hero tortured by identity crisis, but a clownish character who explicitly 
says that an undercover cop is just a permanent actor. Law argues that by foregrounding 
the performance-based nature of identity, this version of undercover cop creates a new 
consciousness of the Hong Kong people‘s subjectivity; hiding one‘s real identity is not 
necessarily negative, since the so called ―real identity‖ is also just a performance. In 
regard to the question ―What is Hong Kong cinema?‖ Law‘s answer would go further 
than Chu‘s quasi-national cinema and description of an ameboid industry. He would 
conclude that Hong Kong cinema is a performance. As we shall see in chapter eight 
Wong Kar Wai‘s productions are characterized by ambivalent schizophrenic bi-racial, bi-
cultural, bi-lingual, bi-gender, bi-sexual characters and cast.  
Doubleness of Hong Kong cinema 
Hong Kong cinema is not a national cinema and its audience is not exactly 
national citizenry. Poshek Fu and David Desser  in the introduction of their anthology on 
Hong Kong cinema write that Hong Kong cinema is ―a cinema without a nation, a local 
cinema with transnational appeal.‖ In Nation and Nationalism while discussing 
nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy Ernest Gellner points out that even though 
nations are a contingency and not a universal necessity, in our age the idea of the nation 
seems so universal and normative that ―(a) man must have a nationality as he must have a 
nose and two ears.‖ And, ―(a) man without a nation defies the recognized categories and 
provokes revulsion‖ (6). To apply to Hong Kong, the returning of the city to the 
motherland is like giving the Hong Kong people unnecessary implants of a nose and two 
ears. Those with double nationalities or double political allegiances, then, resemble a 





unique historical double allegiance, Hong Kong cinema is like a moving elephant 
captured in a Picasso painting, puzzling to both the blind and the sighted. This city is a 
fertile ground for producing crisscross double undercover genre (undercover cop and 
undercover gangster). In the 1990s the theme of doubleness ran through Hong Kong 
movies from commercial hits to art film fare: John Woo‘s paradoxical good bad guy and 
bad good guy; Jackie Chan‘s Hong Kong police officer caught between two sides of the 
law; Tsui Hark‘s regional hero dealing with the double problems of foreign invasion and 
imperial court corruption; Wong Kar Wai‘s tête-bêche narrative structure; Indeed, the 
1990s are a prime vantage point to study the doubleness of Hong Kong culture.   
In the eyes of the British colonizer, Western media and nationalists, Hong Kong 
was often reduced to an economic city. For those studying Hong Kong from the center 
harboring the notions of everlasting empire, the dominant nation-state, the eternal China 
or essential Chinese-ness, it would be hard to understand why Hong Kong cinema thrives 
on chaos, confusion, contradiction, and transience and survives for a century. As we shall 
see, in the 1990s Hong Kong popular cinema served as one of those machines that 
communicate local memories not fully articulated in the pages of official history. Hong 
Kong is a unique place and Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s is a prime vantage point to 
see multiple forces such as colonialism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism and globalism at 
work. While globalization heightens our interdependence and renders insulated national 
cinema unfeasible, the goal of being a global cinema is obviously unachievable for most 
countries without comparable material power like that of the U.S. In existing theories, 
Hong Kong cinema is an anomaly; but in practice it is not so much of an exception, as is 
seen in the rise of other Asian cinemas crossing over to Western mainstream markets and 





neatly into existing categories, what kind of theoretical tools do we need to understand 






Chapter 3 The Duckling’s Reflection 
Hong Kong cinema is often mistakenly consigned to the shadows of Hollywood 
or mainland Chinese cinema. A cosmopolitan border town, Hong Kong cinema has been 
influenced by international forces. Its system is not a simple imitation of Hollywood's, 
nor is its trajectory determined solely by mainland China. Still, the industry has often 
perceived as sub-standard and its films as sub-national. When measured by the beauty 
standard of the others, Hong Kong cinema has either been overrated as a miraculous 
swan or belittled as a hopeless ugly duck. To paraphrase Schatz‘s affirmation of the 
ingenuity of Hollywood studio system that he quotes from Bazin I would say, ―Why not 
admire in Hong Kong cinema what is most admirable, the beauty of the system of Hong 
Kong cinema.‖
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(Genius) The beauty of the system of Hong Kong cinema lies in the fact 
that it provided a viable platform outside of Hollywood and national cinema paradigms 
for economic survival and relative cultural autonomy. Instead of judging Hong Kong 
cinema for what it was not and what the system could not do, Hong Kong cinema ought 
to be appreciated for what it was (and is) and what the system can and did accomplish. 
Hong Kong cinema was not a national, non-commercial, or global popular cinema. The 
system could not sustain integrated studios for long, could not stay dominant in the 
region, or expand in a scale like Hollywood. But Hong Kong cinema was local, 
commercial and transnational. The system sustained a productive industry in a harsh 
environment for almost a century; it allowed for the coexistence of art films and mass 
entertainment and provided an outlet for collective cultural expression of dimensions not 
covered by Hollywood or Chinese cinema; it did allow for auteur directors to exercise 
their personal vision, making them a presence even as Hollywood dominated the region. 





and balancing various historical forces, survived and thrived in the world even without 
the material power of Hollywood or the state protection of national cinema. Hong Kong 
cinema in the 20th century was a cinema without a nation and a local cinema with 
transnational appeal that changed itself over time. Hong Kong cinema defies the 
recognized categories. How, then, should we theorize about it?   
Since theory is generated to solve problems that have arisen in specific historical-
cultural setting, theories from the West are not completely applicable to Hong Kong 
cinema.  Yet since Hong Kong is a colonized, urbanized and westernized city, we should 
not completely discard Western theories either. Hong Kong cinema presents a theoretical 
conundrum because existing theories do not have a readymade framework to register 
Hong Kong cinema; their approaches are compartmentalized. This chapter looks at the 
duckling‘s reflection - finding its own beauty. It discusses the theoretical issues, and 
examines theories' assumptions, strength and weakness. We can then adjust our critical 
attitude and theoretical tools to better understand this local culture industry in a 
dependent territory. I would propose a circuit model that shows continuity and 
connectivity to illustrate the dynamism of the system of Hong Kong cinema. I will take 
multiple perspectives and borrow theoretical explanations from the fields of cultural 
studies, global media studies, East Asian studies, Hollywood studio system studies, and 
film festival research.   
CULTURAL STUDIES 
Culturalists look for explanations of the global presence of Hollywood in 
reception and text. They contest the claim of invincibility of structural forces and 
challenge the hypodermic needle model of media impact on people. Henry Jenkins III 
proposes a textual poacher theory to illustrate how proactive audience can be. The 





poachers are proactive consumers, crossing over from reception to production. However, 
their production is confined by what is made available at the consumption, and their 
sporadic effort cannot sustain a systematic resistance. When extending this argument to 
transnational textual poaching, the making of a local version of Hollywood hit only 
proves that local audience is active. But this does not lead to the assertion that local 
producers are also active. In a secondhand culture, one can make do with the others‘ 
cultural surplus without extricating oneself from a marginal position. Textual poaching 
alone doesn‘t rectify power inequity; one cannot claim cultural autonomy if the local 
filmmaking community cannot originate production and sustain that production system. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Hong Kong cinema transnational textual poaching can be 
regarded as a learning process prior to the point at which local industry came up with its 
own original action aesthetic and the theme of doubleness (double undercover and double 
faces) that Hollywood then borrowed back. 
Scott Robert Olson‘s narrative transparency theory attributes Hollywood‘s global 
presence to the country‘s unique cultural characteristic, a diversified population.
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 He 
reasons that media products catered for American domestic audience can also meet the 
need of the diversified foreign audience. Olson‘s multi-culturalism theory does not apply 
to Hong Kong cinema since Hong Kong, with 95% of its population being Chinese and 
98% speaking Cantonese, is much less racially and linguistically diversified than 
neighboring countries and yet its cinema was the most exportable in the region during the 
1990s. That said, like Hollywood, Hong Kong cinema also benefited from its hometown's 
hybrid culture. As a Chinese society under British rule, Hong Kong was at the junction of 
two major network civilizations, inheriting the cultural legacies of the British and 
Chinese Empires. The British Empire ruled one fourth of the world‘s population at its 





and English is the most dominant language in the world. Chinese, living in China proper 
and overseas, account for more than one fourth of the world‘s population. Neighboring 
countries in Asia, heavily influenced by Chinese civilization in areas ranging from 
philosophy to language to the use of chopsticks, constitute a large ―Chopstick Culture‖ 
bloc. The confluence of these British and Chinese civilizations in Hong Kong facilitated 
its cinema's accessibility to a large portion of the world‘s population familiar with the 
narratives from both civilizations. Since there is a structural factor for cultural leverages 
of Hong Kong cinema, cultural factors should not be split from structural factors when 
explaining Hong Kong cinema‘s exportability.    
GLOBAL MEDIA AND REGIONAL STUDIES 
Marxist theorists attribute Hollywood‘s world dominance to structural factors.  
Cultural imperialism theory claims that there is economic domination and cultural 
homogenization by the dominant power over the rest of the world (Schiller). It is 
criticized for overgeneralization and material-determinism for assuming that the 
―hardware‖ - material power - is necessary and sufficient to explain the U.S. media‘s 
many years of dominance. By assuming Hollywood is monolithic, the theory overlooks 
the interdependence between Hollywood distribution and non-Hollywood fare, as well as 
how such relationships allowed Hong Kong cinema to crack into the dominant system. It 
infers subjective cultural experience from objective structural factors, assuming passive 
local audiences are completely at the mercy of global media. On the surface this theory 
does not seem to apply to Hong Kong cinema: it neither had the material power of the 
U.S. nor was it dominated by Hollywood. However, as will be detailed in the next 
chapter, Hong Kong lies at the junction of two major historical networks of commerce: 
the tribute system of the Chinese Celestial Empire and the international trading system of 





entrance of the tribute system in East and Southeast Asia for the Chinese Empire, and as 
a trading port of the British Empire the city was pushed toward integration in the world 
capitalist system very early on. Economically, Hong Kong cinema was privileged by the 
structural conditions of global capitalism. Culturally, it enjoyed structural factor for its 
cultural leverage at the junction of two major network civilizations. Hong Kong cinema 
occupied a privileged position in the world‘s asymmetrical power structure.   
Joseph Straubhaar, framing the imperialism issue in a more complex way 
acknowledging the issue of asymmetrical interdependence, proposes a cultural proximity 
theory that explores the local direction. He proofs local audience preference for local 
production and infers that audiences actively seek out cultural proximity in cultural 
goods. This native-culture-as-resistance argument is the opposite of Western-centrism -- 
nativist centrism. Hong Kong‘s native culture, known for its transnational character, has 
never been unmixed. And, given the extensive scope of co-productions in Hong Kong it 
is hard to work out an operative definition of local production to implement Straubhaar‘s 
assumption of a clear distinction between local and foreign productions. The colonized 
culture‘s agency for self-writing is a kind of empowerment. I would propose to remodel 
this theory by shifting the focus from local audiences to local producers. As we shall see 
in the case studies, Hong Kong filmmakers actively search for cultural proximity in their 
productions. Their films told a distinctive local story and exhibit strong Hong Kong 
cultural sensibility despite being export-oriented, catering to foreign tastes.  
Globalization, conventionally defined as compression of the world and as the 
opposite of localization, is often understood in binary terms. Roland Robertson in his 
glocalization theory argues against this binary conception and the cultural 
homogenization thesis by illustrating the tempering effects of local conditions on global 





the interpenetration of global and local. Sinclair and Wilken illustrate how American-
based international conglomerates adopt ―strategic regionalization‖ in Asia as ―a kind of 
practical compromise with an extreme nation-by-nation approach – that is, a means of 
ensuring that marketing campaigns are not glocalized any more than is strictly necessary‖ 
(147). International conglomerates lean towards global standardization to take advantage 
of their economy of scale. Robertson says the whole question of what will ‗fly‘ globally 
is in part contingent upon issues of power, but that it is not simply a matter of Western 
modernity's hegemonic extension. But because Robertson's theory does not address the 
politics of difference it falls short when this strategy of local adaptation of the global is 
adopted in reverse. It cannot explain why East Asia-based producers lean toward local 
differentiation, in contrast to international conglomerates' global standardization. Without 
dealing with historical specificity of Western imperialism in East Asia, Robertson‘s 
glocalization theory cannot explain why only certain places in the East such as Japan and 
Hong Kong are in a privileged position to export cultural products to the West. It cannot 
explain why Japan has to mask its Japaneseness in media products like Mario Brothers 
and Sailor Moon (as we shall see later in a Japanese scholar‘s argument) while Hong 
Kong cinema foregrounded its Chineseness in its kung fu films. The Western global 
players set the parameter and pick local participants to join them. The assertion of the 
local is made within the global terms of identity and particularity. Without taking history 
into consideration, glocalization, the practical compromise of the global-local binaries, 
does not repudiate Western centrism. As a theory it is too general to specify which nation 
or city is privileged to participate in the global game. 
Michael Curtin, in his media capital theory, specifies the characteristics of places 
that emerge as centers of media production. In replacing nation-state with the city as the 





factors that enable particular cities to emerge as centers of media activity in the global 
era. In particular, he points to ―logics of accumulation, trajectories of creative migration, 
and forces of socio-cultural variation as a set of dynamic influences that interact at 
particular locations under specific historical conditions‖ (Playing 10). However, Curtin‘s 
case study on Hong Kong cinema overlooks Hong Kong‘s status as a dependent territory. 
In my view this factor alone—in the form of its potential as a threat to sovereign 
authority—can fatally harm the city's chances of becoming a global media capital. Media 
capital theory, by not going beyond a four level media agglomeration hierarchy model 
and only describing what the world is like without imagining what it can be, is not 
empowering for a genetically doomed city like Hong Kong which was and will always be 
a sub-sovereign territory. Keeping the film industry alive and getting to the second tier 
already exceeds the reasonable expectations for the city. Perhaps instead of viewing the 
media agglomeration hierarchy structure as everlasting and unchanging, we can situate it 
historically.  We can imagine, for example, a proliferation of models like Hong Kong 
cinema eating away at Hollywood‘s overseas market and thus force it to respond. 
Curtin‘s theory of city cinema needs to be adjusted to deal with Hong Kong‘s peculiar 
colonial discourse and the complicit role of cities in the imperialist system. This location 
theory overlooks politics in East Asia, which provided the key source of financing and 
target market of Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s. 
EAST ASIAN STUDIES 
With the four former colonies that are the Asian Tigers achieving phenomenal 
economic growth, East Asia seems like an anomaly in dependency theory. Imperialist and 
nationalist policies in this region are characterized by discourse of economic 
development and soft authoritarian rule justified in the name of nationalism and 





East Asia calls the analytical framework for neo-colonialism in East Asia ―colonial 
modernity,‖ which is a combination of political economy approach and discourse 
analysis.
26
 Barlow's anthology is about persistence of colonial discourses and how 
colonial formations continue to shape the present in East Asia. Hong Kong is an excellent 
example to illustrate this neo-colonialism in East Asia; it is literally a colony with the 
economic achievement of a modern city. Hong Kong transnational commercial cinema 
was possible thanks to the material base laid by colonization and the appealing image of a 
modern city that capitalized on its peculiar colonial discourse. Commercial cinema relies 
on star and genre, embodiments of the society‘s ideological formation.  To export stars 
and genres, that particular city needs to have a desirable, albeit mythologized, image in 
the world.  
Paul du Gay et al.‘s Doing Cultural Studies – The Story of the Sony Walkman, 
inadvertently show the inadequacy of glocalization theory to explain why a nation like 
Japan is privileged to export cultural products to the West. As pointed out by Koichi 
Iwabuchi (see below), they incidentally reinforces the West‘s stereotype of a 
depoliticized and hi-tech modern Japan. Their original intention is to use Sony Walkman 
as to the basis of an argument against the structural determinism thesis found in cultural 
imperialism theory. Their choice of a Japanese brand as case-in-point requires close 
examination. With most of the global conglomerates based in the West, they specifically 
pick an Asian firm and have to spend an entire chapter in asserting this firm as a global 
enterprise. They are in fact not arguing against the cultural imperialism from the West but 
the reverse version of it, i.e. the cultural imperialism from the East, the threat of Japan-
based global firm homogenizing other cultures. According to their analysis, Sony could 
export the Walkman globally because it adopted the strategy of glocalization. Their 





cost effective it responds directly to local conditions, is sensitive to local cultural 
differences and decentralizes its management to give a higher degree of local autonomy. 
They overlook the regional history of Asia, political issues in Asian market, a global 
asymmetrical power structure and Japan‘s privileged position in it. They may have 
proven that Western domination is not complete, but they do not show that Sony‘s 
success refutes Western centricism. Sony‘s marketing strategy supports and capitalizes 
on Western modernity rather than challenging it.  As we shall see below Koichi Iwabuchi 
states that du Gay et al. overlook the fact that Japanese producers have adeptly factored in 
their marketing strategy to defuse the appearance of a ―Japanese threat‖ – the West‘s fear 
of the alleged danger of the yellow race and neighboring countries' memories of Japan‘s 
militaristic past – by removing anything that might associate the Japanese media product 
with the country or people of Japan. du Gay et al., skipping over Japan‘s history and 
colonialist discourse in their case study, proceed to argue for the significance of culture's 
role in global business.  Their ―cultural study‖ overlooks Japan‘s privileged position in 
the world‘s asymmetrical power structure which facilitates the discursive power 
advantage of Japanese cultural producers.    
Koichi Iwabuchi, adopting a discourse analysis approach to study Japanese 
cultural presence overseas during the 1990s, unearths the political discourse behind the 
marketing strategy of Japanese media products in ―Marketing ‗Japan‘: Japanese cultural 
presence under a global gaze.‖ He summarizes the Orientalist‘s image of Japan and 
points out how du Gay et al.‘s interpretation of the Sony Walkman‘s Japaneseness gets 
caught in the Orientalist‘s stereotypical image of modern Japan. He writes, ―the dominant 
image of ‗Japan‘ constructed by a Western Orientalist discourse and reinforced by a self-
Orientalising discourse in Japan, is mainly concerned with ‗traditional‘ and particularistic 





al.) argue, may signify ‗Japanese-ness‘ in terms of miniaturisation, technical 
sophistication and high quality‖ (167). He disagrees with their view and proposes a 
cultural odor theory to explain why Japanese media products are so exportable. He 
attributes the global appeal of a certain product not to the product itself but the image of 
the product‘s country of origin. He argues that it is the discursive formation of the 
country that confers the product symbolic meaning. He writes, ―The way in which the 
cultural odour of a particular product becomes ‗fragrance‘ – a socially acceptable, 
desirable smell – is not determined simply by the perception of the consumer that 
something is ‗made in Japan‘. Neither is it necessarily related to the functions, influences 
or the quality of a particular product or image. It has more to do with discursively 
constructed images of the country of origin, which are widely disseminated in the world.‖ 
By ―cultural odor‖ he refers to ―cultural presence of a country of origin and images or 
ideas of its way of life are positively associated with a particular product in the 
consumption process‖ (166). In this 1998 article he quotes McDonald's as an example 
and claims that its international success is associated with an attractive image of 
American way of life. In contrast to du Gay‘s apolitical reading, he analyzes how 
Japanese producers defuse the ―Japanese threat‖ symbolized in their products. He claims 
that the audio-visual products Japan exports overseas are ―culturally odorless‖, a term he 
defines as ―someone or something lacking any nationality, but [which] also implies the 
erasure of racial or ethnic characteristics and any context that would embed the characters 
in a particular culture or country.‖ (167). However, what he claims as ―culturally 
odorless‖ is actually only deodorized of Japanese-ness and replaced by ―Western 
fragrance,‖ as seen in the examples he cites as internationally exportable Japanese 
products. For example, acclaimed Japanese animation characters modeled on Caucasian 





Italian; The name of a global company (Sony) and its product (Walkman) are in English. 
He quotes a Japanese cultural producer‘s claim and writes, Japan is ―the most 
successfully Westernised country in the world‖ (172). Iwabuchi agrees with Japanese 
producers‘ assumption that being Westernized is modern and a success in itself.  
Iwabuchi celebrates Japanese originality in developing glocalization and he asserts that 
Japanese cultural industries‘ role is to become interpreters of the West for Asia, ―selling 
the know-how of indigenizing the West‖ (165). So, from his description it seems that 
Japanese cultural industries are not rejecting or critical of Western-centricism; rather, 
they capitalize on it. Iwabuchi suggests that one of the reasons for the lack of strong 
impetus on the part of Japanese cultural industries to export popular culture is the 
―historical obstacle of the memory of Japanese colonialism in exporting Japanese culture 
to other parts of Asia.‖ However, later he states that ―Cultural prestige, Western cultural 
hegemony, the universalism of the United States and the prevalence of the English 
language are advantageous to Hollywood‖ (169). Iwabuchi‘s assumption is: Western-
based international conglomerates, unlike Japanese cultural industries, do not have the 
historical obstacle of the memory of Western colonialism in exporting their culture to 
Asia. Therefore what is actually narrated in Japanese cultural products is its (Western) 
modernity while the colonial issue (embedded in racial characteristic) is displaced.   
Modern Japanese cultural producers‘ practice of adopting white Western 
characters can be traced back to Imperial Japan's colonial discourse. Leo Ching, 
paraphrasing Frantz Fanon in the title of his article ―Yellow skin, white masks – race, 
class, and identification in Japanese colonial discourse‖, points out the peculiarity of 
Japanese colonial discourse. He writes ―Japan as the sole non-Western colonial power 
whose imperial dominions and colonial possessions are populated with peoples not 





proximity – in both geographical and cultural terms – of Japan to its empire required the 
Japanese to create rather different sets of what Edward Said has called the ‗strategy of 
positional superiority‘‖
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 Imperial Japan‘s solution was to position and imagine itself 
racially in relation to both the ‗white‘ imperialist and its ‗yellow‘ colonial subject by 
inventing a unique Japanese race, an ―honorary whites‖ which was an identification with 
the ―white‖ race and a differentiation and dissociation from its Asian neighbors. As 
Ching indicates, Japanese writers in the imperialist era like Taguchi Ukichi claimed that 
Japanese belonged to the white race. He describes that Taguchi acknowledged that 
category ―yellow race does exist, it‘s just that the Japanese did not belong to it!‖ 
("Yellow Skin" 72) He points out the complicity of imperial Japan‘s racial discourse such 
as the one propagated by Taguchi which ―does not refute the theoretical underpinnings of 
Western racialist discourse; his interest lies only in extricating and thereby elevating 
Japan from one racial category to another. Taguchi‘s rebuttal of racialist classification is 
not a rejection, but a revaluation and celebration thereof‖ ("Yellow Skin" 75). In 
Becoming ―Japanese‖: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation Ching 
continues to point out the complicity of Japan‘s imperialist discourse in which Japan 
narrated a history of modernization while evading the colonial question. Imperial Japan 
did not rebut the western imperialist ideological paradigm but instead supported white 
superiority and Western modernity. Japan‘s rising to power in the 19th century 
demonstrates that imperialism was not exclusively Western. While calling for solidarity 
of Asia against Western imperialism, Japan internalized the modern project in the form of 
Western imperialism and imposed its metropolitan industrialization and culture on its 
colonized subjects to assert its superior position. Japan rose up quickly, but was 
demilitarized after World War II. Its empire instantaneously disappeared and the spread 





the Allies‘ arrangement of the colonies after the war, Japan evaded the colonial issue. He 
writes, ―the Japanese themselves subsequently avoided the agonizing procedures of 
decolonization, both politically, and culturally. Japan is thus able to narrate a history of 
transitions from defeat to demilitarization, recovery to economic miracle, that 
circumvents the colonial question‖ (Becoming Japanese 12). With various facilitations, 
collusion and the U.S.‘s Cold War policy in the Pacific, Japan rose to become an 
economic superpower in Asia. It has in common with Western imperialist countries its 
modernization projects and its imperialist legacy. It is a privileged player in Asia and the 
only Asian country with a global media firm standing alongside with that of Western 
countries.   
With the Japanese producers consciously suppressing Japaneseness and 
appropriate the ―universal‖ whiteness and western-ness in their cultural products, 
Japanese strategy of glocalization takes into consideration of the historical factors of 
Japan (what Iwabuchi calls the cultural interpreter) and the West (what Iwabuchi calls the 
cultural origin for indigenization). Japanese cultural producers are not simply being 
sensitive to local cultural differences, but have adeptly worked around political and 
historical issues in their marketing strategies. There is a close and intricate relationship 
between a country‘s narrated history and its cultural producers‘ marketing strategy. If 
U.S. consumer goods seek to sell as representatives of a constructed American way of 
life, then Japanese glocalization, in fact, is also about exploiting Japan‘s cultural myth – 
the most modernized Asian country alongside the modernized West. Japanese cultural 
producers play to Japan‘s close ties with Western modernity in its hi-tech cultural image, 
but erase their race and evade the colonial issue.  Du Gay et al‘s study of the cultural 
dimension of globalization does not acknowledge these historical and political issues. 





and discursive power. Iwabuchi attempts to challenge the West-Rest paradigm but 
paradoxically verifies the persistence of Western centricism by showing how Japanese 
cultural producers‘ appropriate and reinforce Western centricism and insert Japan 
between the West and the Rest. The case of Sony complicates the dichotomous West-
Rest model but does not question the hierarchal structure. Japan only moves itself up 
along the linear and singular conception of Western modernity. These studies of Japan-
based global firms demonstrate how Japanese cultural producers, capitalize on Japan‘s 
cultural myth, wedge their way into the world‘s system by appropriating Whiteness and 
Western-ness. Given Japan‘s peculiar colonial discourse - Japan identifies with the White 
and proud of being Westernized - Iwabuchi‘s theory of cultural odor, replacing 
Japaneseness with Western cultural prestige, is unique for Japan and may not be 
applicable to most Asian countries.   
Interestingly, the history of Hong Kong is also narrated as a victory story even 
though Hong Kong was on the receiving end of colonization. Imperial Japan, with its 
absurd racial discourse and peculiar justification for colonization of Asia, is demilitarized 
after the war. Modern Japan, continues to insert itself between Asia and the West, posts 
itself as a transparent interpreter of the West for Asia. According to Iwabuchi, in media 
products it is presented as a defanged modern nation with an economic superpower status 
in the region, adapting to the global without losing its essence. What is consistent with 
the colonial discourses between Imperial Japan and Modern Japan is their white- and 
Western-centrism. In the 1990s, Colonial Hong Kong and Modern Hong Kong were 
rolled into one and also claimed to adapt to the global without losing its essence. This 
miraculously accomplished the Chinese intellectuals‘ century-long goal of ―Chinese 
learning for essential principles and Western learning for practical application‖ as well as 





enlightened postmodern age. Situated between China and the West, Colonial Hong Kong 
occupied the interstitial space between Chinese nationalism and British colonialism. But 
Modern Hong Kong, despite the pressures of unbridled global capitalism, was perceived 
as a postmodern hybrid wonderland. The colonial discourse of Hong Kong is much more 
intriguing, complicit and harder to refute, especially when there was economic prosperity 
with a vibrant local popular culture. In contrast to Imperial Japan‘s military atrocities, 
economic exploitation and cultural assimilation policy, as well as its devastation of 
former colonies in the Third World, it seems that Britain was not a hideous colonizer and 
Hong Kong didn‘t suffer as its colony. Hong Kong, annexed by the British as an 
international trade port, also has close ties with Western modernity. While Japan‘s history 
is narrated as transitions from defeat to economic miracle and evades the colonial issue, 
the discursively constructed image of Hong Kong as a fishing village transformed to a 
modern city, is also presented as an economic miracle but colonization was endorsed 
instead of evaded. The British colonial governmental features were maintained after the 
sovereignty change, and justified in the name of keeping Hong Kong‘s ―stability and 
prosperity‖. The modern Hong Kong success story was not sold to the West in the form 
of high technology or white animation characters. As we shall see in the next chapter it 
was sold as the myth of ―Hong Kong Wonder‖: a genius efficient ―Hong Kong system‖ 
with an apolitical free market economy, the official rhetoric of ―positive non-
interventionism‖, and the peculiar colonial democracy made up of consultative 
committees and politically apathetic economic men.   
British colonization of Hong Kong was perceived as so innocuous that Hong 
Kong‘s success story was bought back by the West. The discursively constructed image 
of Hong Kong as a modern liberal city may explain why Western media scholars 





industry. Despite the fact that the university is a key institution of modernity, there is the 
problem of the dearth of academic critical studies on Chinese language media. There is 
call for the de-Westernization of media studies, but attention to the issue of dependence 
by local scholarship on Western scholarship, and the production of knowledge based on 
Western epistemological schema and theories in and on Asia is far from adequate. The 
discourse of an apolitical efficient Hong Kong system and the essential quality of Hong 
Kong‘s politically apathetic economic men were reinforced by the academy. Sociologists 
Ambrose King and S. K. Lau are the best known representatives of this school. King‘s 
idea of the ―administrative absorption of politics‖ refers to the process of the local 
Chinese elite being coopted to participate in colonial governance. Lau‘s idea of 
―utilitarian familism‖ and ―social accommodation of politics‖ explains Hong Kong‘s 
political stability and low social mobilization.  Both are concerned with modernization 
and the study of how the Hong Kong colonial system worked so well. These works, 
which were published in the 1980s are criticized by present-day scholars.   
Law Kam-yee and Lee Kim-ming in the introduction of their anthology The 
Economy of Hong Kong in Non-economic Perspectives argue against the assumption of 
―pure economics‖: in mainstream media and mainstream economic explanations Hong 
Kong‘s economic achievement was often attributed to the success of the free market, the 
government‘s positive non-interventionism, the city-state‘s laissez faire policy, export-led 
development strategy, and Hong Kong entrepreneurs‘ flexibility in adapting to world 
economic changes, etc. Law and Lee assert that the economic system of Hong Kong is 
socially situated, and culturally, structurally and politically embedded.  In their anthology 
with over forty articles from various disciplines, social scientists present a variety of 
factors to explain Hong Kong‘s economic advances, such as the unique Chinese culture 





geopolitics, etc. More importantly, they also explore the impact of ideology on economic 
growth, and especially the backing of the political system behind Hong Kong‘s economic 
development. Fred Y. L. Chiu points out the bizarre erasure of the social and politics of 
Hong Kong by academia. He describes how Hong Kong people were depicted in 
academic research as ―willfully apolitical…desired a paternalistic and patriarchal 
government that would allow them to pursue their economic interest.‖ He summarizes 
how academia in colonial Hong Kong paints a surreal picture of the city, ―political 
scientists strive to do away with politics, while sociologists deny the very existence of the 
social. At the same time, economists substitute ‗management‘ for economies in a system 
called ‗positive non-interventionism‘! What the members of each discipline fabricate are 
waves of neologistic labeling which are then used to frame Hong Kong as a mythical 
‗equilibrium‘ of developmental managerial laissez-faire-ism. This ‗equilibrium‘ is said to 
coexist with popular consent devoid of ‗social mobilization‘‖ (295-96). While Chiu 
deconstructs the myth of apolitical economic men, Law Wing-sang in Re-theorizing 
Colonial Power shows the absurdity of Chinese nationalist discourse accommodating its 
polar opposite – colonialism (Re-Theorizing). He points out the hidden unequal power 
issue and the double allegiance of local elites. He attributes the popularity of the double 
allegiance theme in Hong Kong movies to the ―political unconscious‖ in Hong Kong 
culture.  He calls the bi-lingual bi-cultural Chinese elite joining the British-Chinese co-
governing synarchy in early colonial years ―collaborative colonialism‖. In another article, 
he coins the discourse around the sovereignty change ―managerializing colonialism.‖ 
While people in Hong Kong experience identity crisis, British and Chinese governments 
never had any confusion over the role Hong Kong should play. Hong Kong was annexed 
by the British as its Far East outpost, a trade port, a commercial city. In China‘s 





to modernity via colonialism, was of use to China‘s quest for modernity. Law describes 
the sovereignty change as characterized by ambiguously re-doubled colonization. The 
Chinese government both hated and loved the colonial legacies. Law summarizes how 
managerialism is employed to normalize the absurdity: ―managerialism, as the ideology 
of the experts in governance, has to be mediating between colonialism and nationalism as 
a pair of twin discourses‖ ("Managerializing" 120). The job of the local elite now is to 
teach the Chinese government how to manage Hong Kong efficiently.  
What is intriguing about Hong Kong‘s colonization is not only its double 
allegiance and double colonization, but also its double positioning. Law Wing-sang 
points out that during the sovereignty change the discourse was mediated by a set of 
managerial discursive processes feeding on the urban-rural imaginary schema (Re-
Theorizing). He calls attention to the complicity of the city in the imperialist plan.  He 
writes, colonial city, constructed and modeled after Western cities and situated at the top 
of the hierarchy of imperialist exploitation, serves as the nerve center to exploit the 
resources of neighboring rural areas. Mirana May Szeto‘s ―Petit-grandiose Hong 
Kongism‖ draws attention to the double positioning of Hong Kong in relation to China in 
the mainstream cultural imaginary with its implication of the binary ―urban Hong Kong 
vs. rural China‖ . It is to this cultural sensibility of complicity and the double positioning 
of Hong Kong that other privileged cities in East Asia can relate.   
Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s was at once resistant and acquiescent to Western 
supremacy and adopted a cultural strategy that was complicit and self-conflicting. As we 
shall see in the following discussion, the genre and stars of Hong Kong cinema are the 
embodiment of the issues of colonial modernity in East Asia. If Japan‘s cultural myth is 
posting itself as the most modernized Asian country alongside the modernized West, 





alongside the modernized West. It is in mainstream movies that Hong Kong is presented 
as a Chinese cosmopolitan nexus, and the inherent conflict between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism is magically resolved. And, also magically, unbridled global capitalism 
can be miraculously kept in check by the traditional Chinese moral code. Hong Kong 
cinema was enabled by both structural advantages and discursive advantages under 
British colonization. Therefore we need to integrate the political economy approach with 
the cultural studies approach to understand the system of Hong Kong cinema. 
STUDIES ON HOLLYWOOD AND NATIONAL CINEMA 
Scholars of the Hollywood studio system adopt an integrative approach that 
connects structure with text and focuses on the industry‘s modus operandi. I categorize 
the studies on Hollywood and national cinemas into four approaches: the Marxist 
approach, institutional approach, ritual approach and authorship approach. Studies by 
Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson, and Thomas Schatz (Genius;  "New Hollywood";  
"Return") illustrate the self-regenerating mechanism of the Hollywood studio system.  
They attribute Hollywood‘s strength to its powerful ―software‖ – the studio system.   
Marxist approach 
In The Classical Hollywood Cinema Bordwell, Staiger and Thompson (1985) 
adopt a Marxist approach and demonstrate that in a capitalist system the mode of 
production influences film style. However, their understanding of the base structure is 
confined to the mode of production. They overlook other material structures, such as 
mode of exhibition or source of financing, which can also influence film style. In 
examining the aesthetic and economic forces involved in the development of classical 
Hollywood cinema, they overlook the national specificity of Hollywood. They study the 





miss the fact that Hollywood is situated in a country with the strongest banking sector in 
the world, which affords a steady cash flow for the smooth running of the Hollywood 
studio system.   
Institutional approach 
The institutional approach regards institutions as the ―rules of the game‖, which 
consist of both the formal legal rules and the informal social norms that govern individual 
behavior and structure social interactions. Thomas Schatz proposes an equilibrium theory 
and illustrates how the studio as a site of convergence balances various historical forces. 
He exalts Hollywood‘s autonomous system as ―genius‖.  He states that the classical 
Hollywood between 1920s and 1960 is 
―…a period when various social, industrial, technological, economic, and 
aesthetic forces struck a delicate balance.  That balance was conflicted and ever 
shifting but stable enough through four decades to provide a consistent system of 
production and consumption, a set of formalized creative practices and 
constraints, and thus a body of work with a uniform style – a standard way of 
telling stories, from camera work and cutting to plot structure and thematic.  It 
was the studio system at large that held those various forces in equilibrium.‖ 
(Genius 8-9) 
Schatz‘s study is historically specific but he also left out the financial sector. Both 
Bordwell et al and Schatz believe in the resilience of the Hollywood studio system i.e. the 
individual players may change, but the studio system and oligarchy market structure 
persist. In history to date Hollywood is the only global cinema with no peer in terms of 
power and scale. It is easy to err in believing that the Hollywood studio system is the only 
proven system of the global cinema, and slip into a belief in an eternal studio system. 
However, these American scholars‘ studies of American commercial cinema in a world 
capitalist system of international trade overlook the vital role of the American financial 
sector, to which the American film industry has been tightly tethered since the early 





business, and financing plays a pivotal role in the world‘s postmodern economy 
(Harvey). At the macro level, they overlook the tie between Hollywood, American 
financial institutions and Washington. At the micro level, they didn‘t pay attention to 
modes of financing.  Bordwell et al. illustrate how the mode of production influences film 
style, but they didn‘t study how the mode of financing influences filmmaking practice 
and film style.   
American scholars Bordwell et al. and Schatz‘s oversight is filled by David 
Puttnam. Puttnam in Movies and Money traces the history of the close ties between 
American working class banks and the Hollywood majors, which also started their 
business for working class immigrants. Janet Wasko‘s Movies and Money – Financing 
the American Film Industry is a critical study on Hollywood film financing (Movies and 
Money). Wasko traces Hollywood‘s close ties with the American financial sector which 
is strictly regulated and influenced by Washington. She insightfully points out 
Hollywood‘s political tie: the banks‘ control over the studios at a high level is established 
by setting parameters for the film industry rather than by monitoring the day-to-day 
operations. Hollywood‘s expansion was backed by American financial institutions, which 
in the 1970s already owned 70% of the world‘s debt and still is the most powerful sector 
in the world economy. With such a backing, the Hollywood majors can afford to take 
much greater financial risks than any film company or national cinema in the world. This 
is confirmed from the website of Motion Picture of America (MPAA), ―Moviemaking is 
an inherently risky business… No other nation in the world risks such immense capital to 
make, finance, produce and market their films.‖ (Z. Shan) (Z. Shan) (Z. Shan) (Z. Shan) 
(Z. Shan) (Z. Shan)
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 (qtd. in How Hollywood Works 3). However, Wasko‘s study, 
assuming a vertical relationship between financing and film production, implies no room 





Kong cinema, having alternative sources and modes of financing, was able to engage in a 
more flexible relationship with Hollywood without being subjected to be either its 
dependent or its nemesis. And it also got around the colonial government‘s indirect 
control via the banking sector, which was dominated by British banks.  And, without the 
requirements of a script and proper procedures, this more cash-based flexible mode of 
financing allowed Hong Kong filmmakers to enjoy the freedom of freestyle filmmaking.  
Bordwell et al.‘s studies of Hollywood in the classical era assume that 
commercial first-run theater distribution was the only bottleneck, the key sector for 
market control. Schatz‘s study on ―New Hollywood‖ describing how the majors retained 
their roles as financiers and distributors in the 1970s, and acknowledges the important 
role of film distribution ("New Hollywood"). In the U.S. in the 1990s, commercial 
independent production has a symbiotic (dependent) relationship with the Hollywood 
majors (Perren). Video, cable, network television, merchandizing and the like are 
derivative markets of Hollywood conglomerates (Schatz "Return"). Schatz and Bordwell 
et al.‘s studies in the 1980s did not foresee the rise of new technology and alternative 
distribution and exhibition channels, which decentralize the markets. They focus on the 
U.S.‘s domestic market and neglect the international arena where Hollywood‘s traditional 
strategy of centralized market control was rendered less effective by the rise of new 
technology and intensified globalization in the 1990s. Outside the U.S. there are 
emerging alternative international distribution systems that are not dependent on 
Hollywood, such as the piracy industry and international film festival circuit. 
Hollywood‘s windowing practice sections the derivative markets, based on centralized 
control and the linear concept of time. The piracy industry, enabled by digital technology, 
disrupts this practice, circumvents Hollywood majors‘ control and eats away their 





relationship between Hollywood and the globalized film festival circuit points out, is an 
alternative distribution network. The international film festivals offer ―the rest of the 
world a chance, exhibiting and evaluating films produced outside the commercial U.S. 
‗mainstream‘‖ (202). They provide platforms for local filmmakers to ―breakthrough‖ 
internationally and open doors abroad, even though a major film festival like Cannes is 
also a ―notoriously exploitative commercial film market‖ (204). Nevertheless, these two 
major distribution systems, operating in the same world capitalist system with 
Hollywood, are still related to Hollywood. The most pirated movies in the world market 
are Hollywood features. International film festivals signify an atmosphere of prestige, 
rarity, the highbrow and elitist, which qualities are meant to be alternative and reacting to 
Hollywood. These two rising global commercial distribution systems are understudied. 
Hong Kong cinema was heavily dependent on overseas markets and its distribution sector 
was the weakest compared to their counterpart in Hollywood.   
The socio-cultural motive of film production was also insufficiently studied by 
these scholars.  Bordwell et al.‘s study make no reference to an American cultural context 
in that particular era or single out individual filmmakers. Schatz fills this lacuna by 
situating the studio system in a specific American historical context and takes into 
account the role of individual players. He describes meticulously the role of creative 
producers in the studio system in balancing the creative and business aspects of film 
producing. He affirms human agency by demonstrating how the producers and directors 
are able to engage in creative activities despite the constraints of the studio system. He 
describes the rise and fall of the movie moguls struggling in an emerging business in an 
immigrant society. However, while celebrating the individual‘s agency, Schatz does not 
examine the relationship between film producing and its cultural context. He pays no 





era that privileged young males to be the creative producers. Susan Douglas, relating 
technological history to its social and cultural context, in Inventing American 
Broadcasting 1899-1922 describes, in the U.S. starting in the teens that there was the 
emergence of the boy hero image: the self-made stars who succeeded without relying on 
their fathers‘ largesse, in the popular culture which redefined American masculinity. This 
youth culture and the democratic myth in an immigrant society probably privileged 
certain individuals to rise to leadership in a new popular culture industry. Schatz‘s 
institutional study does not go further to analyze how social and cultural factors like 
gender, class and race influence the filmmaking practice, select leaders, shape 
organizational structures and the modes industry forms.   
Schatz‘s oversight of the institution‘s being socio-culturally influenced is filled by 
Keith Negus. In The Production of Culture/Cultures of Production Negus argues that ―the 
activities of staff working in the cultural industries are informed by particular sets of 
values, beliefs and working practice – a ‗culture of production‘ … has a significant 
impact on the ‗production of culture‘‖ (69). He asserts that, ―We need to study the culture 
of production not only within the organization, but also how these connect with broader 
social divisions and how these are given specific cultural meanings within the production 
process‖ (102). A study of the broader society and cultural practice can help us better 
understand why the studio system situated in American culture works in a particular way, 
and then why in a different socio-cultural context like Hong Kong, filmmakers devise a 
commercial system quite different from that of Hollywood. As we shall see in chapter 5 
the case of women producers illustrates how the industry capitalized on the woman‘s 
traditional role as a multi-task caretaker and her modern role as an executive leader. 
There was a connection between the organizational structure of the film industry and the 





Schatz affirms the aesthetic and social value of commercial cinema by 
emphasizing the individual. As John Caldwell describes, Schatz ―showed how the 
personalities of each of the studios in the classical era were written into the films 
produced at each company because of the controlling oversights of studio bosses‖ (198). 
Such an effort to redeem the individual author in a collaborative work can also be seen in 
Horace Newcomb and Robert Alley‘s The Producer‘s Medium: Conversations with 
Creators of American Television. Newcomb and Alley were aware of the socio-cultural 
context in which the television industry was situated. They mention the connection 
between the American TV industry and the broader social divisions of American society. 
In the introduction, they admit the reason for the omission of women and minority 
members in their book is ―because the structure of the television industry, like the 
structure of American society, has been dominated by white males.‖ With the intention to 
affirm television as an art form, Newcomb and Alley declare it their mission to ―shatter 
the anonymity of television‖ and they do it also by emphasizing the individual - asserting 
television as a producer‘s medium. They argue that a self-conscious creative producer is 
an auteur with vision, mastery and discipline. In an implicit argument against the Marxist 
emphasis on the mode of production superseding the individual, they strike to the other 
extreme, the individual artist‘s sovereignty. They aimed to rescue the network officials 
from their relative obscurity, but they limit their object of rescue to producers. Below the 
line members remain neglected. Newcomb and Alley overlook the fact that they can 
claim television as a producer‘s medium because their auteur is situated in an institution 
with a pyramid-shaped hierarchical organizational structure. The producer at the apex of 
the organization is the center of power and creative control, maintaining both 
management consistency and narrative coherence. In an effort to affirm American 





Schatz‘s works emphasize the producer‘s individuality, whereas individuality is an 
aesthetic value which emerged in Western fine art in the industrialized age. The producer 
system of American film and television industries worked within the particular context of 
American corporate culture with major corporations sharing the pyramid organization 
structure. The American media industry was situated in the particular U.S. political-
economic context, i.e. a democracy but with its economy characterized by corporate 
domination. The producer in American media industry is a situated author in a situated 
institution. 
Schatz, Newcomb and Alley‘s oversight of the political-economically situated 
American media institution is filled by Tino Balio in Grand Design – Hollywood as a 
Modern Business Enterprise 1930-1939. According to Balio‘s argument the industry 
revived after the Depression when the majors behaved like modern business enterprises. 
He quotes from Alfred D. Chandler Jr. who defined the modern business enterprise as 
having two specific characteristics: i) it contains many distinct operating units and is 
managed by a hierarchy of salaried executives; and ii) separation of management from 
ownership. The argument of Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.‘s The Visible Hand – The 
Managerial Revolution in American Business is that the visible hand of management 
replaced the invisible hand of market forces. He states: ―The market remained the 
generator of demand for goods and services, but modern business enterprise took over the 
functions of coordinating flows of goods through existing processes of production and 
distribution, and of allocating funds and personnel for future production and distribution. 
As modern business enterprise acquired functions hitherto carried out by the market, it 
became the most powerful institution in the American economy and its managers the 
most influential group of economic decision makers‖ (1). This is a producer market, a 





Chinese business in the 1910s could acquire those functions and be allowed to become 
the most powerful institution in Hong Kong economy, and a potential threat to its 
sovereign power. Situated in a different political economic context Chinese-capital 
institutions in Hong Kong developed a different organizational structure. Hong Kong 
started with a colonial economic system: the British hongs monopolized the major 
economic sectors such as banking and financing, aviation, communication and public 
utilities which usually had a corporate hierarchical structure. The Chinese businesses 
developed outside the government plan and British hongs‘ activities. The open port 
policy was adopted throughout British rule. In the 1990s, Hong Kong‘s economy, which 
remained small and open, was susceptible to speculative and international economic 
activities. Despite the rise of Chinese corporations, half of Hong Kong‘s business 
organizations were still Small and Medium scale Enterprises (SMEs)
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 with flexible 
organizational structures. The Hong Kong film industry with its horizontal organization 
structure was part of this SME culture, a contrast to the Hollywood pyramid organization 
structure within America‘s corporate culture. 
Besides operating as a modern business enterprise, Hollywood is also an 
institution run on abstract factors like fantasy and glamour. In How Hollywood Works 
Janet Wasko briefly mentions that Hollywood ―seems to have a fantasy quality, even 
non-production work in the film industry seems glamorous‖ (How Hollywood Works 47). 
She describes,―(T)here is a glut of eager workers for Hollywood companies to employ.‖ 
The abundance of the labor supply is a great asset, but Wasko doesn‘t compute how such 
an intangible quality is translated into tangible capital. She doesn‘t define ―fantasy 
quality‖ and ―glamour‖ in cultural terms, i.e. the cultural meaning of such an economic 
activity like filmmaking in Hollywood to this particular community. Nevertheless, her 





notion of ―cultural odor‖, the discursively constructed image of the city as a Chinese 
cosmopolitan construct has conferred symbolic meaning to Hong Kong cinema as a 
liberal lively Chinese culture industry. This may be the appeal of the Hong Kong film 
industry to Chinese talents and filmmakers from various parts of the world. Hong Kong 
cinema was not associated with glamour and power like Hollywood is, but its image was 
distinctive, like a national cinema.   
Tom O‘Regan problematizes the concept of national cinema in Australian 
National Cinema, but he also points out the strategic role of government in sustaining 
domestic production and the national cinema‘s role in creating a space for non-
Hollywood filmmaking. Even though Hollywood is a global cinema, it is no exception to 
national cinema. The U.S. government also plays a strategic role in setting the parameters 
for the industry and steering its development despite the rhetoric of a free market 
economy. Michael Curtin points out the role of U.S. government in creating a market-
driven system and calls its policy ―official internationalism‖ in ―Beyond the Vast 
Wasteland: the Policy Discourse of Global Television and the Politics of American 
Empire‖ analyzing the political context of the early 1960s ―Vast Wasteland‖ speech 
("Beyond"). He argues that the discourse was inextricably linked to the imperial 
aspirations of American foreign policy in a post-colonial world since it set the parameters 
for the adoption of the new satellite technology, and its policymakers were imagining an 
international community of the Free World. Curtin is insightful to foreground the covert 
state intervention in commercial enterprises in a democracy like the U.S. but his study of 
Hong Kong cinema overlooks the role of the colonial government in creating the 
commercial system and molding an apolitical entertainment industry. There was also the 
contradiction between stated governing policy and unstated film policy. On the one hand 





the other hand there was the British imperialist policy in East Asia (―Imperialism of Free 
Trade‖) enforcing a commercial system and the colonial policy of disciplining the film 
industry. We shall see in chapter 5 that Hong Kong cinema, having neither government 
facilitation nor the right to freedom of expression, was in fact on parole. 
Ritual approach 
The ritual approach explains the socio-cultural motive for the industry. In Hong 
Kong empires and regimes came and went: the Qing dynasty‘s demise; the British 
Empire diminished; the Japanese defeated; the KMT government retreated. But Hong 
Kong cinema survived for collective cultural expression. The ritual approach is adopted 
by studies in popular media, genre and stars. Hong Kong cinema has been popular since 
its early years and productions in the 1990s were mainly star- and genre-driven.  
Back in the 1970s when television was generally dismissed as mindless 
entertainment in the academy, Newcomb argues that television is the most popular art 
form, affirming the aesthetic value of this mass entertainment. In ―Television as a cultural 
forum‖ Newcomb and Hirsch, quoting James Carey‘s ritual view of communication, 
assert television‘s cultural function. They put forth a dynamic model in which both the 
producers and consumers are active and their relationship is interactive. They agree with 
Carey‘s view: ―Communication is a symbolic process whereby reality is produced, 
maintained, repaired, and transformed‖ and propose that television text functions as a 
cultural forum in which important cultural topics may be considered (505). On the 
production side the producers use the mass media as a means for personal expression, and 
on the reception side the individual audience creates his or her own meaning from the 
text. This is an ideal democratic system in which the producers and the audience interact 
directly and have comparable power. However, Newcomb and Hirsch do not show how 





Nevertheless, their ritual view of television as a cultural forum for a community to deal 
with common issues is useful for understanding Hong Kong cinema‘s cultural function in 
the region. Hong Kong, as a colony without the official title of Colony,
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 was not atypical 
amongst other limbo states in East Asia such as Taiwan (which claims to be independent 
but is under constant threat from China), Singapore (a city state), South Korea 
(partitioned during the Cold War) and Japan (demilitarized by the U.S.) which are also 
susceptible to external actors influencing the domestic authority structure. Hong Kong‘s 
identity crisis arising from the fear and hope over the sovereignty change was a cultural 
sensibility which Hollywood and national cinemas like Chinese cinema did not and could 
not represent. Hong Kong popular cinema served as a forum in the region to deal with 
our common concerns such as our colonial past, the Japanese military atrocities, the Cold 
War polarization of the region, the soft authoritarian governments, the pain in economic 
growth and the persistence of a political limbo status in the future.   
Thomas Schatz, in Hollywood Genres, regards genre as a form of social ritual, a 
sort of tacit ―contract‖ between filmmakers and audience, and movie production is a 
dynamic process of exchange between the film industry and its audience. He argues that 
many qualities traditionally viewed as artistic shortcomings ―assume a significantly 
different value when examined as components of a genre‘s ritualistic narrative system‖ 
(Hollywood Genres 15). The cultural function of genre filmmaking is to project an 
idealized cultural self-image. Therefore commercial filmmaking is like a form of 
contemporary mythmaking, the process of a unique conceptual system that confronts and 
resolves immediate social and ideological conflicts.  To Schatz, Hollywood film genres 
are formal strategies for renegotiating and reinforcing American ideology. Even though 
Hollywood is a global cinema, Schatz‘s conception of genre film is domestic market-





example, he writes, ―A culture‘s mythology…represents its society speaking to itself.‖ 
―They are among the various stories our culture tells itself.‖ ―Professional filmmakers are 
cut from the same cultural cloth as the members of the audience, of course, and we can 
assume that their response to human existence is substantially the same as the viewers‖ 
(Hollywood Genres 264). As Hong Kong cinema was heavily dependent on overseas 
markets, the assumption of the filmmakers and their audience being cut from the same 
cultural cloth cannot be made. Hong Kong genre film was not just Hong Kong society 
speaking to itself. As a contract between Hong Kong filmmakers and their audiences, it is 
an idealized cultural image of Hong Kong agreed upon by three partners: the domestic 
audience, the overseas audience and Hong Kong filmmakers. Schatz‘s genre approach 
needs to be adjusted for the transnational dimension when applied to Hong Kong cinema. 
In the 1990s Hong Kong produced only two major genres: action and comedy. In terms 
of film genre development, the 1990s stands out as a complex and distinctive era and the 
most overtly genre-driven production period in Hong Kong film history.
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 Anxiety 
permeated every genre with films revealing the peculiarity of Hong Kong‘s colonial 
discourse in which colonialism, nationalism, communism, capitalism, modernity and 
globalism acquired complicated meanings. Hong Kong film genres are formal strategies 
for renegotiating and reinforcing ideology about Hong Kong by domestic audiences, 
overseas audiences and Hong Kong filmmakers. In contrast to Japanese media 
showcasing high technology and the erasure of race, Hong Kong action film showed off 
stunning kung fu, foregrounding its low tech-ness and Chinese-ness. Never before in 
Hong Kong cinema was local identity and the export-oriented film industry so closely 
aligned via genre films. 
Hong Kong film production has been star-driven since its inception.  Richard 





producers define and delimit the choice of stars and the audience elects which stars get to 
stay in the market. Both are shaped by the particular ideological formation of their 
situation in society. Existing star studies mostly interpret what each individual star means 
for the local audience. Star crossover studies are mostly confined to crossover within the 
same nation or language. In Hong Kong productions, having overseas appeal was a must 
for stars. Hong Kong‘s transnational stardom involves a crossover between nations, 
languages and races. Existing star study needs to be adjusted when applied to a 
transnational cinema. Currently, despite the rise of transnational cinemas, transnational 
stardom is seriously understudied and there is no study of stars‘ cultural meaning as a 
collective from a city or nation. To borrow Iwabuchi‘s idea of ―cultural odor‖, it is the 
discursive formation of Hong Kong that confers Hong Kong stars‘ symbolic meanings. 
Japanese animation characters are modeled after Caucasians and Iwabuchi describes, 
―Japanese animation industries always have the global market in mind and are aware that 
the non-Japanese-ness of characters works to their advantage in the export market‖ (167). 
Hong Kong filmmakers have also always had the overseas market in mind.  How does 
Hong Kong stars‘ Hong Kong-ness work to their advantage in the export market? And, 
what is Hong Kong-ness? There is no study on the relationship between the discursively 
constructed image of Hong Kong and the stars as a collective representing Hong Kong-
ness. Given this huge limitation, transnational stardom is not covered in this project.   
The ritual approach emphasizes the socio-cultural motive for the media industry. 
In the 1990s Hong Kong cinema, being the only non-standard sinitic-language cinema 
that could challenge the Mandarin-dominated cinema from China and elsewhere, 
contested the global and national denial of its local historical agency and spoke its local 






In the 1990s stars gave Hong Kong cinema recognizable faces in the world but it 
was directors who gave it distinctive voices. Classic auteur theory is challenged for being 
overly romantic about filmmakers transcending the studio system. Modernists 
announcing the death of the author, leave us with no individuated voice for expression. In 
the 1980s and 1990s there was a celebration of the auteur director cult status in the 
industry. In the new millennium there was the revival of the authorship approach in the 
academy. David A. Gerstner and Janet Staiger point out the usefulness of the authorship 
approach in studying the dynamic relationship between the individual and the system.  
They state, ―…the individuals…function within the constraints and possibilities of the 
cultural fields and systems that inform the filmmaking conventions in which they operate. 
What is at stake, of course, is negotiating these systems through the [marking] of their 
identities in relationship to these conventions and method of filmmaking.‖ By asserting 
that ―(i)n naming an author, a function is served.‖ Gerstner and Staiger points out the 
power of naming and how authorship can give agency to minority production by creating 
―the potential for expression, social change, and identification‖ (xii). Tom O‘Regan 
argues that film, unlike broadcasting and print media, is international and cultural 
exchange is fundamental to cinema at every level ("Cultural Exchange"). Hong Kong 
cinema was always transnational but paradoxically, in the 1990s the more intensified the 
global competition was, the more personal and director-centric Hong Kong production 
was. The discussion of the global-local dynamic should go further to the personal level to 
better understand the global film business. No film can impact the audience without 
touching people at a personal level. The authorship approach reveals the individual 
filmmaker‘s tactics in surviving in the institution and thus can help shatter the anonymity 





The classic auteurism‘s over-romantic notion of transcending auteur-director and 
Schatz and Newcomb and Alley‘s oversight of the situated-ness of the auteur-producer in 
a hierarchical organization structure is filled by Timothy Corrigan‘s idea of ―the 
commerce of auteurism‖ and John Caldwell‘s industrial auteur theory. Corrigan points 
out that the auteur in the revival of auteurism in the 1980s and 1990s was constructed by 
commerce and for commercial reasons. He proposes to re-contextualize the author within 
industrial and commercial trajectories. He states that an auteur is ―a commercial strategy 
for organizing audience reception, as a critical concept bound to distribution and 
marketing aims that identify and address the potential cult status of an auteur‖ (103). 
Hong Kong cinema in 1990s is like a supermarket populated by typed directors who are 
differentiated not only by their films but also their public images. Each typed director has 
consciously found his position, branded himself and stayed in his type. Each has his 
trademark theme, trademark genre, long time collaborators and usual stars. They all had 
their personalities written into their films. Like producers of supermarket merchandise 
they all operated within Hong Kong cinema‘s commercial system and the colonial 
government‘s regulation. In Production Culture – Industrial Reflexivity and Critical 
Practice in Film and Television, John Caldwell proposes ―theorizing from the ground up‖ 
and ―industrial auteur theory.‖ ―Theorizing from the ground up‖, the opposite to the top-
down authorship approaches, means critical theory embedded in the everyday experience 
of the workers. In the chapter on ―Industrial auteur theory‖ Caldwell points out the 
tension between affirming collectivity and claiming autonomous responsibility as the 
central tenet of the production strategy in Hollywood. He describes how a television 
producer from an Ivy League background can suppress his elitist look and project a frat-
boy image, flaunting Hollywood‘s mixing of high and low culture. Hong Kong film 





committee, no clear division of labor, and the troupe system that bonded the crew like a 
family. We shall see in the case studies the interesting tactics the director employed to 
project a distinctive image to mark his position in a supermarket mixing high and low 
culture, and yet benefitted by the team efforts in their productions. In the Hong Kong film 
industry horizontal organizational structure, power was much diffused. Hong Kong 
cinema could not be neatly defined as a director cinema or a producer cinema. So we 
need to adjust the authorship approach to take into consideration these factors and situate 
the director in various contexts. A project might start with a director‘s vision but it was 
the collaboration of the cast, crew and administrators that made a project work and the 
system function. 
Film Festival Research 
In the field of film festival study there is surge in scholarly interest in how the 
system works. Even though the film festival exists as an alternative distribution network 
and creates an atmosphere for the appreciation of film as art, it does not transcend the 
mundane issues of politics, power and money. Thomas Elsaesser in ―Film festival 
network – the new topographies of cinema in Europe‖ points out that the international 
film festival is a very European institution that has globalized itself and has become the 
key force and power grid in the film business. But unlike Hollywood, it has the function 
of taste-making by canonizing masterpieces and consecrating auteurs. The auteur 
director, instead of the producer, is at the center of the system. For filmmakers the 
advantage of this system is ―(i)t ensures visibility and a window of attention for films that 
can neither command the promotional budgets of Hollywood films nor rely on a 
sufficiently large internal market… to find its audience or recoup its investment.‖ The 
film festival has salvaged the careers of certain Hong Kong art film directors. But, 





is also highly structured and has general rules governing the system. As a self-sustaining 
system for art films, it ―first and foremost sets the terms for distribution, marketing and 
exhibition, yet to an increasing extent it regulates production as well, determined as this 
is in the non-Hollywood sector by the global outlets it can find, rather than by the single 
domestic market of its ‗country of origin‘‖(88). While Elasesser delicately explains the 
complexity of film festival politicization, Mark Peranson lays bare the power struggle of 
the art film market in ―First you get the power, then you get the money: two models of 
film festivals.‖ He points out the false dichotomy of the multiplex and the film festival 
world as business versus art.  But he presents ‗core versus periphery‘ models of the film 
festival. The audience festival model, which describes the majority of the world‘s 
festivals with low budgets and little business presence is at the periphery. The business 
festival model such as Cannes, Berlin and Venice, which operate with both the market 
and a high budget, is at the core. In the business festival the distributor is the most 
important interest group and the sales agent, with the most powerful ones being French, is 
the defining actor. The sales agents and distributors decide what films will play where. 
Peranson points out that in this system, where a film plays is a question of power (or 
perceived power) as much as a question of money. The best way for festivals to attract 
the films they want is with cash, such as prize money for their competition. Peranson 
mentions how the system functions for powerful interest groups and creates some bizarre 
phenomena. For example, in some festivals the prize money went not to the filmmaker, 
but to the sales agent or the local distributor. Well-known auteurs are promised or assured 
a slot in competition. Certain festivals nurture a particular kind of festival film such as the 
―Sundance film‖ which ―often involving emotionally damaged characters, and featuring 
costume design as character short-hand‖ (41). Peranson laments that film critics are 





festivals and concentrate their efforts on the larger business festivals. As we shall see in 
chapter 8, the business film festival can be credited with catapulting the career of Wong 
Kar Wai, who might otherwise have been drowned out in Hong Kong‘s mass market 
entertainment productions.  
CIRCUIT MODEL 
The disconnection of the above mentioned fields from one another hinders the 
understanding of Hong Kong cinema. I would propose a circuit model to connect the 
fields and integrate their approaches. I would add the finance and discourse sectors to the 
production-consumption circuit and situate the Hong Kong film industry in an 
international context.  
Figure 1: Circuit Model 
 
 
The discourse sector includes not only local critics, government censors, and the 
funding committee, but also international the film festival jury, overseas film critics and 
the academy. This sector has the discursive power and can translate such intangible 
power into material power. The finance sector includes not only the domestic theater 
owners who funded the production, but also overseas distributors, insurance companies, 





In the production sector, Hong Kong cinema followed the commercial cinema‘s 
rule of matching star, genre and market. It also had the industry auteur who is both 
industry savvy and yet projects a romantic image of an autonomous artist. But its 
organization was relatively horizontal and had a duo-department structure with the 
director heading the creative department and the producer leading the administrative 
department. Hong Kong filmmakers adopted a director-centric production approach with 
the producer playing a supportive role. Even though they also adopted the practice of 
writing by committee, the script was not used as blueprint for production as in 
Hollywood, and the screenwriter served more like the director‘s service provider. The 
directors with creative control were usually industry-savvy and served also as producers, 
writers and even agents. So I would propose to insert the authorship approach to 
Bordwell et al.‘s capitalist machine model. 
The Hong Kong film industry was weakest in the distribution sector but it also 
had more alternative platforms such as the European film festival, the American 
independent film festival and independent production, the traditional Southeast Asian 
market distribution network and the newer East Asian network. In the exhibition sector, 
Hong Kong cinema suffered most from the high rent land policy and censorship rules of 
the colonial government. The censorship rules gradually loosened up as Hong Kong 
approached 1997. The rent dropped during the financial crisis but so did the box office. 
The government set the political parameters by limiting what was legal to be shown to 
the public in local theaters. Theater owner-financiers set the economic parameters for the 
industry by funding what they thought was commercially viable. In the discourse sector, 
Hong Kong cinema was not affected by a government funding committee, which didn‘t 
exist during the colonial period. Local film critics did not diminish Wong Jing‘s career 





Wave phenomenon and recognized Wong Kar Wai‘s artistry in his debut commercial 
film before he turned completely to art film productions. The finance sector, helping the 
industry to get a living space beyond its tiny domestic market and colonial government 
censorship, molded Hong Kong cinema into various forms such as regional cinema, 
Diaspora cinema, transnational cinema and implemented switching between the studio 
system and independent production. 
Each sector is interrelated to each other.  This is a system with multi-directional 
closed-circuit feedback loops. It was also autonomous in that it could run by itself and 
balance various historical forces. In the 1990s as a cottage industry heavily dependent on 
its constantly shifting overseas markets, it operated on a more horizontal and flexible 
organization structure. Like Hollywood, it had a market-driven system and relied on star 
and genre for its commercial operation. Like a national cinema, it was a space for non-
Hollywood filmmaking. Like European cinema, it has its regional network, adopted a 
director-centric production approach, and served as a cultural forum to deal with common 
issues in East Asia. If it was like a bricoleur, borrowing bits and pieces everywhere, how 






―Every business has its ups and downs. Have you ever seen Hong Kong cinema 
dead?...Hong Kong cinema is like a phoenix. Every time after the fire, it becomes 
prettier and flies higher. A phoenix will not be burnt by fire. The matter is how 
long we have to stay in the fire.‖ -Wong Jing 
 
SECTION II  
THE BAMBOO CINEMA 
HOW DID HONG KONG CINEMA, WITH ITS INHERENT SHORTAGE, 
SURVIVE IN A HOSTILE AND COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT? 
In the 1990s Hong Kong cinema went through a trial of fire and is now in its 
glacial epoch.  Wong Jing‘s comment above in 1995 might be overoptimistic, but the 
history of Hong Kong cinema has been, in fact, characterized by an alternation between 
death and rebirth. The development of Hong Kong and its cinema has not followed 
existing theoretical models. The Imperialist view of Hong Kong rising to become a 
modern metropolis, from a small fishing village, owing to the tranquility of colonization, 
is a myth. However, the dependency theory‘s crude prescription of ―once colonized 
always devastated‖ cannot aptly describe Hong Kong either.  Hong Kong had become a 
world-class city by the time of the sovereignty change, in contrast to dependency theory‘s 
assumption. There was an industrialization of the economy by the elite-group 
government, as world systems theory would assume, but the Hong Kong film industry 
was not part of a government economic plan. Its development was not steered by the 
state, and its history has not been characterized by succession of industry moguls.  
Neither the system of the industry, nor the movies were homogenized by Hollywood as 
Cultural imperialism theory would predict. In the 1990s Hong Kong cinema flourished 
throughout the world, by creating independent productions in a cottage industry without 





the opposite of the grand design of a modern business enterprise as Tino Balio describes 
of Hollywood in the 1930s.  But Hong Kong cinema stayed with the people while ruling 
regimes came and went.  During the imperialist era, the Chinese film industry could not 
keep the studios integrated when even the Chinese government could hardly keep the 
country integrated.  During the postwar nation- building era in Asia, when protectionism 
was the norm, Hong Kong cinema was situated in an open port, and became an oddity for 
not being dominated by Hollywood. It survived without state protection and thrived 
without expanding like Hollywood. How did Hong Kong cinema survive the harsh 
conditions in the past and thrive in the competitive environment of the 1990s? The 
history of the Hong Kong film industry does not fit into a linear development model: 
from pre-modern to modern, from cottage industry to studio system, or from director 
cinema to producer cinema.  Its development plainly did not follow Hollywood model.  
In Western culture, the Three Little Pigs fairy tale is enshrined with the moral that only 
the third pig‘s house, made of hard brick instead of straw and sticks, is the ultimate model 
of a house adequate to withstand the wolf‘s huff and puff.  In real life it is impossible and 
impractical to build a hard brick house like Hollywood, without the political might and 
material power like that of the U.S.  In the age of globalization a closed national market 
and insulated national cinema becomes unfeasible as the world‘s interdependence is 
heightened.  Hong Kong cinema, situated in a colony, a diametrically opposite situation 
compared to the U.S.‘s superpower status, could not exclude external actors from its 
domestic authority structure.  In Chinese culture bamboo is a symbol of vitality and 
longevity because it survives by bending with the wind.  This section is about how this 
bamboo cinema, situated in an open city, developed a system adapted to its particular 
insecure habitat and withstood the huff and puff of external forces, and explains how this 





context.  It was flexible not only at the production level, but also in its industry structure.  
At the production level, the ―anything-goes‖ filmmaking style was practiced throughout 
the industry. The industry alternated between the studio system and independent 
production in accordance with the political and economic climate of Hong Kong and the 
region. Instead of expanding into a modern business, the history of Hong Kong cinema 
was characterized by mixture. In the 1990s it was like a juvenile centenarian: the films 
are vibrant and full of youthful energy, but the operation of the industry looked pre-
modern despite its nearly one-hundred years of history. Its history was one of crumbling 
down and rebuilding. While Hollywood is like a pyramid with its perennial major studios 
as its broad foundation, Hong Kong cinema is like a collective of jugglers balancing on a 
moving unicycle. Nevertheless, Hong Kong cinema, with the city‘s geopolitical 
significance and various historical factors, enjoyed relative stability.  There were some 
consistencies in Hong Kong cinema: it was consistently commercial and transnational, it 
adopted a director-centric production approach even in the studio era, and it adopted the 
same mode of financing (the ―pianhua‖ system), and the matching of star-genre-market 
served as the key support of the industry.  On the one hand there were forces that set the 
ground rules: the colonial government maintained political censorship and dictated what 
was legally permissible to be shown in local theaters, while the exhibition sector-
financiers insisted on greater economic control in prescribing what star and genre were 
commercially viable.  But on the other hand filmmakers were breaking these restrictions 
by exploring alternative financing, distribution, and exhibition options.  In the production 
sectors there were changes in practice to keep up with the times as Hong Kong cinema 
broadened its overseas markets.  There were various cultural translators to help promote 
Hong Kong cinema‘s cross-cultural appeal, and yet the production approach remained 





Hong Kong New Wave generation had to keep up with modern packaging and marketing. 
The was a rise of women production executives to deal with the increasingly complicated 
financial and administrative logistics of runaway productions, and the new younger 
generation of screenwriters humbled themselves to become service providers for the 
director.  Like Hollywood, the source of the strengths of Hong Kong cinema also came 
from within, i.e. reaching an equilibrium by balancing various historical forces.  While in 
classical Hollywood the studios were the sites of a convergence of forces, in Hong Kong 
it‘s the entire film industry, which was collectively almost the size of one Hollywood 
studio, balanced various social, industrial, technological, economic, and aesthetic forces.   
Hong Kong cinema has both the positive and negative symbolic characteristics of 
bamboo.  Situated in a hybrid culture, it can be disavowed as ―jūksīng‖ (bamboo cane), 
one that is hollow on the inside because of its impure Chinese culture and nomadic 
characteristics, but it can also be embraced as part of the nation‘s heritage by being the 
cultural bridge between the East and West. It likewise can serve as a link between the 
modern and the traditional, like a bamboo scaffold still being used in constructing 
modern architecture. Hong Kong cinema entered the modern world market with its 
traditional perennial genre, the martial arts film.  In the West it can be seen as the dated 
chopsocky in Chinatown video shops, but can also be appropriated for high tech sci-fi in 
Hollywood. Unlike the traumatic interruptions experienced by commercial cinema in 
China and Taiwan, Hong Kong commercial cinema has had a continuous history of 
prolific filmmaking. It adapted to its extreme environment by bending with circumstances 
to the point of being seemingly spineless. Like bamboo as a strong building material, it 
could survive harsh conditions and grow easily, extremely quickly and in multiple 
climates. In the 1980s and early 1990s Hong Kong cinema grew very quickly, became 





boomed like the ominous bamboo blossoming when the industry was in a dire situation.  
We have yet to see if it can again bounce back and grow like bamboo shoots after the 
spring rain. The following two chapters are about how Hong Kong cinema worked in the 
past and in the 1990s in its specific historical context.  In the past, Hong Kong, being a 
British colony with the China reunification factor looming on the horizon, has survived 
by maintaining an unsteady balance between the British and the Chinese forces. Situated 
in such a precarious city, Hong Kong cinema has survived by maintaining its flexibility 
by constantly adapting its industrial structure and filmmaking practice, without being 
forced to insulate itself like national cinema or being compelled to expand like 
Hollywood. During the transition period in the 1990s with the political anxiety induced 
by the Sino-British conflict, economic fluctuation due to speculative and international 
forces, and social instability due to a massive outmigration of the middle class and 
accumulated hidden social conflicts, Hong Kong was like a jungle on fire. To maintain its 
competitive edge to survive in an intensified global market, the Hong Kong film industry 
further streamlined itself like a legless bird, cutting off all means of retreat and 
subordinating its long-term interests to immediate survival. 
The development pattern of Hong Kong cinema shows the inadequacy of existing 
theories and methodologies in dealing with the film industry of a non-nation entity like 
Hong Kong. Hong Kong cinema was born under unusual circumstances. It was an oddity 
in the world in the past, and a theoretical conundrum in the present, but it is not an 
exceptional case as we can see in view of the recent rise of other East Asian cinemas, also 
from countries in a political limbo status. They, too, are exploring their own paths, 
developing systems adapted to their particular habitat and do not indiscriminately imitate 
the Hollywood model or have a government powerful enough to enduringly block out 






Chapter 4: A Flexible Cinema in a Precarious City 
Hong Kong cinema has its inherent deficiencies. The domestic market was petite 
and the film industry was miniscule. Situated in a dependent territory, it went through 
multiple threats of annihilation and debilitating censorship by various regimes. Located at 
the geographical periphery of China, as a dialect cinema for mass entertainment operating 
in a Western power‘s colony and characterized by low budget commercial quickies, it 
suffered cultural denigration due to its marginal status in Chinese culture. Annexed as a 
trade port and located at the South gate of China, with its population made up mostly of 
refugees and migrants who constantly migrated in and out, Hong Kong society was 
characterized by its mobile population and social unrest. Life in this city in the early 
years was not associated with harmony, stability or prosperity. Hong Kong before the 
1990s suffered political uncertainty, economic instability, social unrest, and cultural 
denigration and it never had a gradual and independent development. Despite all of these 
handicaps, the Hong Kong film industry maintained prolific record of filmmaking long 
before the Hong Kong economy took off in the late 1970s. How did Hong Kong cinema 
cope with adversity in the early years in an adaptive manner and bounce back?   
The history of Hong Kong and Hong Kong cinema has been characterized more 
by chaos and uncertainty than tranquility and predictability. From personal life planning 
to business operation to government administration, long-term planning and elaborate 
research and development were more the exception than the norm. The Hong Kong film 
industry, with its studio system being more the exception than the norm, unlike Schatz‘s 
description of classical Hollywood with four decades of relative stability, was never in 
extended equilibrium. As Ming K. Chan argues, ―maintaining a precarious balance‖ was 







survival of Hong Kong cinema was also characterized by maintaining a precarious 
balance, and a constant renewal of its system and films to adapt to its constantly changing 
milieu. In the last one hundred years there were multiple pronouncements of the death of 
Hong Kong cinema, indicating both the grave situations that Hong Kong cinema had 
constantly been facing, and the strength of Hong Kong cinema to prevail. Before the 
1990s, the history of Hong Kong cinema is characterized by rapid cycles of boom and 
bust. Hong Kong cinema and its filmmakers, with no control over its external 
environment, adapted to the changing local, regional and international environments not 
only by being flexible down at the level of everyday filmmaking practice, but also up to 
the level of market structure transformation. The early years have prepared Hong Kong 
cinema to develop adaptive mechanisms early on to survive in Hong Kong‘s precarious 
political, economic and cultural context. These mechanisms enabled filmmakers, who 
thrived in the chaos and facilitated Hong Kong cinema, to survive in the 1990s, a decade 
characterized by intense political anxiety and economic fluctuation caused by 
globalization and sovereignty change. Over the years Hong Kong cinema has developed a 
successful adaptive defense system to fit its particular volatile habitat. 
Hong Kong cinema has many inherent deficiencies when compared to 
Hollywood, but it also has a lot of inherent competitive advantages when compared with 
neighboring cinemas, especially Chinese and Taiwanese cinemas. For example, due to 
various historical contingencies, paradoxically, Hong Kong benefited from the world‘s 
asymmetric power structure and became a privileged player while it was still a colony, 
and Hong Kong cinema gained structural and cultural advantages from Hong Kong‘s 
strategic geopolitical position. When compared with neighboring countries in Asia, Hong 
Kong was relatively stable and better off. Politically, despite its colonial status, it went 





experienced by other former colonies. Economically, despite its vulnerability, it was 
congruently defined and supported as an economic city by the major powers and thus 
prospered as a trading port. Socially, despite its highly mobile population (40% plus 
born-outside-Hong Kong population and continual two-way immigration), the majority of 
the population is Chinese, speaking the local dialect and saving Hong Kong from severe 
ethnic conflict but also benefiting the city with a dynamic cultural exchange and youthful 
population as in other immigrant societies. Culturally, despite the marginalization of its 
Southern and colonial culture, Hong Kong is situated at the junction of two major 
network civilizations, namely the ―chopstick culture‖ of the Chinese and the Anglosphere 
of the English. Such a combination of hybrid culture makes Hong Kong‘s cultural 
products accessible to a large part of the world‘s population. What follows is the 
paradoxical history of Hong Kong and Hong Kong cinema. Politically as a colony Hong 
Kong was a midget survivor in international politics; Economically, it was a giant in the 
region and in the world, but vulnerable to international and speculative forces; Socially, it 
was a significant transfer port of the global Chinese social nexus; Culturally it was a 
conjoined twin by being at the junction of English and Chinese cultures. Operating in 
such a city, Hong Kong cinema was a political Laputa not tied to any grounded territory 
and ruling regime, an industrial amoeba changing its form when it moved and a cultural 
chameleon that changed its outlook according to its target markets. 
A PRECARIOUS CITY 
Despite the vicissitudes on the outside, the colonial government and later the SAR 
government maintained a certain consistency in ruling Hong Kong, such as the colonial 
governmental features, the trade-oriented economic policy, and a lop-sided economic 
development structure as well as an acquiescence to corporate domination. The 





Chinese elites while claiming consensus building. After World War II with the rapid 
defeat of the British in Asia, the myth of the invincibility of the British Empire was 
destroyed and the rise of independence movements in Asia seriously challenged the 
colonial government‘s legitimacy. The need for a consensus government prompted the 
growth of advisory committees. The colonial state claimed it was a ―government by 
consultation‖ but in fact the government only listened to the elites (S. W. K. Chiu; 
Manuel). The advice from the committees had to be approved by the Legislative Council 
and Executive Council and from the late 19th century to the 1980s. These two councils 
were made up of representatives appointed by the governor rather than popularly elected 
by the society. In 1951, for example, Stephen W. K. Chiu quotes from Sorby‘s study 
(1968) (S. W. K. Chiu 154) almost all of the unofficial members of the two councils were 
businessmen from the banking industry, merchant ‗hongs‘, property development, and 
public utilities. There were no representatives from the working class. It was an 
executive-led government. As C. K. Lau points out, the quintessential art of government 
in Hong Kong was consensus building (30). As Gren Manuel describes, in the 1970s and 
1980s the government would attempt to defend unpopular policies by saying that they 
had been passed by an advisory committee (245). The British perfected this arrangement 
of co-opting the Chinese elite into the system, but the last governor Patten attempted to 
introduce political reform in Hong Kong. With the rise of political parties, this old system 
inevitably became undesirable. Nevertheless, when SAR Chief Executive Tung Chee-
hwa came to power, he not only revived this old system, but also set up many more 
committees and advisory bodies. Manuel points out that almost every aspect of life had a 
government advisory committee to look after it.  However, like the colonial government, 
the SAR government has a bias towards lawyers and businessmen. The Democrats and 





Manuel quotes from DeGolyer that at the time of the handover, Tung‘s advisers were 
almost all businessmen aged over 50 who were born in China. DeGolyer predicted that 
Tung would end up out of touch with the community. In Tung‘s Elderly Commission, 
whose purpose was to help the elderly poor, there were no elderly members on the 
committee and women were underrepresented as usual.    
The economic development of Hong Kong was consistently lopsided. The 
economic power transition in Hong Kong was smooth and it began long before the Sino-
British talks in the 1980s. It started at the grass-root level without state intervention.  As 
Stephen W. K. Chiu analyzes, in other post-colonial countries, ethnic cleavage was a 
major factor in shaping the state-capital relationship with state intervention. In Hong 
Kong, British capital dominated the Hong Kong economy and the power of hongs and 
banks was even higher than that of the governor. But there was no ethnic conflict 
between the colonialists and the indigenous society. When Hong Kong Chinese 
businessmen started to challenge the British hongs monopoly in the late 1970s, this didn‘t 
prompt the state to intervene. The Chinese businessmen meticulously planned the buying 
and selling of shares in the stock market, an open game originally set up by the British 
merchants. From the 1950s to the 1970s, it was the peak of British hongs‘ monopoly of 
the stock market. But like their diplomatic corps back in 1898, arrogance characterized 
the British hongs and colony state. As we shall later, uncertainty of the future gave local 
Chinese industrialists an advantage over the British traders who made blunders in the 
market and eventually lost out to the Chinese. In the 1990s, the stock market remained 
the major arena of business battles. The property market became the driving force of 
economic growth and was open to international competition. Hong Kong remained a free 
port with an open economy as the British originally planned. As a demonstration unit of 





defined as an economic city no matter whom the sovereign power was. Stability and 
prosperity are of paramount importance for business. The Hong Kong film industry, like 
other Hong Kong Chinese industries before the 1970s, was not taken over by the state 
and British hongs. Commercial film making remained in the hands of the Chinese and 
was never interrupted (except during the Japanese occupation) as in China and Taiwan. 
The Hong Kong economy, characterized by corporate feudalism, was far from a 
neoclassical utopia. Throughout history, the Hong Kong economy was never laissez-faire 
and non-market forces played a key role in steering its development. As a colony, Hong 
Kong‘s economy started as typically colonial with the British monopolizing the major 
sectors of finance, transportation, public utilities and trading, etc. The role of the 
administration was to protect the interests of the trade-finance complex. Richard Hughes 
sums up the concentration of power and wealth in Hong Kong in his 1968 book: ―Power 
in Hong Kong, it has been said, resides in the Jockey Club, Jardine and Matheson, the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Governor – in that order‖ (17). During the Cold 
War, the U.S.‘s maneuvers restructured the Hong Kong economy so as to keep Hong 
Kong a free port (Turner 130). Like other developed countries, Hong Kong had China 
serving as its economic hinterland, supplying low price foodstuffs since the 1950s 
(Schiffer) and cheap labor and materials since the Open Door policy. In the 1970s the 
British hongs were gradually acquired by Chinese- owned corporations. In the 1990s, the 
players and the playing field became more international, but the Hong Kong economy 
remained dominated by the corporations.  
As Ming K. Chan points out, Hong Kong as a Chinese city under British rule 
survived the last one and a half centuries by maintaining a precarious balance between 
China and Britain ("Hong Kong's Precarious" 5). Besides these two sovereign powers, 





however brief, forever changed the British Empire‘s position of supremacy in Asia. The 
United States, replacing Britain as the hegemonic power in the world, played a significant 
role in re-assembling the balance of power in the region and shaping the development of 
East Asia. Japan bounced back and became the most affluent country in the region, and 
the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs), like the Asian Four Tigers, rose up with the 
United States‘ assistance. One hundred and fifty years ago, Hong Kong started as a 
Crown colony with a typical colonial comprador economy with key economic sectors 
dominated by the British hongs and the society suffering under Apartheid. But, one and a 
half centuries later, Hong Kong became a Chinese-dominated cosmopolitan city. This 
change of political sovereignty occurred without any violent anti-colonialism bloodshed. 
The shift of economic dominion from the British to the Chinese happened without a 
drastic nationalization campaign. Hong Kong changed from a fishing village to a world-
class city without fanfare. What was consistent amidst this dramatic transformation was 
that Hong Kong remained a de-politicized free port and expanding cultural nexus. To 
maintain the delicate balance of power in the region, it was in the major powers‘ interest 
to keep Hong Kong politically neutralized and economically fortified. There was no 
civilizing mission by the British, or cultural mission by the Communists. Throughout its 
history, Hong Kong has served as the transit station of people, capital and goods. This 
particular historical context provides a structural and cultural context that has favored a 
transnational commercial cinema.   
In international politics Hong Kong is a dwarf vulnerable to the major powers‘ 
pressure. However, despite Hong Kong‘s marginal political status, it occupies a 
significant geopolitical position to those with vested interest in the region. Being treated 
as an atypical colony by Britain and given a Special Administrative Region (SAR) status 





international and domestic political scene, the government policy has been adaptive. With 
the rise and fall of Empires and coming and going of power blocs, there was also a power 
shift in domestic politics. The administration style of Hong Kong changed from that of a 
high-handed colonial government, to an executive-led government with advisory 
committees. The government made further accommodations as the local Chinese rose in 
power in the economic realm and with the growing significance of the China factor in 
Hong Kong‘s affairs. 
The foreign policies and rise and fall of the three major powers (Britain, China 
and the United States) greatly influenced the fate and shaped the development of Hong 
Kong. Hong Kong was originally annexed as the British Empire‘s Far East outpost. 
Britain‘s particular imperialist policy in East Asia had changed the post-colonial fate of 
East Asia to be considerably different from that of the other continents. The China factor 
never diminished in Hong Kong and in the region, despite the shattering of the Celestial 
Empire in the 19th century and the containment of Communist China in the mid-20th 
century. In the late-20th century China‘s economic reform and national unitary plan made 
Hong Kong a peculiar part of China and made the Hong Kong-China connection ever 
more important to each other. The United States replaced Great Britain as the world‘s 
hegemonic power after World War II. Its Cold War political engineering had an 
enormous impact on the contour of development in the Asia Pacific region. Its economic 
involvement in Hong Kong restructured the Hong Kong economy to be more open to the 
world. What these major powers all had in common in their Hong Kong policy was an 
intention to keep Hong Kong politically neutral, economically strong and socially stable.  
To protect their vested interests, no extreme interruption or radical action was permitted.  
Britain‘s imperialist policy in China and Hong Kong was different from that on 





one colonizer, Britain, and it returned to its previous sovereign state, China. Both Britain 
and later China regarded Hong Kong first and foremost an economic city. As Steve 
Tsang argues, the British Empire in East Asia was primarily interested in trade and 
economic benefits rather than in territorial acquisition. Britain had no intention to exploit 
and develop Hong Kong‘s natural resources. Nor did it have a civilizing mission. As 
Tsang puts it, the British policy in China was a classic manifestation of ―imperialism of 
free trade.‖
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 Instead of scrambling for concessions with other powers, the British 
preferred China to be kept in one piece, whereby the trade between Britain and Hong 
Kong would serve as an important conduit to the China trade. It was in the British interest 
to maintain Hong Kong as an apolitical commercial city and detached from the politics in 
China. As Tsang analyzed, ―(Hong Kong) Located at the edge of China, with promoting 
trade and economic exchanges with China as its raison d‘etre, the interests of the British, 
which were overwhelmingly economic, could not be advanced by Hong Kong being 
embroiled in Chinese politics‖ (Modern History 83). Britain‘s policy for Hong Kong was 
to ensure Hong Kong was politically detached from Chinese politics, socially stable and 
economically active. The China factor always loomed over Hong Kong and kept Britain 
in check. Unlike other colonies, Hong Kong was only on lease.34 Unlike other territories 
that China was forced to lease in the 1890s, the lease of Hong Kong ran its full 99-year 
course. Although the political status of Hong Kong actually depended on the rise and fall 
of major powers, China, interestingly, honored this lease, even though it was signed 
under a humiliatingly unequal treaty. There has been a long tradition of Chinese 
resistance to British colonial rule in Hong Kong since 1840s (R. Cai). In the postwar 
years, the China factor was evident in many local resistance incidents (Tsang). 
Geographically, China is attached to Hong Kong, but it did not take advantage of earlier 





against Western colonial rule in Asia. It was to China‘s advantage to keep Hong Kong as 
an outlet to the outside world during the Cold War containment. After World War II the 
major powers‘ balance of power in Asia was upset. With Britain‘s rapid defeat, the 
British Empire in Southeast Asia and East Asia was disintegrating, but Britain never 
intended to relinquish its rule over Hong Kong. During the 1966-67 riots, the British 
colonial government, with its legitimacy seriously challenged, adopted a more 
accommodating approach in Hong Kong and worked out a more delicate diplomatic 
relationship with China. To maintain their sovereignty over Hong Kong, the primary 
focus of British foreign policy was to avoid any provocation of China. It was to Britain‘s 
advantage not to carry out any oppressive cultural mission to provoke further anti-
colonial rule riots, and it was out of such pragmatic considerations, not the colonial 
government‘s benign neglect, that Hong Kong cinema was allowed a living space. The 
governance between 1967 and 1997 was so ―soft‖ that Robert E. Mitchell coins it ―Velvet 
Colonialism.‖ During this time, the government pursued various pro-stability policies. 
For example, it developed a more transparent and efficient legal and institutional 
structure that encouraged trade and investment. It also adopted a more pro-active 
approach to social issues, such as the massive housing program where half of the 
population is presently residing.
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 More advisory committees were set up to build a more 
consensus-based government. Laws were established to restrict popular participation 
activities to prevent politically-inspired disruptions. In the post war years Hong Kong 
was a haven for the refugee-created population. The China factor that kept British 
colonialism in check, however, also impeded the development of democracy in Hong 
Kong. As C. K. Lau points out, Hong Kong changed from crown colony government 
system to an executive-led government. What was consistently absent was democratic 





like other British colonies. After World War II, the British Colonial Office started 
political reforms to prepare its colonies for self-government. However, the unstable 
situation in China in 1952 prompted the officials to halt the reforms in Hong Kong, and 
in 1953 the film censorship policy was officially established. Britain never intended to let 
go of Hong Kong, and China would never allow Hong Kong to be independent. What 
was absolutely certain was, in the case of Hong Kong, either as a British colony or a part 
of China, it would never be allowed autonomy.  
The ending of British colonial rule did not give Hong Kong more democracy. The 
sovereignty change was meticulously planned for more than a decade in advance to 
ensure a smooth transition. Hong Kong citizens were excluded in the Sino-British talks 
over the future of Hong Kong. After 1997, China would retain the colony governmental 
features and capitalist system in Hong Kong, by observing the principle of ―one country 
two systems,‖ a model originally designed for Taiwan. As Lee Kim-ming and Jack Yue 
Wai-chik point out, the Tung Chee Hwa administration demonstrated close continuity 
with the preceding colonial regime. ―The continuity is a logical corollary of the ‗through-
train‘ arrangement for a Hong Kong civil service…‖ As a demonstration unit of this 
political experiment as its raison d’etre, Hong Kong has to maintain ―stability and 
prosperity.‖ The interests of China – territorial integrity and economic modernization – 
could not be advanced by Hong Kong interfering with China‘s politics. Hong Kong is 
now part of China, but like Britain, China does not want Hong Kong being involved in 
Chinese politics either. China has no civilizing mission to stir up this colonial city, and 
promised not to make changes in Hong Kong for 50 years (i.e. until year 2046). This 
smooth transition in Hong Kong is in contrast with other turbulent and disruptive 
sovereignty changes and nationalist movements in Asia. Hong Kong was handled as an 





colonialism in check, but it also contained Hong Kong‘s democratic development. Social 
stability was of paramount importance in government policy during the transition period.  
The United States‘s Hong Kong policy, though almost imperceptible, greatly 
influenced Hong Kong‘s economic structure. It made Hong Kong‘s economy ever more 
open to the world and thus more vulnerable to international crisis. The United States 
replaced Great Britain as the new hegemonic power and assumed supremacy in the 
realms of the military, finance, commerce, industry and ideology after World War II.  
Interestingly, Hong Kong remaining a British colony shielded it from the United States‘ 
open and direct interference. During the Cold War years, the United States‘ foreign 
policy in the Pacific was focused on containing the communist bloc, which included 
Soviet Union, China and North Korea. The United States constructed the capitalist bloc 
to encircle and isolate the communist bloc. It provided economic aid, loans, industrial 
contracts, and opened its domestic markets to its East Asian allies like Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. The United States‘ patronage of its capitalist allies and its assault on 
communist enemies in East Asia had a profound impact on the contour of development in 
this region (Lai and So). The economic development in East Asia was geared towards 
international trade and integration into the world‘s capitalist system. The 1980s witnessed 
the rise of the Asian Four Tigers, the economic miracle achieved by four Asian Newly 
Industrializing Economies (NIEs), namely Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and 
Singapore. Hong Kong was not the United States‘ ally, but given the significance of 
Hong Kong‘s geopolitical position, Hong Kong fell within the United States‘ plan. As Yu 
and Cheng analyze, the United States had no Hong Kong policy before World War II. 
But in 1942-1960, the United States‘ Hong Kong policy was to maintain Hong Kong as a 
free port for international trade (Q. Yu and S. Cheng). To maintain Hong Kong‘s 





continue its colonial rule over Hong Kong instead of returning Hong Kong to Chang Kai-
shek‘s Chinese government. Free trade was the United States‘ Cold War long-term 
weapon against the communist bloc. Matthew Turner insightfully points out the contrast 
of Britain‘s oversight and aloofness with the United States‘ attentive involvement in 
Hong Kong‘s economy in the post-war years. For example, ―Britain had excluded the 
colony from direct economic aid since 1945 and offered no assistance to the several 
million refuges throughout the 1950s. By contrast, the United States gave US$3 million 
in direct aid, together with US$6 million in food‖ (39). To monitor the economic 
embargo the United States‘ research on Hong Kong‘s economy and industries was much 
more thorough than the perfunctory work done by the colonial government.  The United 
States‘ reports on Hong Kong factories included the work environment, new industries 
and potential for United States‘ direct investment. Turner describes the results of the 
United States‘ economic policy in Hong Kong as ―first destroyed, then rebuilt Hong 
Kong‘s economy…‖ ―The twists and turns of a Cold War policy that first prevented, then 
promoted, and finally controlled Hong Kong domestic exports…‖ (37). The United Sttes 
greatly influenced Hong Kong industrialists, traders, and designers and its policies were 
translated into products. Hong Kong‘s export-oriented manufacturing industries swiftly 
adapted to the United States‘ changing politics, policy and economic fluctuation.  Turner 
describes the Hong Kong model as flexible, diversified and imitative. Yu and Cheng‘s 
analysis was based on newly partially de-classified documents. Interestingly, the United 
States‘ post war Hong Kong policy was so indirect and imperceptible that even the 
Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate believed that Hong Kong 
was not on the radar of American foreign policy until as late as 1992 (Committee on 
Foreign Relations United States Senate, 1992). Britain was the United States‘ ally. Hong 





interference from the United States, the much stronger rising power.
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Nevertheless, the 
United States‘ policy was influential in restructuring the Hong Kong economy to cater to 
the United States‘ needs. The Hong Kong economy was made to be responsive to world 
market changes. It was so wide open that it became vulnerable to speculative economic 
activities and international crisis. 
Hong Kong went through the British Empire‘s velvet colonialism of economic 
revival, the United States‘ intense economic involvement, and integration into China, 
which was also heading to get on the global track. From Britain‘s imperialism of free 
trade, to the United States‘ internationalism of the free port, to China‘s nationalism of 
economic reform, Hong Kong was congruently defined as an economic city in their 
policies. In this international politics of free trade Hong Kong was politically neutered.  
Prosperity and stability have taken precedence over democracy. No democratic politics 
was encouraged by the United States or under the British or Chinese rule. In the 
interstices of international politics, Hong Kong survives but has remained vulnerable.  
Nevertheless, the post-war British Empire was diminished, the United States‘ interference 
in Hong Kong was indirect and post-Mao China‘s policy on Hong Kong was pragmatic.  
To maintain the delicate balance of power in Hong Kong and in the region, Hong Kong 
government policy was to avoid radical interruption and provocation. Generations of 
Hong Kong administrators have been adept in the tradition of negotiation and 
compromise to adapt to the changing environment. The early political formation of Hong 
Kong shapes a political culture of pragmatism and moderation and a society of 
ambivalent dual-allegiance, providing a favorable atmosphere and a fertile environment 
for the entertainment industry.    
In the economic realm Hong Kong was a vulnerable giant. Throughout its 





Kong‘s small and open economy made it susceptible to the attack of international 
speculative activities. In Hong Kong, an apt pupil of capitalism, the power shift in the 
economic realm was drastic even without changes in political sovereignty. In ancient 
Chinese history, Hong Kong was remote from China‘s economic center in the north. To 
the 19th century British Empire it was a ―barren rock‖
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and to the world, it was not even 
on the map yet. But, by the end of 20th century, its economic growth was ahead of its 
motherland. In 1995 it was eighth in the world, in terms of trading volume (Mo 82). It 
was the financial and communication center of the region with a per capita GDP higher 
than its first-world colonizer.
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 Contrary to the expected destiny of a former colony, 
Hong Kong transformed from a typical colonial comprador economy with the British 
dominating it, to a modern cosmopolitan economy with the local Chinese business in 
control. In the 1990s, Hong Kong remained a free port and open economy as the British 
originally planned. But the economy was much more locally driven and internationalized, 
instead of solely under the domination of British oligarchic power blocs. Contrary to the 
claim of a purposive laissez-faire policy, the colonial government economic policy has 
been adaptive and conservative in response to external factors.  Contrary to the expected 
fate of a small city with no protector, Hong Kong not only survived, but thrived despite 
desperate circumstances such as the British Empire‘s extortion for foreign exchange in 
the post-war years, the United States‘ blocking of Chinese trade and interfering in East 
Asia economies, and the growing power of Communist China etc. As Hong Kong‘s 
economy got more China- and regionally-oriented, Hong Kong corporations ventured 
further into the international market. In Chinese history, Hong Kong is located at the tip 
of the ―Southern Barbarian‖ region vis-à-vis the Central Plain of the Celestial Empire.
39 
It 
was far away from the economic center in the north. Since the Ming dynasty (1366-





middlemen of a multi-cultural network as a result of China‘s multi-national network of 
investment and trade (Fok). In the 19th century, the arrival of Western imperialists from 
the sea created trading centers along the coastal treaty ports. Foreign invasions, 
government corruption, civil war and various disasters have caused turmoil in China for 
the last couple of centuries. People from the devastated Southern coastal area looked for 
asylum or economic opportunities overseas, particularly in Southeast Asia and North 
America.  These overseas Chinese gradually formed a bamboo network: a financial and 
social network of ethnic Chinese. The Taiping Movement (1851-1864), the largest 
peasant uprising in China‘s history, drove people from the Southern provinces further 
down to Hong Kong seeking asylum. Under British jurisdiction and shielded from 
Chinese political struggles, Hong Kong gradually replaced Canton as the main exchange 
center of labor, goods and capital for the international bamboo network. Hong Kong 
benefited from British administration and became a privileged player in the world ahead 
of its neighbor. Very early on, the government built the infrastructure and set the policy 
for international trade, originally meant to benefit the British corporations. But astute 
Hong Kong Chinese were quick to exploit their opportunities. As in other colonies, Hong 
Kong‘s economy was altered by the imperialist powers. Local primary industries like 
fishing and agriculture gradually declined. But unlike other crown colonies, Hong Kong 
was not utilized to produce raw materials and foodstuffs for the empire‘s industrialized 
metropolitan center and thus avoided retarding its own industrialization and development.  
Initially Hong Kong was used by the British as a giant warehouse for the opium trade. It 
developed quickly in the shipping, financial and telecommunication sectors and after the 
banning of the opium trade, trading became diversified. The telephone was introduced in 
Hong Kong one year after its invention. More infrastructures for international trade, such 





as an adherence to a free port policy and small government were established in the early 
colonial days (Tsang Modern History; Faure and Lee). Very early on the colonial 
government‘s economic policy established itself as conservative and adaptive.  The 
government‘s strong adherence to a conservative financial policy has facilitated Hong 
Kong‘s financial autonomy. Britain‘s emphasis on the colonies‘ financial solvency and 
self-sufficiency reinforced the financial conservatism of the colonial state.  As Stephen 
W. K. Chiu points out, both the colonial government and the Colonial Office were 
anxious to maintain the colonies‘ financial solvency in order to protect their 
administrative independence. The financial policy in Hong Kong was extremely 
conservative. Hong Kong was annexed only as a conduit for China trade. Britain did not 
intend to pay for administering this ―borrowed‖ trading port, so Hong Kong had to limit 
itself to a small government and minimum public expenses. Prior to the Second World 
War, the colonial government was run by only 33 administrative officers, occupying 23 
offices (Tsang Modern History 24). After the war in the late 1950s, there were still fewer 
than 50 administrative officers (Mo 165). In the early 1950s, the size of the public sector 
was below 10%. Even at its highest, it was only 20%, still lower than the 30% of the 
United States and Japan, two contemporary market economy countries (Mo 97). The 
colonial government had only limited liability and expenses owed to the citizens in terms 
of social security. There was little expenditure on national security, a major factor for the 
growing size of governments in many countries in the post-war years. As Hong Kong 
was not a nation-state, it could not get foreign loans like a developing country in the case 
of financial crisis. After the war, the Hong Kong government consistently maintained a 
budgetary surplus in order to avoid financial control by the British Treasury (Tsang 
Modern History). In the few decades after the war, the Hong Kong government 





102). Such a conservative financial policy allowed Hong Kong to be financially 
autonomous from its colonizer Britain, and also avoid emergency assistance from the 
world‘s largest loaner, the United States. This conservative financial policy allowed 
Hong Kong (and the Hong Kong film industry) to circumvent Britain and the United 
States‘ financial interference. However, the governance in Hong Kong was not actually 
planning ahead, contrary to conventional belief, which credits Hong Kong economic 
boom to a purposeful positive non-interventionism or laissez-faire policy.
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The colonial 
government‘s policy for the development of Hong Kong was not guided by any 
foundational ideological schema, constitution, or following the spirit of any founding 
father, but simply by pragmatism: just being adaptive to their circumstances. Hong 
Kong‘s early colonial years were characterized by a British-dominated comprador 
economy focusing narrowly on trading. The British dominated the key sectors of the 
Hong Kong economy, such as the public utilities, public transportation, 
telecommunication, banking, shipment, real estate and hotels, etc. The Taipans of the 
British hongs were also members of the Legislative Council and the Executive Council, 
influencing the major political and economic affairs of Hong Kong (B. Feng). Chinese 
compradors acted as translators and middlemen. The majority of the local Chinese 
population, left alone by the government, were workers or engaged in trading business 
termed ―South and North stores‖ serving China and Chinese Diaspora communities 
mainly in Southeast Asia and North America. These ―South and North store‖ business 
activities, rarely documented by the colonial government, were already quite prosperous 
and of large scale. As the regional and global situations changed, within a few decades, 
Hong Kong went through two major rapid economic transformations: the 
industrialization in the 1950s, and economic diversification in late 1970s. Both are 





opportunities that presented themselves. These transformations simultaneously pushed 
the Hong Kong economy to be more open to the world, and closer to an economic 
integration with China. The rapid industrialization in the 1950s extended Hong Kong‘s 
financial network and its role as a major trading center. The revival of Hong Kong‘s 
industry was, in fact, facilitated instead of being repressed by the British. The 
industrialization helped the rise of the previously neglected Chinese industrialists who 
later replaced the British hongs as the dominant bloc in Hong Kong‘s economy. In the 
1950s, the United Nations‘ and the United States‘ embargo against trading with China 
ended Hong Kong‘s role as China‘s premier entrepôt. After the Second World War, the 
deterioration of Britain‘s industrial economy and the sterling crisis made Hong Kong‘s 
financial contribution significant to the diminished British Empire, especially during the 
period of decolonization and the uncertain allegiance of former colonies to the sterling.  
Previously, British trade-oriented economic policy in Hong Kong overlooked Chinese 
industries, which were already established in the pre-war years. But in the post-war years, 
Hong Kong Chinese manufacturing enterprises were actively revived and promoted by 
the government in order to earn foreign exchange. As Alex H.K. Choi quotes from Susan 
Strange‘s studies, it was ―a bizarre situation, whereby foreign exchanges earned by tiny 
Hong Kong had become a major pillar supporting the ailing sterling empire‖ (qtd. in Choi 
185). By 1967, ￡350 million, one-third of Britain‘s total reserves, had been transferred 
from Hong Kong to be deposited in London. From the 1950s to the 1970s, it was the peak 
of the British hongs‘ monopoly. Before the 1970s, the hongs occupied 70% of listed 
companies and they dominated every major economic sector except the industrial sector. 
Arrogance characterized the British hongs, and they defined the colony state and entrepôt 
trade as the sole raison d‘etre of Hong Kong. The British merchants lacked interest in 





Tak-wing points out, the manufacturing industry, which gradually became the largest 
employment sector, was developed totally outside the imperial plan and the hongs‘ 
activities. This rapid industrialization generated new trade. It reinforced and expanded 
Hong Kong‘s role as a major trading center and turned Hong Kong into an entrepôt for 
the East Asia region. In addition, it induced the local Chinese and the expatriates to work 
more closely together. The Shanghai immigrant entrepreneurs, unlike their Cantonese 
counterparts, broke the barrier between the local Chinese and the expatriate communities. 
They approached British banks for loans for their enterprises. The British banks then 
started to get involved in financing the local manufacturing sector. As Tsang analyzes, 
―The British banks had the financial resources, expertise and ready access to the rest of 
the world through their excellent international financial networks. They became available 
to the local Chinese entrepreneurs who surpassed the long-established British hongs in 
exploiting the economic opportunities.‖(Modern History 167) Consequently, the financial 
network for Hong Kong entrepreneurs extended from the traditional bamboo network to 
East Asia and the world. As Tsang concludes, the British banks helped the local 
industrialists enter the international market. Hong Kong‘s economy took off towards the 
end of the 1960s. ―It combined to good effect the resources of entrepreneurial 
industrialists, expert exporters, trade financiers and international bankers‖ (Tsang 
Modern History 167). Taking advantage of the British financial resources, expertise and 
networks, local Chinese businesses went beyond the traditional ethnic Chinese markets. 
Interestingly, British colonization enabled Hong Kong Chinese businesses financially, 
and allowed them to expand globally. 
The 1970s diversification of the Hong Kong economy turned Hong Kong into a 
modern international financial center and capital market. By 1970s, as Tsang describes, 





banking, insurance and other business servicing facilities, a vibrant domestically driven 
local economy, an increasingly educated workforce, and efficient public services to 
support and sustain a modern economy‖ (Modern History 174).  In 1972, with the United 
States‘ President Richard Nixon visiting China, the diplomatic breakthrough and lifting 
of the embargo heralded China‘s opening to the world. Hong Kong‘s old role as the 
premier entrepôt of China was restored. Hong Kong‘s financial and commercial services 
boomed (Mo). In 1978, the lifting of a restrictive moratorium on new banking licenses 
attracted major foreign and international banks, including leading international merchant 
banks. As Tsang describes, their presence made Hong Kong more attractive to other 
major business servicing sectors, such as international law partnerships, accountancies 
and firms of consultants (Modern History). Hong Kong was turned into a leading modern 
international financial center. It was also a major capital market for local entrepreneurs, 
and the region as a whole, especially for the fast-growing economy of China. The growth 
was driven by a generation of younger local entrepreneurs with modern Western 
educations and management knowledge. In the 1990s, China replaced the United States 
as Hong Kong‘s major trading partner. The Hong Kong Chinese industrialists, previously 
neglected, accumulated capital and ventured into the real estate sector. As Feng Bangyan 
analyzes, the British hongs, due to the uncertainty of their long term commitment to this 
city, gradually lost out to the Chinese businesses after making blunders in their business 
strategies, in the manufacturing sector, real estate sector and the stock market. In the 
1990s, the stock market remained the major arena of business battles and the property 
market became the driving force of economic growth and was open to international 
competition. 
While there were the local Chinese conglomerates, the modern Hong Kong 





over 50% of Hong Kong‘s firms were SMEs. This can be attributed to the colonial 
government‘s post-war pro-stability economic policies, such as micro-economic 
intervention. As Jonathan R. Schiffer points out, the system of the Hong Kong economy 
was not an unfettered capitalism, despite the absence of macroeconomic development 
planning and government subsidies of industries. Non-market forces intervened 
significantly in all factor markets such as labor and land. For example, the government 
oversaw the regulation and steady supply of staple, highly subsidized public housing, and 
expanded human capital expenditure to ensure the workforce had the requisite amount of 
health, education and shelter to enable it to function properly in an industrial society. 
These actions contributed to economic stability and laid the cornerstone for the export-
oriented economy. In colonial Hong Kong, all land was Crown land and its supply was 
under government control. Government policy bended the land and labor markets to 
privilege certain types of industrial users. All these were favorable to the development of 
small-scale industries which were the backbone of Hong Kong‘s export-led economic 
growth.  In the regional context, the rapid growth of East Asia economies provided Hong 
Kong with an affluent and rising market. During World War II, industries in European 
countries were seriously damaged and thus drastically decreased their exports to Asia. 
For daily necessities, they even had to acquire products from Hong Kong and thus 
stimulated Hong Kong‘s industrial development. But after the European industries 
recovered, their products occupied East Asian markets again and Hong Kong‘s industry 
quickly declined. In addition, from 1948 the United States opened up Japan‘s economy, 
which added salt to Hong Kong‘s struggling industry‘s wounds.  Japan‘s products, which 
had a production cost 20-30% lower than that of Hong Kong‘s, were massively exported 
to Southeast Asia, taking over Hong Kong and its overseas markets (S. Liu). However, 





Hong Kong. Taiwan, after being expelled from the United Nations in 1971, pursued more 
aggressive economic growth and became one of the Asian Four Tigers.
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 In the 1990s, it 
had the highest foreign reserve in the world.  South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan all 
initially adopted protectionist policies and import substitute production. Later they went 
through industrialization and eventually, like Hong Kong, developed export-oriented 
economies. Amongst the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs), South Korea and 
Taiwan, the two key financiers of Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s, changed from being 
on the receiving end of foreign loans and subsidies to capital markets. As Lai and So 
describe, the economy of the NIEs changed from Americanization to Asianization. In 
strengthening the East Asia economies against the Communist bloc, the United States 
paradoxically enabled East Asian NIEs to be less dependent on it financially. The rise of 
China‘s market further facilitates inter-regional trade and regional autonomy and thus 
makes Asia even less dominated by the United States‘ economy. 
Hong Kong, instead of ended up a devastated colony, paradoxically was enabled 
by Britain‘s pro-trade colonial policy, the Hong Kong government‘s conservative fiscal 
policy and pro-stability administration, the United States‘ effort in strengthening East 
Asia capitalist allies, and China‘s economic reform to get on a global economic track. 
The early economic formation of Hong Kong has provided the infrastructure for the 
Hong Kong film industry to be transnational and commercial since its inception. The 
infrastructure for Small and Medium Enterprises for industry in general has facilitated the 
film industry to transform swiftly from the studio system to independent production 
within a couple of decades when the occasion required it. In the 1950s, the Hong Kong 
economy‘s industrialization coincides with the Cathay studio and Shaw studio moving 
their production centers to Hong Kong. The 1970s economic diversification coincides 





Power shifted from the integrated Shaw studio to Golden Harvest which contracted out 
its production with satellite companies. Run Run Shaw moved to the more insulated 
television market and continued his integrated studio production management style there. 
In the 1980s, when Hong Kong turned into a capital market for local entrepreneurs, 
Cinema City‘s rapid rise was attributed to support by a local theater chain Golden 
Princess as its major financier and the booming domestic market. As China‘s economic 
reforms deepened, a new economic nexus between China and Hong Kong intensified. 
Hong Kong-China co-production increased. Like the industrialized Western countries, 
Hong Kong benefited from China being its economic hinterland, providing land and 
labor. The Hong Kong film industry streamlined from studio production to independent 
production. In the 1990s, when the Hong Kong economy depended heavily on the service 
sector and Hong Kong became the financial and communication center of the region, 
Hong Kong cinema was spreading the fastest in the world market and the film industry 
was further streamlined. However, free trade did not set us free. With its small and open 
economy, Hong Kong remained vulnerable to international crisis. Hong Kong‘s petite 
and export-oriented film industry was overshadowed by competition and has declined 
since the mid-1990s. When the general economic environment became more locally 
driven and Chinese dominant, there was parallel development in Hong Kong‘s culture 
and society.   
In the social dimension, Hong Kong‘s society was characterized by its mobile 
population, and accommodation of the oppositional ideological camps of the Rightist and 
Leftist, the Chinese and the Western, the capitalist and the communist. Hong Kong is a 
Chinese cosmopolitan city. It has been the nexus of overseas Chinese, a network society 
straddling the gap between the Chinese and the outside world since the 14th century. In 





Chiuchow and Canton, emerged as the cultural middlemen because of their multi-national 
networks of investment and trade. The Taiping Movement (1851-1864), the largest 
peasant rising in Chinese history, drove massive numbers of Chinese from the Mainland 
to Hong Kong for asylum. In the 19th century, at the peak of the ―South and North 
stores‖ – the stores for transporting and trading goods between Northern and Southern 
China – Hong Kong served as the link between Mainland China and overseas Chinese. 
Hong Kong remained a Chinese society despite Britain‘s one and a half centuries of 
colonization. At the start, the British Empire administrated Hong Kong as a typical 
colonial apartheid society, with the mid-level area of Hong Kong Island reserved 
exclusively for European expatriate communities. While the Chinese population grew 
from a few thousand to over six million, the European expatriate community remained 
small, less than 2% of the total population throughout the colonial history of Hong Kong.  
Under the Peking Treaty signed between the Qing Dynasty and Britain in 1898, Chinese 
citizens could freely enter and leave Hong Kong. Hong Kong, with its population made 
up mainly of refugees and immigrants, was a migrant society, and not a settled one.  
Modern China went through foreign invasions, civil wars, riots, chaos and various man-
made and natural disasters. Hong Kong served as China‘s revolving door, with constant 
massive migration of Chinese in and out of the city. Whenever there were emergencies in 
China people fled to Hong Kong, and then moved back to China when the situation 
calmed down, or fled further to Southeast Asia or Western countries for asylum or 
economic opportunities. Such a mobile population created an unsettled ambience. Back 
then there could hardly be a distinctive cultural identity for the ―Hong Kong identity.‖ In 
the 1950s, Communist China closed its doors and thus impeded migration on a massive 
scale. With the post-war baby boom in the 1960s, Hong Kong started to have a sizable 





no memory of China until China was re-opened gradually in the 1980s. In the 1990s, 
60% of the population was local-born. Meanwhile in Taiwan, only 12% of the population 
was from Mainland China when the KMT retreated to the island in 1949 and the majority 
of the population was local born. The island has been under 50 years of Japanese rule and 
50 years of KMT rule. For one hundred years, the majority of the population has had no 
memory of China other than the depiction of China in Japanese or KMT education 
materials and media. The Cultural Revolution in China (1966-1976) and the 1967 riot in 
Hong Kong drove waves of migration in and out of Hong Kong again, and deepened the 
Hong Kong immigrant population‘s fear of Communist China. In the 1970s the Hong 
Kong economy took off, in sharp contrast with its closed-door developing motherland. In 
the 1980s the deadlock in Sino-British talks over the future of Hong Kong, and then the 
violent crackdown of China‘s democratic movement in 1989 pushed political anxiety to 
its peak. There was a massive migration of the middle class out of Hong Kong. From 
1990 to 1999 almost 10 % of the population migrated out of Hong Kong, and this group 
consisted mostly of well-educated professional and middle class people (Skeldon; Lam 
and Pak). This mobile population deepened the transnational character of Hong Kong 
culture. This transfer station of people, capital and goods has fostered an ambience of 
transience and pragmatism, generating a peculiar post-national social sentiment, an 
ambivalent double allegiance to the city and the nation, an idiosyncratic non-territorial 
based ―cultural nationalism‖ which is an identification with the Chinese civilization, but 
not necessarily with the ruling regime. While enjoying the material comforts in a colonial 
city and feeling ambivalence towards its motherland, Hong Kong was caught between 
British colonialism and Chinese nationalism, an in-between sentiment many Chinese of 
the Diaspora can relate to. In political limbo under a soft authoritarianism experiencing 





people in Newly Industrializing Economies in Asia can relate. This affective dimension 
of Hong Kong history, not documented in Chinese or English language in any official 
history, has instead been recorded in sight and sound within Hong Kong movies. 
A FLEXIBLE CINEMA 
Situated in a precarious city, Hong Kong cinema has been crisis ridden and the 
history of Hong Kong cinema was characterized by interruptions. There was the rapid 
rise and fall of film companies, speedy rise and fall of power blocs, and the swift change 
of trends. Hong Kong cinema has suffered from political pressure, economic crisis, and 
intermittent shutdowns of the entire industry. To adapt to its volatile milieu, it has 
changed its outlook, language, source of funding, target markets, mode of production and 
even the entire industry‘s market structure. What remains unchanging is that it is always 
commercial, transnational and entertainment-oriented and it has nurtured generations of 
commercial filmmakers who thrived in chaos. Within a five-hour flight from Hong Kong 
where half of the world‘s population resides, there are more than a dozen forms of 
polities and a few dozen languages, in contrast to the U.S. unity of language and political 
system under one nation. Nevertheless, Hong Kong was relatively stable – enough for 
film production, especially when compared with its neighboring Asian countries, which 
have gone through multiple foreign invasions, colonization, civil wars, or even the 
splitting of the country into antagonistic halves in the last couple of centuries. Some 
underwent various changes in government, ranging from monarchy, dictatorship, and 
republic to authoritarian. In the name of de-colonization, nationalization or liberation, 
these ruling regimes would have one official language replacing another, and impose 
strict and debilitative cultural policies, or even rewrite the country‘s history to fortify its 
legitimacy. People have been denied freedom of expression to speak out about their 





interference. Their cinemas have withered under the state‘s tight control or declined in 
the face of foreign domination. Hong Kong‘s film industry has witnessed British 
colonization, KMT‘s language unification policy, Japanese occupation, the impact of 
Communist China‘s Cultural Revolution, and Hollywood‘s domination of the Pacific 
region in post-war years. Hong Kong, despite its location in turbulent Asia and its status 
as a colony, has enjoyed a relatively stable society and autonomous culture. The Hong 
Kong film industry has managed to survive crisis by being flexible, adaptive and 
maintaining both a precarious balance and constant renewal. In the political dimension, 
Hong Kong cinema is like a Laputa, receiving no ideological guidance from the state, or 
at times being tied with political or financial power blocs which were more short-lived 
than the film industry itself. In terms of industrial structure, it is an amoeba, swiftly 
transforming from studio monopoly to independent production free market competition in 
the space of a couple of decades. In the cultural dimension, it has been like a chameleon, 
changing its outlook, language, genre, theme and style according to its sources of 
financing and its target markets. 
Hong Kong cinema has been characterized by its precarious balance between 
various forces and thus created a moderate ambience. As an entertainment industry in a 
colonial Southern city labeled as ―cultural desert‖ considered beyond redemption, Hong 
Kong‘s commercial filmmakers had no ideological baggage or reason to raise the mass‘s 
consciousness or legitimize the ruling regime. Under the colonial government‘s pro-
stability and trade-oriented administration, no radical political views or forces were 
tolerated, and political censorship was established to ensure of such absolute political 
neutrality. Radical filmmakers, whether from the Left or the Right were expelled. 
Political films were banned according to the censorship regulations when a film was 





before its public release, a practice in opposition to democratic principle. The Hong Kong 
film industry never grew important enough to be enlisted as a government propaganda 
tool or perceived as a threat to the ruling regime. No studio ever grew big enough to 
impede change in market structure. The biggest one, the Shaw studio, gradually gave way 
to independent production in the 1980s. No organization was strong enough to unify local 
filmmakers for a war effort. The Japanese, despite their military might, failed to organize 
Hong Kong filmmakers to make a propaganda films. No social force was strong enough 
to ―clean up‖ the entertainment industry. The pro-leftist Southern Chinese filmmakers, 
despite their enthusiasm, failed to continue their co-op filmmaking as their productions 
were not cost-effective and competitive enough to sustain their survival in the free 
market. The domestic market of Hong Kong cinema was not big and lucrative enough for 
Hollywood conglomerates to take more aggressive moves to monopolize the distribution 
and exhibition sectors. In Hong Kong cinema, there was neither extreme political stance 
nor big money and power.  
The development of Hong Kong cinema has been disruptive in character and 
sporadic in nature. Zhou and Li, coming from China, divide the history of Hong Kong 
cinema into three major periods along a political timeline.
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 They assume that Chinese 
politics was the central factor in determining the course of development of the Hong 
Kong film industry, which in fact, in contrast to the insulated Chinese film industry, was 
responsive to multiple international influences and multifaceted social and cultural 
factors. Zhou and Li‘s periodization overlooks the cyclical, meandering and erratic 
pattern of Hong Kong cinema‘s development. Chung Po-yin‘s effort to summarize and 
tidy up this disarray of incidents into a coherent narrative assumes the integrated studio 
system as the norm, and eternity and independent production as the interim and 





path of Hollywood or Chinese national cinema. I would prefer to present a rough 
chronological account here to show how volatile the environment was and how 
responsive Hong Kong film industry was to these changes. There is a strong sense of the 
random fate of life in this industry.  
The motion picture, like other Western novelties, was introduced to Hong Kong 
very early on (circa 1896). Movie theaters were soon built for regular screening. By 
1920s, theater chains were formed all over major Chinese coastal cities with Lu Gen and 
Lo Ming-yau (Luo Mingyou) dubbed ―King of the South China theater chain‖ and ―King 
of the North China theater chain‖ respectively. After World War I, the supply of 
European productions reduced drastically. Hollywood majors‘ binding long-term 
contracts, as well as the block booking and blind selling practices made it risky and 
unprofitable for Hong Kong theater owners. Lu Gen turned to Shanghai productions for a 
more favorable deal. The practice at that time was that the theater owners only had to pay 
the royalty fee to the Shanghai producers, and all box office income went to the theater 
owners. The theater owners did not have to share profits with the producers/distributors.  
In 1933, Lu Gen and Lo Ming-yau attempted to merge their giant theater chains in a 
challenge against the Hollywood majors‘ trust. The attempt failed but Lo Ming-yau went 
on to build the most powerful film studio in Asia, Lianhua, in 1932 with support from 
and involvement of Hong Kong‘s and China‘s most powerful business moguls, 
politicians, the triad, and overseas Chinese businessmen, etc. As Chung Po-yin describes, 
this integration of political and economic authorities and incorporation of the Northern 
and Southern China power blocs, is unprecedented in Chinese film history (Endnote).  
However, Lianhua was soon divided between the Leftists and the Rightists like the 





system and the star system were adopted in Shanghai, but it was impossible to sustain an 
integrated studio without an integrated country.   
In the 1920s, eighty years before Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (Ang Lee, 
2000) was shown in the West, martial arts movies with special effects were very popular 
in Shanghai and Hong Kong. The most notable one was Torching the Red Lotus Temple 
which has a total of eighteen episodes. It incorporated an early technology to show 
magical light and force emanating from swords, or palm thunder, or martial artists 
jumping on a wall or flying in the air. But in 1931, at the peak of its popularity, the Film 
Inspection Committee of the KMT Government banned it for its ―superstitious content‖ 
and ended the making of martial arts films in Mainland China. Later the Japanese 
occupation and the civil war led a number of filmmakers of these martial arts movies, 
such as Wang Yuanlong, Hong Zhonghao, Ren Pengnian, Wu Lizhu, Lu Jiping to 
migrate to Hong Kong, so the genre lived on and was revived in the early 1960s in 
Cantonese martial arts films. 
In the 1930s, sound films were popular. Shanghai and Hong Kong became the 
production centers of Mandarin and Cantonese films respectively. Luo Mingyou sent 
Moon Kwan to form the Da Guan film company in the United States. The first Cantonese 
film was financed, and targeted Cantonese in Guangzhou and overseas Chinese 
Cantonese in Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Malaysia and North America, relying on 
their big consumption power for its profit. At the same time the Shaw family‘s Tian Yi 
studio, seeing a similar lucrative opportunity, also moved to Hong Kong to target 
Cantonese-speaking Chinese in Southeast Asia. As early as 1910, China‘s ruling party, 
the KMT carried on the ―language unification movement.‖  Mandarin was chosen as the 
national language and dialect was banned in textbooks and as a language of instruction in 





the KMT government announced the banning of Cantonese film production. Even though 
Hong Kong was a British colony not under China‘s jurisdiction, the Cantonese market in 
China was too big for Hong Kong producers to lose. The filmmakers sent multiple 
petitions, and the ban was suspended for three years. According to Zhou and Li, the 
banning of Cantonese film production involved the plan of the Shanghai producers to 
seize the lucrative South China market. Interestingly, as Chung Po-yin describes, the 
outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937 reversed the fate of Cantonese cinema. With 
the KMT government banning Cantonese film production in China, Hong Kong became 
the asylum for Cantonese film production. And, because the KMT‘s Nanking 
Government was occupied with its anti-Japanese and anti-Communist propaganda film 
productions, it loosened its grip on Cantonese cinema. The Hong Kong film industry 
benefited from the southbound Shanghai filmmakers with an increased number of film 
companies and film productions. The China market was shut down.  Cantonese films 
were more exportable than Mandarin films to overseas markets in Southeast Asia since 
the early generation overseas Chinese came mostly from the South China coastal area.      
In the 1940s, the film industries in Taiwan and China were seized and centralized 
by the Japanese military as propaganda tool for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere. When the Japanese invaded Hong Kong, the British surrendered the city. The 
Japanese deemed Hong Kong ―strategically vital for the defense of the Greater East 
Asiatic Sphere‖ (Tsang Modern History 126). The underlying principle of Japan‘s 
occupation policy in Hong Kong was that ―Hong Kong‘s first and foremost function was 
to support the Japanese war effort.‖ Despite the threat of violence, and the lure of food 
rations, wealth and power, Hong Kong filmmakers changed jobs
43
 or fled. As they are 
usually described, Hong Kong filmmakers were like a sheet of loose sand, difficult if not 
impossible to unify.
44 





filmmakers was arrested and sent back to Japan. The Japanese military finally made one 
film, but with an all-Japanese cast and crew and a 17-year-old Hong Kong actress playing 
a side character who later also fled. Nevertheless, after the war this Cantonese actress was 
labeled a traitor for being in a Japanese film. The film was shown with little audience 
attendance. During the Japanese occupation, the Hong Kong film industry did not make 
one film. Zhou and Li attribute Hong Kong filmmakers‘ successful escape to Hong 
Kong‘s geographical location, with well-extended sea and land routes, whereas Shanghai 
filmmakers were trapped with no exit. Besides, to reduce the population burden, the 
Japanese military forced a large number of people to return to their South China 
hometowns. Hong Kong filmmakers escaped inland by mixing in the repatriated crowd. 
In Zhou and Li‘s account, there is some interesting detail that is worth mentioning. 
Canton Bay was French colony. It was divided into two districts. One was in fact under 
the domination of the local triads, against which the French could not intervene. Hong 
Kong filmmakers stayed on this side, while the Japanese official pursuing them could 
only stay at the other side. The Japanese official could not even lure the filmmakers to 
cross over to the other side to talk. While the Chinese government and the French could 
not mediate, the triad indirectly protected Hong Kong filmmakers from the Japanese 
military. After the war, there was almost a chance of Hong Kong returning to a Chinese 
government. Hong Kong lay inside the Allied powers‘ China theater
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 and Hong Kong 
was supposed to return to Generalissimo Chang Kai-shek‘s Chinese government. But, as 
Tsang reports, in the scramble for the liberation of Hong Kong, Chang‘s hands were full 
with his struggle with the Communists in China proper. Besides, a confrontation with 
Britain might jeopardize his relationship with the United States, and therefore Hong 





have been no more Cantonese cinema and no more ―superstitious‖ martial arts films with 
special effects.   
After the war, Hong Kong filmmakers returned and the Hong Kong film industry 
bounced back. In Taiwan and China the media industries were tightly tied to the state.  In 
Taiwan, the post-war film industry was firmly in the grip of the party, the state and the 
military to promote nationalism and the legitimacy of the KMT‘s rule in Taiwan. In 
China, filmmakers who worked for the Japanese-occupied studio were indicted for 
collaboration. Many fled to Hong Kong, bringing with them valuable talents, capital, 
machines, know-how, connections and entrepreneurial experience. They continued the 
tradition of the Shanghai filmmaker southbound migration. The Hong Kong Cantonese 
cinema used to be a small-scale cottage industry production. The exodus of Shanghai 
filmmakers and building of big studios changed the outlook of the Hong Kong film 
industry. The most prominent example is S. K. Chang (Zhang Shankun), who was then 
the leader of the Japanese occupied China United Film Company.
46
 After fleeing to Hong 
Kong, he later built his studio in Hong Kong with close political ties to Taiwan.
47
  In the 
1950s, with co-production with Japan, he maintained his contact with Kawakita 
Nagamasa, then vice-president of the China United Film Company (Fu "Struggle"). 
While the Chinese film industry let go of its valuable filmmakers and connections with 
Japan and Taiwan cinema, Chang‘s Taiwan and Japanese connection was brought 
forward to other Hong Kong studios like Shaw, and later Golden Harvest. Taiwan and 
Japan remained as important markets for Hong Kong cinema well into the 1990s.   
In the post-war years there was the parallel development of Mandarin cinema and 
Cantonese cinema. There were three major groups of Chinese filmmakers, and thus three 
modes of production. The first one was the Southbound Shanghai filmmakers, with their 





Cantonese cinema with their low budget quickies. The third one was the co-op production 
by the pro-Leftist South China Filmmakers organization. In 1949, this group declared a 
―Clean Up Cantonese Cinema Movement‖. Mainstream Cantonese films were criticized 
for their ―rough and slipshod productions and feudal and superstitious content‖. The co-
op‘s quality Cantonese films sold well for a while but gradually faded, since their 
production was not cost-effective and competitive enough in the market.   
During the Cold War years, the United States launched a containment policy 
against communist countries in the Pacific. But in Taiwan, American‘s ally, both 
American and Japanese movies were seriously restricted. In South Korea, Japanese 
movies were restricted. But Hong Kong movies, until 1997, enjoyed the status and 
privilege as a national cinema with tax exemption in Taiwan‘s market due to the KMT 
government‘s anti-communist policy. In China, the market was closed and the film 
industry was centralized and modeled after that of the Soviet Union. Frequent political 
movements and purges interrupted production and impeded industrial transformation.  At 
some point the film school and the industry were shut down, drastically reducing film 
production to a handful of model opera films during the Cultural Revolution. Film 
industries in China and Taiwan were firmly in the grip of the state and went through de-
colonization and nationalization. There was a while when Hong Kong cinema became the 
battleground between the Leftist and pro-Rightist studios with ties to China and Taiwan, 
each respectively vying for ideological triumph in Hong Kong. These southbound 
Mandarin studios set their sights northwards. Their films were shot in Hong Kong, but 
dealt with issues on mainland China or an imagined Chinese culture with anti-feudalism 
or anti-capitalism themes. Some movies were adapted from May Fourth intellectual 
novels, and these émigré directors produced socially conscious entertainment films. But 





outright commercial film companies in the box offices. During this period Hong Kong 
was the only place in the world free to churn out Chinese language commercial 
entertainment.   
In the 1950s there were a few bigger Cantonese film companies. But compared to 
their Mandarin cinema counterparts, they were short in capital, theater chains and staff 
support. The post-war years saw the rapid rise and fall of Cantonese cinema. With the 
China market closed, Hong Kong Cantonese cinema targeted Southeast Asia with the rise 
of the overseas Chinese communities there. Independent production with cash-oriented 
financing from distributors in Southeast Asia was common. The most popular genre was 
martial arts and the most notable series was Wong Fei Hung (directed mostly by Hu Pang 
and starring Kwan Tak Hing) with more than one hundred sequels and spin offs made 
since 1949. These stories revolve around a regional folk hero of the named title with his 
ensemble cast. The demise of Cantonese cinema in the 1960s was attributed to its shoddy 
production: overproduction, over-booking for stars, shooting without a completed script, 
constant improvisation, etc. But it also had its unique challenge of the time: the 
establishment of free television broadcast in Cantonese in Hong Kong, and the rise of 
nationalist movements and anti-Chinese riots in Southeast Asia which reduced Cantonese 
cinema‘s overseas market.   
The 1950s and 1960s were the golden times of Hong Kong Mandarin cinema.  
The duopoly – the Cathay studios and the Shaw studios – were aggressive in opening the 
Taiwan and Japan markets. Instead of colluding with each other like Hollywood majors, 
Cathay and Shaw engaged in vicious competition to the point of making the same stories 
released at the same time. In the midd-1960s, after the demise of Cathay studio due to its 
owner‘s accidental death, Shaw studio became the only dominant studio in Hong Kong.  





symbol of the modern Asian film industry. However, it was managed like a traditional 
Chinese family business, with Run Run Shaw as the patriarch, and the center of creative 
control and power was the director, not the producer. Each major director had his regular 
cast and crew, and younger filmmakers had to wait for the older generation directors to 
retire or leave to get a chance to make their own movies. Nevertheless, the Shaw studio 
nurtured a big pool of talents like directors Chang Cheh, star Jimmy Wang Yu and action 
choreographer Yuen Woo Ping and Ching Siu Tung. Chang Cheh‘s protégé John Woo is 
a master of the action film himself. The ―New Epoch of Wuxia‖ headed by King Hu 
reinvented the genre and elevated the genre to the realm of international art film and Ang 
Lee‘s Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon (2000) is an homage to King Hu‘s poetic martial 
arts film.   
In 1970, production head Raymond Chow left Shaw studio and formed Golden 
Harvest. To reduce overhead, Golden Harvest contracted out its productions to satellite 
companies of filmmakers like Bruce Lee, Michael Hui, Jackie Chan, and Sammo Hung, 
etc. Golden Harvest provided the financing and distribution. And unlike Shaw studio, 
Golden Harvest accepted profit sharing with the filmmakers. It was aggressive in opening 
the world market and acquiring films from independent production. Bruce Lee‘s kung fu 
series was a hit in the world market, and the Michael Hui comedy series was a big hit in 
Japan.      
In 1967 Television Broadcast (TVB) was established with Run Run Shaw as one 
of its founders. It replaced cable television and became the most popular family 
entertainment in Hong Kong. TVB gradually localized its production and recruited young 
people for its cast and crew, giving regular training classes. Later the cable TV was also 
changed to wireless, and together with the short-lived Commercial TV, these three 





was the ―film unit‖ in which the producer-director and his writers enjoyed their creative 
autonomy. Round table scriptwriting by committee was the practice that the New Wave 
directors carried on when they migrated to the film industry. The troupe system, i.e. the 
director worked with his regular crew across productions, was also continued in the film 
industry. The New Wave generation, mostly educated in British and American film 
schools, also introduced the ―art director‖ position to Hong Kong film industry. In the 
past, this duty was taken up by the props master, or the directors had to do it themselves. 
These New Wave filmmakers, many with an overseas education, invigorated the ailing 
industry, but unlike the filmmakers of Taiwan New Cinema and China‘s Fifth 
Generation, they ―flocked to the industry without prior shared intentions or plans, and 
with no uniform agenda and no consistent ideology‖ (Cheuk 235) They made no 
declaration to clean up the industry or challenge the older generation. They worked side 
by side with filmmakers of the previous generation or under the apprentice system. Like 
the way they worked in the television film industry, they collaborated with each other. 
More importantly, most of them were not resistant to commercial films. Ann Hui made 
―commercially viable political films‖ like her Vietnam trilogy (The Boy From Vietnam, 
1978, The Story of Woo Viet, 1981 and The Boat People, 1982) and Tsui Hark made 
popular films, adopting genres and the star system. The New Wave directors were soon 
absorbed into the mainstream commercial cinema. The rise of independent productions 
opened up more opportunities for the young filmmakers.   
As television production became more localized, Cantonese production in the film 
industry declined. In 1972, no Cantonese film was released in this Cantonese speaking 
city. However, within a few years, in 1980, Cantonese cinema bounced back and 






Table 4.1: Rise and Fall of Mandarin and Cantonese Films 
 Mandarin Cantonese 
1970 83 35 
1971 85 1 
1972 87 0 
1973 93 1 
1974 80 21 
1975 69 28 
1976 59 36 
1977 42 45 
1978 24 75 
1979 23 86 
1980 0 105 
 
In 1980, Run Run Shaw became chair of TVB, and production in Shaw‘s film 
studio declined. The film market of the 1980s was dominated by the tripartite: Golden 
Harvest, Cinema City and D & B.  The rapid rise and fall of Cinema City is worth 
studying since it had a powerful impact on the entire industry despite its brief existence.  
It introduced the producer system and exerted greater administrative control over the 
creative process. It invented the renowned 9-reeler formulaic script writing: the efficient 
committee writing process to ensure the frequency and even distribution of gags and 
visual spectacles in their standard 90 minute films, to keep the audience engaged 
throughout the film. It emphasized modern marketing and packaging, and the glossy 
appearance of their films. It implemented its export strategy by localizing a foreign film 





Taiwan: in the Hong Kong version the comic character speaks Cantonese with Chiuchow 
accent, but in the Taiwan version, to achieve the same comic effect, they have the 
character speaking Mandarin with Shangdong accent.        
After the end of the Cultural Revolution, China gradually opened its doors and 
launched its economic reforms. In the 1980s, when the costs of Hong Kong film 
production skyrocketed, low cost labor and scenic landscapes were supplied by China for 
co-production. The Southeast Asia market further contracted, and Hong Kong filmmakers 
faced the harsh realty: find new international outlets or fold. As Hong Kong cinema 
became more widely spread around the world, the industry and its productions were 
further streamlined out of necessity. Bureaucracy, paper work and other time consuming 
practices were further reduced or eliminated. 
ADAPTIVE 
The development of Hong Kong cinema was not linear and planned. In response 
to external changes, Hong Kong cinema switched between Mandarin and Cantonese; 
between studio system and independent production. Its target markets moved from 
Guangzhou, China, to overseas Chinese communities, to East Asian countries. The film 
industry did not grow logically from small to big. In the 1990s, the Hong Kong film 
industry integrated a bit of everything from its history to help it survive a volatile global 
age. It inherited the talent pool from the Shaw studio and television. It adopted the 
Cantonese cinema‘s troupe system and cash-oriented financing. It took advantage of 
Golden Harvest‘s connections in Taiwan and Japan. It incorporated Cinema City‘s 
market calculations and fast-paced comic action style. In the 1990s, the 1960s Cantonese 
cinema‘s cottage industry‘s mode of production with its prepaid cash financing, troupe 
organization pattern, and anarchic filmmaking practices were replicated and the Wong 





series. The 1990s was like a deja-vu of the 1960s Cantonese cinema. Interestingly, the 
factors attributed to the demise of Cantonese cinema in the 1960s were also repeated in 
the 1990s. Is Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s a regression to the 1960s cottage industry 






Chapter 5: A Legless Bird in a Burning Jungle 
Hong Kong in the 1990s is defined by the sovereignty change, a decade bracketed 
by the traumatic June Fourth Incident in 1989, and Hong Kong‘s return to control by 
China in 1997. Political anxiety was at its peak and the 1997 issue defined every aspect 
of life. During the last stage of transition, Hong Kong was in limbo and the colonial 
government was reduced to lame duck status. Uncertainty of the future induced 
international corporations to move their headquarters overseas and inflamed a massive 
outmigration of the middle class, the backbone of Hong Kong‘s economy.  Hong Kong‘s 
small and open economy, at the mercy of unfettered global capitalism, suffered intense 
fluctuations due to international and speculative economic activities.  Local economic 
growth, mainly driven by the real estate and stock markets, was in the hands of a few 
land barons. The widening of the gap between the rich and the poor in this colony, 
without the safety net of social security, further fueled social unrest. Life in this decade 
was a Darwinian survival of the fittest in a burning capitalist jungle at the fin-de- siècle. 
Interestingly, ―stability and prosperity‖ was the official description of reality of Hong 
Kong. This southern colonial city, once labeled a ―cultural desert‖ became a cultural 
swan, with its popular cultural products dominating the region and epitomized by the 
slogan ―Hong Kong Wonder Never Ceases‖, a myth embraced by those who believe in its 
magical makeover by global capitalism. During this decade, when Hong Kong‘s movies 
spread the most and became recognized around the world, the film industry switched to a 





filmmakers‘ frantic work style. There was absence of the integrated studio or any clear 
division of labor; the mode of financing was switched back to the pianhua system – a 
cash-based pre-sale financing of films; directors routinely started shooting without 
completed scripts, and improvisation on the set was the norm. It looked more like guerilla 
filmmaking than a modern movie business. In the previous era the integrated Shaw studio 
was regarded as a symbol of the modern film industry in Asia. The 1980s were deemed a 
golden age by industry insiders when thinking in terms of financial profit. But in the 
1990s, when Hong Kong cinema looked good on the outside, the film industry was 
already in a dire situation and was pronounced dead by the local media. In the new 
millennium, production dropped to only a few dozen films per year, and Hollywood 
features dominated more than half of the local market share, unprecedented in the history 
of Hong Kong cinema. Was the operation of Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s a 
regression to the shoddy filmmaking practices of the past, and an inability to move 
forward? Was it a dysfunctional maladjustment?  
Hong Kong cinema, even though situated in a small colonial city with no control 
over its external environment, survived the harsh conditions in the past by maintaining a 
precarious balance amongst various forces, undergoing constant renewal and being 
adaptive to its peculiar environment. To help make it over the very rugged path of the 
1990s, the Hong Kong film industry switched to a survival mode and further streamlined 
its operations. It seemed to go back to the mode of a cottage industry with the tripartite of 
the 1980s being replaced by numerous passing independent production houses, and the 





flexibility was a response to extreme uncertainty. Since the Hong Kong film industry was 
de-integrated and had no control over its reception end – the distribution sector and the 
overseas markets, flexibility was emphasized in the supply arrangements – the production 
sector. In his analysis of the economics of contemporary Hollywood, De Vany concludes 
that its change to a more flexible mode of operation was shaped by uncertainties and that 
also applied to Hong Kong cinema, ―The crucial factor is just this: nobody knows what 
makes a hit or when it will happen. When one starts to roll, everything must be geared to 
adapt successfully to the opportunities it presents.‖(Z. Shan; de Vany 28) Hong Kong 
cinema in the 1990s was like Cantonese cinema in the 1960s: besides the ―Seven Day 
Wonder‖ quickies, sequels, series and copycats were strategies to cash in on and replicate 
success. Proven stars were overbooked, until the overexposed star lost popularity and was 
no longer wanted by the market. Bureaucracy, paperwork, executive meetings to green 
light projects and ―development hell‖ procedures were minimized or avoided.  However, 
the Hong Kong film industry in the 1990s was not a simple regression or replication of 
the 1960s. It did make various improvements and made intelligent progress: filmmakers 
capitalized on and integrated Hong Kong‘s positive image as a modern liberal city in 
their narrative films, productions were star and genre driven, and the Classical 
Hollywood narrative style was appropriated to widen Hong Kong‘s popular movies‘ 
accessibility to non-Asian audiences. The European modernist aesthetic was espoused to 
appeal to Asian and Western niche markets, the domestic exhibition sector was 
remodeled, and filmmakers adopted more effective and diplomatic ways to battle 





particular organizational structure of the Hong Kong film industry and Hong Kong 
Chinese culture. However, while being efficient and flexible, the film industry became 
streamlined to the point of crippling itself like a legless bird. It unloaded its excessive 
baggage, and was light enough to get through the burning jungle, but it did not have legs 
to rest and catch its breath for the future journey. For example, there was no research and 
development, no or little retention of copyright of the movies made by Hong Kong 
filmmakers, or any building of a film library for better bargaining power. There was no 
long-term planning for the future or any grooming of a new generation of talents. Like 
the ominous bamboo blossoming, immediately after the bang in the 1990s, Hong Kong 
cinema deteriorated, and suffered a serious shortage of new cast and crew needed to 
sustain the boom or to replenish the talent pool. In sum, what was perceived as 
maladaptive is in fact a desperate adaptive survival strategy of a cinema, situated in a 
colony in a volatile region, during a chaotic time. Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s is like 
a legless bird trying to make it through the burning jungle. Those outside the jungle were 
impressed by how high it flew, but those inside knew how hard it was just to survive. 
A BURNING JUNGLE 
Hong Kong in the 1990s was a city with a strange identity and an intriguing story 
to tell. During the transitional period, Hong Kong was a political limbo. The only 
certainty about the sovereignty change was it would not bring either autonomy or 
democracy. The colony‘s governmental features would be continued and Hong Kong‘s 
people were excluded from the Sino-British talks over the future of Hong Kong just as 





integrity and national dignity, China had allowed this city be kept as a Western power‘s 
colony all the way to the end of the 20
th
 century. China was admitted to the United 
Nations in 1971 and demanded that the UN clarify Hong Kong‘s political status as ―a 
Chinese territory under British administration‖. In 1972, the UN General Assembly 
removed Hong Kong and Macau from its list of colonial territories, and Hong Kong 
changed from a Crown Colony to a Dependent Territory. Interestingly, in 1974 China 
declined Portugal‘s offer to return Macau but in 1997 China did not decline the return of 
Hong Kong by Britain. Instead the event was celebrated by the Chinese media as the 
ending of a national humiliation, ―a huge diplomatic, national, and psychological victory 
over the unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers in the mid-1800s.‖  (Carroll 
207) And, despite its anti-imperialism stance, China would retain Hong Kong‘s colonial 
governmental features. For example, the SAR government retained the advisory system, a 
device created by the colonial administration to build a consensus government after its 
legitimacy was seriously challenged. But the government was still biased towards an elite 
and was not accountable to the people. The last governor, Chris Patten, attempted to 
introduce political reforms and infuriated the Chinese government. The Sino-British talks 
came to a halt and the Chinese government retaliated by forming their own shadow 
committee and advisory bodies. The antagonism and limited cooperation between the 
British and the Chinese governments caused a severe confidence crisis in Hong Kong. 
The authority of the colonial government was undermined. In the international arena, the 
Hong Kong government was toothless. In the domestic realm, it was a lame duck. The 





was characterized by mass demonstrations and a panic-driven massive outmigration. In 
June, 1989, eight years before Hong Kong‘s return to China, 1.5 million people – a 
quarter of the local population - marched in the streets to protest against the crackdown 
against the democratic movement in Beijing. On July 1, 2003, six years after the 
handover, half a million people marched to demonstrate against the imbecilic 
administrators of the Hong Kong SAR government. In this decade alone, 600,000 people 
i.e. 10% of the population – mostly professional and middle class, and the cream of Hong 
Kong society, emigrated out, indicating their lack of confidence of the future of the city 
(Skeldon). The prevalence of surveys on Hong Kong identity, by academia and the 
media, was symptomatic of the allegiance and identity crisis of the Hong Kong people. 
Answers to survey identity questions varied from ―I am a Hongkongese,‖ to ―I am a 
Chinese,‖ to ―I am a Hong Kong Chinese.‖ The most commonly used answer ―I am 
Chinese, but I‘m from Hong Kong‖ (C. K. Lau) indicates people‘s double allegiance. The 
―but‖ in their answers speaks of their ambivalence towards the motherland. People 
identified with Chinese culture, but not necessarily with the state. Hong Kong was ruled 
by Britain with a soft approach but was not let go. It became part of China but was 
allowed to continue with a high degree of self-government. As ethnically Chinese, the 
SAR government has the legitimacy that the alien colonial government lacked, but it 
didn‘t build the consensus that the former colonial office was excellent at doing. As the 
test subject of the political experiment ―one country two systems‖ in which the British 
and Chinese governments cooperated unwillingly, Hong Kong was dealing with an 





The Hong Kong economy was always characterized by a concentration of power 
and wealth since the early colonial years. Throughout its history it was not really laissez-
faire. Instead, non-market forces played a key role in steering its development. Situated 
in a British colony, Hong Kong‘s economy started with the British monopolized the 
major sectors like finance, transportation, public utilities and trading, etc. and the role of 
the administration was to protect the interest of the trade-finance complex. Since the 
1950s Hong Kong had China serving as its economic hinterland, supplying low price 
foodstuffs, cheap labor and materials. During the 1970s, the British hongs were 
gradually acquired by Chinese business corporations. With entrepôt trade defined as the 
raison d‘être of Hong Kong, the British merchants left the entire manufacturing sector to 
the Chinese, who later accumulated capital and ventured out into the real estate sector. 
The British hongs, due to the uncertainty of any British long- term commitment to this 
city, made blunders in their business strategies in the manufacturing sector, real estate 
sector and stock market, and gradually lost out to the Chinese. Hong Kong‘s economy 
instantly bounced back after the shock in 1989 and China quickened the pace of 
economic reforms. China‘s leader Deng Xiaoping‘s 1992 Southern Tour with his famous 
remark ―China could do with a few more Hong Kongs‖ helped boost Hong Kong‘s 





classical utopia of fair market competition, even though the power had shifted from the 
British to the Chinese. In the 1990s, the stock market remained the major arena of 
business arena and the property market became the driving force of economic growth. 
Both were open to international competition. The players and the playing fields became 
more international, but the game remained the same. In the global age, Hong Kong‘s 
economy remained characterized by corporate feudalism and the life for ordinary 
citizens remained harsh. 
Hong Kong was routinely ranked as one of the most expensive cities in the world 
before the coining of the term ―Nylonkong‖
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 to recognizing Hong Kong as one of the 
tripartite financial centers of the world. During the transition period, high property prices 
were caused by the British and Chinese governments‘ deliberate policy to restrict land 
supply. In the 1990s, real estate was the actual largest sector in Hong Kong‘s economy.  
As Jean Jaulin and Jean-Francois Huchet point out, Hong Kong‘s economic growth was 
mainly driven by real estate, the stock market and collateral sectors, rather than by trade 
and finance as is popularly believed. Real estate is reckoned to have largely dominated 
the Hong Kong stock market with 60% of stock capitalization. Hong Kong never had a 
free market in land because as a colony all land in Hong Kong was Crown Land. 
Revenue from land and property has always been the most important contributing 
element in Hong Kong‘s government non-tax revenues, which averaged over 34% of 





this proportion is among the highest in the world (Schiffer 208). The outrageous rise of 
land prices in the 1990s was a result of a deliberate policy. In 1984, China and Britain 
signed the Joint Declaration setting a ceiling on land sales of 50 hectares a year from 
1985. The economy and population grew rapidly (there were 150 emigrants from China 
daily and also demand from foreign companies; 200,000 more people per year in the 
territory, which was an increase to 2 to 3 %) (Schiffer 264). This artificially induced 
land scarcity pushed up property values and prices. Linda Y.C. Lim presents figures to 
show how expensive cost of living in Hong Kong was, ―Land costs typically amount to 
70% of the total cost of building in Hong Kong, the inverse of the relationship in most 
markets‖ (275) From 1984 to 1997, prices of residential property rose 14 times. Between 
1987 and 1997, office rents soared by 300 to 400%! This ―helped make Hong Kong, in 
the space of ten years, into the most expensive city in the world after Tokyo.‖ (261) The 
average shop rents in Hong Kong were 41% higher than in the most expensive areas of 
New York. Some hotels demanded from their retail tenants prices close to double what 
is charged in London or Tokyo. ―The cost of real estate has been added to the price of 
goods, making Hong Kong one of the most expensive shopping centers in the world.‖ 
(265) High property prices were the main reason that Hong Kong was routinely ranked 
as the most expensive city in the world in terms of cost of living. 
The primary beneficiaries of this bullish property market were the government, 
private developers and households with high savings capacity as Jaulin and Huchet have 
determined. The government derived an average of almost 30% of its tax revenue from 





quotes from various sources, from 1976 to 1980 the net profit growth of the five 
dominant real estate companies was a multiplier of 2 to 10 times (B. Xu). In early 1980s, 
the average profit margin was 10-30%. The return rate on property investment in Hong 
Kong was 10%, more than double that of major cities in the world. Around 1997, the 
sales profit for developers generally was over 30%. In 1996, the property sector was 
dominated by only 7 companies: Cheung Kong, Sun Hung Kai, Henderson, Sino Land, 
Swire, Wheelock & Co., and New World. The Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the world‘s 
fifth largest exchange, was disproportionately populated by publicly listed property 
development firms, and by banks and financial institutions heavily exposed to the 
property sector, to which almost one-half of all bank loans go. As Xu points out, the 
property market of Hong Kong was ―international‖. ―International‖ here included China. 
And Lim points out that many Chinese SOEs (state-owned enterprises) with strong 
political ties heavily invested in the Hong Kong property market. Before Hong Kong‘s 
return to China, it was estimated that 40% of capital investment was from China (B. 
Xu). In the 1990s, the world‘s richest Chinese mostly were either industrialists or 
retailers turned property-tycoons. Xu also points out that the property market in Hong 
Kong was very speculative. The prices continued to rise way above the local end user‘s 
buying power. The land barons and local elite (included stock-broking, banking, law and 
other cartelized professions) stayed at the top of this fast growing market and wage 
earners stayed at the bottom.  
Housing has continued to be a problem for residents of this city. In this Chinese 
society with no pension system, an apartment purchase became the investment most 
highly prized as a financial product for the future. However, as Xu has determined, the 
price of property grew much faster than wage earners could catch up. From 1970 to mid-





by only 11.9%. But from 1984 to early 1993, the increase in property price was double 
that of the increase in average income. From 1994-5, the prices decreased by 20-30%. 
But in two years time, it increased by doubling again. It was estimated that in 1993, a 
tiny apartment of 400 square feet (which is about the size of a garage in the United 
States, and in Hong Kong usually housed a family of at least 3 to 4 people) in the urban 
area equals a college graduate‘s 15 years of income. In 1995, an average family had to 
spend three quarters of the total household income to service a housing mortgage. The 
inflation rate in the 1980 to mid-1990s was at a record high. In 1980 the inflation rate 
was 4.444. In 1981, it jumped to 9.479. In 1982, it reached double digits: 10.948. From 
1989 to 1991, it stayed at double digits. It was only after the financial crisis and the 
SARS crisis that the inflation rate started to go down and even to have a negative rate in 
1999.
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 For the ―shell-less snail‖ the majority of average wage earners living without 
owning a home and fighting a double-digit inflation rate, life in Hong Kong in this era 
was like the survival of the fittest in a burning capitalist jungle. 
In East Asia, Japan and Taiwan, the key markets of Hong Kong cinema in the 
1990s, shared a similar experience. Hong Kong‟s property market was characterized by 
being speculative and international. It was closely linked to the cycle of the international 
economy. Since the 1970s, especially after the 1980s, economic growth everywhere in 
the world slowed down except in East Asia.
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 Xu continues to point out that 
international unemployed capital and hot money flowed into East Asia property markets 
for a high and quick return. In Japan, in 1991, land prices reached 20 billion US dollars, 
which was equal to five times that of the US‘s total land value. From 1986 to 1988, in 
two years time, property values increased by 2.8 billion dollars, which was the amount 





2.5 times from 1987 to 1989 and led to the ―Shell-less Snail‖ circumstance. In Chinese 
society, not owning a home is considered very unsettling, especially for the older 
generation who have experienced war time destitution and constantly look for a place 
they can call home in their old age. As times went on, the gap between the rich and the 
poor widened. In the 1996 Hong Kong by-census, the Gini coefficient, which measures 
the disparity of income distribution, was at 0.518.  It was one of the highest among the 
developed countries as pointed out by Jaulin and Huchet (0.35 for countries with 
relatively egalitarian redistribution. ―0‖ indicates equality. ―1‖ means complete 
disparity). In 1986, it was 0.453. In 1991, it increased to 0.476 and continued to climb.
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Besides that, as C.K. Lau adds, the distribution of household income in 1996 showed 
that the top 10% of Hong Kong households earned as much as 41.8% of Hong Kong‘s 
aggregate income, compared with 37.3% in 1991. And this sector of the society was the 
only one, which saw any growth in its earnings share (73).   
With inordinate dependence on the property market, Hong Kong economy was 
extremely interest-sensitive. It was vulnerable to changes in political climate and 
international speculators‘ attacks. Some scholars have pointed out the structural flaws of 
Hong Kong economy (Jaulin and Huchet; Lim; B. Xu; K.-y. Law). With a completely 
unprotected open economy, Hong Kong was slower than other East Asian countries to 
recover from the Asian financial crisis in 1997. In the 1990s, the soaring property and 
stock markets were mistakenly perceived as manifestations of a healthy competitive 
market. Speculators‘ gambling-style economic activity was conflated with frantic market 





to exploit cheap labor and resources, but technology was not upgraded and workers were 
not retrained. The population was aging and there was no specialization in Hong Kong, 
as was happening in other developed countries when relocating production overseas. 
Beneath the hustle and bustle of a busy city was a puddle of stagnant economy. Like a 
neon light shining on a puddle, the flashing colorful glitter on the surface masked the 
lifelessness underneath. To the outside world, with its skyscrapers, fashion, international 
cuisine, and hi-tech electronic gadgets, Hong Kong had all the trappings of a modern 
cosmopolitan city. It seemed to have transformed into a beautiful swan in the eyes of its 
Western capitalist beholders. 
Socially Hong Kong was also anachronistic. Despite its cosmopolitan outlook, 
Hong Kong‘s society was feudalistic and littered with urban problems. Colonization by 
a civilized Western country didn‘t redeem this Chinese society from its feudal practices.  
The inheritance law dating from the Qing dynasty, which denied women of indigenous 
communities the right to inherit family property, was not canceled until as late as 1994, 
three years before the handover when Hong Kong was under the gaze of the 
international media (Loh).  Despite the passing of the first ordinance by the Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong in 1844, prohibiting the practice of slavery in Hong Kong, the 
mui tsai system (female bondservants), and the buying and selling of human beings, was 
still tolerated and legal as late as the 1930s, after almost one hundred years of 
administration under British rule (Chin). In Britain, certain types of homosexual 
behavior were decriminalized in 1967 ("Gay Rights"), but in Hong Kong these were 





provided for conventional families, and the system was flawed by gender inequality (K. 
W. Chan). The price of private housing was prohibitive for average wage earners, who 
must then look for alternative arrangements. Hong Kong was presented as a liberal city.  
The smooth running of business and commerce has been attributed to the maintenance 
of law and order by British legal system, but as we shall see later, the colonial 
government broke international law in regulating film exhibition for political reasons 
with no statutory basis. The censorship ordinances allowed the government to ban any 
film deemed ―prejudicial to good relations with other territories‖. It was only in 1994, 
three years before the sovereignty change ceremony, that this political censorship clause 
was dropped. On the other hand, modernization also brought to Hong Kong the urban 
problems Western developed countries experienced such as a rising crime rate, juvenile 
delinquency, high suicide rates, teenage girl anorexia, as well as urban diseases such as 
mental disorders, heart disease and cancer. Hong Kong in the 1990s was in fact 
politically backward, economically stagnant and socially feudal. It retained a colonial 
government, its economic growth was lopsided, and unjust feudal practices were 
permitted. For those who didn‘t subscribe to the beauty standards of global capitalism, 
Hong Kong was still an ugly duckling, only larger, but on the screens of Hong Kong 
export-oriented entertainment films we only get to see the swan.  
CITY BRANDING AND CINEMA 
In Hong Kong there is a close link between city branding and this city‘s cinema.  
Michael Curtin‘s media capital theory points out the structural material precondition for a 





relationship between a country‘s discursively constructed image and its export media 
products. To insert the cultural odor theory into the media capital theory, it means the city 
presents its positive desirable discursively constructed image in the world in order to be a 
media capital able to export its products. When it comes to power, perceptions are as 
important as actual power, and city branding is important in the global era. With tourism 
and trading as two of its major income sources, Hong Kong was a city abounding in 
fascinating stories. Hong Kong‘s transformation was legendary and the shift of the 
discourse of it was dramatic. The city was deemed undesirable in the past. In the history 
of the Chinese Celestial Empire, Hong Kong was a terra incognita located in the land of 
Southern Barbarians. In the 1830s, it was verbally dismissed by a British naval 
commander as merely ―a barren rock.‖ In the 1960s, it was still stereotyped as a ―cultural 
desert,‖ a term used by mainland Chinese intellectuals since the 1920s to describe Hong 
Kong‘s hybridized culture: ―simultaneously Westernized, feudal, colonial, and 
provincial.‖ (Fu "Between Nationalism" 247) But in the 1990s Hong Kong suddenly 
became such a desirable city that people began worrying about this ―Pearl of the Orient‖ 
being devoured by Red China. Everything about it became positive and desirable: its 
capitalist system, its positive non-intervention policy, its peculiar colonial democracy, its 
laissez-faire economic policy, its vibrant popular culture and its cinema. Hong Kong‘s 
government was quick to capitalize on the city‘s new international image, and Hong 
Kong cinema‘s new fame in the world market even though it had never supported the 
film industry before. In 1996, a year before Hong Kong‘s handover, the Hong Kong 





business, with award-winning actress Josephine Siao as the cultural ambassador, and the 
tour was titled ―Hong Kong Wonder Never Ceases‖. ―Wonder‖ was the way we narrated 
the story of Hong Kong to the outside world. In the United States, politicians have cited 
Hong Kong‘s economic policy as a model. Former consul general Richard A. Boucher in 
his 1997 speech titled ―The Genius of Hong Kong‖, liberally uses words like ―magic,‖ 
―magnet,‖ ―efficient,‖ and ―successful‖ to describe Hong Kong‘s achievements
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 and the 
British even used ―capitalist paradise‖ to tell the Hong Kong story – a barren rock before 
British arrival turned it into a capitalist paradise by their benevolent rule (Ngo). 
―Miracle‖ was often used to describe Hong Kong‘s rapid development and Hong Kong 
was seen as the leader of the Asian Four Tigers in the ―East Asian Miracle,‖ and widely 
endorsed as a development model even in international organizations like the World 
Bank (Ngo). As Ngo Tak-wing points out, what‘s so unique about Hong Kong is that 
colonial rule and economic development were seen as going hand in hand. Even 
Communist China‘s late leader Deng Xiaoping endorsed it and didn‘t seem to be 
disturbed by its colonial form of bureaucracy. He pronounced that China would build 
more special economic zones in China: development a la Hong Kong. Hong Kong 
graduated as an apt pupil of capitalism and became a master to be imitated. In the new 
narrative, Hong Kong became the paragon of Chinese modernity and it succeeded 
without colonizing its neighbors like Imperial Japan did, and without patronage from the 
United States like other East Asian countries did.   
If all discourses are products of power, this shifting discourse of Hong Kong is a 





hierarchy of China proper as the center, and overseas Chinese as marginal seemed to 
reverse. When the Chinese Celestial Empire called itself the Middle Kingdom of the 
world, lands along the Yellow River were regarded as the ―origin‖ of Chinese 
civilization. In the Central Plain syndrome (Da Zhongyuan Xintai) the capital in the 
north was the political, economic and cultural center and thus Hong Kong was at the 
periphery of China‘s imagined geopolity. However, the arrival of Western imperialists 
from the sea moved the economic centers to coastal ports. Shanghai and Hong Kong 
became the two busiest ports. As Poshek Fu points out, Hong Kong was marginalized in 
the 20
th
 century‘s representation of Chinese culture. In a centralizing, anti-imperialist, 
state-building discourse, Hong Kong culture was deemed impure, colonial, and 
politically apathetic. After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese economy was 
devastated. The Chinese government started the Open Door policy and invited foreign 
investment, which logically came mostly from the more affluent overseas Chinese who 
have blood ties or emotional connections with China. The citizens of China avariciously 
consumed foreign cultural products, and as Tu Wei-Ming‘s article in the early 1990s 
claims, the periphery became the center (W.-M. Tu). Hong Kong, with the infrastructure 
of a free port running for more than one and half century, located at the southern tip of 





into the world‘s trading system. Hong Kong‘s culture, a hybrid culture which used to be 
denigrated in the discourse of national culture and cultural authenticity, became a 
positive attribute to be embraced. Situated at the junction of two major network 
civilizations – the Anglo-sphere and Chopstick Culture – Hong Kong, in the age of 
China‘s ascendancy and an Anglosphere-dominated global era, occupied the most 
strategically important crossroads. As economic growth in the West began slowing 
down, Western-based transnational conglomerates pursued the world‘s largest and 
fastest growing markets, East Asia and especially China, which in the post-Socialist era, 
focused on economic growth and getting on the global track, instead of cultural purity or 
political fanaticism, as a goal for national pride. In the new global era, Hong Kong, once 
denigrated as the bastard resulting from Western imperialist assault, became the hybrid 
wonder child to be embraced.   
The new international migration patterns, with the expansion of Asian activities 
around the globe, also complicated the old dichotomous Western-centric core-periphery 
hierarchy. As pointed out by Ronald Skeldon, the migration out of Hong Kong ―is part 
of the expansion of a global system whereby areas that, within the context of the world 
system paradigm, were once on the periphery are now expanding into the core.‖ (12) 
Unlike the older generation of immigrants, the new overseas Chinese are typified by 
movements of the highly skilled, and many of them are key players in regional and 





wealth and Asians make up of the majority of this westbound migration. Skeldon 
describes, ―By the early 1990s, Asians accounted for almost 40 percent of migration to 
the United States…, 44 percent of migration to Canada, and almost half of migration to 
Australia.‖ (41) In Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Thailand, ethnic Chinese 
have also figured prominently. The outflow of the highly educated and skilled has also 
characterized the other three ―Asian Tigers‖: South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore. 
South Korea was estimated to have had 10 percent of its high-level manpower migrate to 
the United States during the 1970s. In Taiwan, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, around 
2,000 students per annum left to the United States. In the mid-1980s, this rose to over 
5,000 per annum. Usually only about one-quarter from any one year have ever returned. 
In 1991-92, 35,550 students from Taiwan and 25,720 students from South Korea left for 
the United States. Skeldon asserts that with Hong Kong people (and other Asians elite) 
moving into key areas, often global cities, the resulting networks established by the new 
overseas Chinese (and Asians) are fundamental linkages in the creation of any ―new 
world order‖ in the post-Cold War era.  
Westerners brought with them, among many other things of Industrial Age, the 
novelty of the century – the motion picture. As movies became popular in China, they 
brought not only the hardware, but also the software - the social values and norms 
associated with entertainment industry. Shanghai and Hong Kong became the 
production centers of Chinese cinema. Businessmen and entertainers used to be at the 
bottom of Confucian social hierarchy, and were hardly ever associated with wealth and 
power, not to mention social prestige. The rise of the United States to superpower status 
was accompanied by the global presence of Hollywood, which glorifies the 
entertainment business and celebrates commercial culture. Movie stars become 





ago, filmmaking in Hong Kong was still stigmatized as an illegitimate business which 
only the low class and uneducated would join. In 1973, when Josephine Siao returned to 
Hong Kong with a bachelors degree from the United States, she was dubbed by the 
media as ―the movie star with a bachelors degree.‖ This is symptomatic of the 
perception of the general low education level of the movie stars of that generation. The 
Western educated Hong Kong New Wave generation joining the film industry and 
producing critically acclaimed films helped reduce this stigma. The elevation of the 
social status of the film industry helped to draw more educated and professional people 
to join this business. Despite the lack of high regard in cinema from the states as in other 
Chinese societies, in the 1990s Hong Kong filmmakers worked out Hong Kong‘s 
cultural redemption among its people and became the equals to the Mandarin and 
Western cinemas in the domestic market. In the overseas market, the discursively 
constructed positive image of Hong Kong as a success facilitated the export of Hong 
Kong cinema with the myth ―Hong Kong Wonder‖ embedded.   
A LEGLESS BIRD 
Situated in a precarious city, Hong Kong cinema has always been always crisis 
ridden. In the 1990s, the Hong Kong film industry had to be made even more flexible to 
adapt to its even more unusual external conditions by reshaping the industry and 
changing the tools and methods that no longer worked. The industry was not tied to any 
political or economic power bloc; it was switched modes to an almost guerilla-like 
independent filmmaking, and the movies changed to a more cosmopolitan outlook for its 
more affluent East Asian and Western markets. Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s was a 
political Laputa, an industrial amoeba and a cultural chameleon forced to adapt to its 
unpredictable changing milieu. But without the backing of the power bloc, the foundation 





further streamlined to the point of being crippled like a legless bird. It has no reserves in 
terms of talents, a movie library or accumulated capital for long-term planning and future 
development. With its cottage-industry outlook and massively produced low budget 
quickies, the industry was mistaken seen as regressing. Hong Kong cinema, like bamboo, 
continued to survive by being flexible and adaptive. A closer look will show that it went 
beyond mere survival, and in fact made some impressive progress and innovations, not 
only as enhancements of the 1960s filmmaking practice, but also as a forerunner in world 
cinema. The progress ranged from tangible remodeling of theaters to re-conceptualizing 
filmmaking. 
The most remarkable difference in the 1990s was the filmmakers capitalizing on 
city branding (the positive image of Hong Kong as a modern liberal city, especially vis-à-
vis China in the 1990s) in the narratives of their entertainment films. Operating as a 
transnational cinema without a nation in the world market, Hong Kong filmmakers could 
not resort to the branding of national cinema in the U.S. market or European film 
festivals. Director branding, beyond the narrow definition of art cinema auteurism, was 
not only a marketing device to encourage repeated consumption but also effective for 
promoting community recognition. This has helped Hong Kong cinema to stand out in 
the global market. Production in this decade was mostly genre and star driven and 
matched with target markets. Hong Kong star Maggie Cheung was praised by Western 
film critics as a ―symbol of modernity‖ from a modern city (Berenice). Hong Kong action 
film was no longer the un-differentiable kung fu Chop suey, but an action aesthetic with 
formal style as well as heart and soul. Action film masters like John Woo are 





opportunities a hit movie presents, Hong Kong filmmakers switched back to the pianhua 
system, a flexible cash-based mode of financing to provide them with greater flexibility 
and autonomy in production. Bureaucracy and paper work were reduced. Bank loan 
financing was not involved. ―Development hell‖ and executive meetings were dodged or 
minimized. It is this mode of financing that enabled Hong Kong filmmakers to be more 
spontaneous and make more personal films. In the case of Hong Kong cinema in the 
1990s it was the style of filmmaking practice that influenced the mode of financing. The 
domestic exhibition sector, formerly characterized by the big screening hall and 
resistance to the new rating system, gradually remolded their theaters to adapt to the 
world trend of the segmented market and the flexible arrangement of the multiplex.  
Hong Kong filmmakers gradually became more adept in battling the censorship rules and 
beating the consensus-building colonial government at their own game by playing the 
public-opinion card. They also invoked international law to point out the lack of legal 
basis of the government censorship ordinance implemented by the British, who claimed 
an intention to bring law and order to the colonized. They capitalized on the attention of 
the international media, as Hong Kong approaching 1997, to demand that the ―positively 
non-interventionist‖ government protect filmmakers from triad harassment. The 
producers played an important role as facilitator of the film director, and developed a 
management style that fitted the Hong Kong film industry‘s duo-department and flat 
organization structure. The younger generation of screenwriters humbled themselves by 
accepting a reduced status of being the director‘s service provider, in order to produce 





areas of development: the exhibition sector, government film policy and the filmmaker‘s 
censorship battles, and the adjustment of the roles of the producer and the screenwriter. It 
will show the peculiar way the Hong Kong film industry worked, and why it worked in 
that particular environment. 
EXHIBITION SECTOR- THE LOCOMOTIVE OF THE INDUSTRY 
The domestic market box office was symbolically significant even though it 
constituted only a minority portion of box office return and its size was minuscule.  
Traditionally Hong Kong box office record was used as index for setting the price for the 
movies sold overseas.
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 In 2000, Taiwan director Ang Lee‟s Crouching Tiger Hidden 
Dragon was premiered in Hong Kong in its Asian tour. In 2009, Mainland China director 
Feng Xiaogang, the top box office director for a decade in a country of over 1.3 billion 
population, brooded on Hong Kong audience ignoring his movie.
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 Before the new 
millennium Hollywood had less than 30% market share in Hong Kong. American film 
scholar David Bordwell writes about this in the opening chapter of his book, even though 
in later chapters he insists that in quantitative term that “Hollywood of the East” is still 
Hollywood. It proofs that audience recognition in this tiny market was symbolically 
significant to filmmakers and film scholars like Ang Lee, Feng Xiaogang and David 
Bordwell. It was like Hong Kong theater had the power to consecrate the movies as 
genuine popular film among Chinese. The exhibition sector (domestic or overseas) 
played a leading role in the system of Hong Kong cinema. Instead of passively waiting to 
be fed by the production sector, it was like a locomotive steering the direction of the 





segmentation but it could also help boost the rise of independent productions and de-
integrate the industry. But how the domestic exhibition sector worked and why it was not 
dominated by Hollywood always intrigued industry outsider. 
In early 1992, the director of the Newport distribution company Chan Wing-mei
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openly admitted to rigging the box office figures of The Magic Touch (1992, dir: Michael 
Hui), which was competing with Clifton Ko‘s All’s Well End’s Well during the Chinese 
New Year holidays. This admission stirred up the public, and became talk of the town 
even though the practice of rigging box office figures had long been an open secret of the 
industry. This was the second time a rigged set of figures was done so blatantly, and then 
become widely reported beyond the circle of industry insiders. In 1984, it was Cinema 
City versus Golden Harvest over their Chinese New Year films (―hesui pian‖ the Chinese 
New Year‘s season greeting film).  Both sides printed ads in newspapers ―congratulating‖ 
each other‘s unbelievable box office figures.  As in 1992, the producer eventually openly 
admitted rigging the figures. This discussion and controversy over the issue of getting 
accurate box office figures has gone on for years, and has been published in multiple 
issues of Film Bi-weekly
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 the only and longest running film magazine of the 1980s-
1990s. The two most vocal writers on this issue are Li Cheuk-to and Chan Ching Wai.  Li 
criticizes Chan‘s method of calculation as not scientific, and Chan criticizes Li for 
idealizing Western statistical practice. Chan Pak Sang, editor-in-chief of City 
Entertainment, in his op-ed titled ―How to promote Hong Kong cinema without data 
support?‖ (P. S. Chan) points out the difficulty of getting objectively reliable industry 





and import of industrial products from the government industry and commerce 
department, but no government department keeps track of the number of Hong Kong 
films being released in a year. The censorship department only records the number of 
films being processed in this department, which includes films for film festivals, art 
centers and video films. The MPIA
57
 (Motion Picture Industry Association) cannot give 
any accurate figures because many films cannot be easily categorized as Hong Kong 
productions, not to mention many have been export-only and are not for release in Hong 
Kong. What is surprising amidst these arguments is that the industry insiders were not 
bothered by the incident, and it did not slow down their business. The lack of published 
reliable box office figures did not paralyze the industry, or even deter it from thriving in 
the world market in the 1990s.  In response to the incident, Bill Kong
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, president of the 
Hong Kong Theatre Association of that year said, ―I think this is completely not a 
problem. The box office figures provided by the MPIA are not based on any standard 
anyway. So long as industry insiders know the box office, it is good enough. The box 
office is just a reference. The newspapers printed the figures only to make their film 
section look more substantial.‖ (He Huixian 21) In 1984, the issue went through various 
government departments such as the Consumer Council, TV and Film Bureau and the 
censorship department. After deliberation the censorship department responded with an 
absurd solution: banning the use of box office figures on all film publicity material.  
Filmmaker Ng See-yuan
59
 argues that it was unfair because the film owner had nothing to 
do with the theater owners reporting the box office figures, but they were the one who 





happened again, the censorship department could do nothing about it, because since 1987 
film publicity material no longer had to pass through this department for approval. The 
censorship department‘s authority was limited to checking if the publicity material 
contained erotic content. The MPIA, publishing the daily box office report, made an 
announcement requesting that fellow film workers practice self-discipline. However, 
many agree that there was no way to stop rigging by either government regulation or by 
industry self-discipline. The fact that the industry has been operating all these years 
without objective market data is intriguing to outsiders. How did the Hong Kong film 
industry survive all these years without accurate market feedback, such as box office 
data? How did the exhibition sector work, and what was its role in the system of Hong 
Kong cinema?  
In the Hong Kong film industry, the exhibition sector provided market feedback 
to the production sector not by box office numbers, but by loaning money to production 
companies when directly ordering the specific films they wanted for their theaters.  
Instead of playing a passive role of providing venues for screening and reporting box 
office data, the exhibition sector was the locomotive of the industry, and had an active 
role in the system of Hong Kong cinema. Being both the financier and the customer of 
film products, it set the direction and pace for the production sector, laying down the 
parameters for the industry on issues like business practice and the censorship system.  
Situated at the frontline of customer service, it served as the cultural antenna in feeling 
the cultural pulse and feeding it back to the production sector. This practice in the 





made. In the case of Hong Kong cinema, the mode of financing and mode of exhibition 
influenced both the style of filmmaking and film texts. Even though the Hong Kong film 
industry did not have the studio practices of blind selling and block booking to secure the 
theater outlet in local and overseas markets, the Hong Kong film industry ran like 
Hollywood in classical era, with the production sector regularly feeding massive products 
to fill up the screening halls, a practice Tino Balio calls ―feeding the maw of exhibition‖. 
(Balio) In the 1990s the market of the exhibition sector was structured in a way that 
favored independent productions. It was the strength of the exhibition sector that helped 
protect the domestic market from Hollywood encroachment. Hong Kong filmmakers did 
not enjoy government support and protection. It was the Hong Kong exhibition sector‘s 
decades of ―tough love‖ that pushed Hong Kong movies to be exportable and competitive 
in overseas markets even in the age of globalization. 
That Hong Kong theater businessmen have been running their business without 
precise business information such as box office data is intriguing to outsiders. But one 
man‘s uncertainty is another man‘s routine. In fact, Hong Kong‘s box office data report 
was started not by local concerns, but by the initiation of the branch offices of Hollywood 
majors in Hong Kong. The ―obscure‖ way the local theater owners worked, the petite size 
of the distribution sector, and the small ratio of theaters for foreign-language films helped 
impede Hollywood‘s massive advancement into the Hong Kong domestic market from 
the 1980s to the early 1990s. Hollywood seldom dominated the Hong Kong market. The 
history of the Hong Kong cinema starts with the exhibition sector, not the production 





market. In this British colony there were no anti-trust laws. The market structure was 
determined solely by market forces, without government decree. Local theater owners 
could make swift decisions to merge or separate, and either collude or compete with each 
other. They could switch from foreign films to Shanghai productions, or to local 
productions without concerns for screen quotas like in other national cinemas. In the 
1920s Chinese businessmen quickly formed horizontal integration of theater chains all 
over major Chinese coastal cities. Lu Gen and Lo Ming-you were dubbed the ―King of 
South China theater chain‖ and the ―King of North China theater chain‖ respectively.  
After World War I, the supply of European productions reduced drastically. Instead of 
being trapped by Hollywood majors‘ binding long-term contracts, and monopolizing 
practices such as block booking and blind selling, Lu Gen swiftly turned to Shanghai 
productions for a more favorable deal. At that time local theater owners only had to pay a 
royalty fee to the Shanghai producers, and all box office income went to the theater 
owner. The theater owners did not have to share profits with the producers/distributors.  
In 1933, Lu Gen and Lo Ming-yau merged their gigantic theater chains to challenge the 
Hollywood majors‘ trust. Their production company Lianhua became the biggest studio, 
and unprecedented in Chinese film history. Even though the attempt failed in the end, it 
demonstrated the pivotal position of the exhibition sector in the Chinese film industry. In 
Hong Kong and Chinese film histories, the production sector was strong when the 
exhibition sector was also strong, regardless if the industry was vertically integrated or 
not, and we can see that the 1930s and 1940s were considered the golden era of Chinese 





Kong cinema.  Since the 1980s, theater chains for Chinese language films occupied over 
70% to 80% of total theaters in Hong Kong. Many of these were family businesses 
passing from generation to generation and were also involved in real estate business. For 
foreign language film theater chains, the deal was less favorable since the theater owners 
had to share part of the advertising and the publicity fee. In the mid-1980s, for Chinese 
language films the advertising and publicity fee was about 10% of the box office (not of 
the production costs) and the filmmakers were already complaining.  According to Chan 
Ching Wai‘s report, for example, for a film that grossed over a 10 million HKD, the 
advertising fee would be 1 million HKD; a 5 million gross would be 500,000 HKD.  And 
the ratio of profit sharing usually was not favorable to the theater owners. But with local 
production, the theater owner usually got 60% and the film owners got 40%. Gradually 
over the years, when Hong Kong local productions were proven to produce hit after hit, 
some theaters switched from showing the more prestigious foreign films to local features 
for a more favorable deal. Some even became investor/financiers to secure the exhibition 
rights of Hong Kong produced films.   
A browse at a history of the box office report reveals that Hong Kong film 
industry insiders rarely relied on box office reports to operate their business. According 
to Chan Ching Wai‘s interview of a theatre insider, the box office report started with the 
Hong Kong branches of the Hollywood eight majors (C. W. Chan "Theaters Fake") The 
branches had to report their box office performance back to their American headquarters 
every day.  This was before the age of the internet, and other hi-tech international 





information of other companies for reference. From then onward, the theater insiders 
exchanged information with each other and that practice became an unwritten rule. In 
1969, the Entertainment News, an industry subscription-based daily publication had more 
than 95% of theaters participating. The data came from participating theatres‘ daily self-
reporting. This publication was intended for industry insiders only. In an article titled 
―The possibility and extent of exaggerating box office figure‖ Chan Ching Wai argues 
that the data was accurate and reliable because the daily report was further broken down 
to individual film, individual theater and individual theater circuit. With such detail, there 
was not much leeway for fooling industry insiders who were familiar with the 
performance patterns of their theaters (C. W. Chan "Possibility ") When I was riding in 
my producer friend Rita Fung‘s car to a location shooting one night, I overheard her 
asking about the box office of certain theaters showing her film.
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 Fung explained that by 
asking the performance of a few flagship theaters that night, the producers usually have 
confidence in estimating the overall box office of the film and planning their next move. 
Writer-producer Chan Hing Kai in his column article titled ―the box office data is known 
before the film is released‖ confirms this (H. K. Chan "Box Office Data "). He explains 
how and why the industry insiders can make accurate estimates. Even though his article 
was published in 2008, it also applies in the 1990s, as the 1990s‘ market was even 
simpler. Chan Hing Kai says the reason is simple. For those who were familiar with 
distribution, they could tell the overall box office just by the number of theaters and 
screens of the opening day. Chan Hing Kai describes, ―The theater chain owners have 





the number of theaters for showing the film they bought.  These people are market 
experts. They make decisions according to their past experience.  They will fully utilize 
every theater and every screen.‖ In 2008, the theater owners could take advantage of the 
flexibility of the multiplex in scheduling. Back in the 1990s, theater chains could collude 
or compete to get the best out of the top hit movies. Chan Hing Kai continues, ―Those 
film acquisition experts of the theater chains watch many more films than average people.  
Besides, they face the audience everyday and thus know very well what the audience 
likes. They won‘t be slow in re-scheduling theaters and screens when they see a hit 
film…. If the opening box office is not good, they instantly cut it before waiting for the 
word of mouth to spread. That is why they rarely underestimate a hit film.‖ Given the 
expense of theater rent, it is understandable that Hong Kong theater owners, when 
presented with a more favorable, bigger profit sharing ratio, were highly motivated to 
fully utilize the screening halls and maximize their own profit even it meant dropping the 
less-than-top films early at the expense of the film owners. The competition in the 
domestic market was no less fierce than the international one. The exhibition sector was 
supportive of the production sector by funding projects and making the funding 
procedure simple, but was also tough on them when the films didn‘t perform at the very 
top.    
The petite size of the exhibition sector is most probably the reason why this sector 
could operate flexibly and made it possible for experts to watch every single film and 
then make quick decisions according to their past experience, instead of relying on 





280,000 seats (C. W. Chan Structure ).  In 1981, there were 81 theaters.(C. W. Chan 
"Fake Box Office")  Even at its peak in 1994, Hong Kong had only 132 theaters with 202 
screens and 121,765 seats. 
Table 5.1 The Petite Size of the Exhibition Sector of Hong Kong Cinema (1989-1998) 




No. of seats HK Production Gross 
take HK ( USD) 
million 
Total Gross take HK 
(USD) 
million 
1989 116 151 125,747 879 (112.99) Not available 
1990 121 164 128,295 939 1,313 (168.77) 
1991 123 173 126,269 1,038 1,377  
1992 124 183 125,410 1,240  (159.38) 1,573 (202.19) 
1993 131 184 123,034 1,146 (147.30) 1,580 (203.08) 
1994 132 202 121,765 973 1,423 
1995 122 200 107,032 785 1,357 
1996 111 201 96,833 686 1,323 
1997 101 199 87,564 546 1,163 
1998 91 197 79,791 Not available 1,059 
 
In 1979, when the Hong Kong economy was about to take off, and the period that 
saw the rise of the Chinese business moguls, the total gross take of Hong Kong theaters 
was 403 million HKD (about 51.8 million USD).  Hong Kong productions took up only 
one third of the total gross. But by 1982, after the Sino-British talks started, Hong Kong 
productions already took up more than half of the total gross (over 57% of the market 
share). In the 1990s, when a handful Chinese land barons dominated local economic 





in 1993). Nevertheless, no matter how big the market share of Hong Kong productions 
was, the total gross take of Hong Kong was still minuscule when compared to that of 
neighboring countries, not to mention Hollywood. At the peak of Hong Kong theaters‘ 
gross in 1993, even if Hollywood were to devour the entire Hong Kong theater market, 
the total gross take was only 1,580 million HKD (203.08 million USD). In the 1970s 
there was still the impression that Hong Kong was off the radar of U.S. foreign policy.  In 
the 1980s the Sino-British talks were at a deadlock. British hongs lost out to Chinese 
businesses in the real estate market, due to their lack of confidence and long-term 
commitment to the city. Given the meager monetary return of Hong Kong theaters, it is 
doubtful that the Hollywood majors would be motivated to take risks in Hong Kong‘s 
volatile real estate market to acquire more theatres, or to lobby Washington to intervene 
aggressively in this tiny and obscure market by administrative means while Hong Kong 
was still a colony of Britain, American‘s ally. 
Table 5.2 Gross Take in Hong Kong Theaters (1979-1983) 
 Hong Kong Production Gross take 
HKD (USD) million 
Total Gross take HKD (USD) 
million 
1979 133 403  (51.80)  
1980 184 492  (63.24) 
1981 242 567  (72.88) 
1982 404 701  (90.10) 
1983 411 788  (101.29)   
 
In 1985, Film Bi-Weekly ran a series on ―Theater Review‖ covering all 98 current 
theaters and 53 demolished theaters in Hong Kong in only 18 pages
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includes Chinese and English names of the theaters, photos of the theaters, addresses, 
phone numbers, name of the managers, class of seat and ticket price of each class, total 
number of seats, box office of each screening and total box office of 5 screenings in a 
day.  The box office figures are exact down to the last digit. The Film Bi-Weekly
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 office 
had only a handful of staff but still could list such detailed information.  Therefore, it was 
possible for the MPIA, government or another organization to get accurate box office 
information if they really wanted to, without resorting to sophisticated statistic techniques 
or an army of accountants. However, in such a small exhibition sector, it is doubtful that 
local theater owners would be motivated to spend the extra executive costs to tidy up 
their sloppy accounting practices, since they could already make an educated guess of the 
information by experience. Hong Kong box office income was unnoticeable to 
Hollywood and insignificant even in the Hong Kong economy. Even though the Hong 
Kong film industry was export-oriented, its contribution to Hong Kong‘s foreign 
exchange earning was unimportant. In an article titled ―Meager Hong Kong film export 
trade‖ published in 1982, Chan Ching Wai was cautious about Law Kar‘s prediction of 
the Hong Kong film industry‘s prosperity, and becoming the Hollywood of the East in 
the near future.  Chan Ching Wai writes that in 1982 Hong Kong had only 84 theaters and 
the population was 5.1 million.  In his tables and statistics, he shows how unimpressive 
the Hong Kong film industry‘s impact was, in terms of Hong Kong‘s overall import, 
export and entrêpot trade. He writes, ―In 1981, the total film export is $85,135,525 and 
the import is $34,208,660. That brings $50,926,865 in foreign exchange earnings. In the 





billion. The deficit is 16 billion. Hong Kong film import is 0.25% of total import and 
0.68% of total export. The film entrêpot is $28,116,501. This is an extremely 
insignificant figure in Hong Kong‘s enormous entrêpot trade. Hong Kong film industry 
as a source of foreign exchange earning is very insignificant.‖ (C. W. Chan "Meager" 44) 
The Hong Kong film industry was small, and the Hong Kong government was even 
smaller in terms of spending. Chan Ching Wai did an interesting statistical comparison in 
1981 to verify this (C. W. Chan "Why Do We Spend"). In 1980 the total gross take of 
Hong Kong cinema is about 500 million HKD. It was two times the colonial government 
spending on executive costs (245 million HKD), education (219 million HKD) and urban 
council and recreational facilities (215 million).  It was close to government spending on 
defense (453 million HKD).  Therefore it is doubtful that such a small government would 
be motivated to facilitate, or be involved in the petite Hong Kong film industry as it had 
been in the manufacturing industry in the 1970s and the servicing industry in the 1990s.  
Nevertheless, Chan Ching Wai reiterates the significance of Hong Kong cinema, in non 
quantitative terms, ―Those figures illustrate how insignificant Hong Kong film industry is 
in Hong Kong‘s overall import and export trade. But they don‘t reflect the importance of 
Hong Kong cinema. Film, when compared with other commercial products, has greater 
influence. When we compare the same commercial product with that of other countries 
we can show how important this product (film) is in the world.‖ (C. W. Chan "Meager") 
The perceived power of Hong Kong cinema was much greater than its actual total gross 
take. Chan Ching Wai quotes the Taiwan TV and film workers‘ protest against Hong 





to Taiwan is only about 9 million HKD (about 1.16 million USD).  The cost for the first 
quarter of this year is only 2.2 million HKD (about 0.28 million USD).  But that already 
provoked disturbances. Taiwan TV and film workers united together to protest and 
complain about Hong Kong cinema threatening them. They urged for a restricting quota 
for Hong Kong film imports. This illustrates the impact of 85 million dollar film export.  
But compared with the billion American dollar foreign exchange earnings of Hollywood, 
Hong Kong as ‗Hollywood of the East‘ is so minuscule. And in the near future, we still 
will not be able to extricate ourselves from such a minuscule condition.‖ (C. W. Chan 
"Meager") The petite size of the exhibition sector might have enabled theater 
businessmen to operate flexibly, and the meager income might probably de-motivate 
Hollywood and the colonial government from getting involved or intervening in this 
sector. But being minuscule did not make Hong Kong cinema less significant or market 
competition less fierce. Unlike the film industries of neighboring countries, the 
government and Hollywood were not the overriding factors in the development of this 
sector of the industry. Hong Kong theater businesses enjoyed relative autonomy and 
adapted themselves quickly to market changes. Within a couple of decades the exhibition 
sector switched swiftly between integration and de-integration, collusion and 
competition, and among foreign language films, Mandarin films and Cantonese films. 
They expanded the theaters or remodeled them into multiplexes, etc. In the 1990s, 






In the 1980s and 1990s film companies can be roughly categorized into two types: 
the big companies and the independents (C. W. Chan "Big Companies"). The big 
companies refer to those who own or have secured access to theater chains. Shaw studio 
owning its own theatre chain was a typical big company. Cinema City had secured access 
to Golden Princess‘s theater chain and thus was a big company. D & B signed a rental 
contract with Shaw‘s theater chain and thus was regarded as a big company. Independent 
companies were those without secured theater chains, and most of them were smaller in 
scale. But some independent companies could be large in scale like Win‘s. In the 
immediate post-war years, theaters were divided into three types according to the 
languages of the films: foreign-language theaters showing mostly Hollywood and 
Western films, Mandarin film theaters, and Cantonese film theaters. Foreign-language 
theaters had the highest ticket price and social status, Mandarin film theaters were at the 
middle, and Cantonese at the bottom. But since the 1980s with the cessation of Mandarin 
film production, the theaters were re-categorized and divided into two groups: foreign-
language film theater and Chinese-language film theater. Since then, theater chains for 
Chinese language films have occupied over 70% to 80% of the total number of theaters 
and over 70% of the box office.   
By late 1970s, Shaw studio production started to decline and its theater circuit 
was filled with the studio‘s generic performance sex and violence films, while the Golden 
Harvest theater circuit was boosted by films from its satellite production houses. The 
Shaw studio started to incorporate younger directors into their productions. Golden 





seeing the threat from the rapid rise of Cinema City (backed by Golden Princess theater 
circuit), Shaw and Golden Harvest joined their theater chains to maximize the box office 
of their respective movies. In 1987, Newport, a new theater circuit was set up. The owner 
Chan Wing-mei came from a theater business family. His father and his father‘s friends 
switched between foreign films and local productions whenever they saw fit. This not 
only changed the tripartite balance of power, but also opened up a big outlet for 
independent productions and facilitated their rise (Lan 9) since Newport opened up the 
prime time slot for independent films
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 while the big companies reserved the prime time 
slots for their own productions. Unlike the big companies, Newport did not have its own 
production company but it did loan money to independent productions. Chan Wing-mei‘s 
personal way of doing business is typical of that era. In response to the question of the 
type of filmmakers he would loan money to, Chan says, ―First of all we will see if the 
producer is reliable; we‘ll look at his track record; next is director and cast. We don‘t 
know how to assess a script. We can‘t tell what is good or bad. But, if the cast is strong, 
even if you give him over a million, there is a big chance we can make the money back.  
If there is no strong cast, then you can read the script and see if there is anything 
attractive and interesting. But to be honest, we don‘t understand that. We won‘t do it and 
we don‘t have an expert responsible for this (reading the script).‖ (Lan 9) Chan 
emphasized his reliance on the personnel rather than the script or idea when someone 
presented him a project proposal. ―It depends on who that person is. This is a small circle 
and it is easy to ask around and check out information about that person.‖ (Lan 9) Chan 





strong cast, if the amount they ask for is not too much, and if we can figure we can get it 
back, then we will loan the money to him.‖ (Lan 9) In the 1990s most projects were star-
led productions. Genre, character, story and the crew all revolved around the star. Chan 
said he could be flexible in the method of payment. He says, ―Our way of working is the 
same as the others. When the filmmaker has tight cash flow, we will loan him a big sum 
of money first and pay the rest later. For example, you now have a movie that is reaching 
10 million box office. And you are waiting to shoot your next 3 million budget film. We 
will give you that 3 million first and deal with the rest later.‖ Chan‘s flexible mode of 
financing was common practice in the 1990s. Wong Jing says having the financier be 
lenient and flexible with the cash flow makes a huge difference for him to work smoothly 
(Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). Back then there were only a few bosses (film financiers) 
in Hong Kong. Almost everyone knew everyone and people relied on the honor system. 
The procedure for launching a project was quite simple, no lawyer, contract and lengthy 
negotiation. Usually the filmmaker pitched the idea to the boss and shooting could start 
once the boss green-lighted it, even when the script was not completed, if there was one. 
The financiers only set the date of delivery, budget, cast and genre. The rest was all up to 
the filmmakers. There was no scrutiny of scripts or multiple executive meetings to green 
light the project. No bank loan was involved. It is due to such flexibility in financing that 
Hong Kong filmmakers could enjoy a free hand and improvisation in their shooting. In 
the case of Hong Kong cinema, it is this mode of financing that influenced the style of 





Another interesting phenomenon of the Hong Kong exhibition sector is they have 
overlapping shareholders and staff across companies. For example, Fung Ping Chung was 
both a high ranking executive at Golden Princess and an important strategist for Newport  
(Lang "Fung Ping Chung"). Fung‘s father inherited the family architecture business while 
also working with Lu Gen (the King of Theater Chain of Southern China) in the foreign 
film sales and distribution business. After the Sino-Japanese war, Fung‘s father returned 
to Hong Kong and set up his architecture and real estate business and also set up his first 
theater. Fung‘s and Chan Wing-mei‘s fathers and uncles worked together in the theater 
business. Fung himself worked in the banking field until 1975 and joined the theater 
business in 1961. These two business partners inherited wide connections from their 
fathers. The establishment of Newport opened up more opportunities for independent 
productions and invigorated the industry. 
It is amazing that Hong Kong filmmakers survived the cut throat competition in 
the 1980s market. In 1983, besides the domination of the big companies, independent 
production also faced reinvigorated forces from Hollywood. In the foreign film theaters 
Hollywood blockbusters like E.T., First Blood, Top Gun, the Star Wars series, the 
Superman series and the James Bond series, etc. continued to flood into Hong Kong. But 
Chan Ching Wai was optimistic about local production. According to his analysis, 
Chinese language films still had a big share of the box office. In 1980, it was 54%; 1981, 
58%; 1982, 68% (C. W. Chan "Chinese Language Films"). 
Throughout the 1980s to 1990s there were three to five major theater chains of 





and the production sector. While the production sector went from the Shaw monopoly to 
a tripartite oligarchy (Golden Harvest, Cinema City, and D & B) of the 1980s to the 
multiple independent productions of the 1990s, the exhibition sector also went from 
oligarchy domination to musical chair rotation. Both the production and exhibition 
sectors changed from concentration to diffusion of power. In the 1970s, in the exhibition 
sector, the big two were Shaw and Golden Harvest. In 1984, the big three were Golden 
Harvest, Golden Princess and D & B. In 1986, the Shaw theater chain closed. In 1987, 
Newport was set up but did not have its own production company. In 1992, the four 
major theater chains were Golden Harvest, Golden Princess, Newport and Regal. The 
Golden Princess theater chain closed in 1992. Since then the musical chair pattern 
accelerated: in 1993, Mandarin opened and Regal closed. In 1994, Mandarin closed. In 
1996, the three majors were Golden Harvest, Empire Theatrical Circuit and Newport.  In 
1997, Mandarin formed a new chain with another company… 
The diffusion of power in the exhibition sector can be discerned from the change 
in the outlook of the theater chains. During the oligarchy domination period, i.e. before 
the mid-1980s, each theatre chain had its own distinctive look. This indicates the active 
and significant role of theater in the system of Hong Kong cinema. In an article in 1980 
Manfred Wong describes the distinctive look of each theater circuit. In the late 1960s at 
the peak of Cantonese cinema, Wong describes that ―just by mentioning the name of the 
theaters like Globe, Tai Ping, Kam Ling, Pei Ho, Yaumatei, we all know they are for 
local features.‖ (16) In 1980, there were four circuits for local productions.  Local 





though Shaw has its loyal fans for its mid-night screening, the intellectual audience for 
Golden Harvest must be a bigger crowd… the theaters of the Royal Theatre circuit are 
located at obscure corners. Its box office performance has not been great.  But with 
Jackie Chan‘s kung fu flicks and Bang Bang Company‘s publicity, it can do better. And, 
with its better profit-sharing offer, it should be able to attract quality local films.‖ (16) 
Wong also describes the circuits run by pro-Leftist organizations and theater circuits for 
foreign films. In those days, ―the types of films the theater shows in the long run will 
gradually constitute the distinctive look of that theater. And audience chooses on the 
basis of that distinctive brand look.‖ (16) But as more new competitors joined the field 
and competition got keener, theater circuits all chased after the biggest hit films. In the 
early 1990s, the distinctive theater circuit look no long existed. Chan Wing-mei said it 
was then all mixed up, and the theater chains could not be differentiated by the styles of 
films they showed (J. Lin 43). In the past, the theater chains of Shaw and Cathay, and 
later Golden Harvest and Cinema City, all had their own distinctive image. But by the 
mid-1980s, there were a lot of variations and changes. Except for extreme examples like 
theaters for porn films, there was no need for branding a theater circuit by giving each 
chain a distinctive image. The four theater chains had comparable competitive power, and 
film production companies could choose among the four theater chains for themselves. 
Chan Wing-mei says it was drastically different from the past when certain production 
companies could only show their films exclusively in certain designated chains.  
 As competition got keener, films competing for the prime time slot started to have 





productions had priority to get the prime time slot in their own theater circuits.  
According to Chan Ching Wai‘s analysis, the four major prime-time slots occupied 
around 60% of the entire year‘s gross take. From 1987 to 1997, the gross take in the 
summer (about 65 days) of Hong Kong production was 24.88% of total Hong Kong films 
gross take; the Chinese New Year (about 15 days) was 13.92%; the Christmas/New Year 
(about 15 days) was 8.72%, and the Easter holiday (about 10 days) was 6.1%. (C. W. 
Chan Structure ). During the boom time, the big companies‘ own productions may fill up 
the entire year‘s slot. Films produced particularly for the Chinese New Year are called 
hesui pian (Chinese New Year Season Greeting film). Chan Ching Wai calls these 
formulaic big budget hesui pian ―Spring Festival Couplet
64
 Film‖ such as Kung Hei Fat 
Choy (1985, Cinema City), The Eight Happiness, (1988, Cinema City), The Fun, the 
Luck and the Tycoon (1990, Cinema City), and The Perfect Match (1991, D & B).  
Another prominent example of prime-time slot formulaic films are Clifton Ko and 
Raymond Wong‘s It’s a Mad Mad World series (1987, 1988, 1989 D & B), the All’s Well 
Ends Well series (1992, Ko Chi Sum/Regal; 1993 Golden Harvest; 1997 Mandarin), and 
It’s a Wonderful World (1994, Mandarin). These are usually star-studded mass 
entertainment comedies.  Having a time slot for the Chinese New Year time became an 
index of power. The 1980s ―Spring Festival Couplet Films‖ were also recognized by their 
company trademark style, such as Cinema City‘s deluxe-packaged middle class 
comedies. They are impressive because of the number of stars in them, but did not give 
full play to star power just yet. In the 1990s the production company trademark style 





for big budget star vehicles. ―Two Chows one Cheng‖ became a staple of the holiday 
season. ―Two Chows‖ refers to Chow Yun-fat and Stephen Chow. ―Cheng‖ refers to 
―Cheng Long,‖ Jackie Chan‘s Chinese stage name. The 1990s Chinese New Years were 
filled with feel-good festive Jackie Chan action adventure spectacles, Stephen Chow‘s 
signature mouleitou (roughly meaning nonsense) comedies and Chow Yun-fat‘s heart 
warming comedies, which extended his persona as the most homely star from TV. The 
box office success of these star-vehicle Chinese New Year films was so sweeping, that 
distribution companies of Hollywood features wouldn‘t want their Hollywood 
blockbuster to compete head to head with these local productions. Often they voluntarily 
gave way. The Chinese New Year time slot was the battle ground where local 
productions had the overwhelming advantage. Gradually there became a link between 
time slot and film style: the Chinese New Year was the venue for family comedy, and the 
summer holiday was for action adventure. In the 1980s, big companies with big theaters 
called for formulaic mass entertainment at the production end. For example, Cinema City 
backed by the Golden Princess theater circuit churned out its 9-reel formulaic films 
productions.   
Films released during non-prime time slots varied greatly. The big companies‘ 
prime time slot advantage was not absolute. This was especially so in the 1990s. During 
the down time, when the big companies did not want to take risks, they opened up their 
non-prime time slots to the independents. There are various factors that gradually 
decrease the significance of the prime-time slot. With a larger variety of entertainment 





Kong production came to depend more and more on overseas markets, the Chinese New 
Year prime time slot effect was not applicable to non-Chinese societies. The movies had 
to sell themselves. The most prominent example in history is Bruce Lee‘s Fist of Fury 
shown in 1972 from March 1 to April 19, during relatively quiet season. It was produced 
by Golden Harvest, newly formed after Raymond Chow left the Shaw studio and became 
a formidable challenge to his former boss.  In the 1990s, the most prominent surprise hit 
was the drug-lord film To Be Number One (produced by Johnny Mak) released from 
April 5 to June 3 for 60 days, an unusually long showing for Hong Kong films. It ranked 
number three in 1991 and was shown in the Golden Harvest circuit. The success of this 
film led to numerous copycats of gangster and drug-lord films. In 1989 Jackie Chan‘s 
production Mr. Canton and Lady, ―the Cantonese martial arts version of A Pocketful of 
Miracle‖ ("M.P.I.A. Yearbook"), was released on June 15, obviously targeting the 
summer youth market instead of the Chinese New Year family market. Even though it 
was launched shortly after the 1989 June 4
th
 Incident, it was shown until July 27 and 
ranked second of that year. 
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 While prime-time movies had a holiday formulaic look, 
non-prime-time movies tended to diversify and were more innovative.  It was the time 
slot of exhibition which called for particular types of films.   
The length of the shelf life also influenced the mode of production and style of 
films. Cantonese cinema in the 1950s and 1960s was known for its ―Seven Day Wonder‖ 
productions, movies finished within seven days or less. Back then in the exhibition 
sector, local productions were generally shown for a week. The common practice was 





cut instantly.  In the first week 60% of the profit went to the theater owners. The profit 
sharing ratio gradually decreased for the theaters in the following week. But theater 
owners set a minimum box office number. If the film could not reach that number by say 
Monday, it would be eliminated from the game. In the 1970s, local productions were 
generally only allowed a shorter shelf life in the theaters. For example, in 1979, for 
Chinese language films, even the top ten hits had only an average two weeks and a 
maximum three weeks‘ shelf life. ("Top 10 Box Office Hit of 1979") But the top ten 
foreign language films were shown from three weeks up to more than two months. Hong 
Kong productions had a shorter shelf life than foreign films even though their box office 
performances were in general higher than foreign films. If we divide the box office by 
number of days shown, the average box office per day of a Hong Kong film was much 
higher than that of a foreign film. This might be because either local film performance 
dropped sharply after two weeks, or foreign films were allowed to stay in theaters at a 
lower standard. Without a daily breakdown we cannot distinguish the tailing off patterns 
of these two groups of films. But obviously there was the pressure for Hong Kong films 
to open like dynamite, short and explosive. In 1979, most theaters for Chinese language 
films were big theaters and there was no rating system yet. There was a financial pressure 
to fill up the giant screening halls.    
Table 5.3 1979 Top Ten Hong Kong and Foreign Films 
Top Ten Hong Kong Films 
  box office days average per 
day 
1 The Fearless Hyena 5,445,535 19 286,607 





Table 5.3 continue 
3 Itchy fingers 4,086,632 17 240,390 
4 The Proud Twins 4,009,486 16 250,593 
5 The Magnificent 
Butcher 
3,629,171 12 302,431 
6 Cops and Robbers 3,497,812 16 218,613 
7 *  14  
8 Lam Ah Chun 
Blunders Again 
3,179,708 14 227,122 
9 Odd Couple 2,961,417 12 246,785 
10 His Name is Nobody 2,917,346 14 208,382 
 
Top Ten Foreign Films 
  box office days average per 
day 
1 Moonraker 7,864,054 64 122,875 
2 Foul Play 3,938,329 59 66,751 
3 Jaws 2 3,928,224 35 112,235 
4 Superman 3,525,512 21 167,882 
5 The Champ 3,452,947 36 95,899 
6 Alien 3,245,922 30 108,194 
7 Midnight Express 2,819,846 36 78,329 
8 Force 10 from 
Navarone 
2,458,748 28 87,812 
9 Deer Hunter 2,446,382 34 71,952 
10 Trinity Is Still My 
Name 
2,229,786 23 96,947 
*On Film Bi-weekly the number 7 film is Games Gambler Play.  But this film was released in 1974.  It 
was probably a typographical error. 
 
In the 1980s, in the domestic market Hong Kong movies had to compete with 
New Hollywood‘s blockbusters. In the foreign markets, the Southeast Asia market was 
shrinking. As Chan Ching Wai points out, in Malaysia and Indonesia, there was anti-
Chinese sentiment and the import of Hong Kong films were subject to changes in the 
political climate. In 1982, Indonesia further restricted their quota for Chinese language 
films from 35 to 25 films per year (C. W. Chan "Meager"). The Hong Kong film industry 





Kong film businessmen came up with the nerve wracking practice of the ―Saturday mid-
night premier‖. The director of the film had to sit inside the theater hall and watch the 
audience‘s response on the premier night. Usually this Saturday mid-night crowd was 
assumed to have attention-deficit disorder, and being boring was seen as the cardinal sin 
for Saturday night entertainment. Whenever there was moment of dead air time or simply 
silence in the audience, such as not laughing at the gag or not wowing to the stunt, the 
directors would have to re-edit or even reshoot the film. Coinciding with the emergence 
of high concept films in Hollywood, Hong Kong‘s Cinema City came up with its 9-reel 
formula.  In the scripting stage, the film was divided into 9 reels and in each reel there 
had to be a sufficient number of gags and stunts evenly distributed to ensure a constant 
and high frequency of stimulation for the audience. Since the Cinema City days, Tsui 
Hark has carried this kinetic style in his films. The late James Wong said that Tsui Hark‘s 
films are like 90-minute trailers. He vividly describes the tense feeling he had when 
watching Tsui‘s films: he had only half of his butt sitting on the edge of the seat 
throughout the entire screening. In such a harsh environment, where local filmmakers had 
to compete with each other during the prime season, and with Hollywood productions 
during the non-prime season, Hong Kong movies always had to perform like an attention-
seeking approval-addicted overachiever child, without the option of falling back on 
government protection or deep-pocket studio support. If the films performed less than the 
best, the theater owners would shorten the release days or switch to foreign films. 





of the few dozen theaters in Hong Kong. The soaring real estate market in the 1990s 
made this competition even more cut-throat. 
In the 1990s, Hong Kong was one of the most expensive cities in Asia. The Real 
estate market soared to phenomenal high. Big theaters of over 1,000 seats in individual 
buildings were demolished to give way to more lucrative retail businesses. Shopping 
malls sprung up everywhere. Multiplexes were embedded in shopping malls, and the 
function of cinema became to draw crowds to the mall, and not just during the Chinese 
New Year holidays, but all year round. Breakeven films were not good enough for that 
purpose. They wouldn‘t help draw large enough crowds, cover the rent or compete with 
the wide array of entertainment options in the mall. Sporadic independent surprise hits 
could not be provided in sufficient quantity or for a steady enough flow of supply. In 
districts with rent of over a hundred thousand dollars per square foot, shopping mall 
multiplexes needed a constant flow and large amounts of hit movies, be they local or 
foreign productions. Movie screening, as a business activity taking up over 90-minutes of 
such a high-rent space, must justify its existence by a high return. By the end of the 1990s 
the multiplex composed over 80% of the total number of theaters. The advantage of 
multiplex flexible scheduling is that it helps to maximize the profit of hit movies. The 
film industry in the 1990s, was characterized by endless sequels of hit movies (made by 
local production), and Hollywood-made star-vehicle blockbusters. To compete in the 
world market and with Hollywood in the domestic market, Hong Kong cinema in the 
1990s was reduced to two exportable and competitive genres: action and comedy. This 





The size of the screening hall had an impact on the adoption of a rating system in 
Hong Kong and the varieties of films being shown. In 1982 New Wave director Patrick 
Tam‘s Nomad was forced to be re-cut, even after it gotten a screening permit from the 
censorship department and was already being shown in the theaters. This re-censoring of 
the film created an uproar among Hong Kong filmmakers. In the midst of debate over the 
censorship of sexually explicit films, it was the theater owners who refused to adopt the 
film rating system, worrying that its adoption might send away family audiences and 
reduce the number of viewers, according to filmmaker Ng See Yuan.
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 In the early 1980s, 
the majority of Chinese-language film theaters were big theater (about 700 to over 1,000 
seats) showing family friendly mass entertainment while foreign-language film theaters 
started migrating into multiplex or smaller size theaters (less than 500 seats). The rating 
system was practiced in foreign-language film theaters and on movies like Last Tango in 
Paris, shown in Palace Theater, which had proved commercially viable. Besides 
criticizing the double standard of the censorship department in their treatment of Hong 
Kong productions and foreign films, Ng See Yuan also points out the absurdity of 
government actions such as giving the screening permit but forbidding the printing of 
Chinese subtitles. Ng See-yuan says, ―This is burying one‘s head in the sand. We can still 
understand a lot of things even without the Chinese subtitles. We did not protest against it 
because we don‘t want the government to also tighten the censorship on foreign films. 
This does not mean we approve the government‘s action.‖ It was only in the mid-1990s 
when Chinese-language film theaters were gradually turning to multiplex or smaller 





Hong Kong it was the exhibition sector that deterred market segmentation and impeded 
the production of niche market films.  It was the size of the exhibition hall that influenced 
the types of films being produced.     
Before the 1990s there was no lasting regular art house cinema circuit in Hong 
Kong. Foreign art films were shown sporadically in the City Hall, the Arts Centre, the 
Hong Kong International Film Festivals or by film clubs renting screening halls in 
schools or theaters on Sunday morning. In the 1970s, King Hu‘s classics, produced by the 
Shaw studio, were packaged as mainstream genre martial arts and shown in Shaw‘s 
theater circuit. Tang Shu Shuen‘s ―counter cinema‖ film Sup Sap Bup Dap (1975), a 
poignant critique of patriarchal and commercial culture in Hong Kong was disguised as a 
commercial film (Yau). Tang Shu Shuen had a short career span, producing only four 
films before leaving Hong Kong.  When the Chinese-language film theaters started to 
adopt the multiplex or remodel big theaters into small theaters, niche market films by 
Stanley Kwan, Wong Kar Wai and Fruit Chan started to emerge.   
 The MPIA‘s year-book divides Hong Kong theaters into three major geographic 
areas: Hong Kong Island, Kowloon peninsula and the New Territory. Hong Kong Island 
is where the City Hall, the Art Center and the headquarters of major banks are located.  
There are many Western expatriates living and working on this side of the city. The block 
Lan Kwai Fong with bars, restaurants and various entertainment venues was built to cater 
to this group of consumers. Foreign-language film theaters concentrated more in this 
area. Multiplex and art house theaters like Columbia Classic and Cine-Arts started on 





teenage popular culture, and shops and theaters mostly cater to this group of consumers.  
The proliferation of the multiplex and the decline of big theaters (over 1,000 seats) was 
most pronounced in this area. The number of multiplex and small theaters rose from 6 in 
1989 to 33 in 1998. Big theaters reduced from 30 in 1989 to 4 in 1998. The New 
Territory consists mostly new town government or private housing complexes.  In this 
residential area, big theater or multiplex and small theaters do not show any big change.  
Big theaters reduced from 7 in 1989 to 1 in 1998. Multiplex and small theaters only 










Table 5.4 Decline of Big Theater and Rise of Multiplex 
 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total no. of seats 125747 128295 126269 125410 123034 121765 107032 96833 87564 79791 
Total no. of 
theaters 
116 121 123 124 131 132 122 111 101 91 
Total no. of big 
theater 
51 46 44 36 31 29 20 17 12 8 
Total no. of 
multiplex or 
small theater 
30 39 42 54 61 67 73 77 80 79 
Hong Kong Island 
Number of seats 32,081 30779 30566 30246 31362 33740 24847 22294 20479 16051 
Big theater 14 13 13 10 9 9 6 5 5 3 
Multiplex or 
small    
12 12 13 17 21 26 27 29 29 29 
Kowloon 
Number of seats 62910 64803 61996 60164 58973 58204 51391 45386 40495 39027 
Big theater 30 27 25 21 19 18 12 10 6 4 
Multiplex or 
small 
6 11 12 18 20 21 25 28 31 33 
New Territory 
Number of seats 30756 32713 33707 35000 32699 29821 30794 29153 26590 24713 
Big theater 7 6 6 5 3 2 2 2 1 1 
Multiplex or 
small 
12 16 17 19 20 20 21 20 20 17 
 







   In 1989, the number of theaters with over 1,000 seats was almost half the total 
number of theaters in Hong Kong. But by 1998, it was less than 9%. In 1989, only a 
quarter of the theaters were multiplex or small theaters. In 1998, over 86% were 
multiplex and small theaters. During this transitional period of the transformation from 
big theaters to multiplex an interesting phenomenon emerged: the crisscross of art house 
cinema and mainstream cinema. In the exhibition sector, there were theater owners 
bringing in foreign art/classic films to the Hong Kong mainstream. Columbia Classic was 
opened in 1988 and closed in 1997. Its owner Bill Kong emphasized that it was a theater 
for high-class movies, not for art films. Bill Kong‘s 1985 interview reveals the general 
atmosphere of resistance to elitist art in Hong Kong film business. He explained, ―In 
Hong Kong, audience is resistant to art film theaters. They think it will only show ‗weird 
movies‘. Art film theaters are not acceptable for general public. I have to make clear that 
we are not building an art film theater. It is like a while ago the Palace Theater showed a 
‗Hitchcock Retrospective‘. It was successful. It‘s a balance between arts and commerce.‖ 
Bill Kong came from a distribution and theater business family. His family distributed 
foreign films (from Europe, Hollywood and Japan) to Hong Kong. In 2000, he was the 
mainstay producer who brought Crouching Tiger Hidden Dragon to the U.S. mainstream 
theater. In the production sector, quality commercial films like Wong Kar Wai‘s 
directorial debut As Tear Goes By (1988) were packaged as mainstream gangster films 
with the two most bankable and top over-booked stars Maggie Cheung and Andy Lau. 






Hong Kong. Wong Kar Wai is the prime example of a Hong Kong director of 
commercially viable art film. In the 1990s Hong Kong filmmakers, including art film 
directors, could work without studio and script, but had to stay within the star and genre 
prescribed by the financiers. 
The exhibition sector played an active part in the development of Hong Kong 
cinema. As both the financier and the buyer of film products it was the locomotive of the 
industry, setting the pace and direction for the production sector, laying down the 
parameters on what and how to produce. The mode of financing and mode of exhibition 
influenced both the style of filmmaking and style of film text. Hong Kong filmmakers‘ 
frantic and spontaneous filmmaking style, and the kinetic and neurotic energy in Hong 
Kong movies can be attributed to the personal management style in the exhibition sector.  
Given the significant and driving role of the exhibition sector in the system of Hong 
Kong cinema, how did the colonial government adeptly discipline the industry and shape 
it into an apolitical entertainment industry via this sector? 
GOVERNMENT AND CENSORSHIP – HONG KONG CINEMA ON PAROLE 
In the 1990s, with the euphoric atmosphere boosted by economic achievements 
and the myth of the government‘s laissez-faire economic policy, it was believed that even 
though the government didn‘t play a protective and supportive role to Hong Kong‘s 
cinema, the industry benefitted from the colonial government‘s benign neglect. This 
impression intensified especially when compared with situations in neighboring Chinese-
language film industries under state control, or with intense government involvement.  






not depend on bank loan financing or state studio approval. Hong Kong filmmakers‘ 
spontaneous and frantic filmmaking style further reinforced the illusion of the autonomy 
of Hong Kong cinema. The vitality of the popular culture, the energy of Hong Kong 
cinema and the prosperity of the city may have obscured the colonial nature of the 
administration – Hong Kong was ruled as a colony and the government was not elected to 
represent the people. The Governing authority of the ruler superseded the freedom of 
expression of the ruled, and administration expedience superseded the preservation and 
development of local film culture. The British colonial government officially established 
film censorship in Hong Kong in the 1950s after regaining Hong Kong from the 
Japanese. The political censorship clause has been resiliently maintained since then, 
despite repeated challenges by the local film community. It was only finally dropped in 
1995, two years before Hong Kong‘s sovereignty change. How did the colonial 
government apply censorship control over the local film industry, and yet present an 
image of being liberal or even benign? What was the role of the government in the 
system of Hong Kong cinema? And how did the Hong Kong filmmakers carve out a 
space for themselves?  
The role of the colonial government in the system of Hong Kong cinema was 
quite peculiar. It was not protective or supportive as in national cinema, nor did it 
function as a facilitator as in Hollywood. Instead, it added chaos and crisis to the film 
industry‘s operations, either by its presence in enforcing censorship rules or by its 
absence in maintaining law and order and setting film policy. During the transitional 






intensified political anxiety. Filmmakers were preoccupied with political issues, and free- 
floating anxiety was present on the screen, the set and in the industry at large. Not being 
recognized as an art worth preserving by the society, or as a vital industry worth 
supporting by the government, Hong Kong cinema was like a street kid under the 
pressures of parental negligence, discipline by authority, and street violence. It had 
neither the freedom from government censorship, nor the support to elevate its status and 
pursuit of any higher goal. With the government setting the political parameters for its 
production, Hong Kong cinema was in fact on parole. In the name of protecting the 
citizens, the government applied censorship rules mainly in the exhibition sector, and not 
the production sector. Hong Kong filmmakers‘ initial response to censorship rules 
focused mainly on pragmatic and logistical issues, instead of arguing on principles of 
fairness or freedom of expression. Over the years, however, they got more creative in 
their strategies in dealing with the consensus-building British colonial government by 
invoking public opinion, and setting up a moderate public forum in which to force 
government officials to have some face time with the public. They were no less skillful 
and diplomatic than the colonial government in pressing their demands. They developed 
tactful and flexible resistance approaches well suited for dealing with a colonial 
government whose rule was described as ―velvet colonialism‖. 
The colonial nature of the government in the system of Hong Kong cinema has 
often been overlooked or misinterpreted.  In her study of film censorship in Hong Kong 
Maria Barbieri succinctly describes that the essence of the system of government in Hong 






with local administration by officials reporting to the Governor‘s office.‖(92) Despite the 
euphemism ―velvet colonialism‖, Hong Kong was ruled with an iron fist as a colony first 
and foremost. Barbieri states, ―Hong Kong was essentially a military, diplomatic and 
trading station, and not an ordinary settlement. Strategic considerations demanded a more 
stringent control by the British Empire.‖ (92) The highly publicized positive non-
intervention policy of the colonial government was a myth.  Barbieri poignantly points 
out its essence: ―the real nature of the laissez-faire economic policy in Hong Kong, the 
lack of intervention by the colonial government was an ideological tool, used to disclaim 
accountability for social inequality, rather than a coherent policy…the government 
intervened to favour the generation of wealth rather than its distribution.‖ (64) In the 
cultural realm there was no coherent policy either.  The government that intervened with 
its censorship system in the name of protecting the citizens was, in reality, more 
concerned about protecting the governing authority from social protests and 
disobedience, as well as preventing Hong Kong from being embroiled in China‘s politics, 
which was essential for the continuation of British rule over Hong Kong. The colonial 
government enforced tighter controls on films than on other media, since all films had to 
go through a censorship procedure and get screening permits from the authorities before 
any public release, while there was no such requirement on print media. The colonial 
government never neglected the Hong Kong film industry, as Barbieri points out when 
describing the significant role of Hong Kong cinema in the political power struggle: 
―(T)he development of cinema in Hong Kong has been affected since its beginning by its 






Not only the thematic aspect of movies made in Hong Kong but also the organizational 
structure of the industry and the market competition within the industry itself are closely 
related to the struggle for cultural hegemony in the area.‖ (72) Throughout the history of 
Hong Kong cinema, there was always link between government, politics and the film 
industry. The very apolitical outlook of Hong Kong entertainment movies is symptomatic 
of the very political nature of this mass entertainment industry. Situated in a dependent 
territory, the Hong Kong film industry never enjoyed benign neglect by any ruling 
regime. But the intricate relationship between filmmakers, major studios and political 
power blocs in previous eras is beyond the scope of this dissertation. In the decade I 
focus on, the 1990s, when Hong Kong cinema was facing intensified global competition, 
there was an obvious relationship between the role of government and Hong Kong 
cinema‘s industry structure, filmmaking practices and film style. The industry had to 
adopt a flexible mode of production and a horizontal organizational structure to enable it 
to respond quickly not only to volatile overseas markets, but also the changing political 
climate. Hong Kong cinema was an anomaly in an era when the nation-state was assumed 
to be the norm, and national cinema was treated as sacrosanct to help it resist Hollywood 
domination. Despite the appearance of being a market-driven operation the Hong Kong 
film industry was largely defined by the political structure of the territory, and the 
governing philosophy of its ruling regime. The Hong Kong film industry had to 
economically perform (survive by not being a burden to the small government) while 
remained politically subservient (not damaging the image of the tranquility of colonial 






the thematic and formal presentation of Hong Kong cinema. The government‘s action, 
whether present or absent, played a significant role in the system of Hong Kong cinema. 
Hong Kong filmmakers responded to the ruling regime‘s unaccountability by changing 
their resistance strategies. Over the years they gradually changed their strategy from 
passive appeal and petition to authority, to positive intervention for change by playing the 
public opinion card and international law card to take advantage of the transnational 
status of Hong Kong society, and international media attention focusing on Hong Kong 
near the days of sovereignty change.    
The Presence of the Government 
Early incidents of censorship were mainly prompted by overt political reasons and 
Hong Kong filmmakers were, in general, defenseless vis-à-vis the authorities. In 1936, 
the Nationalist (KMT) government announced the banning of the production of dialect 
films in the name of unifying the national language. As Zhou and Li describe, the 
announcement rocked the entire Hong Kong film industry because it affected the 
livelihood of Cantonese filmmakers, and sounded the death knell of dialect cinema.  
Since Hong Kong cinema heavily depended on the Cantonese speaking market in China 
at that time, Hong Kong filmmakers petitioned the Nationalist government, but only got a 
temporary suspension of the ban. The incident tailed off when China and later Hong 
Kong became entangled in the war with Japan. In 1938, March of the Guerillas (1938, 
written by Cai Chusheng) was banned by the Hong Kong government because Britain at 
that time wanted to stay neutral and did not want any anti-Japanese films shown in Hong 






Japan (110). During the Japanese occupation, Hong Kong filmmakers fled and stopped 
making films, and the only Cantonese movies shown in theaters were those that had been 
confiscated and were scheduled by the Japanese occupying force (Zhou and Li). A full 
scale civil war resumed after the Japanese surrender. The Nationalists lost and retreated 
to Taiwan. When the Communists took over China and closed its doors, Hong Kong 
cinema shifted its markets to overseas Chinese. When the Cold War started, the Hong 
Kong government decided to combat communist propaganda. According to Barbieri, in 
the 1950s the government summoned and asked local film producers not to produce films 
that would incite unrest, and decided to establish an unofficial scripts censorship. The 
administration did not use Hong Kong cinema as a propaganda tool to legitimize its rule 
or counter its opponent, but no Kino Fist or Cinema Agitate was permitted either. In the 
post-war years, mainland China‘s stated film policy was to promote communism; in 
Nationalist-ruled Taiwan it was countering communism; and in the United States the 
unstated media policy was ―internationalism‖ (Curtin "Beyond").  To maintain its rule 
over Hong Kong amidst nationalist movements in Asia, the British had to keep Hong 
Kong neutral. Political neutrality was the unstated official film policy of the colonial 
government throughout its history, as we shall see in the censorship battles below. To 
avoid upsetting the public order, films shown in Hong Kong could not be supportive of 
communism, anti-colonialism, anti-capitalism from any political direction. 
By 1953, an official system of film censorship had been implemented (C.-t. Li 
"Fatal Blow"). British colonial rule in Asia was seriously challenged in World War II and 






a softer approach.  Films slated for public release had first to be submitted to the censor‘s 
office.  The stated purpose of censorship system was to protect society from harm. Given 
that the society was based on a moral consensus, this censorship was a means to protect 
this moral consensus. But the censorship system in Hong Kong was plagued with 
problems.  The rules, written loosely, were subjected to the censors‘ personal 
interpretations and the implementation was inconsistent or even absurd. As Barbieri 
points out, the system was characterized with a paternalistic attitude, and a general 
prejudice born out of the colonialist discourse, which discriminated against local films 
and gave imported films an unfair advantage. The system was racially discriminative, 
with the censorship authority headed often by a Westerner who decided what was moral 
and decent for the ruled Chinese community to watch.     
Censorship, on political or on social issues, was widely implemented by the ruling 
cadre to ensure the public would not be incited to unrest. In her research, Barbieri 
detailed censorship cases to illustrate the breath of the colonial government‘s censorship 
and the absurdity of its reasoning. Here is a brief list: in the post-war years it was 
particularly opposed to China‘s political propaganda films. Documentaries on the 
national celebrations of China were banned to avoid ―provoking public disorder in Hong 
Kong cinema‖ (109) Films like The East is Red and The Great Victory of Mao Zedong’s 
Thought were cut. The Opium War (1967) was banned because ―its showing in a public 
place would damage good relations with other territories.‖ Even films from the city‘s 
sovereign United Kingdom were cut or banned after they had been cleared by the 






Today and Tomorrow, was accused of depicting an apocalyptic vision of Hong Kong, and 
was held back by the distributor. Gillo Pontecorvo‘s The Battle of Algiers was banned on 
the grounds of ―excessive violence and its strong anti-colonialist theme.‖ (112). Akira 
Kurosawa‘s Dersu Uzala (1975) was banned in Hong Kong in 1977 because it was 
considered anti-Chinese. Easy Rider was banned because ―it was not conducive to the 
well-being of youth because not only did it dwell on the use of drugs, it also seemed to 
endorse such practices,‖ said Nigel Watt, Commissioner for Television and Films at the 
time. (112) Watt‘s cultural relativity reasoning for different censoring measures on sexual 
and violent material on the Hong Kong screen is particularly revealing of the prejudices 
inherent in the system. He said, ―Chinese audiences in Hong Kong are more ready to 
accept violence on the screen than they are to accept blatant sex. The minority audience 
of European or Western people, however, seems to look at the problem the other way 
round!‖(113) With the censor‘s endorsement it is no coincidence that Hong Kong action 
cinema gradually excelled in the ―violence aesthetic.‖ 
Barbieri goes on with censorship cases to illustrate the inherent contradictions and 
hypocrisy of colonialism in the decisions made by the authorities.  The written censorship 
rule was in fact created more for administrative expedience than for giving the 
filmmakers a clear guideline of the Do‘s and Don‘ts. Years of censorship had such a 
stifling effect that Hong Kong filmmakers had turned to costume drama for political 
allegory, or other creative ways to express their discontent.  But as Li Cheuk-to describes, 
―Although the political system is far from democratic, the British administrators ruled 






the filmmakers until the 1980s, when the ―1997 issue‖ started to raise concerns over 
political censorship and the community‘s urge to discuss the political issue intensified. In 
1980 New Wave director Tsui Hark‘s controversial film Dangerous Encounter – 1st Kind 
was banned on the grounds of ―incitement to crime, violence and anti-social behaviour.‖ 
(Barbieri 121). Taiwan‘s anti-Chinese communist films If I Were For Real (1980) and 
The Coldest Winter in Peking (1981) were banned on political grounds. In 1981 Ng See 
Yuan‘s Men without a Promised Land didn‘t pass the censor even after it was reshot. In 
1982, New Wave director Patrick Tam‘s Nomad was approved, re-censored and then re-
cut. In the same year, New Wave director Ann Hui‘s The Boat People, a story about 
Vietnamese people after the Vietcong take-over, produced by a pro-leftist company, 
passed the censor and was briefly released before it was withdrawn by the distributors 
due to pressure from the Leftists later. 
In an interview in 1982, Ng See Yuen complains about how the censoring practice 
became disruptive to film business in Hong Kong (C.-t. Li "Ng See Yuen on 
Censorship").  Prompted by the recent incidents of banning and re-censoring films, Hong 
Kong filmmakers established ―The Hong Kong Film Worker Against Re-censor System 
Provisional Committee‖ and Ng See Yuan was one of the five committee members.  He 
had experience in negotiating with the censorship authority and knew the problems of the 
censorship system well. Ng says, ―in fact the Hong Kong filmmaking community is 
defenseless in face of the censorship authority. It goes without saying that we all know 
that there is no standard in the censor…What we are really up against this time is not the 






and rules.‖ ("Ng See Yuen on Censorship" 6)  Ng quotes the case of Nomad to illustrate 
how disruptive and costly the re-censorship was to the filmmakers. ―This set a bad 
example for the future. There is no point of getting a screening permit from the 
authority…according to Hong Kong censorship ordinance, one person or a group has the 
right to appeal for re-censor or banning a film even after it is approved for public 
screening. This is problematic. They (the censors) have no idea of film production 
procedure. Usually after we finished making the movies, we only print one to two copies 
for the censorship authority to decide to cut or not. After getting the screening permit, we 
then print more copies, plan release dates with theaters and sign contracts with 
advertising companies. This will cost us at least 300,000 to 400,000 dollars. For public 
release, we only need to print 6 to 7 more copies.  But in the United States or Japan, they 
need up to 200 to 300 copies and that costs over one million dollars. But a complaint 
from one person or one group can have a huge impact and stop the screening of an 
approved film. This will cause chaos to the business cycle.‖ ("Ng See Yuen on 
Censorship" 6) The person or the group asking for re-censoring a released film could 
make an anonymous call and was not responsible for any consequences. Ng vents, ―The 
authority‘s reason for re-censor is to protect the public‘s interest…but who protects the 
interest of the film company? ... their complaint can disrupt or even suspend our business 
but without taking up any responsibility for our loss. This is very unfair…the suspension 
of screening can cost us up to 500,000 dollars.‖ ("Ng See Yuen on Censorship" 6) The 
filmmakers had the right of appeal against the re-censor, but the bureaucracy of the legal 






magazine, Hong Kong filmmakers published an open statement against the re-censor 
rules. What is interesting about this incident is that the focus of the filmmakers‘ argument 
was not about the right to freedom of expression or asking for clarity of the rules and 
regulation.  Instead, their concern was more pragmatic: a desire for a more proper 
censorship procedure to minimize the disruption to the film business, as well as a 
punishment to deter irresponsible anonymous complainants. Another important point to 
note is that the filmmakers united and set up a committee to open a channel to 
communicate with the government, instead of suffering the authority‘s maltreatment 
quietly. Hong Kong filmmakers were not stereotypically politically apathetic as the 
authority or university scholars of that era depicted. This incident stirred up a commotion 
in the filmmaking community and considerable public discussion. From then on there 
were more and more articles revealing the problems of the film censorship system and 
requests for change. In his summary of the activity of Hong Kong film workers opposing 
the re-censor system, Koo Siu Fung (Stone Koo) points out that up to that time (1983), in 
this dominantly Chinese society, the film censorship regulations only have an English 
version and no Chinese version. Subsequently a non-official Chinese version of the 
regulation (of 1976) was published in the next two issues for concerned readers ("Film 
Censorship Clause Part 1";  "Film Censorship Clause Part 2"). More and more people 
from the public arena joined the discussion and published articles in that film magazine.    
In 1984, the Film and Broadcasting Bureau suddenly announced that all scripts of 
stage drama must pass through the censor before a public showing. This shocked the art 






government used to set up consultation committees to seek public opinion before passing 
new laws. It was unusual for the government to catch the public by surprise. Secondly, 
Hong Kong stage drama was still a small circle activity, which could hardly incite 
widespread public disorder. The news of this incited heated discussion and media 
workers from various fields to set up a forum on ―Creative Freedom of the Repertory 
Theater‖. Lam Yik-wah (Edward Lam) of Zuni Icosahedron (an art group) expressively 
points out the paternalistic attitude of the government in the name of protecting the public 
(C. You). Interestingly, it is the Bureau‘s sudden action that prompted workers from film, 
artists from the stage, and scholars and publishers to gather together to hash out the 
censorship issue. Political censorship was the key concern in their debate on censorship. 
As Chan Ching Wai perceptively points out, the censorship was set up to protect the 
governing authority, not the people. ―If that‘s only for the purpose of protecting the 
citizen from the harmful conditions of the sex and violent material, existing laws in Hong 
Kong are effective enough to make filmmakers self-disciplined. There is no need for a 
system that pre-censors films before they are released.‖ ("Censorship Shackles" 38) The 
essence of the censorship ordinance was to control rather than to protect the people 
despite the official rhetoric. Chan Ching Wai continues, ―Although the flavor of 
colonialism is fading in Hong Kong, it is still a genuine colonial government.  That is to 
say, however much it respects the people‘s opinion it is still not a government that 
represents the people. Therefore its legislation is not that of the people…the priority of 
the government legislation is to protect its own governing authority. It will adopt strict 






censor and re-censor procedure. Chan Ching Wai laments, ―The grounds for banning a 
film can be on moral, religion, education or anything the authority comes up with.‖ In 
view of the unchecked power of the censorship authority Chan Ching Wai presciently 
warns that we should not be over optimistic about the amendment of the regulation in 
1984 and sadly he was right. Despite the heated debate among both legislators and 
industry professionals, the clause on political censorship (banning films which might 
―damage good relations with other territories‖) remained in the 1988 amendment too. 
Such politically conservative practices were extended to the Hong Kong International 
Film Festival (HKIFF), known for showcasing Asian art movies. According to an 
interview article in Film Bi-weekly titled ―Making a Big deal – Why the Hong Kong 
International Film Festival does not screen Taiwanese films?‖ HKIFF, despite the 
geographical and cultural proximity between Hong Kong and Taiwan and the rise of 
Taiwan New Cinema, did not show Taiwanese films for ten yeas (1976-1987) while other 
major international film festivals were inviting films from China, Taiwan and Hong Kong 
for exhibition (Ji). No government official gave the interviewer a direct answer although 
the political reason was obvious to the decision makers in the festival office. 
In 1986, the government decided to amend the film censorship ordinance and it 
was a closed-door drafting with no industry professionals involved. In June 1986, Film 
Bi-Weekly and Hong Kong film workers published a public statement in major 
newspapers expressing their concern and suggesting that the authorities open the draft for 
public review. Before the filmmakers received any answer, the government announced 






community, because according to that regulation anyone found spreading false news and 
causing public panic would be prosecuted. The swing between the tightening and 
relaxing of public order ordinances since 1967 has always been an issue and concern in 
Hong Kong.
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 In March 1987, veteran film critic Li Cheuk-to, after a discussion with 
lawyer friends, found out an outrageous fact: the film ordinance was not legally valid and 
the censorship system, which operated for more than thirty years, had no legal basis. In 
his article titled ―Questioning the Legality of the Film Censorship System‖ Li explains 
that the ―film censorship standard guideline‖ edited by the censorship authority was just 
an internal executive guideline and not part of the censorship ordinance (C.-t. Li 
"Questioning"). Without including the censorship standard the ordinance was not legally 
valid and thus the censorship authority had no legal authority to approve films for 
screening. In 1987, an article in the Asian Wall Street Journal leaked a confidential 
government document revealing that the government had known since 1972 that the film 
censorship system had been operating without legal authority.
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 This confirmed Li 
Cheuk-to‘s suspicion. In March 1987, the government openly admitted that it had not set 
up a legally valid censorship ordinance. In April 1987, Hong Kong filmmakers posted a 
public statement on Film Bi-Weekly asking the government to explain ("A Statement"). 
The filmmakers also demanded the government be more open to the public about 
introducing the new three-tier rating system, and to be clear and precise about the 
political censorship clause if that could not be canceled. Instead of coming clean and 
explaining to the public, the colonial government‘s response to the scandal was: lie and 






system (Nie "Who"). The Head of the censorship authority P. Lebrun straightforwardly 
states that the three-tier rating system was conceived from the perspective of executive 
efficiency, i.e. to ensure that the theaters will actually implement the censorship 
authority‘s guidance (Nie "Censorship Bil").  The government had already discussed the 
three-tier rating system for more than ten years and it was only after the outbreak of the 
scandal that it suddenly rushed to pass the bill to give the censorship authority legal 
power to approve films again. As Barbieri describes, ―The new bill was designed to plug 
all the loopholes (of the previous ordinance) and recommend a film classification system, 
while preserving the feature of the existing censorship system, including the sensitive 
clause on political censorship.‖ (96) In the late 1980s with its economic achievements, 
Hong Kong was a world class city opened to international information with a well-
educated labor force attentive to international news, trends and standards. In an article 
published in May 28, 1987, Li Cheuk-to brought another bomb. He pointed out that the 
political censorship clause violated the freedom of expression portion in Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (C.-t. Li "Political Censorship 
Violates"). Although Britain is a member of the Covenant, the political clause survived 
intact in the 1984 amendment. In 1988, the clause survived again and was only tempered 
by including the obligation for the censors to take into account Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In 1995, two years before Hong 






The absent government   
In the 1990s, the eleventh hour democratic reforms by the last governor were not 
extended to the culture industry. Despite using Hong Kong cinema for promoting trade 
and tourism, the colonial government made no effort in supporting local culture industry.  
The lack of a film policy and guarantees of constitutional rights of freedom of expression 
left the industry to continue to operate like an illegitimate business, vulnerable to police 
harassment and triad violent threats. The tax-paying Hong Kong filmmakers did not 
enjoy the same rights to legal protection and government facilitation as other businesses 
and industries. The colonial government did not try to balance the tension between 
governmental efficiency and upholding the principle of freedom of expression. 
 In mid-1990s, when the Hong Kong film industry was plagued with all ills, there 
were calls for government involvement. In 1994, four film and culture organizations set 
up four forums to push the government to get involved and set up a long term 
development policy for the industry. The topics of the forums were government policy 
and film censorship, the Hong Kong International Film Festival, the Hong Kong Film 
Archive and the Hong Kong Film Development Council. The purpose of the forums was 
to ―get more people involved in open discussion so as to provide a reference for 
government and civil groups to develop a blue print for future development.‖ The 
summaries of the forums and news clips were published in the book In Search of Hong 
Kong Film Policy (Zuni). The forums exposed not only the notorious censorship issues to 
the public, but also the problems caused by an absent government in the film Festival, 






these organizations were just muddling through, and ran into chaos and crisis. The film 
festival was severely understaffed and suffered from the bureaucracy of the civil service 
system. The film archive was short of resources and its operation was unclear to even its 
consultants. The film development council project was once canceled.   
In the forum on government policy and film censorship, it was interesting to note 
how straightforward and sometimes even blunt the government officials were in holding 
their stances. Since the late 1980s, Hong Kong filmmakers had been worrying that the 
clause on political censorship ("damage the good relationship with other territories"), 
would be used by the Chinese government after 1997 to tighten control on the 
industry. In 1994, Martin Lee, head of the Democratic Party, proposed to cancel or 
amend the political censorship clause, and it provoked a great reaction from the Chinese 
side because that involved China's foreign relationships and Hong Kong's cultural 
management after 1997.  The Chief Secretary, Anson Chan‘s
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 response was interesting 
especially being the second highest ranked government official. She said amending the 
film censorship clause did not involve foreign policy issues after 1997, and the Hong 
Kong government seldom invoked the authority from this clause. In the past, the 
aforementioned clause was invoked only once. Therefore, to her it was no big deal to 
amend or cancel this clause now (Zuni 14). This was typical of the style of the colonial 
administration: strict legislation and liberal execution. The government reserved the right 
to invoke the law to discipline the public at will. The response and reasoning from the 
Chinese side, Wu Weili of the Xinhua Agency, was also interesting. His argument against 






be preserved.  He further elaborated that letting films that ―damage the good relationship 
with other territories‖ shown can affect the relationship between Hong Kong and its 
neighboring countries after 1997. This meant it involved China‘s foreign relations and 
thus the central government had to intervene. Both focused on administrative expedience.  
Neither side argued on the principle of freedom of expression for the Hong Kong people.   
It is also interesting to note that as we see in the 1980s, Hong Kong filmmakers, 
caught between the colonial and Chinese officials, learned to be more and more 
pragmatic and effective in their approach in negotiating with governments. They became 
more proactive in film policy issues (albeit mainly limited in the area of film censorship) 
and started to get government to respond to their demands (albeit limited to minor 
changes in ordinance). In the 1990s, Hong Kong filmmakers took one more step forward 
by getting government officials involved in an open forum providing direct face to face 
communication between filmmakers and government officials in the presence of the 
public.  Peter Lam (Lam Yuk-wah) says his purpose of organizing the forums was to 
collect opinions from various fields and write them into reports and send them to the 
government. He says he learned this strategy of negotiating with the government from the 
experienced art group Zuni Icosahedron (Zuni 8).  In this open city of the information age 
under the world media‘s watchful eyes as Hong Kong approached 1997, the colonial 
government couldn‘t use bullets to subdue people as in an authoritarian country. The 
Hong Kong citizens couldn‘t cast ballots to express their opinion as in a democracy. In 
this peculiar city, communication and negotiation between government and the people 






committees to seek public opinion in order to legitimize its rule. Over the years, the 
filmmakers and other cultural organizations learned that the effective way to make the 
aloof colonial government listen, budge and change was to use the same tool: play the 
public opinion card. They invoked the power of the people by setting up committees to 
collect people‘s opinions, organize popular forums, and kindle public response with open 
statements and inviting debates.  In Hong Kong, the government could not use bullet and 
the people had no ballot. Creating popular forums was an effective way to improve 
communication. On and off the screen, the Hong Kong cinema served as an important 
cultural forum to voice the people‘s concerns, hopes and fears.    
Cinema of anxiety 
The history of censorship in Hong Kong reveals that the stated cultural issues are 
in fact displaced political issues. The banning of political films, imported or local 
productions were small in number compared with the severe measures taken in 
neighboring China‘s film industries.  Nonetheless, the enforcement of political censorship 
since the 1950s has had a stifling effect and set the parameters for the industry. The 
prosperity of the industry may obscure its conditioning effect on filmmakers over the 
years.  In the 1990s, filmmakers from the most commercial to the most artistic, were all 
preoccupied with Hong Kong‘s political issues.  
Even though Hong Kong cinema was not a national cinema, the Hong Kong 
colonial government, whether present or absent, played an important role in creating the 
market-driven system, shaping the industry organizational structure and molding an 






approach in controlling the film industry was so soft and inconspicuous that its 
relationship with the local film industry has been mistaken as benign neglect, which 
might have paradoxically helped promote Hong Kong‘s image as a modern liberal city 
despite its status as a colony. The filmmakers‘ dealings with the government gradually 
became also more flexible and pragmatic. While the colonial government has used a 
closed-door operating style for the last one and a half centuries, contemporary Hong 
Kong filmmakers and critics have insisted on making public statements, setting up public 
forums and gathering public opinion. As Hong Kong cinema became more spread out in 
the world market, such a soft, pragmatic and flexible approach was also practiced in the 
production sector by the producers and production executives who were mostly women 
and were fondly addressed as ―housekeeper.‖ What was the role of the producer in the 
system of Hong Kong cinema? Why were production executives mostly women in the 
1990s? How was their management style different from that of their counterparts in the 
previous era or in Hollywood?   
PRODUCER: HOUSEKEEPER OF HONG KONG CINEMA 
In the 1990s, Hong Kong cinema seemed to regress to a cottage industry 
comprised of independent productions known for its filmmakers‘ frantic work style.
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 In 
the production sector it looked more like guerilla filmmaking than a modern movie 
business. In the previous era the integrated Shaw studio was regarded as a symbol of the 
modern film industry in Asia.  Interestingly, in the 1990s parallel to the de-integration of 
the film industry, there was the rise of the position of producers, and 70% of the Hong 






a sign of progress and a producer cinema is a symbol of the modern movie business, then 
Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s was more advanced than the previous studio era which 
recruited no women in production and had the directors, instead of the producers, as the 
centers of power and creative control. What was the role of the producer in the system of 
Hong Kong cinema? Why in the 1990s, were production executives mostly women? How 
was their management style different from that of their counterparts in the previous era or 
in Hollywood?   
In Hong Kong cinema, woman producers were often fondly addressed as ―the 
housekeepers,‖ the matriarch figure in charge of administration. On the one hand, this 
exploited women‘s traditional gender role as the multi-tasking caretaker. On the other 
hand, it capitalized on modern women‘s leadership role as executives.  Producers of 
Hong Kong cinema experienced the intriguing power dynamic of an industry going 
through the double edges of colonialism, capitalism, and globalism. The history of the 
Hong Kong film industry does not fit into a linear development model. It is not a 
mechanical imitation of the Hollywood studio system model, and the role of the producer 
is not a simple replica of their counterparts in Hollywood. Within Hong Kong cinema‘s 
specific political, economic and cultural parameters, producers modify and adapt their 
roles to local socio-cultural contexts, industry organization structures and across various 
team chemistries. Like the housekeeper in a family, the producer played a significant, all-
round, supportive role beyond that which a simple job specification could describe.  The 
rising of the producer position and increasing participation of women at the executive 






Hong Kong producer shows the inadequacy of existing theories and methodologies to 
conceptualize industrial models and professional positions situated in Hong Kong‘s 
particular cultural contexts. At present, the few studies on Hollywood women producers 
often define the gender issue as a woman‘s issue and overlook the economic realit ies of 
American corporate culture. Studies of the Hollywood studio system often frame the 
producer-function as an economic issue and overlook the socio-cultural factors in shaping 
the organizational structure and the producer‘s role in such a system. In this segment, in 
order to understand the role of producer in Hong Kong cinema, I would contextualize the 
system of Hong Kong cinema in the world market and situate the producer within the 
system of Hong Kong cinema. The recruitment of women producers in the Hong Kong 
film industry is in congruence with the pattern of Overseas Chinese business and the 
Hong Kong style of management of drawing from traditional cultural practice to adapt to 
the modern global business environment in the rapidly growing East Asian region.  While 
in some studies of Hollywood, where expansion is often equated with growth, the 
adaptive flexible practice of Hong Kong cinema could easily be mistaken as a 
dysfunctional maladjustment. The management style of this generation of producers, 
women or the younger generation of collaborative males, best illustrates the Hong Kong 
film industry‘s survival strategy: by being adaptive, pragmatic and flexible in order to 
keep making movies.  
Studies on Woman Producers in Hollywood   
 By referencing the studies on women producers in Hollywood, we can better see 






the role of the producer and the organizational structure of the industry. So, it is 
worthwhile to discuss briefly the Hollywood studio system and the handful of written 
sources on woman producers in Hollywood before going on to the case of Hong Kong 
women producers. In Hong Kong there is neither scholarly study nor many newspaper or 
magazine articles on producers, not to mention any focus on the gender dimension of this 
profession. At present Hollywood is the most dominant film industry in the world and its 
industrial model is the most extensively studied in the academy.  It has also experienced 
the rise of women executives. In 2002, Jess Cagle in her magazine article, ―The women 
who run Hollywood‖ featuring Stacey Snider, Sherry Lansing, and Amy Pascal, states 
that ―for the first time in history, women are now running half of the six major movie 
studios.‖ (44) However, despite such an event‘s groundbreaking historical significance, 
there is still little literature on Hollywood women producers about their roles in the studio 
system, on how they break into the old boys‘ club, and on how their management style 
differs from their male counterparts or the impact of women‘s leadership on the 
organizational structure of Hollywood. Even with the tremendous amount of research in 
disciplines like gender, business management, and the Hollywood studio system, there 
are few that integrate theories from these disciplines and analyze the role of women 
executives in Hollywood. Nevertheless, the sparse sources available still serve as good 
references for studying Hong Kong producers and exploring how these issues may be 
conceptualized, framed, and reframed.   
The early literature on Hollywood women filmmakers are often more like 






Ally Acker in Reel Women – Pioneers of the Cinema 1896 to the Present argues that 
women had a strong presence in the beginning but gradually faded out in the mainstream 
and in history. Despite her intention to redeem women‘s history, in the chapter on women 
producers Acker perceives women producers and Hollywood as unchanging. In the 
biographical description, Acker repeats the stereotypical and binary types of powerful 
women such as the non-threatening nice girl Sherry Lansing versus the masculine Dawn 
Steel. Dawn B. Sova in Women in Hollywood – From Vamp to Studio Head also argues 
that women filmmakers had a strong start and could meet their male counterparts on 
equal ground. She describes women‘s on again off again relationship with the Hollywood 
system. In the 1930s and 1940s once formal structures were established to determine 
roles and to set standards, women were pushed out of the high-power jobs. Then in the 
1980s women were restored to positions of power such as studio head, producer and 
director. But these women often created new enterprises and remained outside of the 
mainstream of power. Then in the 1990s women invaded the existing enterprises and 
assumed decision-making roles at major studios. But Sova does not explain why the 
Hollywood studio system that pushed women out in the 1930s and 1940s would admit 
women back in the 1980s and 1990s when the New Hollywood global conglomerates, as 
Schatz describes, were ever more structured and blockbuster-obsessed and ―the 
production and calculated reformulation of these blockbuster films into multimedia 
franchises has become more systematic.‖ ("Return" 76) She does not analyze the changes 
in the structure of Hollywood and how women took advantage of that to penetrate into 






organizational structure and industrial system. Acker and Sova inform us of women‘s 
presence in the industry but do not help us understand objective changes in the industry 
or the subjective experiences of the women.    
With the assumption that to be equal means to be the same, the goal of getting 
women into a position of power becomes a common view of gender equality. But in an 
industry like Hollywood sexism is the elephant in the room and there is tremendous 
pressure on women to keep quiet about their gender issues. Sherry Lansing has been 
quoted on many occasions for denying prejudice against women, and having insisted that 
talent is the only criteria in this creative industry. Stacey Snider, who declined the Cagle 
interview, is ―like many other younger women working in Hollywood, …[who] resists 
being labeled a ‗female executive‘ or drawing attention to her gender.‖ (46) Culture is a 
salient issue for analyzing gender relations and organizations, because organizational 
cultures like that of Hollywood have been significant barriers to change. The informal 
organization may transmit cultural messages about the ―proper place‖ for women.  
Popular book writers or writers with high-ranking industry experience are more 
perceptive and offer more practical advice. In her popular book on career advice for 
women Nice Girls Don‘t Get the Corner Office Lois P. Frankel acknowledges sex 
discrimination as a real part of a woman‘s employment experience, but warns women not 
to file complaints via formal channels or verbalize any concerns openly because it may 
backfire. She also advises women not to change the system alone or play the gender card 
without exploring other alternatives. Even though she advises women to ‗quit being a 
girl,‘ she also strongly advises against women acting like a man.
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daunting task facing women executives in Hollywood, a paradoxical industry: while 
creativity and breaking the rules are exalted, there are many more tenacious secret rules 
than written ones. Gail Evans, an executive vice president of CNN, in Play Like A Man, 
Win Like A Woman, who is also encouraging women to adapt to the ―malestream‖ but to 
succeed on female terms, provides a concrete description of the structure of American 
media industries, and explores the unwritten rules in business and lists the usual traps 
women fall into in such a structure.  She points out the importance for women to be 
industry-savvy, i.e. to be aware that the rules are written by men and the structure of the 
playing field is traditionally shaped like a pyramid. This point is particularly important to 
the study of the Hong Kong producer, even though the structure of the playing field in 
Hong Kong cinema was drastically different from the pyramid structure of Hollywood. 
Evans says sometimes a woman fails not because she lacks good ideas, but ―because she 
lost sight of the fact that a good idea isn‘t more powerful than the structure that must 
approve it.‖ (40) Evans goes further to urge women to change the system communally, to 
stay in the mainstream and change the system from the inside out, instead of finding a 
voice outside the system.
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However, this is much easier said than done. When a woman faces hostile 
cultures, she has to spend a tremendous amount of energy just to develop strategies for 
her own survival. Lynda Obst, one of the most successful producers who survived 
Hollywood for two decades, in her autobiographical survival guide Hello, He Lied – And 
Other Truths from the Hollywood Trenches illustrates the pragmatism of woman 






woman executives face. Nevertheless, Obst manages to define success in her terms, ―My 
goal has been to learn how to get movies made without losing sight of the reason I began. 
I have had to learn to recognize the insidious nature of the beast without becoming one.‖ 
(8) Rachel Abramowitz‘s Is That A Gun In Your Pocket – Women‘s Experience of 
Power in Hollywood based on extensive research and interviews, written in a novelistic 
style, vividly presents the lived experience of woman executives struggling to assimilate. 
With back stories of parents, spouses, friends and associates around the women 
executives, one can imagine how hard these women have fought when they could not 
even verbalize sexism and there was no rosy female-bonding in this colony.  The call for 
more fluid gender roles - for both men and women - in the business world is echoed in 
Linda Seger‘s When Women Call the Shots – the Developing Power and Influence of 
Women in Television and Film. Seger also observes that for the first wave of women 
executives in the 1980s, the pressure to assimilate to the ―malestream‖ was enormous.  
But she is optimistic that the new wave of women executives in the 1990s, even though 
mostly still in middle management, will gradually ―trickle up‖ as the industry evolves. 
This generation of women executives reenvisions business by redefining success.  While 
traditional definitions of power depend on competition with the result dividing winners 
and losers, for the younger generation women executives ―power‖ is about getting the job 
done, about empowerment, and to be in a position of power is to be very clear about how 
one feels about things, etc. Seger then compares the competitive model (usually 
associated with masculine qualities) and the collaborative model (usually associated with 






to women, and may be the most conducive to the film industry.‖ (62) She reasons that a 
competitive attitude can work directly against the goal of producing great films. The 
building up of the individual ego is detrimental to a positive working environment, and 
competition can waste time and be counterproductive when an inordinate amount of time 
is spent on corporate politics, etc. The collaborative model can be more efficient because 
it removes internal competition, removes the need for politicking, and promotes strategic 
and creative thinking. Seger goes on to state that the effectiveness of the collaborative 
model is gradually becoming appreciated by the new generation of men working under 
female bosses. Seger‘s collaborative model is echoed by producer and professor Myrl A. 
Schreibman, in his Creative Producing From A to Z – The Indie Producer‘s Handbook. 
Schreibman points out that the two most important concepts in independent production 
are ―relationship‖ and ―ego‖. This indicates the significance of collaboration in a 
flattened organizational structure like independent production and producer, where the 
executive, regardless of his or her gender, plays an important role in creating and 
maintaining an amicable work ambience. As the New Hollywood conglomerates focus 
more on investing in people who make films, rather than making films in-house as in the 
classical era, the role of entrepreneurs become more important to the process. Together 
with the outsourcing of financial planning, marketing and script consultation to small 
businesses, the structure of the American film industry is a complex mix of the pyramid 
and flat organization structures.   
 Studies outside Hollywood and American corporate culture are most relevant to 






structure and the functions of women executives. Sally Helgesen and Carol R. Frenier, 
instead of urging women to assimilate to the ―malestream,‖ look for female advantages 
and call for changes in organizational structures. They reframe the gender issue as a 
business issue, instead of a women‘s issue. They illustrate how it makes economic sense 
to have woman leaders. Helgesen, in The Female Advantage – Women‘s Ways of 
Leadership, finds that women are best at running organizations that foster creativity, 
cooperation, and intuitive decision-making power. In her documentation of the everyday 
practices of  woman entrepreneurs, she notices how her subjects‘ experience as women 
(wives, mothers, friends, sisters, daughters) contributes to their leadership style. The 
women entrepreneurs ―tended to structure their companies as networks or grids instead of 
hierarchies, which meant that information flowed along many circuits, rather than up and 
down in prescribed channels.‖ (28) The organizations run by these women do not take the 
form of the traditional hierarchical pyramid, but more closely resemble a web. The 
women‘s concern with relationships necessitates the impulse to share information, and 
sharing ―was also facilitated by their view of themselves as being in the center of things 
rather than at the top; it‘s more natural to reach out than to reach down.‖ (27) Under 
female leadership the community is created around a central purpose. As we shall see, the 
organization of the Hong Kong film industry of the 1990s is closer to Helgesen‘s web 
structure, and woman producers, situated at the center of the web, played an important 
role in the efficiency of information flow, pulling cast and crew together, and maintaining 
this tightly-knit filmmaking community. Similarly, Carol Frenier, an entrepreneur and 






proposes to explore the feminine side of our nature to transform our business 
environment. She explores feminine patterns of work and the feminine principles. Her 
notion of feminine leadership is one that collaborates with the masculine, and appreciates 
the value of combining the feminine and masculine ways of thinking.   
Acker and Sova, appealing to the moral of gender equality, state how things 
should be. Frankel and Evans, being practical and pragmatic, explain how things can be 
in the given American corporate culture. Obst and Abramowitz, with first-hand 
experience or interview and research, show how things feel like in candid detail. Seger 
and Schreibman, when comparing the collaborative and competitive models, or 
contrasting studio and indie productions, call for gender fluidity. Helgesen and Frenier, 
researching beyond Hollywood and American corporate culture, reframe the gender issue 
and extol female advantages and feminine principles. In Hollywood, women executives 
have adapted to be gender bilingual, that is assuming both masculine traits such as 
ambition, assertiveness and competence, and feminine traits such as caring, nurturing and 
connectedness. Helgesen and Frenier‘s vision of female leadership and changing 
industrial structure may still seem far-fetched in Hollywood, but is a closer description of 
the phenomenon in Hong Kong cinema where women were invited, not for moral reasons 
of gender equality, but for the economic benefits they brought to an industry going 
through seismic structural changes in a different socio-cultural context. It is from an 
economic perspective – the producer‘s core job being about the bottom line – that we 






and how producers, men and women, functioned in the changing organizational culture 
and industrial structure. 
Producer-function in Hollywood studio system 
In Hollywood studio system studies there is the assumption that the function of 
the producer in the studio system hinges on centralization. Thus, the role of American 
socio-cultural context in shaping the Hollywood organizational structure is overlooked. 
For example, Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson in Classical Hollywood Cinema and 
Thomas Schatz in ―The return of the Hollywood studio system‖ argue, from the central 
producer system, to the producer-unit system of the classical era, to later New 
Hollywood‘s conglomeration, the different systems are merely a revision of the principal 
of centralization of the Hollywood studio system because the studios either retained 
centralized physical facilities and labor, or maintained the pivotal sectors of financing 
and distribution. Bordwell et al. pay no attention to human agency in the big capitalist 
machine, and Schatz pays no attention to the return of women studio heads in the return 
of the Hollywood studio system. It is not a surprise that David Bordwell in Planet Hong 
Kong makes no attempt to theorize the system of Hong Kong cinema despite he and his 
associates‘ established work on Hollywood. Hong Kong‘s film industry being mysterious 
to him reveals the inadequacy of the theories and methodologies of their model to 
comprehend production in a different socio-cultural context and to recognize the role of 
producer in the process. In Genius of the System, Thomas Schatz conceptualizes the 
filmmaking process in the classical era in very masculine terms, ―…studio filmmaking 






approaching armed conflict‖ (Genius 12) and his study of human agency covers no 
gender dimension. Nevertheless, his insight about the melding of institutional force and 
personal expression brings out the concept of institutional authorship,
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 a different way of 
thinking about the producer‘s role in the creative process. The producer, often dismissed 
as the interfering administrator on the side of the bankers, in Schatz‘s interpretation is 
creatively constructive to the making of movies, and this can be used to explain the 
impact of women producers on the style of Hong Kong cinema. Timothy Corrigan in 
―The Commerce of Auteurism‖ (Corrigan) illustrates the distinctive auteur persona of 
director-producers such as Francis Coppola, and how the author is constructed by and for 
commerce. However, Matthew Bernstein argues that a TV producer like Jerry 
Bruckheimer cannot be considered an auteur, but as a brand name he can facilitate the 
contemporary auteurs‘ work. In Hong Kong cinema, the producer, not positioned in a 
vertical relationship with the director, is neither auteur nor brand name. But he or she did 
contribute greatly in the creative process, and played a key role in facilitating the auteurs‘ 
career. For example, director John Woo‘s producer Terrance Chang plays a key role in 
launching Woo‘s career in Hollywood. Director Tsui Hark‘s producer Nansun Shi played 
a key role in maintaining their production house, and keeping projects from falling apart 
for a quarter of a century, an impressive accomplishment given the usual short lifespan of 
Hong Kong production companies. John Caldwell in Production Culture proposes an 
integrated cultural-industrial method of analysis, i.e. to integrate cultural analysis with 
political economic frameworks. He shows how TV producers at the top display a frat-boy 






useful for understanding the cultural factor for women being invited into the film 
industry, and where they were positioned. Caldwell also proposes ―theorizing from the 
ground up‖ which is not applicable to the Hong Kong film industry because of the Hong 
Kong film industry‘s flat organization structure. But I would situate the producer within 
the system in order to study how the producer worked at the center in a web-like structure 
instead of at the top of the pyramid.  
Housekeeper of Hong Kong Cinema 
If Hollywood women producers are male impersonators with a gun in the pocket, 
and poach power from men at the apex of the pyramid, Hong Kong woman producers are 
―the housekeepers,‖ an unofficial title that bespeaks of their position as the supportive 
maternal administrator in a web-like communal structure. They have extended their role 
from controlling the strings of the family purse and holding the family together, to 
controlling the budget and schedule, pulling the cast and crew together, as well as 
cultivating and maintaining relationships with overseas financiers and distributors. There 
was a ―proper place‖ already saved for her, like in a family business, with the dual-
department structure, usually with the male director leading the creative department and 
the woman producer heading the production executive department. While Hollywood 
women producers are described as crashing into the boys‘ club without invitation, Hong 
Kong women producers were invited by men who felt the need for women to fill the 
vacancy. While Hollywood women producers suppress their gender, Hong Kong women 






facilitated the economic empowerment of women, as well as the industrial context of 
Hong Kong cinema that drew women into this industry and this profession would help.   
The Hong Kong film industry in the 1990s, being much smaller in scale and 
material resources, with about one thousand active members and a relatively flat 
organization structure, was the opposite of Hollywood. In this small community there 
was no trade journal for industry news, and the filmmakers relied more on the honor 
system than formal organizational rules or legal codes. Power was much diffused and 
information flowed via informal channels which the producers called ―gossip.‖
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 This 
was closer to Helgensen and Frenier‘s vision of an organizational structure which 
facilitated female leadership. Women producers were expected to play a complementary 
and supportive role to the director, and relied more on intuition than on formulated 
organizational and workflow charts. They played an important role in creating an 
ambience in the work place that was conducive to creativity and efficiency. This 
coincides with producer Rita Fung‘s assertion that the most important job for a producer 
in Hong Kong is managing interpersonal relationships.
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 As Frenier describes, her 
accomplishment in business often is ―something that was outside of the usual measuring 
systems‖ her tasks seemed almost invisible to everyone (21). Maria Tong comments that 
being a producer is quite a thankless job, because when the production runs smoothly no 
one will notice the producer‘s contributions and hard work, but when she fails, everyone 
notices.
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 In Hong Kong while the directors receive public recognition, the role of the 
producer is seriously underrated. In the Hong Kong film industry, the producer, man or 






well as feminine qualities of modesty and diplomacy to lead the team with an iron fist in 
a velvet glove.   
Since its inception, Hong Kong cinema was a commercial, transnational and de-
politicized mass entertainment industry. With the government‘s rhetoric of the ―positive 
non-intervention‖ policy, small and medium scale enterprises (SMEs), more flexible in 
absorbing economic fluctuations, composed half of Hong Kong‘s enterprises. These 
SMEs had been the backbone of Hong Kong‘s economic growth for the past few decades, 
and many were family businesses. In the 1990s, the Hong Kong film industry, with most 
of its film companies being of small to medium scale, was part of this SMEs culture. It 
was not only flexible at the level of production, but also in its industrial structure. It had 
no lasting studio or production house and its history is characterized by an alternation 
between the studio system and independent productions. In the early 1980s when the 
traditional markets (Southeast Asia) were seriously shrinking, the Hong Kong film 
industry had to aggressively explore new overseas markets while the Hollywood 
domination in Asian markets was increasing. The industry gradually de-integrated to 
lower overhead costs and started run-away productions in China and other Asian 
countries to lower production costs. As the Hong Kong economy took off in the late 
1970s, the domestic market was too small to support the rising production costs. When 
market share guaranteed by monopoly or oligopoly practice faded, the pressure to depend 
on overseas markets increased. As Hong Kong cinema expanded its overseas markets, the 






became more prominent, and the demand for a producer who could balance business and 
the creative dimensions of this culture industry increased.  
  As the Hong Kong economy transformed from a manufacturing to a service 
industry, the colonial government needed better-educated laborers, regardless of gender. 
The free general education policy and civil service system were designed to train 
English-speaking laborers for tertiary industries like financing, communication, tourism, 
etc..  Education was made accessible to girls, and Hong Kong soon boasted a high 
percentage of women entrepreneurs and executives. But the rise of women to economic 
power was no rosy picture. For woman producers active in the 1990s, growing up in 
Hong Kong in the 1950s and 1960s was as far from sugar and spice as Frankel‘s version 
of American girlhood during the same decades. In Hong Kong, young girls were forced 
to grow up fast and help out the parents. While in Frankel‘s description girls in the U.S. 
were denied participation in competitive games, Hong Kong girls were forced to work 
and compete in the real world for survival. Child labor and factory girls working in 
sweatshops were common in the 1960s. Financial literacy, instead of the bliss of 
ignorance, was encouraged and required to survive in a post-war refugee colonial society 
designated to contribute financially to its sovereign power. In the 1950s and 1960s, child 
actresses like Josephine Siao and child singers like Anita Mui (1963-2003) ―quitted being 
a girl‖ and worked professionally at the age of five to support the family. Siao became 
one of the biggest stars in the 1960s Cantonese cinema and later re-invented herself as a 
director-producer. She was still active, played leading roles and won best actress award in 






Cantopop of the 1980s and 1990s, was respectfully addressed as the ―Big Sister,‖ a 
powerful nearly-matriarchal figure in the music industry. Even for someone like powerful 
producer Nansun Shi coming from a better-off background, there was no over-protected 
girlhood.  ―Nansun‖ means born in the south, indicative of the itinerant life of her 
formative years. In the unstable mid-1960, Shi was sent alone to South Africa by her 
father to attend a class with children coming from half a dozen countries (Cindy S.C. 
Chan Nansun Shi). Shi later went to the U.K. for a college education in a competitive 
emerging field, computer science: rare even for Hong Kong boys at that time. Besides 
political turbulence and social unrest, for that generation of filmmakers, constant 
migration also contributed to an unstable childhood environment, which extended into 
their adult lives. Many of them migrated from China or Southeast Asia, briefly settled in 
Hong Kong, went for an overseas education, migrated mostly to English-speaking 
countries because of concerns over the 1997 turnover, and then returned to Hong Kong 
because of the economic boom in the 1990s. In the age of globalization, overseas 
experience became an asset to executive leaders in the Hong Kong film industry serving a 
diverse market.   
Girlhood was no less brutal and competitive than boyhood in such a society in 
that era. It did not necessarily get more liberating when girls grew into womanhood even 
after gaining economic power. In her ethnographic study of women entrepreneurs in 
Hong Kong, Priscilla Pue Ho Chu concludes that the motivation and reason women were 
often pushed to set up their business was to provide extra income for the family, or to 






ambition or for her own good. Unlike their counterparts in Hollywood, Hong Kong 
women producers entered the industry without a vision to break into the boy‘s club or an 
ambition to get to the top. Producer Chung Chun entered the Shaw studio by answering a 
newspaper advertisement, not knowing that they had never had women working in 
production before (Cindy S.C. Chan Chung Chun). Chung switched her job because she 
was bored with her clerical job in shipment. Producer Jessinta Liu switched her job from 
taming sea lions in the Hong Kong Ocean Park to leading the production team in the 
movie business (Cindy S.C. Chan Jessinta Liu).  Nansun Shi was invited to join the 
fledging Cinema City in the early 1980s while she was dating Tsui Hark, their star 
director. The men inviting her only knew that they needed a woman in their company as 
they expanded. They didn‘t even know what the job title and specifications were, but 
called the post ―housekeeper,‖ assuming it to be self-explanatory (Cindy S.C. Chan 
Nansun Shi). Nansun Shi, a veteran public speaker appearing on radio and TV shows, 
jokingly and humbly described her job as a ―translator‖ – to translate negative unpleasant 
words between colleagues and partners into agreeable ones. Her sense of humor probably 
makes her a survivor. ―Whatever hardship we are facing now, it will be good material for 
jokes in the future,‖ she said as she described the early struggling years in Cinema City. 
In that interview for the Hong Kong Film Archive, supposed to be formal and serious, 
Shi filled it with jokes and laughter while delivered the hard data and information we 
needed. Unlike their Hollywood counterparts, Hong Kong woman producers just acted 
like they belonged, with no pressure to assimilate. It was for economic reasons that 






women writers were admitted to Tsui Hark‘s writer group with the intention of widening 
the market appeal of Tsui‘s masculine martial arts films.
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 The most obvious change and 
impact was the insertion of the romance plot in Once Upon A Time in China series (Tsui 
1991-1994).  
In the production executives department women were very welcome. Lorraine 
Ho, chair of the Hong Kong Production Executive Association, comments about the 
inconvenience and interruption of production caused by the previous generation of male 
producers, who often put their egos before their projects (Cindy S.C. Chan "Lorraine 
Ho"). Ho praises women for their skill in negotiation and smoothing things out, an ultra 
important skill in Hong Kong‘s tight schedule tight budget productions. While praising 
the women‘s problem-solving oriented attitude, she referred to the creative department as 
―the zoo,‖ where the problem-making wild things are.
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 The director and his team often 
make every day a crisis management day for the production executives by constantly 
improvising on the set. Like other women producers, Ho also has a good sense of humor 
and fills her personal interview with jokes and laughter.
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 As we shall see in the case 
studies, the division of labor along gender lines is best exemplified by the Film 
Workshop, a production house established by Tsui Hark and Nansun Shi, with Tsui as the 
director and Shi as the producer, and the couple acted like parental figures in the 
company, as described by their staff (Ho Sharon Hui). While Tsui operated in the typical 
masculine style of being competitive and goal-oriented (Cindy S.C. Chan "Tsui Hark"),
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Shi was there not only to take care of the marketing and administration, but also 








Sometimes the partnership is a male-male pair and their roles are switched when 
they move across different systems. For example, in their Hong Kong productions in the 
1980s and early 1990s, producer Terrence Chang usually played the diplomat role to 
smooth things out, while director John Woo was the enfant terrible insisting on a 
director‘s artistic integrity. But when they worked in Hollywood in the mid-1990s, John 
Woo played the good cop and Terrence Chang played the assertive aggressive producer 
(Cindy S.C. Chan "Terance Chang"). With Hong Kong cinema moving from the studio 
era to independent production in the 1980s and 1990s, there was also the emergence of a 
new generation of ―the collaborative males.‖  Director-producer Gordon Chan named his 
production house People because he cared about interpersonal relationships and wanted 
to have a positive and mutually respectful working environment. Gordon Chan is gentle 
looking, even though he has produced acclaimed movies with titles like Beast Cop (Chan, 
G. 1998). He laments that in the past there was a hierarchy, and workers at the bottom, 
such as the extras, were often treated like subalterns (Cindy S.C. Chan "Gordon Chan"). 
Director-producer Peter Chan, who also worked in the studio era, criticizes the chain of 
command and tight control over creative team (Cindy S.C. Chan "Peter Chan"). In the 
mid-1990s he founded the co-op like production house UFO (United Film Organization) 
with four other friends in the industry. Peter Chan, also a gentle looking man, was the 
only non-action movie Hong Kong director sojourning in Hollywood. In the new 
millennium he founded the pan-Asian coproduction company Applause. This generation 
of flexible ―collaborative males‖ of Hong Kong cinema with their experiences in the 






Hollywood productions, are now making their move in China where the film industry is 
also going thorough rapid changes.  
While there is a clear division of labor along gender lines and a prescribed place 
for women executive in Hong Kong productions, it seems that it is difficult for people 
(especially men) without a clear gender role to occupy an executive position in this 
Chinese filmmaking community.
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 There are some other unwritten rules from the past 
practice of the Chinese opera troupe system that may sound absurd to outsiders. For 
example, in certain teams, women, regardless of their power and rank, are completely 
forbidden to sit on the crew‘s tool-box. Besides gender as a marker for one‘s ―proper 
place,‖ seniority is also a license to certain powers. For example, on one visit to a set, I 
was told that a certain light-man is well respected in the industry just because he had 
worked in this field for a long time.
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 Seniority, loyalty, and honesty are all valued in this 
organizational culture. Such gender and seniority role assignments might come from the 
Confucian social order, dictating the proper places for ―everyone‖ (ruler and the ruled, 
father and son, men and women, elderly and junior etc.) except gays and lesbians.  
Mother Power occupies a prominent position in the Confucian social order, and more 
research is needed to confirm this association. Without breathing the traditional local 
business culture and understanding the specific political, economic, and social historical 
context of this industry, it is hard for an ―outsider‖ to understand or get a foothold in this 
industry. For example, Philip Lee, though being a Chinese and speaking the local 
language, but trained professionally in Japan and the U.S., avoided bringing a lawyer 






2000) when he sensed the informal atmosphere and different practices of the Hong Kong 
filmmaking community (Cindy S.C. Chan "Philip Lee"). Traditional Chinese cultural 
values and practices play an important role in shaping the organizational structure and 
business practice of this industry. Drawing from tradition, and adapting to the modern 
international business environment, Hong Kong enterprises have developed a distinctive 
business model and distinctive style of management.    
Overseas Chinese business model and Hong Kong style management 
The Hong Kong film industry, being part of the larger Hong Kong economy, was 
operated like many Overseas Chinese businesses: with a clan-like structure, family-
managed enterprises, and an emphasis on flexibility and innovation. While most business 
management courses focus on public-management enterprises, the Hong Kong style 
family-management started to gain attention in academia in the West.
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 Today in the 
West, continuous innovation becomes vital for business success against the backdrop of 
global complexity. Peter Drucker, the man who invented the discipline of management in 
the U.S., and perceptive of many of the major developments of the late twentieth century, 
repeatedly emphasizes the importance of continuous innovation in the knowledge-based 
society. He gradually shifts more attention to development in East Asia, a turbulent 
region with rising opportunities, and notices a distinctive overseas Chinese business 
model. In Managing in Turbulent Times he calls the twenty-five years between the 
Marshall Plan and the OPEC cartel the ―predictable times,‖ and after that the ―turbulent 
times‖ in which planning alone no longer works and ―an enterprise has to be managed 






(Turbulent Times 9) in the context of the integrated world economy, transnational world 
money and the weakening of sovereignty, etc. This is a close description of the way Hong 
Kong cinema operated in the 1990s. In Managing for the Future – the 1990s and Beyond, 
he predicts that the big enterprises will change from a command-and-control army model 
to the flat organizational model like that of an orchestra.  In Managing in a Time of Great 
Change he calls the overseas Chinese, ―the new economic superpower.‖ They are the 
driving force behind the explosive economic growth of coastal China, leading the 
economies of the fast-growing countries of Southeast Asia and branching out to the West. 
Drucker perceptively points out that the multinational groups of the Overseas Chinese, 
unlike the Japanese or the typical Western companies, function in a distinctive way. They 
are like ―a clan doing business together…The word of the founder-CEO is law. But his 
authority far more resembles that of a Confucian head of the house…than that of the head 
of a business…What holds together the multinationals of the overseas Chinese is neither 
ownership nor legal contract.  It is mutual trust and the mutual obligations inherent in 
clan membership.‖ (Great Change 171) Although he realizes the strength and deep roots 
in Chinese culture, and history of this clan structure, Drucker predicts that these overseas-
Chinese multinationals will have to change in the next decade in view of a decade of 
surprises and turbulence in mainland China. Nevertheless, he is certain that they will 
maintain their basic Chinese character, ―They will change details, but they won‘t change 
the fundamentals any more than the Japanese changed theirs when they 
modernized‖(Great Change 208) In Drucker on Asia the themes of sea-change, 






accentuated and China becomes the focus. Drucker further elaborates on the distinctive 
Chinese management style and management structure, ―I have often said that the secret of 
Japan consists in Japan‘s ability to make a family out of the modern corporation. The 
secret of Chinese management may well consist in the ability of the Chinese to make the 
family into a modern corporation.‖ (7) In the 1990s, coastal China has been the fastest 
growing area in the world economy, and the importance of the Overseas Chinese is their 
contribution to mainland China.  Ducker points out that while developed countries like 
Japan mainly invest in heavy capital equipment, the Overseas Chinese focus on the 
―invisible infrastructure‖ – a financial network which Bordwell calls ―the bamboo 
network‖ in his study of the Hong Kong film industry. Hong Kong cinema, with its 
reliance on Overseas Chinese cash-based financing, instead of bank loan financing, was 
remarkably different from Hollywood starting at the financial sector.   
In the decade of sovereignty change with political uncertainties, volatile regional 
economy and social restlessness, Hong Kong cinema, to compete in the world market 
without  material power like Hollywood or government protection like a national cinema, 
fell back to local business cultural practices to provide stability and certainty for efficient 
operation. The producer functioned as a resourceful housekeeper, providing powerful 
backing for the production team in a system diametrically different from Hollywood, but 
adapted to Hong Kong‘s vibrant cultural and volatile political economic context in that 
specific era. The housekeeper phenomenon in the 1990s illustrates that the gender issue is 
an economic issue rather than a women‘s issue. The production sector of Hong Kong 






times‖ when unique events changed its configuration, and planning did not work in a 
decade of unpredictability. To paraphrase Drucker, it is the strategy for tomorrow that 
enables a business ―to take advantage of new realities and to convert turbulence into 
opportunity‖ (Turbulent Times 4) The role of producer was ―the housekeeper‖ of a small 
filmmaking community operating in an informal setting.  In this decade of confusion and 
uncertainty, when male producers softened up to become more collaborative, women 
producers geared themselves up to take up the executive role. If the producer was the 
embodiment of the strategy for tomorrow, the screenwriter seemed to be the epithet of 
yesteryear. Hong Kong filmmakers were known for their frantic filmmaking style, and 
shooting without a completed script, and where improvisation was the norm. The Hong 
Kong film industry seemed to go back to the 1960s practice of writing the script on the 
fly. Why did the screenwriting department stay in an outmoded stage of development in 
the 1990s?  What was the role of the screenwriters in the system of Hong Kong cinema?   
SCREENWRITER – THE DIRECTOR’S SERVICE PROVIDER 
In contrast to the rising status of the producers, that of the screenwriters seemed to 
go downhill. This profession was plagued with all ills and was often the target of 
criticism. When the movies failed in the box office, a bad script was the first to receive 
the blame. In recent Hong Kong cinema history, scripts have seemed to be marginal in 
productions. In the 1970s, it was simply an afterthought for linking action sequences in 
Kung Fu flicks. In the 1980s, Cinema City style 9-reeler formulaic writing by committee 
was the standard practice. In the 1990s, shooting without a completed script was 






changed the completed script on the set to refresh himself. Tsui Hark overhauled the 
story in the dubbing room. Even Wong Kar Wai, deeply influenced by literature, shot 
without a script. Hong Kong directors‘ frantic work style would have many believe that 
the Hong Kong film industry has no system, that the filmmakers just muddled through 
and the screenwriters simply played it by ear. Screenwriters were often required to be on-
site during shooting to help keep the character and narrative coherent when mishaps 
happened and changes in the script were required. Some even have had to work also as 
assistant directors. They were exploited, owned no copyright of their brainchild, and were 
in a passive position relative to the production since projects were mostly initiated by 
financiers or directors. They became the director‘s epiphyte since the raison d‘être for the 
screenwriter was serving the director. The Hong Kong film industry seemed to go back to 
the early Cantonese cinema tradition when there was no script and no division of labor.  
Hong Kong screenwriters‘ ―backward‖ practice and low status looks odd when viewed 
from both contemporary and historical perspectives. Hong Kong‘s screenwriting process 
is particularly intriguing given the blueprint function of scripts in Hollywood as a modern 
business enterprise and the supremacy of the written language in Chinese culture. In the 
West, very early on Hollywood studios used the script as a blue print for production.  
There was a labor union to guard the welfare of its members and writers got both profit 
sharing and roller credit. In the 1990s Hong Kong was a westernized world- class city 
and has advanced to a service-oriented economy. However, the way Hong Kong writers 
worked indicates no hint of modern management. Situated in a Chinese society, the 






Chinese civilization. Paperwork like scripts, contracts, memos, and meeting records were 
often minimized or skipped. Why did the screenwriting department stay at an outdated 
stage of development in the 1990s? What was the role of the screenwriters in the system 
of Hong Kong cinema?   
Situated between China and the West, Hong Kong cinema developed a unique 
system. Hong Kong screenwriters worked under tremendous structural, industrial and 
cultural constraints. Their seemingly archaic and chaotic practice is not a sign of 
regression, but a survival mechanism. In facilitating the production to be more efficient 
and the director more creative, the screenwriter, by being adaptive to their fast-changing 
environment, played an important role in the system to sustain and reinvigorate Hong 
Kong cinema. The changing role of the writer illustrates how flexible, pragmatic and 
adaptive the system of Hong Kong cinema was. Writers, who used to be at the top of the 
social hierarchy in traditional Chinese society, also had to be flexible and accept the loss 
of status inherent in becoming the director‘s service provider. 
Constraints and Varieties 
Hong Kong screenwriters operated within delimited political, economic, cultural 
and industrial parameters different from that of their counterparts in Hollywood and 
Chinese cinema. Hong Kong was a colony and the domestic market was small. The Hong 
Kong film industry has neither lasting studio nor government support. The colonial 
government‘s requisite for political neutrality drove most Hong Kong productions to 
commercial apolitical entertainments. Heavy reliance on overseas markets obliged most 






Kong writers had to be aware of and familiar with social taboos and political censorship 
rules in Hong Kong and overseas markets. A volatile regional market and non-
standardized practices limited Hong Kong productions‘ access to completion bonds or 
bank loan financing. Hong Kong‘s movies were mostly financed by overseas distributors, 
who dictated the details of cast, genre, budget and delivery date. Although the cash-based 
financing and absence of demand for completed scripts allowed improvisation and 
creative autonomy, there were only two major genres in the 1990s: action and comedy. 
As a government film fund was not yet available and financing was mostly on an 
individual project basis, filmmakers had to be sensitive to the cultural pulse and market 
trends to attract financiers to reinvest for the next project. The screenwriters had to be 
able to write in the two major genres and be ready to crank out sequels on short notice to 
capitalize on any successful formula. As Hong Kong productions were star-driven, they 
also had to be familiar with the star system and write around the star. More importantly, 
they had to be able to overhaul the story quickly if there was a change of cast. Since in 
Hong Kong cinema the director was the center of creative control and every department 
was geared to support the director, the writers had to work around the director. Before the 
shooting, the writer had to provide a shoot-able script, in written or mental form, tailor-
made for the director and the particular production. During the shooting, the writer had to 
ensure the software work to actualize the ultimate product, the film. The function of the 
screenwriter was not to manufacture a tangible product, a script. In Hong Kong in that 






was a service profession. The writer‘s job was to support the director and help the 
production to be more efficient.   
With no studio or strong labor union to set standards for work procedures and the 
division of labor, there were a variety of ways for people to enter and work in this 
industry as screenwriters. Some were only involved in the brainstorming stage and some 
specialized in the write-up. In Hong Kong the entire pool of screenwriters was small and 
full-time mono-task screenwriters were rare. When the Hong Kong Screenwriters‘ Guild 
was established in 1991 there were only sixty plus members and anyone who ―has the 
potential talent and sincerity to be a screenwriter can apply.‖ (Reporter) In 1992, there 
were about one hundred plus members, but only twenty to thirty of them worked full 
time. The majority were part-timers or amateurs and only a few could write a completed 
script independently. The following sample of writers illustrates the various ways writers 
worked and how they negotiated their agency. Some have been active since the 1950s; 
some were active only in the 1980s and some emerged in the 1990s. Some judge this 
chaotic practice by Hollywood standards; some embrace it and appreciate the beauty of 
the system.   
In the 1980s and 1990s as the Hong Kong film industry got more aggressive in 
new markets, the status of the screenwriters seemed to diminish. Chen Jinchang points 
out that in commercial filmmaking screenwriters are ―intellect laborers‖ and 
screenwriting is ―just a servicing profession.‖ ―In the filmmaking process, the 
screenwriters provide the best service and list all possible plot devices.  Their only goal is 






thus the script per se has no value.  It‘s only a transitional tool.‖ (18) In their survey of 
ten screenwriters Yang Xiaowen and Luo Miaolan sadly state that ―the screenwriter was 
just the director‘s epiphyte, a writing machine for the director.‖ They lament the writers‘ 
passive position, ―They are hired after the boss or the director came up with an idea.  It is 
extremely rare for Hong Kong screenwriters to sell their scripts to the boss like their 
counterparts in Hollywood.‖ (54) Yang and Luo say the low status of the screenwriters is 
reflected by their low pay, an estimated median of 100,000 to 200,000 HKD, far lower 
than that for directors and actors. Given the way the writers were hired, it was hard to 
fight for professional respect and creative autonomy. There were in general three ways 
the screenwriters were hired. The first type were those who were also directors or 
financiers/bosses like Clifton Ko (Ko Chi Sum), Jeff Lau, Tsui Hark and Lawrence 
Cheng (Cheng Tan Shoi). But they had to hire someone to do the writing once they 
started the shooting, because they became too busy to do the writing.  The second type 
was those hired by the director or the financier. Usually the director had already worked 
out the major plot and secured the major cast before discussing a detailed plotline with 
his hired writers. Yang and Luo say 90% of Hong Kong screenwriters were this type. The 
third type were like Hollywood screenwriters. ―They finished their scripts and then sell 
them to the boss. But this is extremely rare. Cheung Chi Sing and Sandy Shaw (Shaw Lai 
King) each had once successfully sold their scripts.‖ (54) Both the first and third types 
had their difficulties. Yang and Luo explain that a writer like Lawrence Cheng could 
afford not to compromise because he owned a production company, but most couldn‘t 






The situation was worse for the third type because he would be doing it for naught if he 
could not sell the script. Yang and Luo explain Hong Kong writers‘ ―inactivity‖. They 
state: ―Even if the screenwriters have a lot of ideas, they won‘t spend time to develop it. 
They only pitch it verbally and will do the writing only after the idea is sold.‖ (54) 
Nevertheless, there are opposing opinions. Cheung Tan says he always has nice directors 
and seldom feels pressured to compromise. Neophytes like Elsa Tang, a protégé of Tsui 
Hark, appreciates the way she works, ―I am a new comer. I learn more techniques with 
people teaching and guiding me.‖ (54) In a group chat, Bryan Chang (Chang Wai Hung) 
urged me to write a paper to let outsiders know how they worked. Besides being a 
director of independent film,
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Chang also writes for commercial films, financial 
magazines and various media. He embraces the system and thinks the way Hong Kong 
screenwriters work things out is amazing.   
Literati Pride 
In an industry as commercial and disorganized as Hong Kong cinema, it is hard 
for the literati with a teaching or stage background to go along with mainstream practices.  
Raymond To (To Kwok-wai), Clifton Ko (Ko Chi Sum) and Elmond Yeung (Yeung Chi 
Sum) straddle the line between stage-theater and film. Raymond To taught for seventeen 
years before switching to professional writing. He is also an award-winning stage drama 
writer and a staff writer of the Hong Kong Repertory Theatre. Some of his popular stage 
dramas were adapted to films, but To resists the practice of committee writing in the film 
industry. He wrote the script for New Wave director Ann Hui‘s action film Zodiac Killers 






draft. Raymond To admits that he was upset about the re-write (Xiaowen Yang "Take 
Screenwriter Seriously?"). Raymond To laments, ―Many writers do not regard 
scriptwriting as the only way to express themselves. The younger generation only sees 
that as a stepping stone. Their goal is to be a producer or director. Screenwriting is only a 
transitional stage...they don‘t fight for better treatment for writers because they are not 
certain if they‘ll stay as screenwriters forever.‖ (Xiaowen Yang "Take Screenwriter 
Seriously?" 58) Raymond To understandably adds, ―Most directors and crews are 
respectful of the screenwriter‘s opinion before the shooting. It is only after the shooting 
starts that things get out of control. From my years of experiences, however good the 
script is, without a good director, the film will still be a failure.‖ (Xiaowen Yang "Take 
Screenwriter Seriously?" 59) He says in stage drama the director is the one trying to 
actualize the scriptwriter‘s heart and soul in the script. But in film production the 
screenwriter is the one to catch up with the director‘s thought. In Yang and Luo‘s survey, 
Sandy Shaw, Lam Chiu Wing and Keeto Lam agree that a competent director is the key 
for success and thus they do not mind their scripts being altered. Lam Chiu Wing jokes 
that, ―A bad script in the hand of a talented director can turn into a good movie.  But a 
good script in the hand of a mediocre director will absolutely fail as a movie.‖ (Yang and 
Luo 55) Raymond To feels disrespected when he spent three weeks finishing a draft only 
to have the director instantly call for revision after reading it in one night. Nevertheless, 
he finds consolation that most of his projects are referred by cinematographers or other 
crew members. He says, ―That means sometimes crew members pay more attention to 






He used to worry about a failed film tarnishing his name, but now realizes that people in 
the industry will still know his writing is good since his script went through multiple 
hands. 
In the system of the 1990s the chemistry of the creative team was important for 
Hong Kong film production. Elmond Yeung points out that the troupe system in the 
1990s was inherited from Cantonese Opera in which a troupe leader worked closely with 
the same cast and crew to tour around the country (Cindy S.C. Chan "Elmond Yeung").
 
 
It‘s the major cast and the troupes‘ name that sold tickets. Yeung is the writer of Hold 
You Tight (Stanley Kwan, 1998),
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  an award winning film shown in the mainstream 
theater with queer content, starring Chingmy Yau and produced by Golden Harvest. 
Yeung is not prolific by Hong Kong industry standards and his works are not genre films. 
His day job as a tea businessman allows him to listen attentively to his customers‘ stories 
in his tea house. He is also the director of the International Association of Theatre Critics 
(Hong Kong) and is involved in Cantonese opera, a vast reservoir of traditional myths 
and legends.  
Despite the rich story material in Chinese culture, Raymond To was often asked 
to copy popular foreign films. He says what is lost in translation is the interpersonal 
relationships. Writers and directors like Raymond To, Elmond Yeung and Stanley Kwan 
are known for their sensitivity and are less associated with mainstream entertainment 
films. In response to the comment that film companies seeking quality non-mainstream 
scripts find that they are not having any scriptwriters approach them, Raymond To 






We should be active like a sales person in selling our scripts.‖ (Xiaowen Yang "Take 
Screenwriter Seriously?" 62) But he also adds the importance of the personality factor, 
―Say, I wrote a script and approach ten directors. I will get very different results. They 
will be interested to further the discussion, not because of my script per se, but because of 
my spirit in inspiring them.‖ (Xiaowen Yang "Take Screenwriter Seriously?" 63) In 
Hong Kong even literati like Raymond To are not resistant to commercialism.  To him, a 
commercial film means a quality film, ―To help the box office, we need to make good 
films.  The key is the film has to be well made, has a selling point and commercial value.  
Commercial value does not equal to crowd-pleasing.‖ (Esther 57) Raymond To says in 
the past producers had the wrong perception that the only way to draw an audience is to 
keep them laughing.  He thinks the downturn of the industry is good for him, ―Now there 
are those who hire me not because I can churn out a script fast, but because they know I 
work hard and write well.‖ (Esther 58) Despite his complaints, Raymond To continues to 
be an active writer.    
 Clifton Ko is known for his star-studded Chinese New Year entertainment (hesui 
pian).
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  Despites his success as a consistent box office hit writer-director, Ko was very 
vocal of the exploitation in the industry. He angrily says, ―The screenwriters have no 
power to negotiate their pay. There is total lack of professional dignity. In the 1980s, the 
bosses are so disrespectful to screenwriters. They invest 5 to 6 million in a film project, 2 
to 3 million is for the star but only 20,000 to 30,000 dollars is for the script.‖ The boss 
usually green-lighted a project only based on the secured cast, and not the quality of the 






professional screenwriters. He says, ―It is like going back to the days of Cantonese 
cinema when the writer/director just tore off a small piece of paper from the cigarette 
pack and wrote the script on it.  He wrote as the shooting went on.  There was no 
complete story and the film has no integral style.‖ (Lang "All the Problems" 3) Ko is also 
upset by the lack of copyright protection. He directed the It’s A Mad, Mad, Mad World 
(1987) for D & B Films and the collaboration ended with the sequel in 1988.  But D & B 
Films continued to use the character prototypes in the third episode in 1989.  Ko quotes 
another example: Wong Jing created the ―Plain Jane‖ character on TV
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 but now the 
character is moved to multiple films and Wong Jing didn‘t get any royalty. The problem 
of lack of copyright protection for writers still went on in the 1990s. Writer-producer 
Chan Hing Kai‘s observation succinctly describes the writers‘ predicament in the Hong 
Kong film industry and is worth being quote at length here.  He writes in his column, ―In 
the past the contract for the screenwriter was service-oriented. Once the writer handed in 
the script and took the money, he had no more right. When the industry was in boom, all 
a writer wanted was to get all of his pay because the incidences of denying payment were 
so common.  He would feel lucky enough to get full payment and thus would not go 
further to negotiate re-make right and other copyright. Such practice is still followed 
today. The production company owns every right…It says clearly in the contract that the 
creator owns no right to the films. However, certain clauses in those contracts in the past 
are too unfair that they are not recognized by international standard and thus are regarded 
as unequal treaty. Therefore, to play safe some companies, before they sell the film 






dispute.‖ ("Who Owns") The lack of copyright protection de-motivates youngster to take 
screenwriting seriously as a long term profession.   
Star power was another factor in the writers‘ frustrations. Hong Kong productions 
were mostly star-driven and the overstepping power and unprofessional conduct of some 
stars often was the cause of chaos on the set. Raymond To says, ―I worked my heart out 
to write those lines, but when they are left in the hands of the stars, the dialogues were 
distorted to become unrecognizable…A smart actor like Stephen Chow can improvise 
and do well.  But some are mediocre.  What‘s the point of putting so much effort in 
writing the lines?‖ (Esther 56) Ko, also a director, was in no better position to discipline 
the stars, ―Nowadays in this film circle, the actors arrive late, leave early, drop by 
whenever they feel like.  They totally disregard the crew. During the shooting, they take 
lunch break and leave for press conference. They come and go without informing anyone. 
Those overbooked stars… took the money without contributing much effort in their 
work. When they are on the set, they are seldom attentive.  They can‘t memorize long 
lines and ask the director to change them. They always press the director to hurry and let 
them leave early.‖ (Lang "All the Problems" 4) This misconduct was so commonplace 
that Ko said when he worked with disciplined actors like Michael Hui and Sylvia Chang, 
it was like a director‘s paradise.
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 In this 1988 interview, in regard to the practice of 
stealing ideas from foreign films, Ko‘s comment invoked a discourse of ―Hong Kong 
being a colony and cultural desert‖ and hinted at the stifling effect of film censorship. He 
says, ―It is inevitable that people in this film circle copying plots from foreign film. This 






Yellow Earth because he has personally experienced it… If John Woo had not hit rock 
bottom in his life, he would not be able to express such feeling in A Better Tomorrow.  
Most writers grew up in Hong Kong‘s colonial education.  It is hard to expand the 
directors‘ creative horizon.  Sensitive topic is forbidden. ‗Gimmick‘ becomes more 
important than life experience.‖ (Lang "All the Problems" 4) However, in 1993 Ko did 
what he criticized: copy a foreign film and use gimmicks. Crazy Love (1993) is a copycat 
of the German soft porn Griechische Feigen.
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 The publicity focused on Loletta Lee (Lee 
Lai-chun), known for her teenage cutie pie role in The Happy Ghost series, taking her 
clothes off.   
Low pay and a high burn out rate has been persistent in this industry. When Ko 
returned to Hong Kong in the mid-1980s and worked at Cinema City as an intern he got a 
meager income. Ko says, ―My first film The Happy Ghost (1984) helped Cinema City 
make a net profit of 12 million. I originated most of the ideas and did the writing, but I 
got only 40,000 to 50,000 dollars. Even though back then this was enough to buy an 
apartment, it‘s still not fair…I should get half of it…this is exploitation…The boss of 
Golden Princess was nice and offered me some profit. Most bosses would just run away.‖ 
(H. Huang "Clifton Ko" 46) After realizing that he was a cash cow at D&B Films with no 
hope of profit sharing, he established his own production company. He admits that so far 
(in the 1980s) the most profitable films of his company are soft porn. It was hard for 
writers to generate scripts quick enough to make up for the low pay. Ko says, ―In 1967 
the script fee for Chang Cheh‘s One Armed Swordsman was 30,000 dollars. Nowadays 






to be a good writer? How can a young man see a career in screenwriting?‖ (H. Huang 
"Clifton Ko" 48) One could easily burn out in this industry. Ko continues, ―For ten years, 
I gave my all. I worked both as writer and director. Originating ideas is hard enough and I 
have to churn out a few projects a year.  This is taking a few years off my life.‖ (H. 
Huang "Clifton Ko" 48) As director, Ko is also very efficient, ―In technical aspect, I can 
claim as the top three directors in Hong Kong… I am more than sufficient in 
commanding on the set, controlling budget and schedule.‖ (H. Huang "Clifton Ko" 48) 
Ko is one of the four directors of the charity film The Banquet (1991) which involved a 
cast of almost 200 top Hong Kong stars and was shot in less than 8 days.
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  By 1994, Ko 
felt it‘s time he should work on something he was passionate about. He made I Have a 
Date with Spring (1994), an adaptation from a stage drama with no major star, to 
commemorate his tenth anniversary in the industry. In the 1988 interview Ko complained 
about the investors being shortsighted and over-relying on star power. I Have A Date 
With Spring was his attempt to prove to them that he could make a hit without a star. 
However, this is the exception that proves the rule since this film‘s success was a fluke. 
There was no sequel and the main actress never again played a starring role in her career. 
Without recognizing the specific constraints of Hong Kong cinema, Ko idealizes 
Hollywood and criticizes Hong Kong‘s cultural poverty. He says, ―Hong Kong has too 
few literatures. The screenwriters of foreign country do not have to originate their 
script…Most Hollywood movies are adapted from novels. They have something for you 
to base on.  You don‘t have to start from scratch.  The workload is much lighter.‖ (H. 






Idealizing things Western was more evident in the 1980s.  Kam Ping-hing, a film 
critic known for introducing auteur theory to Hong Kong in the Chinese Student Weekly 
in the 1960s, also envied of the respect foreign screenwriters enjoy.  He so disliked  
directors altering the script that in a 1981 interview article titled ―There should be rule 
forbidding unauthorized changes by the director‖ he says, ―In a foreign country, one 
needs the consent of the screenwriter to alter the script.  Even one line in the dialogue is 
no exception.‖ (C.-t. Li "There Should Be Rule" 19) Kam studied film in Italy from 1968 
to 1971 and returned to work in TV. He was a script supervisor before moving to the film 
industry when independent productions and the Hong Kong New Wave emerged.  He 
was keen on quality scripts and abhorred seeing the filmmakers start shooting without a 
completed script. Kam attributes the New Wave films‘ weak scripts to the terrible 
conditions for the writers. In the 1980s writers were expected to finish a script within one 
month. The highest pay for a script was just 30,000 dollars and some was as low as 
10,000 dollars.  Kam says, ―Hong Kong does not have a screenwriter labor union to 
control the standard.  When you think the pay is too low, there is always somebody 
willing to take it... In foreign country they have a payment system. The labor union gets 
to set a certain percentage of the production budget for screenwriting fee.‖ (C.-t. Li 
"There Should Be Rule" 19) When asked by the interviewer who the author of the film is 
Kam points out the fluid power structure of the industry, ―It can be the writer.  But 
whoever has a stronger character has a bigger say.‖ (C.-t. Li "There Should Be Rule" 20) 
In response to my question on power structure, prolific and multi-task filmmaker Herman 
Yau said the same about the industry in the 1990s.
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authority, Yau said it varied across productions. There was no rule and power was always 
negotiable. In a magazine interview Kam admitted that his ultimate goal was to be a 
director because as a writer he could not actualize his ideas. Nevertheless, he appreciates 
the changes in the industry because there were more chances for young people in their 
twenties to be directors now (in the 1980s) whereas twenty years ago (the 1960s studio 
era) this was unthinkable.  He says, ―Nowadays if a young person wants to make a 
movie, if he has a good script, and if he can finish under 700,000 dollars, the chance of 
getting a deal is high. But he has to be proactive.‖ Kam admits his personality weakness, 
―I am not active enough. This is a disadvantage. To get people to support your project, 
you need to have a thick skin to sell yourself. This is a modern tactic. People of our 
generation are not aggressive enough.‖ (C.-t. Li "There Should Be Rule" 21) The 
interviewer Li Chuek-to, who embraces auteur theory and wrote extensively about the 
Hong Kong New Wave‘s movies, describes Kam as typical of the literati of his 
generation: passive but persevering and holding onto his principles. This group of literati 
believed in the efficacy of a good story. Raymond To rejected committee writing and did 
not work in genre film. Clifton Ko worked in the comedy genre but resisted the star 
system. Elmond Yeung leaned towards the niche market. Kam Ping-hing aspired to be an 
autonomous auteur. They pictured that a studio would provide better protection for the 
writers. In fact, in the decade characterized by social restlessness the studio protected the 







Chiu Kang-chien, also one of the literati, instead of being cynical, left his 
comfortable life in Shaw studio and ventured out into independent productions. Born in a 
turbulent time in China in 1940, he moved to a chaotic time in Taiwan in 1949 and was 
educated in the U.S. in 1964. He was active in both the Hong Kong and Taiwan film 
industry. He was one of the founders of the film journal Juchang
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, introducing films of 
Godard, Antonioni, Brecht and experimental films to Taiwan. He joined the Shaw studio 
from 1966 until 1974.  In a 1981 interview Chiu described his eight years in Shaw studio 
as cozy, ―It was comfortable and very free. I didn‘t feel pressured or under control...I 
didn‘t need to pay attention to the market situation.‖ (F. Wong "Chiu Kang-Chien 1" 40) 
Four scripts a year was the maximum for him as a staff writer and some were made into 
films and some not.  He got 3,000 dollars for each, but he still got 1,000 dollars monthly 
salary even when he didn‘t finish the script. Usually Shaw studio‘s boss Run Run Shaw 
came up with a project idea and informed the script supervisor, who then coordinated the 
staff writers.  Chiu said the system was not very strict, since the office administrators or 
the directors could contact the writers directly if they wanted to alter the scripts even 
though the administrator had the final say. It was quite free the in early years when the 
four major directors of the studio could pick their scripts and make whatever they 
wanted. Their status was almost like founders of the studio.  It was only in the later years 
that the power shifted to the administrators.  While writers of the 1990s had to serve and 
tailor-make the script for the director, Chiu handed in his script without knowing which 






either be rejected by the censor or go through numerous revisions. But in the Shaw 
studio, he just did things his way, ―I usually don‘t pay much attention to the others. My 
method is: when the boss or director told me, ‗I want to make such and such a martial arts 
film.  I want this and that.‘  I would always say yes.  But when I went home I wrote my 
own thing.  They were usually satisfied with what I wrote.  This is my strength.  They 
didn‘t have to worry about hiring someone else to revise my script.  Nevertheless, they 
worried about me not coming up with anything because sometimes I dragged for so long 
that it made everybody unhappy.  I know I am emotional and not professional enough.‖ 
(F. Wong "Chiu Kang-Chien 2" 33) In the Shaw studio staff writers like Chiu only 
needed to write up a completed script without going through the administrator‘s approval. 
So when he worked for independent productions, which required him to write a synopsis 
and an outline, he found it hard. ―It‘s because a good synopsis contains only two to three 
sentences. It cannot present dialogue, personalities and atmosphere etc.‖ (F. Wong "Chiu 
Kang-Chien 1" 39) In the Shaw studio, Chiu was not required to be active, to pitch an 
idea, to have a thick skin in selling his scripts, or to care about market changes. Chiu says 
he didn‘t do any writing on his own when there was no assignment. ―I spent a lot of time 
sleeping.  There was one year I didn‘t write anything, but I still got my monthly salary.‖ 
(F. Wong "Chiu Kang-Chien 1") However, in 1972-1973 Chiu suddenly became prolific. 
He says, ―I led a very comfortable life in Shaw studio. I didn‘t want to work. I didn‘t read 
any books. I didn‘t write anything. I felt dazed and confused. That was until 1972-73, 
when I felt like I have to do something. I wrote a lot of poems and hung out with young 








first few years in the Shaw studio I did get something done. But gradually I idled my time 
away. When I realized I wanted to do something, there were a lot of problems. I worked 
as a director but failed. It was that year, 1973.‖ (F. Wong "Chiu Kang-Chien 1" 40) The 
mid-1970s was an edgy time 
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 and it showed on the screens when the industry was 
opened up to the younger generation. Chiu noticed the changes, ―I didn‘t see much 
breakthrough in Taiwan. But Hong Kong television and film gave me the impression that 
they were closer to life. They said a lot of things. Bits and pieces everywhere like slice of 
life.‖ (F. Wong "Chiu Kang-Chien 2" 33) He says Hong Kong New Wave directors‘ 
films like The Secret (1979), The Sword (1980), or Dangerous Encounter – 1
st
 Kind 
(1980), though refreshing, have problems in the structure of their scripts. Chiu read a lot 
of scripts in Taiwan and Hong Kong and concluded, ―So far I haven‘t seen any script as 
good as those of foreign countries, including mine. Our screenwriters are still falling 
behind.‖ (F. Wong "Chiu Kang-Chien 2" 34) In independent productions, there was the 
chronic problem of drafty scripts due to rushing. Chiu said the revisions he did on the 
others‘ scripts were usually extensive and he provided rich detail in his own scripts so 
that directors did not have to do scriptwriting on the set. Yet, he said he didn‘t publish his 
screenplay, ―I used to think that the biggest revenge to the director is to publish my 
original screenplay. But in the end I couldn‘t find one good enough to be published.‖ (F. 
Wong "Chiu Kang-Chien 2" 34) Chiu did not criticize the chaotic way Hong Kong New 
Wave directors made their writers work. In the studio days, he didn‘t have to discuss 






directors.  In response to what he felt about the new way of working, he simply said, ―I 
want some changes.‖ (F. Wong "Chiu Kang-Chien 2" 34)  
The Realists 
The intellectual used to be at the top of the traditional Chinese social hierarchy 
commanding respect and authority. Writers who forget to check their egos before 
entering this industry would feel degraded. But women, people from business or popular 
culture backgrounds, the younger generation growing up under colonial education, as 
well as amateurs or part-timers usually do not carry this psychological baggage. They do 
not have a privileged position to begin with, or tie their identities to this profession and 
thus do not feel their authority threatened or integrity compromised. They do not have 
unrealistic expectations in this petite audio-visual commercial entertainment industry 
situated in a small colonial dialect-speaking society. In 1981 Joyce Chan wrote an 
amusing piece, quoting humorous self-deprecations by Hollywood prominent writers to 
illustrate the difficulties these writers faced. She neither idealizes nor criticizes 
Hollywood. She concludes that regardless of one‘s rank, writers working in the 
commercial media all face constraints. She takes American television writer Paddy 
Chayefsky‘s example as her guide, since Chayefsky‘s career covered radio, television, 
stage drama, movie and the novel, but he never posted himself as an orthodox scholarly 
writer. Chan writes, ―I identify myself with him.  I know which path I want to go.  It is 
the one he started thirty years ago.‖ (24) Chan was born in 1936, and active in the 1970s-






considered a prestigious profession. Chan is not prolific by Hong Kong standards and her 
works are associated with the young Hong Kong New Wave directors.
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 In contrast, Szeto On has a long and extremely prolific career and has witnessed 
the boom and bust of the industry a few times. He works on a wide variety of genres and 
produced more than 500 scripts.
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 In the database of the Hong Kong Film Archive it is 
claimed that he probably is one of the most prolific screenwriters in Hong Kong or even 
in the world.
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 He is one of the five consultants of Hong Kong Screenwriters‘ Guild.
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Born in Guangzhou in 1927 and arriving in Hong Kong in 1949 Szeto entered the film 
industry with his actor brother‘s referral.  In Cantonese cinema and later in independent 
productions, pitching is such an important skill for writers that even a childhood 
disability could not get in the way. Szeto says his stuttering problem was corrected after 
working as a screenwriter (Z. Yan). Even a director with an extensive literature 
background like Wong Kar Wai asserts in various occasions that if a writer cannot tell the 
story verbally, he cannot tell it well in written form either. Ng See Yeun, chair of the 
Federation of Hong Kong Filmmakers, said in a 1994 interview that he didn‘t need a 
good script, he only needed the screenwriter to tell an appealing story in one minute (W. 
He "Ng See Yuen Says"). Even without an American film school education or training in 
Hollywood, veteran Hong Kong filmmakers instinctively know ―High Concept‖, the skill 
of succinctly telling a story in 25 words (Wyatt). In this community, it seems that 
Chinese written language skills are secondary to pitching and life experience.  Anyone 
can be a screenwriter. Sze To ran a business before stumbling into the film industry.  Tsui 






chef or a technician (Cindy S.C. Chan "Organized Chaos"). Lam Ling Nam (Nan Yan), 
the first chair of the Hong Kong Screenwriters‘ Guild and screenwriter and lyric writer of 
Prison on Fire (Ringo Lam, 1988), has only a primary education.  He worked various 
odd jobs including jade jewelry apprentice, in transportation, and as a judo instructor and 
gangster (H. Yang). Elmond Yeung is a tea businessman.  Yang Wong (Wong Yan-kuai) 
is a painter and art director.  Keeto Lam is a special effects expert.  Throughout the 
history of Hong Kong cinema screenwriters have come from diversified backgrounds.   
Exploitation was also carried forward from the early years to the 1990s. Szeto 
wrote his first script for the then famous director Chow Sze-luk with a promised fee of 
500 dollars.  But he took home only 300 dollars because his script was not used.  This is 
very fortunate compared to the 1990s when screenwriters, despite the time and effort they 
spent, often got nothing when the script was not used or the project fell through.  Szeto 
says getting paid is even harder than pitching an idea, ―Being a screenwriter is hard.  We 
use our brains to think, our mouths to pitch and our hands to write. In the end, we exhaust 
ourselves to get our promised pay.‖ (Z. Yan 46) In the 1990s the director usually worked 
with a group of writers, which means the writers had to share among themselves the 
meager fee. According to Szeto, in the 1990s the fee ranged from 20,000 and 30,000 to 
200,000 and 300,000 dollars. He says he never wrote a top dollar script. Even Golden 
Harvest paid only 100,000 dollars for a script. Like many Hong Kong screenwriters, 
Szeto is self-educated. In the early years of his career as a writer, he was always between 
jobs. He later entered a company to work for film publicity with a monthly salary of 200 






bosses...everyday after work I went to see the 5:30 pm screening. They were Hollywood 
majors‘ productions. In a few years, I studied the plots of more than 1,000 Hollywood 
features.‖ (Z. Yan 45) Later he switched back to scriptwriting and got more job offers 
than he could handle. He says he was paid 1,000 dollars for each script, which was 7 to 8 
times the monthly salary of the average person back then. He claims, ―My scripts are 
very commercial. I put a lot of entertaining elements into it.  I don‘t pay much attention 
to theme, characterization or drama theory. I didn‘t study film in school. I think once the 
script is finished, the characters will present themselves. You don‘t need theory to 
confine yourself. Otherwise you‘ll never be able to write a script…I have my own 
procedure in screenwriting. First, I‘ll write a story outline and then a scene by scene draft.  
Nowadays almost no one would write major lines and dialogue in this draft.  But this was 
our common practice then. We would wait for the director‘s approval before proceeding 
to write a full script…whether it‘s a 100,000 or 50,000 dollars a piece, I would write in 
the same manner. Nowadays there are so many problems between screenwriters and the 
companies. Now, one third of my job is to revise the others‘ scripts.‖ (Z. Yan 45-46) In 
the 1990s, the power structure of film production was so fluid that a director‘s authority 
could be challenged by veteran workers: from a cinematographer to the screenwriters.  
Arguments on the set were not uncommon, especially when the director was new and 
inexperienced. Szeto agrees that in the production hierarchy the director should be 
superior to the screenwriter, and he advises fellow screenwriters to respect instead of 
confront the director. He says he pays the same respect to a director whether he is a 






directors, and he admits he learns a lot from those sessions. Despite his status in the field 
he still lives a disciplined life. He starts writing at 9 a.m. after his morning tea ritual. He 
does not drink, smoke or stay up late. He says, ―I can finish a scene by scene script in 10 
days. For difficult one, it will take me about two weeks. Screenwriting now is very 
different from the days of Cantonese cinema. I have to pay more attention to dialogues, 
especially in stories of young people. I sometimes consult youngsters on the way they 
talk. All these years, I keep reading books, newspapers and magazines to enrich myself.‖ 
(Z. Yan) He advises young people interested in screenwriting to be prepared to play the 
role of a defendant, being constantly challenged by others. He says, ―I have been a 
defendant for more than 30 years and got used to it. Don‘t underestimate yourself and 
don‘t be over-conscious of the others‘ comments. Otherwise that will break your nerve.‖ 
(Z. Yan 47) Szeto doesn‘t mind his script being altered, being made answerable to the 
director, doing brainstorming or finishing a script in a short time. However, to him the 
screenwriter‘s job should end with the completed script and asking the screenwriter to be 
on set for script revision, a common practice in the 1990s, is preposterous.   
Being prolific seems to be an essential trait for most Hong Kong screenwriters.  
Nan Yan wrote more than 20 scripts in the space of 8 years (H. Yang). Ni Kuang is 
another legendary prolific writer with more than 300 scripts and a few hundred novels on 
martial arts, detective stories and sci-fi. He was the Shaw Studio principal screenwriter 
and one of the few highest-income professional writers. Despite his heavy workload and 
busy social life, Ni claims that he never missed a deadline. Interestingly, Ni is not 






and moved to Hong Kong in 1957. His mother tongue is Shanghainese and his spoken 
language is described as ―high speed Cantonese with 30% discount‖ (Shek and Chen) 
Even though his close friend Louis Cha (Jin Yong) is a prominent modern Chinese 
language novelist, Ni admits that his own education was only equal to secondary 3 level 
and he doesn‘t know English. He also admits that he didn‘t do research for his sci-fi 
novel Wesley or put much effort into language technique. He wrote his scripts in 
Mandarin and the directors have to translate them into Cantonese. He says he adapted a 
character from Louis Cha‘s novel into Chang Cheh‘s One Armed Swordsman so well that 
no one notices its origin. ―Not only are Louis Cha‘s novels hard to adapt, they are also 
very hard to translate because Cha puts a lot of effort in his language skill.  But I don‘t,‖ 
says Ni frankly.  In 1981, Ni already had his novel translated into Japanese and Cha has 
none yet.
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  Unlike other writers, Ni is shrewd in business and he has a strategy to 
survive as a screenwriter in Hong Kong‘s harsh conditions. He says, ―My rule is I get all 
my payment first and I‘ll hand in the script in three days. I won‘t do any revision… If I 
discuss with the director and revise my script, it may make the film better.  But it will be 
hard for me to make a living unless they increase the scripting fee.‖ (Shek and Chen 37)  
He has another tactic that helped keep his work looking fresh in the 1990s: a fast pace. In 
the interview in 1980s when formulaic films were common, he said, ―I feel that films 
now have abandoned structure…They only need to keep audience stimulated…I agree 
that films should be fast pace. My dialogue never exceeds 50 words.‖ (Shek and Chen 
31) He also comments that the Hong Kong New Wave films are lacking in structure and, 






should be an international language. Filmmaking is completely a commercial activity.‖  
Ni presciently tells of the crisis of that generation that was soon absorbed by the 
mainstream. In 1981 as Hong Kong was about to enter the transitional stage, Ni planned 
to write a novel titled The Person in an Interstitial Space. ―It‘s about this generation of 
Hong Kong people.  Aren‘t we all like that character in an interstitial space?‖ (Shek and 
Chen 37) As a prolific writer of popular culture, he is sensitive to the cultural pulse.    
Lilian Lee is also an established popular novelist. In a round table in 1981 Lillian 
Lee and Szeto Cheuk Hon admitted that they were writers with no ambition to be 
directors, unlike most writers of that time (Shan and Chen). Lee authored the novel and 
movie Farewell My Concubine (1993). Szeto scripted Tsui Hark‘s radical film 
Dangerous Encounter – 1
st
 Kind (1980). Both agree that the position of the screenwriter 
should be secondary to that of the director. Szeto says, ―Of course the screenwriter is not 
the director‘s equal.  His status may just be like that of a light man.‖ (Shan and Chen 23) 
Despite her insistence on a writer‘s right to personal expression, Lee agrees on the 
directors‘ central role in organizing the project.  Although her early scripts are mostly for 
Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the non-commercial government TV station, Lee 
does not reject commercialism. She says, ―As a screenwriter you need to bring people 
who don‘t know you to buy ticket and stay in front of the screen.‖ (Shan and Chen 23) 
Despite his literati outlook, Szeto says Hong Kong movies need not be message-loaded, 
―Just make it exciting and entertaining and let the audience passes time happily.  Message 
is cheap.  Instilling meaning is too much responsibility!‖ (Shan and Chen 23) Lee adds 






mind not having credit, ―I am more for the money than the fame. When I take a project, I 
seldom discuss about credit. This film circle is small. People can tell who is actually 
doing the work and who did a good job. So long as you write a good script, people will 
approach you.‖ In this 1981 discussion Szeto‘s confession indicates how non-
standardized the film business was, at least in giving roller credit. Lee insists on having 
her name in the credits not because of fame, but for the sake of being responsible.  In 
answering the question ―What is the quality of a good scriptwriter?‖ Szeto and Lee point 
out the quintessential requirements in Hong Kong: be adaptive and quick.―Be 
adaptive…meet the director‘s requirement, solve the problem for him,‖ says Szeto. 
―Good screenwriter must be able to write up her ideas and inspiration within a short 
time,‖ Lee adds. Being able to write a script on the fly seems to be an essential skill for 
Hong Kong writers.   
For writers surviving the 1990s it takes strong passion, mental strength and a 
sense of humor. A decade after Joyce Chan‘s article, Lam Chiu Wing, a major in Chinese 
in college in the 1980s, also wrote an amusing piece about his experience (C. W. Lam). 
Lam‘s career path covers newspaper columns, radio, television, movie and stage drama 
and he did not take himself seriously either. Lam amusingly says as a screenwriter he is 
accountable only to one person, that is, the director while the director is answerable to the 
boss, the producer, the audience and the tea lady. In recounting an incident of 
exploitation and humiliation, he appreciates himself for keeping his cool. The boss 
neither paid him nor returned his draft. The man finally yielded under group pressure but 






tearing it up as a gesture of defiance. Writers got cheated so often that helping members 
to get their pay became the major task of the Hong Kong Screenwriters‘ Guild.  
Brainstorming is a collective process, but the pressure is not spread thin. Lam jokingly 
describes that every time when he was locked up alone in a hotel room to instill the 
group‘s three months‘ effort into one hundred pages, he wanted to kill himself. He 
relishes the days when he was a part-timer while having a secure day job. After he got his 
down payment he couldn‘t care less. He would wish for the project to fall through, be 
hyperbolic with the cast, insist on exotic location shooting or post himself as a non-
compromising artist. However, when he works full time, he is always ready to yield and 
cannot be selective in picking projects. Passion in writing is the reason he stays. He 
enjoys chatting with directors and getting paid for talking.   
 Writers who also work in administration at the executive level are more 
pragmatic. Chan Hing Kai, screenwriter, producer, column writer and consultant, does 
not find it beneath his dignity to stand by on the set to help revising the script. In 
response to my comments on writers‘ low status, Chan Hing Kai points out how smart 
Hong Kong screenwriters are to get around constraints (Cindy S.C. Chan "Chan Hing 
Kai"). For example, when a popular bankable teenage idol could not deliver certain lines, 
he instantly rewrote her dialogue to get closer to her real life personality so that she could 
present them naturally.  The result was everybody praised the star‘s acting skill without 
knowing of the writer‘s effort in covering up her defects and accentuating her strength.  






between creative expression and market calculation.  She says it is a work ethic to act 
responsibly for the boss‘ investment (Mai "Sandy Shaw").   
 In Hong Kong cinema writers and directors may never have equal status, but their 
relationship was definitely close. Sammo Hung and his writer Barry Wong were 
inseparable.
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 Lam Ning Nam and Ringo Lam are brothers. Tsui Hark and his 
brainstorm group wine and dine together like family (D. Liu). Johnnie To (To Kei Fung), 
Wai Ka-fai and You Nai-hoi are a known creative trio.  Wai Ka-fai was born in 1962 and 
entered the TVB (the major TV station in Hong Kong) screenwriter training class in 
1981. He worked his way up to script supervisor, executive producer and later moved to 
ATV (the smaller TV station in Hong Kong) until he formed a company with Johnnie To. 
He and You Nai Hoi always ask themselves, ―Do you dare to write like this?‖ However, 
on the other hand, he says, ―We also have to consider whether it is shoot-able for Johnnie 
To.‖ (Ernie Au 30) Their scripts have to be shoot-able in the Hong Kong context and 
tailor-made for the director Johnnie To. Johnnie To is one of those Hong Kong directors 
who thrives on chaos. Even when a completed script was available, he would deliberately 
make changes in order to refresh himself on the set (Shin Johnnie To). Their 
collaboration best illustrates the importance of chemistry and how they turn limitations to 
their advantage. Wai describes, ―We have worked in this industry for so long that now we 
no longer need a completed script on day one…We like a more spontaneous way of 
creation. For example, it is now 3:30 in the afternoon. We have a scene to shoot tonight. 
You Nai-hoi and I will start brainstorming now and do the filming tonight… In the past I 






enough time and are always being rushed, paradoxically our creative horizon is 
expanded. The more you think, the more you hesitate. Sometimes some ideas come out 
from pressure. It is only under pressure that we have the energy and dynamite power. The 
key is whether you dare to use this material. Whenever some vague ideas come up, I‘ll 
write it down and film it. The three of us have a very good understanding and we have 
confidence in each other… The advantage of this method is we can observe how the actor 
acts. After two to three days, we can tell how well the actor acts and what her limitation 
is. That way the screenwriter and actor can be more interactive. This is similar to the way 
I wrote script in TV. Filming a TV series takes a long time. We‘ll watch playback after 
each sequence. We can tell which segment is good or not. For the part the actor played 
well, we‘ll expand it. For the part the actor didn‘t do well, we‘ll stop writing in that 
direction…Shooting with completed script is too rigid.‖ (Ernie Au 31-32) Johnnie To 
describes how he worked with Sammy Cheng, a popular singer with no rigorous acting 
training (Shin Johnnie To). He says Cheng is a spontaneous actress and usually her first 
take is the best. So he avoid rehearsal and work around Cheng‘s characteristic to get the 
best out of her. Wai says he and Johnnie To both are fun-loving people and prefer the 
unbeaten path. The key to their collaboration is mutual trust (Ernie Au). 
 To have the screenwriter working as a service provider is not exclusive to 
commercial cinema. The ―low status‖ of the screenwriter in Hong Kong is most probably 
due to the informal organization structure of the film industry, than to Hong Kong being a 
―cultural desert‖ or Hong Kong cinema being commercial and popular. In another 






international award winning films, even screenwriters like Chu Tien-wen, herself a 
prominent writer who began her literary career at a young age, claims that she is just a 
senior secretary of director Hou Hsiao-Hsien. She says, “For me the real creative process 
is in the discussion session. Taiwan cinema is a handicraft industry and a director cinema.  
In Taiwan New Cinema, the director is the initiator of the project and the screenwriter 
functions as the director‘s sounding board. Director Hou always scribbles the script onto 
his daughter‘s school exercise book. It is ‗tianshu‘ (a book from heaven) – abstruse and 
illegible that no one can understand it. For me there is no creative pleasure in the writing 
process at all. The target reader of the script is the crew and investors. It has to be written 
as clearly as possible. Director Hou himself does not read the script and he does not let 
the actors read it either…I‘m just working as a senior secretary.‖ (T.-w. Chu) 
Nevertheless, Chu also adds that when working on Flower of Shanghai (Hou Hsiao-
Hsien, 1998) she kept sending books for Hou to read. She says Hou used to make 
commercial films and back then she and her intellectual friends did not watch Taiwan 
productions. They only watched Hollywood features and Hong Kong New Wave movies, 
and the Taiwan Golden Horse Award was dominated by Hong Kong productions. Unlike 
those returning from overseas film school educations such as Edward Young, Hou‟s 
career started with commercial film and gradually made an artistic turn since working 
with Chu. Chu has had a close collaboration with Hou since 1982 and has written 
numerous screenplays of Hou‟s award-winning films.
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 Despite her self-deprecation, 
Chu Tien-wen is far from a service provider like most Hong Kong screenwriters of the 






In the 1990s in Hong Kong cinema‘s star-driven director-centric production, the 
director revolved his work around the star.  The screenwriter revolved his life around the 
director. Crises on the set were caused not only by tight budgets and schedules, but also 
by spontaneous directors, and overbooked stars. The writer‟s job did not end with a 
completed script. The writer had to be almost a clairvoyant to anticipate the needs of the 
director who usually could plead temporary insanity during shooting on the set. The 
writer had to check his ego, play the role of a service provider to the director, make the 
star‟s acting look good, be adept in writing in the two mainstream genres, quick in 
churning out sequels, and most importantly help the director get the best out of the worst 
situation. He had to be quick, flexible and resourceful. The seemingly chaotic way the 
writers worked is not a sign of regression. The changing role of screenwriter illustrates 
how Hong Kong filmmakers were being adaptive to changing modes of production and 
the specific constraints of the Hong Kong film industry. What did not seem to change 
much is the Hong Kong cinema‟s director-centered production approach. Every 
professional position had to work around the director. In the 1990s Hong Kong cinema 
was known in the world not only for its collective kinetic style but also for the individual 
director‟s vision and personal film style. Hong Kong directors, from the most commercial 
to the most artistic, seemed to enjoy a high degree of creative autonomy despite the 
constraints of the extreme commercial system. Are they auteurs? How did each of them, 
from the most commercial to the most artistic, work out his tactic to survive and thrive in 






―I am a typed director. If I made Cinderella, the audience would immediately be 
looking for a body in the coach.‖  –Alfred Hitchcock 
 
SECTION III  
THE SUPERMARKET OF HONG KONG CINEMA 
CAN THE LOCAL SPEAK? 
In the 1990s when Hollywood domination in Asian markets intensified, Hong 
Kong cinema was locally successful and internationally influential. It was like a Chinese 
Hollywood, commercial entertainment oriented but with a Chinese flavor. It followed 
Hollywood‘s market mechanism inherent in the studio system – the dialectical process of 
standardization and differentiation.
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 On the one hand the producers standardize the 
filmmaking process for efficient mass production. On the other hand they differentiate 
their products to lure the audience back for repeated consumption. Despite the absence of 
the integrated studio, Hong Kong filmmakers had their ways to standardize filmmaking 
for efficient mass production. For example, the productions were star-driven and genre-
driven. And in face of uncertainties, they also capitalized on a hit by churning out sequels 
and series. To differentiate from Hollywood products, Hong Kong cinema leaned toward 
local differentiation, and specialized in action and comedy. The Hong Kong action 
aesthetic was competitive not only in domestic and regional markets, but also in the U.S. 
However, in the Hong Kong film industry the professional organizations were not 






intellectual property, copyright, royalty, residue revenue, and the involvement of lawyers 
and contracts in the film industry, the creations of the filmmakers were not protected. The 
filmmakers either suffered creative burnout trying to keep up with the pace of sequels, or 
they could not build a franchise and profit from their hits when the markets were quickly 
saturated by dozens of copycats. There were endless sequels, series, spin-offs and 
copycats churned out within months to capitalize on any successful product. For example, 
after the success of Once Upon A Time in China (1991) there were eight sequels and 
spin-offs within the space of seven years produced by Tsui Hark himself alone. After the 
success of Wong Jing‘s God of Gamblers (1989), there were a few dozen gambler films 
with titles like ―Knight of Gamblers‖, ―Saint of Gamblers‖, ―King of Gamblers‖ and 
―Queen of Gamblers‖ by Wong Jing and various directors. The same goes for stars. For 
example, Chow Yun Fat, after the success of his character Mark in John Woo‘s A Better 
Tomorrow (1986), repeatedly played the reluctant hero shooting with two guns. Brigitte 
Lin, after the success of her trans-gender character Asia the Invincible in Swordsman II 
(Ching Siu-tung, 1993), repeatedly played an androgynous character in costume. The 
illusion of the ease of mass production, the mechanical calculation of the star and genre 
formula, and the seemingly unsophisticated cash-based method of financing attracted the 
triads to pump hot money into this business and boost output. Hong Kong theaters were 
fed annually with 150 local films, many being quickies of sequels and copycats of the 
same genres with the same stars.  In the domestic market how did these mass produced 
local features compete with glossy Hollywood products? What was their appeal? How 
did they even differentiate amongst themselves? And would Hong Kong local production, 
integrated in the international market while claiming a collective cultural identity, in fact 






voice, a collective locus of agency to speak for its condition without assuming a cultural 
unity among a heterogeneous people?  That is, can the local speak?   
Hong Kong cinema would remain anonymous in the world if not for the typed 
directors and their signature movies. In the 1970s, even though Bruce Lee had single 
handily brought the Chinese kung fu film to the world stage, back then Hong Kong 
cinema as a collective was un-differentiable in the world market. Glocalization, local 
adaptation of the global, is not a sufficient challenge to the cultural homogenization 
thesis. With the dominant in the global setting parameters for the local, what is left for the 
local to adapt is already defined and confined. Hong Kong cinema, a commercial and 
transnational cinema, was embedded in the global system. In the era of intensified 
globalization, everyone from the rest of the world had to work within the world capitalist 
system and make do with the niche markets. Hong Kong cinema, situated in an open port 
city, was reduced to a cultural banana republic, producing only two major genres. The 
Chinese martial arts infused action film, and the verbal gag-oriented comedy were the 
only genres that Hong Kong cinema could find its niche in, within a Hollywood-
dominated world.  
Hong Kong cinema was popular and yet recognized for its individual filmmakers‘ 
personal vision and style. The debates in global media studies often focus on the 
dichotomy between the global and the local/national without going further to the personal 
level. They overlook the personal dimension of transnational media. The Hong Kong film 
industry, populated by numerous independent productions, was like a supermarket 
mixing high and low cultures. To survive fierce competition in a supermarket, there was 
the economic motivation for the filmmakers to brand themselves. Directors were 
increasingly compelled to develop a personal style and producers had to find different 






negotiating autonomy within the industry commercial system was authorship, i.e. by 
marking one‘s identity and getting to the privileged place of author helped the director 
create a recognition factor within the community. At the global level, Hong Kong cinema 
was recognized for its collective style and the means for insubordination, so negotiating 
autonomy within the global system was also authorship. The keener the global 
competition, the greater the emphasis on the distinctive styles of individual filmmakers. 
In global media studies, adopting mostly the political economy and quantitative 
approach, the role of human agency in the system and the function of abstract factors like 
the charisma of the director in production management are often overlooked.   
Filmmakers of the 1990s, albeit making personal films, were more ―calculating‖ 
than the previous generation and tended to be hyphenated director-producers. In 
European art cinema the auteur is at the center of the system. Authorship is credited to 
the director and the film is considered an expression of his personal vision and obsession. 
In classical Hollywood, the producer was at the apex of the studio system. Authorship is 
attributed to the producer who creatively contributed in the production and has his 
personality written into the films, as Schatz argues (Genius). But Hong Kong cinema was 
neither a director cinema nor a producer cinema.  The system of the film industry was not 
controlled by a producer-centered management, nor was it dominated by directors 
operating without commercial considerations. The expansion of the scale of production 
and runaway overseas production made the role of producers become more significant, 
but the industry maintained the director-centric production approach. What was the role 
and function of the director in the system of Hong Kong cinema?  
Classic auteur theory is challenged for being overly romantic about directors 
transcending structural constraints, but Gerstner and Staiger point out the usefulness of 






system. They state, ―the individuals…function within the constraints and possibilities of 
the cultural fields and systems that inform the filmmaking conventions in which they 
operate. What is at stake, of course, is negotiating these systems through the [marking] of 
their identities in relationship to these conventions and method of filmmaking‖ (xii). The 
directors in Hong Kong cinema were situated authors, that is, they worked within the 
political parameters set by the colonial government, inside the commercial systems of 
Hong Kong cinema, the Asian regional market and international film festivals, and 
developed personal styles with influences from Hollywood, Asian cinema and European 
art cinema, as well as the Hong Kong mainstream cinema‘s extravagant style and 
neurotic energy.  Each type of director found his position, branded himself, solidified his 
type and had his signature genre and his usual collaborators.  Besides being the center of 
creative control, the director had to perform a branding function.  In terms of 
consciousness in branding and filmmaking practices, filmmakers from the most 
commercial to the most artistic had more in common than they had differences, since 
they worked within the same political, economic, social, cultural and industrial context.   
The following case studies are about how these individual directors interacted 
with the system of Hong Kong cinema, itself embedded in the global system.  These 
hyphenated authors (writer-director-producer-agent) were industry savvy, knowledgeable 
about the history of the industry, its constraints and possibilities and thus conversant with 
the viable means to get their movies made and sold.  When bonus, profit sharing and 
residue earning were not common practices, stars were often overbooked to capitalize on 
their ephemeral fame. The crew had to hop from project to project.  The charisma of the 
director to hold the cast and crew together and pull off the project was essential.  Not 






cultivate their own director persona, which had a real function in the management and in 
the creative processes.   
The author could also serve as the entering point to investigate the culture in 
which he was situated.  Like a star, the typed director was also part of the meaning-
making process and symptomatic of the society he lived in.  As individuals in a network 
of ideological relations, together they represented the spectrum of local voices and the 
range of emotions. Their films recorded the affective dimension of Hong Kong history – 
how we felt and what our hopes and fears were – which might otherwise be dismissed, 
forgotten or suppressed in official documents. John Downing attributes the thriving of 
alternative media in times of political and economic turmoil to the needs of the audience. 
To explain Hong Kong cinema‘s thriving in times of political anxiety I would paraphrase 
Downing and say, ―Whenever mainstream media industry forms like global or national 
cinemas choose not to represent important facets of social or political reality, an 
alternative industry form like the transnational Hong Kong cinema flourished.  Hong 
Kong cinema‘s shoddy productions were seized upon and shared by many people when 
the need was real.‖
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These situated authors, like stars selected by the audience to stay in 
the market, indicated the socio-cultural impetus of Hong Kong cinema.   
Hong Kong cinema was neither a vocal alternative media nor a silent subaltern.  
Hong Kong cinema was not a replica of Hollywood and it certainly was not a radical 
alternative to Hollywood in Downing‘s definition of alternative media. But it was not a 
subaltern denied of representation either.  The post-colonial studies‘ subaltern view, 
adopted by studies on Hong Kong culture in the 1980s and 1990s, positioning Hong 
Kong as in-between and in a vertical relation to the two dominant colonizing cultures – 
Britain and China, overshadows other variable readings, overlooking the complicated 






why Hong Kong cinema found a voice in the world market.  If the typed directors 
branded themselves as auteurs above the constraints of Hong Kong cinema‘s commercial 
system, Hong Kong was itself branded by tourist associations and various forces as a city 
above its colonial status.  The discursively constructed image of the city by popular 
media was not that of a silent subaltern.  The subaltern view could not explain popularity 
of this urban cinema, the desirability of Hong Kong stars and the cult status of Hong 
Kong auteur directors.  In the 1990s Hong Kong cinema entered a different phase, one 
that was profoundly affected by the way Hong Kong filmmakers had responded to the 
traumatic event of 1989. In the face of Hong Kong‘s sovereignty change, Hong Kong 
cinema dealt with the hierarchal concept and discourse of ―going back to one‘s roots‖, 
with the root supposed to reside in China. China quickened the pace of economic reforms 
and tried to integrate into the world capitalist system. When the Chinese government 
urged people to ―look forward‖, Hong Kong filmmakers insisted on looking ―downward‖ 
(the dreams of people at the bottom), ―backward‖ (an imagined coherent local history),  
and ―inward‖ (a self-reflexive introspection). What dream was sold in this petite industry 
of a colonial city? What story did Hong Kong cinema tell? 
Hong Kong cinema spoke about a peculiar local condition I call ―orphan island 
anxiety,‖ a paradoxical state in which political anxiety was combined and commensurate 
with economic prosperity. The more prosperous the city became the more insecure and 
threatened the people felt. In Chinese history ―the Orphan Island period‖ refers to 
Shanghai under Japanese occupation but before Japan declared war with the Western 
allies on December 1941. Shanghai‘s Western concession areas at that time experienced a 
paradoxical phenomenon. In contrast to the rest of the country, there was stability and 
phenomenal prosperity. They were like ―islands‖ in the ―sea‖ of Japanese occupied 






imminent war and the anticipated passing of prosperity. In 1939 director Cai Chusheng 
fled to Hong Kong and made Orphan Island Paradise, depicting the decadent lives of 
people in Shanghai‘s Western concession during that period. I borrow the term ―orphan 
island‖ to refer to Hong Kong as a city of Western concession enjoying stability and 
prosperity amidst intense political anxiety. Hong Kong was an orphan island in an age of 
the universal and normative idea of the nation. It was a sub-sovereign city and yet 
enjoyed a high level of autonomy. Hong Kong cinema provided the transnational space to 
convey such an ―islander‖ cultural sensibility which was not represented in global 
Hollywood and Chinese national cinema.   
During the transition period, the official description of Hong Kong was ―stability 
and prosperity.‖  But as we shall see Wong Jing and Tsui Hark s movies were stories 
about ―the family ruined and the country conquered‖ and Wong Kar Wai‘s characters 
mostly stay in motels and hotels. Beneath the appearance of a cosmopolitan city there is 
no place their characters can call home. Coincidentally their protagonists are all orphans 
or motherless in the decade when Hong Kong was about to return to the motherland. ―A 
child without a mother, an adult without a motherland‖ Lo Wai Luk‘s description of 
Hong Kong New Wave director Ann Hui‘s oeuvre can be generalized to the works of 
these male directors. The following three case studies illustrate how each filmmaker 
played to his strengths to operate efficiently in the system, but generated a distinctive 






Chapter 6 Wong Jing The Sober Dreamer 
Wong Jing was the top domestic box office director in the 1990s. From 1990 to 
1996 he directed 34 films, and his total gross was 635 million HKD which was 20% of 
the total gross of Hong Kong films (C. W. Chan "Rank"). He was dubbed ―the King of 
Crappy Cinema‖. His films were so formulaic and distinctive that in Hong Kong his 
name ―Wong Jing‖ was often used as an adjective to refer to a certain type of Hong Kong 
formulaic gimmicky shoddy productions. In the 1990s Wong Jing was unabashedly 
sloppy. When asked to rate his movies, he gives an 85. He says, ―For a movie of 85, we 
charge 36 dollars for a ticket. For a movie of 100, we also charge 36 dollars. There is no 
need to work to 100‖ (H. He 32). He created some puzzling phenomena in Hong Kong. 
There was the peculiar behavior of Wong Jing‘s audiences, as pointed out by He Huixian 
in her interview with him in 1992. In the screening hall the audience would curse and 
ridicule the illogicality and absurdity of the plots while watching and laughing. But they 
would buy tickets again to watch his next movie (H. He). In the competitive environment 
of the 1990s Wong Jing‘s movies were still mostly formulaic productions which still 
adopted the traditional mode of financing, the cash based pianhua system. He still 
scribbled the script on a tiny piece of paper and improvised on the set. Despite the 
expansion of the budget, he still finished shooting and editing in a rush. Since the early 
years of his film career he was routinely criticized for the vulgarity in his films, and in the 
late 1990s his movies were still filled with bathroom jokes. Nevertheless, Wong Jing‘s 
market share in Hong Kong was impressive. For example in 1994 alone he was involved 
in 10 films as producer, director and writer. The total gross of his films was 150 million 
(HKD) which was 16% of the total domestic box office (J. Zhang "Hong Kong"). When 






new projects. Some admitted that his low budget mass production system was a viable 
way to survive, but Wong Jing was not respected by his peers (J. Zhang "Wong Jing"). 
His films were rarely nominated in the Hong Kong Film Awards, an award by 
professional peers in the industry. But local film critics‘ incessant censure didn‘t diminish 
his career. In 2010, Sek Kei, a veteran film critic whom Wong Jing respects
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but who 
severely criticizes his trifling and lousy films calls Wong Jing ―the roly-poly of Hong 
Kong cinema‖ because Wong Jing continues making movies whether Hong Kong film 
industry is in a boom or bust phase (Sek). 
Wong Jing‘s trademark genre is the gambler film, which he has developed since 
his early years in television. His God of Gamblers (1989) starring Chow Yun Fat was the 
top box office hit of that year, spawning off an entire decade of gambler films (see table 
6.2). Typical of the exploitation tradition of Hong Kong cinema, shortly after the success 
of God of Gamblers there was a few dozen sequels, series and copycats with the stock 
characters played by the same actors across an enterprise of gambler films by various 
directors.106 Amidst hundreds of gambler films throughout the history of Hong Kong 
cinema, God of Gamblers is regarded as a classic and Wong Jing is regarded as the 
master of this genre. The series were all shown during the Christmas holidays (see table 
6.1) and is about a professional gambler in casino. In clinical terms, his protagonist is a 
problematic or pathological gambler who engages in gambling to the point of ruining his 
family and his own life.
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 And there is evidence of a higher frequency of gambling 
problems among individuals in a casino setting (Fong). In American culture, gambling 
may be viewed by some as a deviant and disruptive activity, but as a form of risk taking it 
is culturally valued, since various types of risk taking such as financial investments are 
positively valued, as Thomas M. Holtgraves argues.  Holtgraves says, the positive 






in Chinese societies, as Chien and Hsu point out, gambling is perceived as a vice that will 
lead some to ―become the pawns of destiny‖, despite the findings that the Chinese are 
higher risk takers. It is regarded as a pastime that needs to be condemned.  Macau is now 
―Asia‘s casino mecca‖. But as Glenn McCartney points out, gambling in Macau has been 
portrayed in a negative light and Macau has gained the image of a wicked city.  And one 
of the arguments to justify the legalization of casinos in Macau is that it generates tax 
revenues and contributions to social and infrastructure projects. McCartney also points 
out that Hong Kong was not turned into a casino city by its sovereign power in the 1860s 
like Macau was ―because of England‘s dismay and disdain for the large ‗profits of vice‘ 
being generated in Hong Kong‖ (39). Thus gambling houses were closed down and 
casino gambling is still illegal in the former British colony. No legal gambling takes 
place in the mainland China. At present, Macau receives a constant flow of gamblers 
from Hong Kong and China. In Hong Kong, gambling is often framed as a problematic 
behavior that the government, education and parents need to fix.
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 There is no similar 
positive cultural value attached to gambling like in the U.S. Yet Wong Jing was able to 
construct an honorable character in a base profession of a stigmatized activity in a base 
genre. He has all his protagonists coming from marginal Chinese territories: Macau the 
wicked city (the Casino Tycoon series), Hong Kong the cultural desert (the God of 
Gamblers series) and Guangzhou the periphery Southern Chinese province (the Saint of 
Gamblers series). More intriguing is that the protagonists of these holiday season mass 
entertainments are tragic heroes. For example, in the God of Gamblers series, the 
protagonist‘s father, his unborn child, girlfriend, fiancé and wife are all killed. His 
mentor, sworn brother and cousin all betray him. How did Wong Jing prosper in the 
competitive environment of the 1990s with a dated mode of production and formulaic 






the few thousands of low budget quickies and hundreds of trash movie directors in the 
history of Hong Kong cinema? What was the appeal of his movies that kept audiences 
coming back for more? What was the Hong Kong story he tells with his trademark 
gambler films? 
Wong Jing has had a long, prolific and consistently commercially successful 
career since 1975. His first film Challenge of the Gamesters (1981) is a gambler film. 
Since then he has asserted himself as an entertainer for the masses. He has survived well 
in the system of Hong Kong cinema for mass entertainment of the early 1980s. He has 
laid a good foundation in industry connection, built a good business reputation, and 
sharpened his skills in genre and the star system. He is industry-savvy and fits well in 
Hong Kong film industry‘s exhibition sector-led production approach. By the 1990s his 
brand ―Wong Jing‖ was so established that his filmmaking style, the gambler genre, the 
stars‘ performance and narrative style, all bear his trademark. But it is his unique voice 
and vision that gives him the leverage to be a champion in the market. Despite his high 
educational background in an elite education system in a colony, he looked at people at 
the bottom of the society and dealt with their dreams and anxiety. His gambler films 
invariably tell the same story over and over again: an honorable man in a base profession 
from a marginal place defies destiny and emerges as a champion in the capitalist jungle 
by honoring the traditional moral code. 
“WONG JING” AS A SAFE BET 
The early years of his career has enabled Wong Jing to thrive in the 1990s. In 
Hong Kong cinema‘s financier-exhibition sector-led productions, he has survived by 
being and projecting an image as a safe bet to his financial supporters, and a guarantee of 
entertainment to his audiences. Back then there was no government funding committee or 






critics‘ response, was not a factor in Wong Jing‘s calculations. The financing and 
exhibition sectors were the key parts in his game. Very early on Wong Jing had set his 
goal as an entertainer for the masses and has never wavered since then. He always keeps 
a smiley face in public and is always the center of the party. He was born Wong Yat 
Cheong in 1955 in Hong Kong. He says, shortly after his birth, his father had to do some 
shooting in Japan, a faraway place for Hong Kong people at that time. The family was 
worried and named the son ―Yat Cheong‖ meaning ―a safe journey to Japan‖ (Shin Wong 
Jing). Names of that generation of filmmakers often indicate the itinerant character of 
their formative years and their parents‘ longing for peace and security and wishes for 
assurance. For example, Jackie Chan‘s Chinese birth name ―Kong-sang‖ means ―born in 
Hong Kong‖; Nansun Shi‘s first name means ―born in the South‖; Yuen Woo-ping‘s first 
name means ―peace‖ because he was born in the year of the end of the Sino-Japanese war 
(Cindy S.C. Chan "Yuan Woo-Ping"). For that generation of filmmakers adopting a stage 
name was a common practice. Wong Yat Cheong named himself ―Wong Jing‖ when he 
started working in television. After a summer internship Wong Yat Cheong went back to 
university and Wong Jing stayed in television. In his journey in the Hong Kong television 
and film industries, Wong Jing takes a steady and reliable approach and strategizes as 
much as he can in this high-risk business.   
In a 1981 interview by Film Bi-Weekly for his very first feature film, Wong Jing 
already asserted himself as an entertainer for the masses amidst the rise of the Hong 
Kong New Wave generation‘s personal and socially relevant films. Since this film Wong 
Jing has been in an antagonistic position with local film critics. He says, ―Hong Kong 
film critics post themselves as intellectuals and look down upon pure entertainment films. 
They only regard art film as admirable. Directors of art and commercial film have to put 






like there are two chefs. One makes buns in restaurant for the mass and the other works 
for the Royal Jockey Club cooking delicatessen for the Taipan. They both work hard. 
Their processes are different but their goals are the same.‖ He made his stand very clear, 
―I don‘t like my film to be message-loaded. I only want to provide pure entertainment‖ 
(N. Shan 24). The writer of the interview ends the article with four words, ―This is Wong 
Jing‖ indicative of Wong Jing‘s distinctive image and style in his very first film. In the 
next twenty years amidst the rise of another wave of art film directors like Wong Kar 
Wai, Fruit Chan, Stanley Kwan and Clara Law, Wong Jing continued to be the 
commercial film director the critics love to criticize, keeping his name a constant 
presence in their film review columns. In 2001, in an interview by the same film 
magazine Wong Jing asserted the same, ―I am an entertainer.‖ He says, ―I never ‗love‘ 
my movies. I only make those movies with a professional attitude‖ (Ernie  Au 38). He 
was an irrevocably commercial film entertainer from day one. 
Wong Jing always pledges his allegiance to his financial supporters and assures 
them of his reliability. In an interview article in 1992 titled ―Box office panacea – Wong 
Jing‖ Wong Jing asserts his role as a commercial film director. He says, ―To me film is 
absolutely not an art. It is a commercial product. Everybody should regard it as a money-
making tool. If not, he should not work in this industry. Filmmaking is teamwork. Film is 
a commercial product at every stage: production, distribution and promotion.‖ He 
expounds his code of conduct: ―I think if you want to make personal art, you should not 
spend the investor‘s money to fulfill your own desire. This is very selfish and unethical. 
Neglecting the investor‘s interest is dishonest behavior‖ (H. He 32). Wong Jing asserts 
that he is always fair to the people he works with and for. He proudly says, ―I did the best 
within the budget allowed‖ (Ernie  Au 38). In the 1990s when unethical producers who 






deteriorated, Wong Jing had a reputation for being punctual in payment even when it 
meant paying out of his pocket. He says, ―In our field, this is our code of conduct. 
Without honoring this, my reputation will be ruined‖ (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). In 
2001, 20 years in the business he is also proud to claim that he never cheated anyone out 
of his money. He says, ―With my ‗Wong Jing‘ fame, I can easily cheat people‘s money. 
But I didn‘t do that. For any business, the most important thing is reputation. If you keep 
your promise and deliver, even if some day you fail, there is always someone to give you 
a helping hand‖ (Ernie  Au 38). In his own analysis of his competitive advantage among 
fellow filmmakers, Wong Jing says it is due to his good interpersonal relationships and 
reputation. He proudly says, ―I have a very good relationship with every sector. With my 
financial supporters‘ trust, I have an easier time in managing the cash flow and that 
makes a huge difference‖ (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing") Columnist Zhang Jian notes 
that Wong Jing was operating like an independent production house, but he has extensive 
connections with financial backing. Wong Jing was associated with the big company 
Win‘s Film. He also got financial backing from Golden Harvest, Shaw studio, and two 
major financiers from Taiwan (J. Zhang "Hong Kong"). In a tightly knit business 
community relying on the traditional cash-based pianhua financing system, a good 
reputation is essential for survival. This generation of filmmakers is conditioned to watch 
out for their investors‘ interest as if with their own family purse. They have been 
operating with skeleton crews since the demise of the studios. It is not a surprise that 
many of them find Hollywood production or China co-production big crew sizes 
wasteful, redundant and even burdensome. 
Wong Jing is conscious of building his image as an unbeatable survivor in the 
business. Hong Kong film critics always compare him with Roger Corman, the American 






doesn‘t lose money, he can keep on working (D. Lin "Wong Jing"). Wong Jing gave 
people the impression of his being invincible in the market: ―He is smart and pragmatic. 
His financiers never have to worry about him over budget‖ (Jiang). He is like a roly-poly 
who bounces back when beaten as Sek Kei says. Wong Jing admits that, ―A lot of people 
think that I am very tough. In fact, I was hurt before. It‘s just that I didn‘t cry after 
falling. I wiped away my blood and no one noticed‖ (Jiang). And then he falls silent 
about the injuries and lost battles. In an era when there was still a distinction in the 
industry between the college educated filmmakers and the ―red trouser‖ filmmakers 
(trained in traditional apprentice system) Wong Jing tried to project a tough guy image 
and yet retain his amicable look as an entertainer. He majored in Chinese at the Chinese 
University of Hong Kong but he always suppressed his elite education background and 
even dismissed his university training as useless. But in a 2007 interview at the Hong 
Kong Film Archive for an oral history project on his father Wong Tin Lam, he opened up 
and talked about his childhood and his father‘s influence on him (Shin Wong Jing). Wong 
Jing worked as an intern at TVB where his father was a prominent producer. He says his 
father was smart not to let his son work under him, in order to avoid criticism and office 
politicking. Wong Tin Lam was a prominent film director before migrating to television. 
Film directors Ringo Lam and Johnnie To are two of his prominent protégés at TVB. 
Wong Tin Lam was well respected in the Hong Kong television and film industries.  
The Hong Kong Film Archive interview of Wong Jing was done with his father 
by his side. In contrast to his image as entertainer for the masses and life of the party, 
there he describes himself as a lonely boy growing up reading avidly in his father‘s study 
room. At age 7 to 8 he already finished reading the Chinese classic Water Margin; at age 
11 he finished reading Louis Cha (Jin Yong)‘s novels; He also read various popular 






Chinese was very solid at a young age. He says at age 8 to 9 he already started reading 
his father‘s scripts. At age 15, he always reviewed his father‘s scripts and gave comments 
like, ―This is too old-fashion…that is too cliché…this is revenge for the father plot 
again…‖ (Shin Wong Jing 98). In that interview he even mentioned his involvement in 
drama theatre (an elite art form in Hong Kong) at Pui Ching Middle School (one of the 
few schools that adopted Chinese as the language of instruction in colonial Hong Kong.) 
He restarted the drama society that was established by Chung King Fai, who is now ―the 
guru of Hong Kong theatre‖ with 60 years of stage experience (Tao Chung King Fai). 
Chung King Fai played the mentor Kent in God of Gamblers 3: The Early Stage (1997). 
Stanley Kwan was Wong Jing‘s school friend at Pui Ching. Wong Jing produced Stanley 
Kwan‘s award winning film Hold You Tight (1998).
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In 2002 when I asked him why he didn‘t put his name on those refined movies he 
produced, he frankly says that ―Wong Jing‖ is not the suitable ―brand‖ for those movies. 
He specifically used the term ―brand‖ to refer to ―Wong Jing‖. He was conscious of 
branding himself and training himself to be industry savvy. He learned from his father‘s 
―mistake‖. He says his father‘s biggest influence on him was not on filmmaking 
technique, but on how to survive in this industry. He says, ―My father is like a mirror for 
me. He teaches me on how to survive in this industry without being bullied and taken 
advantage of‖ (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing") Seeing the ups and downs of his father‘s 
career, Wong Jing comments about his father being ―silly‖ and he learned the importance 
of building one‘s image. He says, 
―My father worked at many positions. He worked with the title of assistant 
director but finished shooting the entire movie by himself. The director just took 
the credit without doing anything. Later when my father became established and 
famous, he didn‘t fight for a better deal for himself. He worked hard without 
promoting himself. He didn‘t give himself more media exposure and build up his 






until he moved to the TV industry that he started a new page in his career. He was 
silly but he had his luck. He was well respected by many people. I‘m different 
from him. I know how to seize the opportunity. I learned his virtues. I want to 
work as hard as him. But I‘m also an opportunist.‖(Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong 
Jing") 
But Wong Jing seizes opportunity not by grabbing more credit for his work, but 
by selecting credits suitable for the image he has constructed. He says, ―I am the 
executive producer of Ringo Lam‘s Full Alert (1997). But my comedy image and Ringo 
Lam‘s masculine action film image are too ingrained in people‘s minds that it will be 
confusing to combine our names together. The audience doesn‘t know what to expect of 
the film. Like Hold You Tight (1998) and the Young and Dangerous series, I let the others 
take the credit. I‘m also heavily involved in The Stormriders (Andrew Lau, 1998) and A 
Man Called Hero (Andrew Lau, 1999), but I didn‘t put my name on them‖ (Cindy S.C. 
Chan "Wong Jing"). The ―Wong Jing‖ on the rolling credits is half of the story. In an 
interview article in 1996 titled ―Wong Jing straddles between art and commerce‖ the 
writer describes how Wong Jing carefully manages what to show to public. Wong Jing 
says, ―You can only see what‘s on the surface of the screen. You can‘t see what‘s behind 
it. What the audience see is half true half false. What they see seems real, but it really is 
not. Because what they see is only the 180 degrees of a sphere‖ (Alge 52). In recent years 
he produced Ann Hui‘s socially relevant films The Way We Are (2008)
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and Night and 
Fog (2009) in which his role as executive producer is better known in the media now. 
Being a successful director was not Wong Jing‘s ultimate goal. In an interview in 1997 he 
says, ―From the very beginning, director is only a transitional job for me. But that 
transition has taken me 15 to 16 years. When I worked at TVB, I was responsible for 
creative, co-ordination and executive works. When I entered the film industry, I knew I 
wouldn‘t have the power to command other directors if I did not have the experience as a 






―I am a maker. I make things happen. I source the funding, find the suitable director and 
match the cast and crew. I initiate the project until it is ready for production, then I hand 
it to the executive producers‖ (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). 
It took Wong Jing years of hard work, skill, strategies and jungle training to get to 
that filmmaker position. Wong Jing is known for being hardworking and prolific. He has 
accomplished a lot since his 20s and he paid a price for that. In an interview in 1995 the 
writer did not list Wong Jing‘s impressive box office performance like most reporters did. 
Instead the opening subtitle is ―Wong Jing‘s real name is medicine pill‖ and then the 
writer goes on to describe the strong smell of Chinese medicines and show photos of the 
herb tea and medicine pills displayed in his office. She observes that Wong Jing was just 
40 years old then but his health had already deteriorated badly. In 1981 at age 26 Wong 
Jing made his first feature film, which was one of the top ten hits of that year. In 1989 at 
age 34, he made God of Gamblers which was the top box office of that year. Wong Jing 
describes how exhausted he felt in those years. He says, ―There was one time I fell asleep 
in the hall while holding onto the water cooler. In 1984 during the shooting of Prince 
Charming, I instantly felt asleep when I leaned on a bamboo behind me.‖ But Wong Jing 
was not complaining about the harsh and exploitative conditions. In fact he was 
presenting how extremely hardworking he was, a virtue he admires in his father. He also 
liked to talk about how he survived in a jungle-like environment. He says in 1975 when 
he started as an intern at TVB, ―I didn‘t plan to work for long there. But they had a labor 
shortage. So I decided to spend my four months‘ summer vacation there. I would make 
them feel they couldn‘t do without me…I took up all the positions. Whoever didn‘t like 
doing his work, I would take over. I worked on scripts, skits, and gags. I gave my all‖ (L. 
Pan 24-25). In my interview with him, he relishes his battles in TVB and Shaw studio. 






Kong New Wave filmmakers. Outside TVB there was the challenge from the rival TV 
stations. There were talent raids and severe labor shortages at TVB. Wong Jing describes, 
for the variety show Enjoy Yourself Tonight, shown five days a week, the demand for 
skits was tremendous. The average length of a drama serial at that time was about 60 to 
110 episodes, also shown five days a week. But there were only about 10 writers in the 
scripting department. In contrast, the ―film unit‖ of TVB, under Salina Chow‘s leadership 
and protection only had to produce a few hours of shows with more than 20 shooting 
days and unlimited resources. Wong Jing calls them the ―privileged class‖. He clarifies 
that Tsui Hark, a prolific filmmaker, did not come from the ―film unit‖, but Patrick Tam 
(Wong Kar Wai‘s mentor) did. He says he was so useful in TVB‘s rating battle that he 
was allowed to break the division between the creative and production departments, and 
had easy access to the manager in that hierarchical organization. When he entered the 
Shaw studio, prominent directors like Li Han-hsiang, Chang Cheh and Lau Kar Leung 
were still working there (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). In order to face the challenge 
from the New Wave, the Shaw studio started to recruit younger directors. But Shaw‘s 
culture was intimidating to young directors even though Wong Jing was established in 
television. Bullying on the set was not uncommon. In an Hong Kong Film Archive 
interview Wong Jing describes how he started his first day of shooting. He says, ―My 
Papa stayed on the set with me for three days. I said to him, ‗You come to the set and just 
sit there. I want everyone to know that I‘m your son. I don‘t want to have a light 
accidentally dropped from the rail.‘ That means I didn‘t want anyone intimidate me. In 
the end no planned accident happened. My Papa just sat there chatting with people‖ (Shin 
Wong Jing 102). Wong Jing says he signed a contract with the Shaw studio with the 
lowest salary, but with a bonus provision; he ended up receiving the highest bonus in 






In the jungle eras of TVB and the Shaw studio, Wong Jing developed his efficient 
methods of operation, especially in scriptwriting and characterization. He says he has his 
own theory and formula for writing scripts: ―With my formula, I can write very fast and 
in a mechanical way. I don‘t need to wait for inspiration and yet maintain certain 
standard. When you have inspiration, you can write better. When you don‘t, you can still 
come up with a story with a decent structure. This is what helps me write so fast. I can 
finish a script in a few days‖ (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). He finished his first 
feature film script in 1978 and in the space of 10 years he has finished over 40 scripts (L. 
Pan). Being able to write a script on the fly was essential for Wong Jing to capitalize on 
hit movies in the 1990s.   
Wong Jing‘s movies look so formulaic that in a feature article a writer 
summarized the two major plots that Wong Jing uses in all of his films, which he says are 
the essence of Shakespeare‘s stories: ―The drama that derives from lower class people 
with high moral value is tragedy; the drama from upper class people with low moral 
values is comedy‖ (D. Lin "Wong Jing"). But the narrative structure of Wong Jing‘s 
gambler films is more culturally specific. Wong Jing adopts the most traditional and 
accessible narrative structure for his mass audience gambler genre films. The stories of 
this genre look so simple and familiar that Wu Yufu summarizes the narrative structure 
and genre conventions of the gambler films from 1989 to 2000 in a few paragraphs. Wu 
says these genre films usually follow the traditional Chinese four step composition: qi-
cheng-zhuan-he (introduction, elucidation of the theme, transition to another viewpoint 
and summing up). And the plot usually goes like this: the protagonist is a champion in the 
gambling field and intends to retire; the antagonist puts him in danger; the protagonist 
gets out of danger with the help of a young man he meets during his down time; the 






ending is: the reluctant hero comes back for a final contest, gets revenge and wins. Wu 
also points out that the Hong Kong gambling film in general is a male-dominant genre 
with the male protagonist moving the mission plot and the female protagonist remaining 
passive in the romance plot. As in Hong Kong martial arts films, male bonding, rather 
than the man-woman romance is the core relationship in Wong Jing‘s gambler films. But 
Wu hasn‘t pointed out that Wong Jing‘s gambler film is indeed a wuxia (martial arts) 
story, moved to the casino setting with the traditional moral code of human relationships 
embedded in it. In traditional martial art films, the chivalric protagonist is not 
materialistic. He will not get any financial gain from his profession and he only fights or 
kills for righteous reasons. In one of Wong Jing‘s gambler films, for example, Little 
Knife (the knight of gamblers, Andy Lau) listens to his mentor and has to use all of his 
gambling gains for a charitable purpose. In the saint of gambler series, Sing (Stephen 
Chow) and his uncle (Ng Mang-tat) instantly get bad karma when they use the money for 
self-interest. Even though gambling is an activity associated with greed, Wong Jing‘s 
gambler films revolve around the theme of revenge and championship, and money is not 
an issue. The casino, like jianghu (the martial world) as an alternative realm parallel to 
the imperial court, and has its own moral code and rules of the game. Wong Jing puts the 
old martial arts genre into the new bottle of the modern casino.  
Wong Jing also applies this recycling approach to characterization. In his gambler 
films, the protagonist and his sidekick are from character prototypes he developed during 
his TV days. He uses his television industry‘s factory training to strengthen his efficiency 
in developing characters who are particularly appealing to local audiences. Television 
scripts require mass appeal and potential for series and sequels. TVB in the 1970s to 
1990s often had 70-80% of the domestic market, and its target audience was 4 to 80 years 






basic structure. In Hong Kong back in the 1980s, the TV serial was shown five days a 
week at prime time. To draw the audience to stick to his channel Wong Jing says his 
formula was: Monday and Tuesday are for the introduction of the story of that week and 
it must reach a climax on Friday. But the most important factor was ―characterization‖. 
Wong Jing explained, ―The key in a serial is not the plot device, but the characters. 
Audience will follow the characters‘ personality development, not the development of the 
events. Audience cares about what happen to the character‖ (Jiang). Characters are the 
main attraction of Wong Jing‘s gamblers films. 
Two of the most memorable characters that Wong Jing created in his TV days are 
Lam Ah Chun and Ah Tsan, and they form the prototypes for Wong Jing‘s gambler film 
characters: the protagonist and his sidekick. Lam Ah Chun is a series comedy about an 
overeducated Plain Jane returning from overseas. She humbly works as an assistant in a 
small company. She does not exactly fit into the modern Hong Kong asphalt jungle but 
she survives. Lam Ah Chun was played by glamorous Cantonese cinema star Josephine 
Siao. Siao was ―demoted‖ to play a Plain Jane wearing a bobbed hairdo, thick eye 
glasses, an over-sized shirt and jeans. When she returned from her overseas education in 
1973, Siao was dubbed by the media as ―a star with a bachelor degree‖. In those days in 
Hong Kong‘s colonial elite education system, having a university education was rare. 
Women having a university education and from overseas was even more rare. A top 
female movie star pursuing a higher education was much rarer. Siao reinvented her star 
persona and her career. She also worked behind the screen as a producer for independent 
productions. Wong Jing‘s gambler protagonists bear a striking resemblance to Lam Ah 
Chun. Josephine Siao is a star working from behind the screen. Lam Ah Chun is played 
by a star hiding her beauty and glamor behind the thick eyeglasses, a high caliber worker 






wisdom often appears to be slow-witted. The theme of concealing one‘s real identity, 
covering one‘s true ability, keeping a low profile, laying low or pretending one is 
ignorant often recurs in Wong Jing‘s protagonists. For example, in God of Gamblers, Ko 
Chun pretends that he didn‘t remember Little Knife and knows nothing about his cousin‘s 
plot to kill him. In the prequel, he pretends that he still has a brain injury and can‘t 
function normally. His enemy spares his life. In the Casino Tycoon series Hsin pretends 
to have heart attack to rest and hide in a hospital. In My Name is Nobody, No-Name 
pretends that he is still blind due to a brain injury. His opponent spares his life and 
underestimates his ability to seek revenge. The Conman series is all about tricks and 
deception. In The Tricky Master the undercover cop‘s supervisor is the Masked Man, ―a 
man with a thousand faces‖. Wong Jing‘s gambler protagonists always hide their true 
identity or assume a fake identity.  
The prototype for the sidekick is Ah Tsan, a side character from a 1979 television 
serial The Good, The Bad and the Ugly (TVB). Wong Jing says they had three actors to 
choose from but he insisted Liu Wai-Hung, an unknown actor, play Ah Tsan and worked 
the script around him (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). Liu Wai-Hung shot to fame with 
this character and still uses his character name Ah Tsan today. In the 1980s, the name 
―Ah Tsan‖ was understood by Hong Kong citizens to signify a hillbilly cousin from 
China. The character is a naïve, gullible and money-minded new immigrant from China 
who has unrealistic dreams of getting instantly rich in Hong Kong. But the character is 
also depicted as simple-minded and kind-hearted. The sidekick comic characters in Wong 
Jing‘s gambler films are a variation of Ah Tsan. For example, Nat Chan in The Conman 
in Vegas (1999), Alex Man in the Casino Tycoon series (1992) and Ng Mang-tat in the 
Saint of Gamblers series. Like Ah Tsan, he is obviously flawed, delusional about fame, 






associated with primitive desire and is openly lusty and vulgar. But he is also a lovable 
underdog, kind-hearted and loyal. For example, in The Conman in Vegas, the Nat Chan 
character is always trapped by a beautiful woman spy. He‘s the character who delivers all 
the bathroom jokes. In the Casino Tycoon series, Kuo Ying-nan (Alex Man) is the 
protagonist Hsin (Andy Lau)‘s childhood friend and he and his son always stand by Hsin. 
He is lusty, vulgar, unsophisticated and uneducated, in sharp contrast to Hsin. His defects 
in English and the Chinese language are a running gag. In the saint of gambler series, Ng 
Mang-tat plays Sing‘s uncle. He is greedy and lusty. He always thinks of using Sing‘s 
supernatural power to get wealthy. He has a comic disability: whenever Sing calls him 
―Uncle Three‖ he will lose control and hop on anyone, man or woman, nearby. In Back to 
Shanghai, Ng Mang-tat plays Sing‘s grandfather. There is an entire sequence 
emphasizing him being a sissy, even though he is a triad member in Shanghai during a 
turbulent time. At a critical moment, it‘s this sissy grandfather who believes in Sing‘s 
impossible story and helps him. Wong Jing‘s description of his own character Lolanto, 
the title character of a comedy I love Lolanto (1984), best illustrates the essence of this 
prototype. Wong Jing says, ―This Lolanto character captures the image of Hong Kong‘s 
lower middle class people. This character is materialistic, pragmatic, stingy, and refuses 
to be taken advantage of. He has no political leanings or social perspective, but he has his 
own value standards and attitudes. He has a unique Hong Kong people‘s view of yi (the 
code of brotherhood or moral code). On small matters he is ruthless, but when it comes to 
the critical moment, he is a righteous man‖ (Luo). Wong Jing has his formula for 
characterization and he is well versed in the star system. He is familiar with many Hong 
Kong stars and has his own efficient way of using stars. 
Wong Jing says, ―When I started the project God of Gamblers, I knew Chow Yun 






actor. I don‘t agree. In fact, he has only three basic stock looks. It is like the three primary 
colors in television that generate varieties of colors on screen. The first one is the smart 
Hui Man-keung character in The Bund (1980). The second one is the serious gentleman 
in The Good, The Bad and the Ugly (1979). The third is a comic thug character. Chow 
Yun Fat combines and matches them so well that it looks like he has a wide range of 
expressions. I know the first and last ones are Chow Yun Fat‘s best. I used them in God 
of Gamblers: the smart look when he‘s the champion and the silly look after he has the 
brain injury‖ (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). Wong Jing is a strong supporter of the star 
system even though many filmmakers blamed the stars‘ high prices for bringing down the 
industry. Wong Jing says, ―Star system will never collapse…How can you do film 
business without a star?...It is healthier to the film industry to have stars. Financiers have 
more confidence and there will be more investment and thus more productions. Every 
profession needs a star.‖ But his concept of the star system is confined to traditional 
commercial filmmaking. He was the director of Maggie Cheung‘s first film and the two 
have been good friends since then. In 1992 Wong Jing said, ―Maggie Cheung comes back 
to make film with me even after getting the best actress award at Berlin film festival. You 
have to understand that the audience is your vitamin. They support your life. An award 
cannot support you. It can only be a burden to you‖ (H. He 32). Wong Jing did not spend 
time and effort to re-invent or explore new dimensions of stars. He has his most efficient 
way of using a star: he capitalizes on the star‘s existing persona, captures his/her best 
parts and mixes and matches well. It is like the way he modifies his character prototypes: 
mixing and matching them well. What remains constant is that the smart protagonist who 
assumes different identities, and the vulgar sidekick who provides the comic relief and 






GAMBLER GENRE AS PERFORMANCE OF HONG KONG IDENTITY 
In his study of why people gamble, Thomas M. Holtgraves argues that one of the 
attractions of gambling is the opportunity to present to oneself and to others a desired 
identity. Gambling is a type of self-presentation, an activity that implicates a desirable 
identity. Holtgraves writes, ―…gambling is a fateful activity and so differs in important 
ways from other ‗inconsequential‘ social settings…it is only fateful activities (risk taking 
in general and gambling in particular) that allow for the expression of ‗character.‘ That is, 
it is only when the outcomes of an activity are consequential and problematic that 
character judgments are possible at all. Some of the bases for strong character 
implications in all fateful situations are courage, gameness, integrity and composure. 
Because most everyday activities are uneventful and not fateful, individuals are not often 
given the chance to display character. One of the appeals of gambling, then, may be the 
opportunity for the display of character‖ (Holtgraves 82). Wong Jing‘s gambler genre can 
be read as an expression of character, a form of cultural expression, a mechanism of myth 
making and thus a performance of the desired Hong Kong identity. Gambling is a 
socially disapproved activity in Chinese society but Wong Jing packages his gambler 
protagonist as a glamorous hero. 
In the 1990s, Hong Kong cinema was best known in the world market for its 
martial arts films, whether it‘s Tsui Hark‘s wuxia in costume or John Woo‘s weaponized 
wuxia, or Johnnie To and Ringo Lam‘s gangster version set in the asphalt jungle. Wong 
Jing says he‘s deeply influenced by wuxia film and Chang Cheh has a huge impact on 
him. John Chiang was his childhood idol and he loves the chivalry romanticism in wuxia 
film (H. He). Wong Jing‘s also sets his jianghu (the martial art world) in the asphalt 
jungle, but he deals with the double-ness of Hong Kong identity with mixtures of 






grandiose Hong Kongism‖, a kind of inferiority-superiority response to Hong Kong‘s 
coloniality. (see chapter 2). On the one hand there is a feeling of superiority for Hong 
Kong. In the sequel, Wong Jing even has a police officer from China blatantly praising 
Hong Kong‘s prosperity and superior capitalist system. On the other hand, the protagonist 
is always surrounded by danger and put in a vulnerable position. The interesting point 
about the antagonists in Wong Jing‘s gambler films is that they are all Chinese and are 
from other societies. His protagonist is pursuing a world championship, but the challenge 
is not from an alien race or from non-Chinese societies. Wong Jing is dealing with the 
Hong Kong identity not just in a vertical relationship with China and Britain, but an inter-
local and intra-Chinese relationship. Wong Jing‘s gambler films play with the 
performativity of the Hong Kong Chinese identity. For example, in God of Gamblers III: 
Back to Shanghai the main part of the movie is a back to the future sequence where Sing 
(saint of gamblers) visits his grandparents in Shanghai in the 1930-40s. The ultimate 
antagonist is a woman Yoshiko Kawashima. In Chinese history Kawashima was executed 
as a traitor (―hanjian‖) by the Nationalist government after the Sino-Japanese war. But 
she was not even a Han Chinese. She was from a noble class of Manchuria and was 
adopted by a Japanese family.
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 Before the Qing dynasty, Manchurians were regarded as 
an alien race, not Chinese. Kawashima‘s character, with her dressing in a male military 
captain‘s uniform, is based on another Hong Kong movie.
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 Opposite Kawashima is the 
gangster head Ding Lik, a fictional character from a popular Hong Kong television series 
The Bund (1980) set in Shanghai. In Wong Jing‘s film version, he lives a luxurious life in 
the French concession in Shanghai during the orphan island period. He receives Sing 
warmly because Sing killed the enemy of his sworn brother Hui Man-keung. He is an 
apolitical character. His actions have nothing to do with nationalism or anti-Japanese 






brother and male friend to the point of giving away his fiancé to his newly met friend. In 
the original TV series Chow Yun Fat plays Hui Man-keung, a university student-turned 
gangster head. Wong Jing says Ko Chun‘s hair style and look is a replica of Hui Man-
keung (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). In the Casino Tycoon series Wong Jing‘s 
protagonist is another university-student-turned-thug. Hsin works his way up and 
becomes the number one in Macau‘s casino business. But when he is cornered in a board 
meeting, he boldly asserts his ability to play rough and tough. He says to his opponents, 
―I just have to take off my tie and I can deal with you like a thug.‖ Wong Jing‘s gambler 
protagonist is his projection of a flexible identity, one who can easily move up and down 
the social ladder, transcend his marginal status but having no problems going back to his 
grass-roots standing. 
THE ORPHAN ISLAND FANTASIA 
Like a star, Wong Jing as a typed director is elected by the audience to stay in the 
market not just because of his performance (how well he tells story or how efficiently he 
operates in the jungle), but also because of which story he repeatedly tells. Columnist 
You Qingyuan in his article titled ―Appeal for Wong Jing‖ asserts that Wong Jing is the 
best B movie writer and director in Hong Kong and no other can master ―low class taste‖ 
and ordinary people‘s fantasy better than he does. You Qingyuan asserts that ―Wong 
Jing‘s Film‖ is a must for understanding Hong Kong cinema, especially of local popular  
culture, and the relationship between film and its era. The interview in 1981 for Wong 
Jing‘s first film foretells very well what fantasy Wong Jing would repeatedly sell in the 
next 20 years. Wong Jing says, ―I always think that film is a ‗dream factory‘. It can give 
audience what they cannot get or see in real life; offer a hero to let them vent their 
frustration in real life. I set Challenge of the Gamesters in the Republican Era and make it 






competition. And then there is an invincible hero who emerges from this‖ (23). The 
Republican Era is characterized by the sovereignty change from the Qing court to the 
Nationalist government, foreign invasion, anarchy and official corruption, war lords and 
civil wars. In 1981 when the issue of ―1997‖ emerged and Sino-British talks started, 
Wong Jing made his first film about a world of deception in the Republican Era and an 
honorable hero emerging from that jungle. In 1989, in God of Gamblers, Wong Jing 
repeated the story and set it in contemporary Hong Kong.  
Wong Jing‘s gamblers films best illustrate the ethos of the era, the mainstream 
cultural imaginary in response to Hong Kong‘s coloniality. On the one hand there is the 
optimism of Hong Kong‘s economic superiority over China. On the other hand there is 
the pessimism over China‘s political domination of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong people 
were not admitted in the Sino-British talks that decided their future. The island city was 
like an orphan with no sovereign state to account for its people‘s wellbeing. Wong Jing‘s 
gambler film genre is an orphan island fantasia: a wild dream about Hong Kong 
transcending its sub-sovereign status. Wong Jing‘s protagonist is often an orphan 
growing up to become a champion. He is the embodiment of ―Hong Kong Wonder‖: a 
political midget recognized for its economic might. He is an honorable man from a 
marginal place who defies destiny and emerges as a champion with intelligence and 
integrity. In the prequel of God of Gamblers, the protagonist Ko Chun is originally from 
a well off family. His father is killed. He was kidnapped and becomes an orphan. His 
mentor adopts and trains him. He emerges as a master in gambling. In the Casino Tycoon 
series the protagonist Hsin is also originally from a well off family. He also becomes an 
orphan. His father also dies. His family fortune is gone. Due to circumstances he is also 
―demoted‖ to engage in coolie jobs and mixes with thugs. After being humiliated by his 






tycoon in Macau. In My Name is Nobody, No-Name is also an orphan who emerges as a 
champion. Wong Jing‘s protagonists are able to control even something as random as 
gambling by skills, technique and supernatural power. Wong Jing‘s entertainment films 
tell where we want to escape to: to be champion in the world, to be recognized despite 
our marginal status.  
Interestingly, while giving the audience the illusion of autonomy and control over 
one‘s fate, Wong Jing also underhandedly tells their worst nightmare: the family ruined. 
In the God of Gambler series (God of Gamblers, God of Gamblers Returns and God of 
Gamblers 3: the Early Stage), the protagonist Ko Chun (Chow Yun Fat and Leon Lai)‘s 
father, child, girlfriend, fiancé, and wife are invariably killed at home. In the Casino 
Tycoon series, the protagonist Hsin‘s son killed another son and the suspicion of an incest 
relationship is dispelled only after confirming the death of the real daughter. The 
antagonist‘s parents and wife attempt to kill him for money when he thinks home is the 
safest place to hide from the bounty hunters. In the Knight of Gamblers series (God of 
Gamblers II, The Conman, The Conmen in Vegas) the protagonist‘s girlfriend and wife 
leave him one after another. In Saint of Gamblers (God of Gamblers III: Back to 
Shanghai) Sing‘s dream girl literally has the word ―dream‖ in her name and she is 
unreachable to him. There is either the killing of the protagonist‘s loved one, or a lack of 
success in the romance plot. In martial arts genre films usually the chivalric protagonist‘s 
role is to protect the family. In Wong Jing‘s gambler films the protagonist is a champion 
in his profession, but fails as a protector of his family. It is his profession that brings 
tragedy to his love ones. Home is where the killings of his family happen. The motif of 
homelessness has become stronger and been put in the foreground in Wong Jing‘s 
gambler films since 1998. In The Conman, King is homeless after getting out of prison. 






sister‘s place. In The Conmen in Vegas, there is only a hotel room and a trailer, but no 
home. And this is not a road movie in which the characters roam free. In The Tricky 
Master, the home is on fire and the protagonists have to run and hide. There is never a 
place where the character feel‘s as safe as home. There is also an absence of a protective 
father figure for other characters. In Back to Shanghai Sing‘s grandfather is a sissy. There 
is no father figure in the story. The gangster head Ding Lik is not a protective male 
figure. He is ready to give away his fiancé to Sing when he learns about Sing‘s interest. 
Later his fiancé is killed, and there is no scene showing his sadness. In the Casino Tycoon 
series, Mei is the protagonist‘s love interest. When Mei‘s father is away from home the 
stepsister assists a man in raping Mei. The scene spirals into having the sisters attempting 
to kill each other. In the sequel of God of Gamblers, the father Hoi On (Ko Sau Leung) of 
the Taiwanese family is killed, leaving behind the sister and her young brother to fend for 
themselves. This sense of homelessness and the splitting up of the family coincides with 
the ethos of the era. In the pre-1997 period there was a massive out-migration of the 
middle class, causing the ―astronauts‖ (taikongren) phenomenon
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, the splitting up of 
husbands and wives of migrating families. For the lower class, the unreasonably high 
price of land forbade any hope of owning a home and created the ―shell-less snail‖ 
phenomenon, the family without a home. After the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1998 
extensive foreclosure left many people homeless. Wong Jing‘s orphan island fantasia is a 
wild dream of being a world champion, boasting of our economic miracle in the world 
while one does not even have a home base. 
Wong Jing has his fantastic style to match his fantasia. In God of Gamblers, in a 
myth of the unbeatable hero and an illusion of autonomy and power, Wong Jing lavishes 
his work with dramatic music, glamorous outfits and hairstyles, preposterous plot lines, 






contest scene. The protagonist Ko Chun dresses in a tuxedo with a glam up hairstyle. His 
entrance is accompanied with dramatic music and played in slow motion. Wong Jing‘s 
films always feel light-hearted even when there are horrible things happening to the 
characters. The tragic dimensions are usually treated lightly and overshadowed by the 
comic segments. For example, in God of Gamblers Returns, after the sad moment of the 
death of the protagonist‘s admirer Siu Yiu Yiu (Wu Chien-lien), there is an immediate 
cut to the casino scene with Siu‘s brother Siu Fong Fong (Tony Leung Ka Fai) playing 
the comic relief. In the God of Gamblers series the death of the protagonist‘s loved one is 
never dealt with at length. The leaving of the girlfriends in God of Gamblers II and The 
Conmen in Vegas is only briefly mentioned in dialogues with no scene shown.  
In these fantastic stories, the protagonist and antagonist are cardboard characters 
with no moral ambiguity. Writer Lin Dake notices that Wong Jing‘s popular movies 
reflected the traditional moral value wulun - the five basic human relationships. For 
example, the protagonist is extremely virtuous. He will not betray his woman, disrespect 
his parent, betray his friend, forgetting another‘s favor, etc. Lin Dake writes, ―Wong Jing 
is completely understanding of what the audience wants. Besides looking for 
entertainment, they want to forget their lower class status and put themselves on a moral 
high ground to judge others.‖ ("Wong Jing") Stars in one of Wong Jing‘s films usually 
have an emotional flatness in their acting style, as noticed by film critic Li Cheuk-to. Li 
writes, ―Andy Lau gets a lot of praises for his multi-facet image and low key performance 
in Running Out of Time (Johnnie To, 1999).
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 But when he‘s in the gangster world of 
Wong Jing‘s Century of the Dragon (1999) he slips back into his old ways. He only acts 
with his usual formulaic facial expression. However, that might be Wong Jing‘s request. 
Wong Jing only needs the actor‘s image, not his acting skill‖ (C.-t. Li "Wong Jing" 197-






effect requires the actor‘s deadpan acting skill and the director‘s direction. Li Cheuk-to 
praises Andy Lau‘s performance in another Wong Jing‘s movie The Conman (1998). Li 
writes, ―Andy Lau‘s acting has never been that pleasing in The Conman. The key is he 
tones down his heroic outlook and gives up the myth of invincibility‖ ("Post-1997" 167-
68). What Li Cheuk-to didn‘t notice is that this can also be the director‘s request because 
Wong Jing has turned to a realist style for an anti-hero story for this film. In the God of 
Gamblers series, Ko Chun‘s hairstyle change indicates his change from the silly guy with 
a brain injury to the smart gambling champion. But the character doesn‘t change on the 
inside. He is the same mythical heroic character. In The Conman series, King does not 
change his salt-and-pepper hair even after he gets out of prison and travels to a colorful 
place like Las Vegas. Yet the character has changed on the inside. Unlike Ko Chun, after 
the brain injury, King‘s life has literally turned colorless and he becomes realistic and 
steadfast. Andy Lau‘s acting style corresponds with that.   
Wong Jing did not simply mold a star‘s performance to fit his request for ―Wong 
Jing‖ cartoonist acting style. He has criteria for selecting his stars. The stars playing his 
protagonists are Chow Yun Fat, Andy Lau, Stephen Chow, Leon Lai and Nick Cheung. 
They all came from TV factory training and are family-audience oriented stars. They 
have three things in common: they are extremely hardworking; top dogs in their fields; 
and have approachable personas. Chow Yun Fat was known for being hardworking since 
his TV days. With the drama serials shown five days a week, he was constantly on screen 
for many years. In the film industry, he is also prolific. In 1987, he played in 11 films. In 
1988, he was in 8 films and his total box office of that year is 137 million, ranked fifth in 
term of total gross, but first in terms of box office per film. He is known for his 
approachable personality. Today in Hong Kong even with his Hollywood fame he is 






In the 1990s, there was an expression of ―Two Chows and one Cheng‖ for the Chinese 
New Year films. ―Chows‖ refer to Chow Yun Fat and Stephen Chow. (―Cheng‖ refers to 
―Cheng Long‖, Jackie Chan‘s stage name.) Stephen Chow originated his unique ―mo-lei-
tou‖ comedy (mo-lei-tou roughly means non-sense). In 2001 Shaolin Soccer (Stephen 
Chow as star, writer, director and producer) was the top box office hit (60 million HKD) 
of that year. Later his Kung Fu Hustle (2004) was a co-production with Hollywood 
financing and distribution. Andy Lau is one of the most commercially successful film 
actors in Hong Kong. In 1988, he made 9 films in a year and his total box office was 145 
million, ranked third among his fellow overbooked stars (Q. Li). From 1982 to 2007 he 
has made 100 films while maintaining a successful singing career. He and Leon Lai are 
two of ―the four heavenly kings of Cantopop‖ of the 1990s. Nick Cheung, a relative 
newcomer, won six best actor awards for his performance in Beast Stalker (Dante Lam, 
2008). Wong Jing admired his father deeply. His father Wong Tin Lam was one of the 
three major directors of the Cathay studio (aka MP & GI) and a prominent producer at 
TVB. In the 1950s Wong Tin Lam made 8 to 20 movies a year. It is estimated that he was 
involved in at least 300 to 400 movies throughout his career. And yet he also produced 
some award-winning and memorable classics like All in the Family (1959), The Wild, 
Wild Rose (1960) and The Greatest Civil War on Earth series (1961-1964). Despite his 
status and fame, he was known for being hardworking and approachable. Wong Jing, like 
an auteur director having his star playing his alter-ego, chooses stars with personas that 
fit his values and world view. Wong Jing says, ―I believe in the significance of a family 
relationship. You can lose everything and be trapped in a cul-de-sac. What is left is your 
family. I‘m very close to my papa and everyone in the family, my sisters, daughters and 
my wife. You can lose all your bet. But if you lose your family relationship, it is a total 






look at life‖ (Shin Wong Jing 98-99). The Conman is Wong Jing‘s illustration of a loser. 
Conman King lets go of his relationship with his wife and child. His life is not 
glamorous, colorful and heroic like that of Ko Chun.    
Hong Kong action cinema is known for its male bonding. John Woo, for instance, 
depicts male bonding at an unlikely place, between the cop and the killer (also played by 
Chow Yun Fat) in The Killer (1989). In Wong Jing‘s gambler films, the core relationship 
is also between two men. But his bonding is between an older man and a younger one: 
mentor-protégé or uncle-nephew. For example, in God of Gamblers the core relationship 
is between Ko Chun and Little Knife. The story starts with Ko Chun touring around the 
world with his fiancé, but she is killed in the middle of the film. In the final scene the 
bonding of the two men is expressed by their sharing of a male-specific vulgar in-joke. 
They say to each other, ―I‘ll cut off your penis.‖ In the Saint of Gamblers series, the 
uncle-nephew pair is played by Ng Mang-tat and Stephen Chow. Wong Jing probably 
appropriates this pair from Corey Yuen and Jeff Lau‘s successful hit All for the Winner 
(1990). In God of Gamblers II, Uncle Three suggests to his nephew Sing that they share a 
prostitute with the money they gain from gambling, and the two instantly share the same 
bad karma: both mysteriously drop on the street from the window of their home. In Back 
to Shanghai the plot is moved by Sing rescuing his uncle/grandpa (both played by Ng 
Mang-tat.) As Wu Yufu points out in gambler films, the plot is often advanced by the 
protagonist being betrayed by the bad protégé (or younger cousin or younger sworn 
brother) and then the loyal younger one comes to the older one‘s rescue. For example, in 
God of Gamblers, Ko Chun is betrayed by his younger cousin, and his loyal protégé 
Little Knife comes to warn him. In the prequel and sequel, Dragon (played by Jordan 
Chan and Charles Heung) comes to his rescue. Deeply embedded in these characters is 






younger one having respect for, and loyalty to, the mentor and senior. Wong Jing‘s 
gambler films reveal his anxiety of the fading of this traditional value. One interesting 
rule of this genre is that the protagonist‘s protégés cannot use their skill in gambling for 
selfish monetary reward. The senior cares for the junior and passes down his skill to him. 
But he also has to guard against his protégé abusing his power. Ko Chun forbids Little 
Knife to use the money he gains from gambling. Sing only learnt foot massage from his 
mentor when he visited him in Las Vegas. Surprisingly in 1997, in the prequel the 
betrayal comes from the senior one of the mentor-protégé pair. Ko Chun‘s mentor adopts 
him and trains him to be a master in gambling. But in a major contest when Ko Chun 
refuses to join his mentor‘s scam, the mentor shoots him in the head. The mentor turns 
out to be the one who killed Ko Chun‘s father. To add salt to the wound, his former 
fiancé together with his sworn brother betray him. The foster family is the one most 
untrustworthy. Ko Chun in fact grew up in a fake family connected more by interest of 
profit than by love and care. Wong Jing goes back to the theme of his 1981 film: it is a 
world of deception.   
Interestingly, in his practice in the business Wong Jing hangs onto the romantic 
idea of the traditional yi (the code of brotherhood or a moral code in general).  He stands 
firm to the traditional values and old practices in the new market of the 1990s. He says, 
―What I‘m practicing now is the apprentice system. It doesn‘t work? So long as I practice 
it in a Chinese society, it will work. It‘s outdated? Then I‘ll find people who respect and 
fit in this system to work with me. I respect this system and I believe they do too. Even in 
the future if they are lured away with higher paycheck, I‘ll be happy for them. I‘m the 
one who trains them. And I deeply believe that if one day I need them, they definitely 
will come back to help me. My mentor is Lau Tin Chi. He taught me scriptwriting. If he 






In the late 1990s Wong Jing‘s gambler films get darker and more realistic. The 
realist style of The Conman makes it the most ―un-Wong Jing‖ style gambler film 
directed by Wong Jing. When Hong Kong was hit hard by the regional financial crisis, in 
The Conman, Wong Jing deconstructs the myth he created: the glamorous life of an 
invincible gambler. Unlike Wong Jing‘s other righteous heroes, the personality of King is 
flawed. The opening sequence is him cheating on his wife with a prostitute. After doing 
his time, King changes and becomes steadfast. There is even a voice over of King stating 
his plans for the future. The voice over is a self-introspection narrative device rarely seen 
in Wong Jing‘s fantasia films. His heroic characters never do self-introspection or plan 
for the future. They just seize opportunities. The Conman is full of self-reflexive 
moments. King routinely corrects his protégé Skinny Dragon (Nick Cheung)‘s illusion of 
the glamorous life of a gambler. He warns Skinny Dragon, ―This is not like in a movie.‖ 
He still engages in gambling, but the work required is heavy. Skinny Dragon complains 
that it is like preparing for a public exam. King‘s wife was not killed but chose to leave 
him and marry his best friend. King didn‘t seek revenge on his best friend for stealing his 
wife whom he had neglected. His brother is killed and his son is crippled. Wong Jing‘s 
depiction and King‘s description of the teamwork and tedious preparation of a conman‘s 
job is realistic. It is closer to social scientist‘s research study of the gambling industry in 
Hong Kong than the lone champion Wong Jing previously constructed. Chu Yiu Kong in 
his study of the triad business describes, ―As casino gambling is prohibited in Hong 
Kong, underground casinos are normally small in size because they need to ‗float‘ from 
place to place to avoid police detection. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
operational costs of a casino are low…the operation of an underground casino requires a 







Interestingly, Chu‘s description of the casino operation looks similar to the 
operation of the Hong Kong film industry. In the 1970s the Hong Kong government 
worked on a new direction of cultural policy and established or sponsored five local 
professional performing art institutions
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 but the film industry was left to operate like an 
illegitimate business under censorship control and triad harassment. In the late 1990s 
triad involvement in the film industry subsided as the business deteriorated. Li Cheuk-to 
observes, The Conman is representative of the post-1997 Hong Kong movies. They are 
characterized with loss, sadness and regret, in contrast to the optimism of pre-1997 
entertainment movies. But Wong Jing, as always audience- and market-oriented, does not 
attribute his style change to personal factors. Instead he links it to changes in Hong Kong 
society. He says, ―We have to pay attention to trends when making comedy. The pre-
1997 ‗non-sense‘ comedy and farce is a result of an abnormal development. But now 
Hong Kong economy is bad. A lot of people are jobless and face foreclosure. That will 
make comedy turn to realist style. Any comedy has to reflect the dark side of society and 
people to make the jokes work. Comedy and social change are inseparable‖ (Ernie  Au 
38). While the audience is still nostalgic of a bygone era and indulges in the myths he has 
created, Wong Jing is clear-headed enough to change direction.  
In the next two gambler films (The Conmen in Vegas, The Tricky Master, 1999) 
Wong Jing reconstructs the myth and switches back to the early years‘ ―Wong Jing‖ 
style: sex jokes, bathroom jokes, cartoon characters and the glamorous casino setting. 
The inclusion or exclusion of vulgarity is in his market calculations. In a 2001 interview 
he says, ―The critics criticize the bathroom joke in my films. In fact, I only put bathroom 
jokes in my films in the first five years of my directing career. In the last 15 years, there 
is almost no this kind of jokes in my films. I intentionally took out this element‖ (Ernie  






Wong Jing didn‘t deny it or justify it. As always, it‘s about market calculations. Wong 
Jing says, ―I think whether I should retain those jokes depends on my target audience. If I 
expect a box office above 15 million, then I better not use those jokes. But the box office 
goal of I Love Lolanto is 10 million. There is no need to avoid sex and bathroom jokes. 
Just treat them in a neater way‖ (Luo 28). With the markets of Hong Kong cinema having 
shrunk drastically after 1997, The Conmen in Vegas and The Tricky Master (1999) are 
mostly probably a big dream for a shrunken market. 
In My Name is Nobody (2000) there is another sharp turn. Wong Jing is the writer, 
producer and star. The bonded males are an uncle and his nephew played by Nick 
Cheung and Wong Jing, himself. The Uncle Lo character‘s full name is Luo Sihai (Lo Sei 
Hoi in Cantonese). ―Sihai‖ literally means four seas and ―Sihai weijia‖ means to make 
one‘s home wherever one is. Luo Shihai is a character Wong Jing created in his television 
days. He brought the gambling genre, the popular character Luo Sihai, and the star 
playing it (Patrick Tse) with him when he migrated to the film industry. In the ending of 
My Name is Nobody, the girlfriend (Shu Qi) learns that the protagonist No-name (Nick 
Cheung) let her raped by his opponent in front of him while he pretended to be blind. 
Like King‘s wife in The Conman, she makes the decision to leave him, and she 
sarcastically congratulates him for accomplishing his mission of revenge. This is a most 
uncharacteristically mixed sad ending of Wong Jing‘s story. But this movie of the 
winning loser is directed under Aman Chang and the protagonist is not betrayed by one 
protégé, but two. One causes him to become blind, and rapes his girlfriend. The other one 
pretends to remain loyal and stand by his side during his time of misfortune, only to plot 
against him in the final contest. Writer, producer and actor Wong Jing has Uncle Lo 
killed in the ending of the story and this sounded the death knell of Hong Kong gambler 






economy. At the peak of the popularity of the genre, Wong Jing‘s protagonist is able to 
exert control over something as random as gambling. He survives with the help of his 
loyal protégé and emerges as a champion with intelligence and skill.  
WONG JING IS NOT A GAMBLER  
Wong Jing likes betting on horse racing, but he says he is more interested in doing 
the homework, studying the data and analyzing the result. He says, ―I am not a gambler. 
It‘s just a game I play. It is like doing homework to prepare for an exam…my bottom line 
is it shouldn‘t affect my life. I don‘t like playing mahjong. If I started this hobby, friends 
would expect me to join them every time‖ (L. Pan 26-27). He keeps the same distance in 
his work with others. He describes his way of working since the Shaw studio as a one 
man show. He says he wrote the script and prepared everything before he handed the 
project to the line producer. He continues to work like this in the 1990s. He says, ―I like 
working with different people and trying out new things. I didn‘t build up my power by 
forming my own clan. I don‘t like doing it that way. All these years, my co-operation 
with my friends is a loose association. I worked with Manfred Wong and recently with 
Gordon Chan. But we don‘t hang out together all the time. We will get together once in a 
while. But they do their own things and I do mine‖ (Cindy S.C. Chan "Wong Jing"). 
Wong Jing looks at the people at the bottom of society and gives them a dream. In a 
colonial city like Hong Kong where people can only vote with their feet or march on the 
street, it‘s futile to look to the future for hope. Wong Jing gives them hope, albeit false 
hope, in his movie magic to fuel their days. He survived the early years with his jungle 
training in the television and film industries. He brought with him his proven genre and 
characters and devised his own formulas and mechanisms to work efficiently. In the 
1990s he thrived in the market by projecting a desirable Hong Kong identity with his 






base profession from a marginal place who defies his destiny with intelligence and 
integrity, albeit without a home base. Wong Jing establishes his reputation as a safe bet 
for his financial supporters and constructs his brand ―Wong Jing‖ as a guarantee of 
entertainment to his audience. His dreams are fantastic, but as a maker of these dreams he 
remains clear-headed in his game. From day one in his film career, he positions himself 
as an entertainer for the masses and never wavers, despite the challenges from the Hong 
Kong New Wave and later another wave of the art film generation. 
Between the extreme ends of the spectrum are directors who try to balance 
between art and commerce. Tsui Hark is one of the most successful of these middle-of-
the-way filmmakers. He is one of the leaders of the Hong Kong New Wave generation. In 
1980 his film ―Dangerous Encounter – 1st Kind‖, was banned by the colonial 
government for political reasons. But the next year he went to the other extreme. He 
joined the Cinema City and directed their renowned 9-reels formulaic mass entertainment 
film All the Wrong Clues (for the Right Solution). His box office performance also shows 
this zigzag and yo-yo pattern. How did he work efficiently and thrive in the 1990s? How 






Table 6.1 Wong Jing Gambler Film Selected Filmography 
* As usual of Hong Kong production, the Chinese and English titles do not correspond 
and create confusion. For example in the English title God of Gamblers II in fact is a 
spinoff of the first one. God of Gamblers Returns is the real sequel as reflected in the 
Chinese title. 
 













1981 Mahjong Heroes 
Writer 
Patrick Tse Dec 22 
91 min 
6,493,694 










1987 Born to Gamble "Skinny Tsing" 
director, writer 
Nat Chan April 1 
100 min 
5,304,148 
1989 Casino Raiders co-direct with 
Jimmy Heung, 
writer 





1989 God of Gamblers “Brothel client” 
 director, writer 














1991 God of Gamblers III: 
Back to Shanghai 
Director, writer Stephen Chow, 











1992 Casino Tycoon II Director, writer, 
producer 
Andy Lau Aug 20 
112 min 
35,236,551 
1994 God of Gamblers 
Returns 
Director, writer Chow Yun Fat Dec 15 
124 min 
52,529,768 
1995 The Saint of Gamblers Director, writer, 
producer 
Eric Kot June 28 
98 min 
13,111,400 




Leon Lai Dec 14 
92 min 
16,986,954 
























Table 6.1 continue 




































Table 6.2 Selected bibliography of Hong Kong Gambler Film in 1989-2003 
God of Gamblers series: 









1994 God of Gambler 
Returns 
Wong Jing Chow Yun Fat Dec 15 
124 min 
52,529,768 
1997 God of Gamblers 3: 
The Early Stage 




Saint of Gamblers series: 












1995 The Saint of Gamblers Wong Jing Eric Kot June 28 
98 min 
13,111,400 







Knight of Gambler series:  









1991 God of Gamblers III: 
Back to Shanghai 
Wong Jing Stephen Chow Aug 22 
120 min 
31,163,730 











Table 6.2 cont. 
Knigth of Gabmler series  

















2002 The Conman 2002 Aman Chang Nick Cheung Nov 7 
98 min 
1,466,320 




Casino Raider/Tycoon series  












1991 Casino Raiders II Johnny To Andy Lau Jun 13 
91 min 
16,889,659 














1991 The Top Bet (aka 
Queen of Gamblers) 




















Chapter 7 Tsui Hark The Disciplined Rebel 
Tsui Hark is the second-highest top box office director in the domestic market in 
the 1990s.
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 From 1990 to 1996 he directed 16 films and his total gross was 268 million 
HKD (C. W. Chan "Rank"; Cindy S.C. Chan "Colonial Modernity"). He is one of the 
leading members of the Hong Kong New Wave generation, known for their personal and 
socially-relevant films. He survived the extremely commercial system in the 1980s that 
had crushed the careers of many of his fellow New Wave filmmakers. He continued to be 
prolific in the 1990s, sojourned in Hollywood in the late 1990s, and is still productive 
now. In 1979 he made his directorial début The Butterfly Murders, a peculiar futuristic 
detective-story martial arts film, with independent production company Seasonal Film. In 
1980 his nihilistic anti-social film Dangerous Encounter – 1st Kind was banned by the 
colonial government censor. The next year he swung to the other extreme and made All 
the Wrong Clues (for the Right Solution) (1981) for Cinema City, a rising film company 
of the 1980s tripartite, known for their formulaic 9-reelers‘ mass entertainment. In 1983 
when the media buzz about the New Wave filmmakers subsided, he directed Zu: 
Warriors from the Magic Mountain, a big budget Chinese New Year film for Golden 
Harvest, the rival of the Shaw studio in the 1970s and one of the tripartite of the 1980s. In 
1984, he set up a production house Film Workshop with his wife Nansun Shi.
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 As a 
producer, he produced critically and commercially successful films such as John Woo‘s A 
Better Tomorrow (1986) and The Killer (1989) and Ching Siu-tung‘s A Chinese Ghost 
Story (1987). Tsui Hark‘s mom-and-pop shop-like production house, and artisanal mode 
of production was typical of Hong Kong filmmaking in the 1990s. But Film Workshop 
has operated for 25 years, an impressive feat in view of the musical chair pattern of Hong 






In the 1990s, Once Upon A Time in China (1991), a film Tsui Hark was heavily 
involved in as producer, director and scriptwriter, was critically and commercially 
successful and spawned off an entire decade of sequels and copycats. Tsui Hark himself 
produced four sequels and three spinoffs in the space of seven years amidst the two dozen 
films he produced in the same time period with critical or commercial success, such as 
Swordsman II (1992), Dragon Inn (1992), The Lovers (1994), The Chinese Feast (1995), 
The Blade (1995) etc. (see table 7.1) What is so intriguing about Tsui Hark is not only his 
zigzag career moves and yo-yo pattern box office performance, but also his ―childish‖ 
and ―artistic‖ personality. In an interview by veteran entertainment news writer Lam Ping 
in 1989, Tsui Hark admitted he failed as a producer since he was bad at handling 
interpersonal relationships and financial management. He said, ―When I worked as a 
producer I ran over budget. The directors working under me were unhappy. The films 
didn‘t make much money. I feel like imbecile‖ (P. L. M. N. Lam 159). It is known that 
Tsui Hark as a producer had miscommunications and a falling out with directors like 
King Hu, John Woo, Yim Ho, Sammo Hung, Alex Cheung, etc. His peer Ann Hui didn‘t 
want to work with him because he was too involved in the creative process.
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 Tsui Hark 
explained, ―I am also a director. I don‘t like the others ‗interfere‘ in my project. Of course 
I understand they don‘t like me to ‗interfere‘ in their projects either. But I have no choice. 
They used up the money and the boss stopped the funding. I have to fix the problem‖ (P. 
L. M. N. Lam 159). In my interview with him in 2000, when I asked him if he was 
bothered by his own difficult personality, and he was not even apologetic about that. He 
didn‘t deny or confirm the falling out, but assertively said: ―People should judge it from 
the end products, the films‖ (Cindy S.C. Chan "Tsui Hark"). Like the chivalric knight in a 
martial arts novel, Tsui Hark does not seem to have a concept of money. He admitted that 






to him that he had to bring cash with him (P. L. M. N. Lam). He said he handed all of his 
money to his wife because he did not like managing finances. Lam Ping described that he 
didn‘t have cash, and that he only went to restaurants designated by his wife. Tsui Hark‘s 
avoidance of handling money extended to his work place. He admitted that at Cinema 
City the bosses always asked him to work on editing and re-shooting of others‘ films 
without paying him. His response was to avoid their phonecalls instead of asking them 
for payment. When asked if that‘s because he‘s a romantic and didn‘t care much about 
money, Tsui Hark responded, ―No, I care about money. It‘s just that I don‘t know how to 
talk about money with them‖ (P. L. M. N. Lam 160). He maintained this naive attitude 
about money and administration even after setting up his own production company and 
working as a producer. In Lam Ping‘s 1989 interview, when asked who helped him with 
executive work, he sounded like an indulgent child: ―The executive general manager is 
Terrance Chang. This is excellent. Now I can act like a kid. I don‘t need to manage 
anything. I can completely depend on him‖ (P. L. M. N. Lam 172). But Terrance Chang 
soon went to Hollywood with John Woo. Lam Ping described Tsui Hark as a 
perfectionist artist who was not careful enough about money. She said to Tsui Hark, 
―Chor Yuen (a prominent director) says you will spend over 1 million dollars just to get a 
tiny little bit better, say 5 points or 10 points‖ (P. L. M. N. Lam 173). Tsui Hark‘s 
obliviousness to money issues is written into the script of the Once Upon A Time in 
China series, in which the protégés of the protagonist, like Tsui Hark‘s wife in real life, 
have to follow their master around to pay for merchandise and services he forgets to pay 
for. Once Upon A Time in China is a remake of a popular long-running Cantonese kung 
fu film Wong Fei Hung (Wu Pang, 1949 – 1960s). Tsui Hark reset the background to the 
late Qing period when the country was under Western imperialist invasion and on the 






history. With the story revolving around the Southern regional folk hero Wong Fei Hung 
and his entourage, Once Upon A Time in China is more about Hong Kong at the present 
than China in the past. Wong Fei Hung‘s home town Fu Shan (in Canton), an affluent 
East-meets-West port city in Southern China, is a stand-in for Hong Kong.  
Before Hong Kong‘s return to China, some have attributed Hong Kong‘s 
fairytale-like rise to a world-class city to it being more open to Western influence, 
especially when compared to China, which had closed its door for a few decades. In the 
1990s, Western media often depicted Hong Kong as a symbol of the triumph of 
capitalism about to be devoured by Red China. In China, late leader Deng Xiaoping 
spoke upon various occasions of the plan to replicate Hong Kong in Special Economic 
Zones in China, implicitly endorsing Hong Kong as a proven case of modernity with a 
Chinese flavor, in China‘s practice of ―socialism with Chinese characteristics‖. With the 
assumption of a unified standard of modernization, Hong Kong seemed to gain 
advantages and endorsements from both sides. But Rey Chow points out the double 
impossibility of Hong Kong‘s coloniality, the predicament of self-writing and the 
conflation of the postcolonial with the postmodern (see chapter 2). She writes, ―The 
enormous seductiveness of the post-modern hybridite‘s discourse lies, of course, in its 
invitation to join the power of global capitalism by flattening out past injustices…the 
postmodern hybridite‘s emphasis falls on post in the strict sense of ‗after‘ and ‗over 
with,‘ and since all posts are considered the same, postcolonial is easily construed as 
synonymous with postmodern. In a space like Hong Kong, the postmodern hybridite 
would criticize not British colonialism (read: ‗international openness‘) but Chinese 
nationalism (read: ‗native conservatism‘), thus obliterating or blurring the complex 
history of the rise of modern Chinese nationalism as an overdetermined response to 






Tsui Hark‘s Once Upon A Time in China series seems to fit into Rey Chow‘s 
description of a postmodern hybridite: flattening out past injustice and criticizing only 
native conservatism. The series depicts Fu Shan as an East-meets-West port city where 
Chinese tradition integrates with Western modernity perfectly. Even though the story is 
set with an East-West conflict as background, the Westerners are mostly cardboard 
characters and only take up brief screen time. The ultimate antagonists who take up more 
narrative space are actually Chinese, such as a xenophobic religious sect, the corrupted 
Qing court officials, and a stubborn desperate martial artist from the North etc. In the 
scene of the burning down of Po Chi Lam (the home and medicine shop of Wong Fei 
Hung and his entourage) the written character ―unequal treaty‖ on a paper fan is partially 
burnt and changed to ―equal treaty‖, it seems to imply the erasing of past inequality. 
While Wong Fei Hung is befuddled by the changes brought by Western challenges, his 
love interest is a Westernized Chinese woman returning from an overseas education 
bringing advanced knowledge and technology to this port city. In the ending scene, Wong 
Fei Hung changes to a Western suit and takes pictures with a camera. Throughout the 
series there are more depictions of Chinese people‘s ignorance, complacency and 
conservativeness than examples of the atrocities of Western imperialism. But the series is 
popular in both China and the West. In this film series of an imagined history of China, is 
the past reconstructed and interpreted anew for the benefit of a global culture and in the 
interest of a market economy? What is the Hong Kong story Tsui Hark tells with the 
Once Upon a Time in China series? With his weakness in interpersonal relationships and 
financial management in a tightly knit filmmaking community dependent on the 
traditional mode of financing, how did Tsui Hark stand out in the competitive 
environment of the 1990s? How did he even survive the harsh conditions that squashed 






positions between personal films and commercial entertainment, what is Tsui Hark‘s 
consistent appeal and strength to stay in the market?  
Tsui Hark is the most prolific and commercially successful director among his 
New Wave peers. He is a disciplined rebel like the feisty Monkey King in the Chinese 
classic Journey to the West who can transform his appearance into 72 forms but cannot 
escape his mentor‘s control and the confines of the Buddha‘s Palm.
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However much he 
tries to push the limit, he never repudiates the commercial system or operates outside of 
government censorship. Despite his frantic filmmaking style, he sees the significance of 
discipline in the Hong Kong film industry. He said, ―They (his scriptwriters-protégés) 
told me they are distracted by the problems in their lives. I told them there are always 
problems in people‘s lives. To grow up they must learn how to discipline themselves. 
They said they couldn‘t. Creative work requires discipline. Without discipline, how can 
you work with others…. If you can convince me, I will follow your way. If not, we have 
to follow someone else. We can‘t work together for a creative work but insist on each 
doing things in his own way‖ (D. Wei 62). Tsui Hark knew when and which way he 
should follow. As Sam Ho describes in his anthology, Tsui Hark, changing the Hong 
Kong film industry from the inside and having been mostly free to do what he wanted, is 
savvy as an industry man who has outlasted both Golden Harvest and Cinema City. He 
reasons that the key for Tsui Hark to do so, was by allying with industry powers and yet 
maintaining an independent production house. He wrote, ―Tsui Hark has been forging ties 
with big companies but seldom becoming a part of them. In addition to Cinema City and 
Golden Harvest, he has also hooked up with Golden Princess, Win‘s Entertainment, 
China Star, Cathay Organization, Columbia Asia and One Hundred Years of Film. At one 
point or another, he would have arguments with some of these companies, but he never 






but never pouring foundations, Tsui remained an independent, keeping himself and his 
company viable while always striking deals with industry powers‖ (Ho "Introduction 
Swordsman" xi). Throughout his career, Tsui Hark‘s productions are mostly supported by 
big companies and the high grossing Once Upon A Time in China series was supported 
by Golden Harvest (except the last one in 1997) (see table 7.1) 
Like Wong Jing, he fitted well in the Hong Kong film industry‘s financier-
exhibition sector-led production approach despite his eccentric outlook and clashes with 
people. But unlike Wong Jing, the discourse sector was important to his game. The local 
film critics who coined the term Hong Kong New Wave, played a role in consolidating 
his image as an unconventional director and boosting his career. His role as an innovator 
and trend-setter of the industry constantly provided rich material for film critics and the 
media. Audiences always expected something edgy in his next film. In those days when 
there was still a clear distinction between the ―red trousers‖ (those trained from the 
traditional apprenticeship system) and film-school trained directors, Tsui Hark was 
careful in striking the balance. He said he was surprised that the partners of Cinema City 
(Raymond Wong, Karl Maka and Dean Shek) would accept a film-school trained director 
like him. Tsui Hark, on the one hand, emphasized how hard he worked just like 
filmmakers coming from the traditional apprenticeship system, but on the other hand 
flaunted his film school education background like his Western film school trained New 
Wave peers as bringing passion to his art. For example, in Lam Ping‘s interview, when 
asked about his long hours of working, he said, ―I had worked for 24 hours without sleep. 
I had also worked for a few days without sleep...There was also one time I fell asleep, the 
cameraman fell asleep, camera assistant fell asleep, assistant director fell asleep, all fell 
asleep…It was the actor who called ‗cut‘ to stop the camera rolling‖ (P. L. M. N. Lam 






his image as a workaholic (H. Huang "Tsui Hark Workaholic"). When discussing the 
success of creating the Mark character (played by Chow Yun Fat) in A Better Tomorrow 
(John Woo 1986), he said, ―I think in making a movie you must keep the feeling of 
excitement, I have been capturing the kind of excitement I had when studying film in the 
U.S. …You cannot be insensitive. You must feel excited‖ (P. L. M. N. Lam 169). Tsui 
Hark was praised by critics as one of the new generation of filmmakers with a personal 
style and socio-political perspective, but he always emphasized his attention to audience 
and market. His message-loaded political allusion films stood out in the 1980s‘ mass 
entertainment. By the 1990s, his brand ―Tsui Hark‖ was so established that his 
filmmaking style, the martial arts genre, the stars‘ performance and narrative style all 
bore his trademark. Even though the 1990s was characterized by sequels and copycats, 
and other directors also began to include political references in their works, it was Tsui 
Hark‘s unique voice and vision that made ―a Tsui Hark Film‖ and the Once Upon a Time 
in China series stood out in the market. Tsui Hark is best at remake, and his productions 
in the 1990s are mostly adaptation, remake and sequels, series and spinoffs (see table 
7.1). This was not only an efficient way to help him capitalize on a hit, and proven 
popular novels and films, but also matched his obsession with exploring new perspectives 
on old events. As a member of the local-oriented identity-searching Hong Kong New 
Wave generation, Tsui Hark has been dealing with issues of cultural identity and 
nationalism. The Once Upon a Time in China series epitomizes his effort to rewrite the 
local history from the margins‘ perspectives, to redefine the future by rewriting the past. 
The martial arts genre is the best vehicle for him to project an idealized alternative realm 
and construct an idealized ―new woman‖ in the historical period when the country was 
struggling for self-strengthening and modernization. In the 1990s when the Western 






Kong to its political past, Tsui Hark‘s anachronistic Chinese history merges the economic 
affluence of the present with the political instability of the past and projected an idealized 
historical juncture where a new future for Hong Kong could be re-envisioned. Tsui 
Hark‘s remaking of the old Cantonese series Wong Fei Hung was not simply for a global 
culture or a market economy. Tsui Hark, on the one hand, like in the old Cantonese 
series, foregrounds the Southern Chinese culture to contrast with the Northern Chinese 
culture, which often is regarded as the most orthodox Chinese culture. On the other hand 
he inserts Western characters and has his protagonists venture out from the confines of 
Canton province. Instead of depicting the port city as a Westernized colonial backwater, 
the series revolves around the protagonist‘s reflection on learning from the West to 
rejuvenate the country. By exercising this repetition and re-creation, Tsui Hark looks 
backward in history and re-imagines the protagonist‘s hometown as a hybrid wonderland, 
a place mixing old and new, modern and traditional, East and West. The series indicates a 
historical endeavor, an effort of the margin to redefine the present by retelling old tales. 
When the local invents their own imaginative histories of the city and retells an old tale, 
the retelling itself is a polemical act. 
“TSUI HARK” AS A REGENERATOR 
The early years of his career has enabled Tsui Hark to thrive in the 1990s. Tsui 
Hark was born in 1951 in Vietnam with the name of Tsui Man-kwong. He moved to 
Hong Kong in 1966. In 1969 he studied, traveled and worked in the U.S. In 1975 in New 
York, he edited a Chinatown newspaper, organized The New Art Drama Group and 
participated in a Chinatown Community TV. It was there that he started to use his 
pseudonym ―Tsui Hark‖ (Liu and Li "Study"). According to him ―Hark‖ means 
overcoming difficulties, indicating his determination to survive and prevail. He returned 






(Commercial Television) was established to challenge TVB‘s dominant market position, 
the head of the creative team Selina Chow
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 brought Tsui Hark over. Since his days in 
New York and Hong Kong television industry, Tsui Hark was perceived by those hiring 
him as innovative: a regenerator bringing new life to an old institution. At CTV in 1978 
he received notice for a martial art series called Golden Dagger Romance. But CTV soon 
folded
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and Tsui Hark moved to the film industry. His first three films are characterized 
by his trademark eccentric style, and he was nicknamed ―Tsui the freak‖ in the early 
years of his career (P. L. M. N. Lam). He and his peers were dubbed the Hong Kong New 
Wave generation. But by 1981 the New Wave subsided and Tsui Hark moved to Cinema 
City. As Tsui Hark describes in various occasions, he grew up in an unstable 
environment, so it is not a surprise that he soon adapted himself to an organization with a 
diametrically different production orientation, and that he managed to rise above its 
constraints. According to Raymond Wong, the creative energy of Cinema City‘s core of 
its key personnel began to wane.
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 When Tsui Hark joined Cinema City, he changed the 
ways the company operated, but Cinema City also changed him. The eccentric Tsui Hark 
added new ideas and a creative stimulus to Cinema City‘s production culture. Cinema 
City‘s commercial orientation made Tsui Hark‘s films more accessible to the general 
public. Raymond Wong describes how he and his partners hesitated when John Woo 
suggested Tsui Hark to them, ―When we heard the name Tsui Hark, we all freaked out. 
Tsui Hark made three films: The Butterfly Murders, We’re Going to Eat You and 
Dangerous Encounter-1st Kind. They are all critical success but box office failures. 
Besides, rumor has it that Tsui Hark ran over budget, got out of control, and his topic is 
too radical for mass audience. But John Woo guarantees us that Tsui Hark will make a 
film with both critical and commercial successs.‖ Tsui Hark delivered: a Tsui Hark style 






at Cinema City All the Wrong Clues (for the Right Solution) still carried his eccentric 
style. It was set in 1930s‘ Hong Kong but had a Westernized look. It was also the first 
time we used art director William Chang. The setting and costumes were so impressive 
that they set the film apart from the tattered costumes of the kung fu flicks of that era. 
The audience found it refreshing‖ (R. Wong "We Freak Out" 13-14). All the Wrong 
Clues‘s box office surpassed those of Golden Harvest and the Shaw studio in the summer 
of 1981.   
Despite his zigzag career moves, Tsui Hark consistently projected his image as a 
regenerator to his financial supporters. At the reception end he provided a guarantee of 
novelty to his audiences. In an 1981 interview, in response to the reporters‘ comment that 
they couldn‘t make a connection between his third and fourth films (Dangerous 
Encounter – 1st Kind 1980 and All the Wrong Clues (for the Right Solution) 1981), Tsui 
Hark said, ―You don‘t have to predict what I‘m going to do because you‘ll fail to predict 
what my next film is…I like trying out new things‖ (Liu and Li "Tsui Hark" 26). Ten 
years later after many commercial successes, when asked how he viewed his early dark 
films like The Butterfly Murders and We’re Going to Eat You, Tsui Hark responded, ―I 
feel like they are not made by me. In fact, up till now I still feel like I haven‘t 
accomplished anything yet. May be few years later I look back at the films I‘m making 
now I will have the same feeling. This may be because of my constant personality 
split…The work that I made in those years lacks a lot of things. Even when I look at what 
I‘m doing now, I still feel inadequate. As I always say, we need to keep up with time and 
deepen our knowledge in film in terms of technique and thought‖ (Law and Lo 28). 
Novelty and improvement are the audience‘s expectation of Tsui Hark‘s new films.  
Very early on Tsui Hark had set his goal to be an innovator, one who balanced 






descriptions of his idiosyncrasies, Tsui Hark was audience-conscious and market-oriented 
from day one. He was not dizzy from the media buzz and celebratory atmosphere around 
the new directors. In a 1979 interview before the release of his first film he said, 
―Whatever films I make, I have two principles. The first principle is I want the audience 
to feel engaged and have fun. This is a very commercial product. I think every new 
director should be concerned about this. The mythical era of making personal films is 
gone. We will compromise. That means we will make commercial films but they are 
commercial films we find satisfaction in making. The second principle is the films we 
make will be acceptable for the film connoisseur. We won‘t do shoddy production‖ (Shu 
35). In an interview a few months later, he reasserted the importance of commercial 
considerations to New Wave directors, ―While I‘m having fun making the movie, I also 
have to consider the film‘s commercial value. This is a matter of survival. We need a 
group of new directors who can survive in the industry and make new movies. We 
present new topics. This is commercial value. We use new technique. This is gimmick. 
To innovate is a commercial act‖ (Gao and Deng 33). Tsui Hark‘s trademark genre is 
martial arts, the perennial genre of Hong Kong cinema. Tsui Hark always brought 
excitement to critics and the audience by reinventing the genre. 
MARTIAL ARTS GENRE AS RE-PRESENTATION OF HONG KONG CHINESENESS 
Sam Ho describes Tsui Hark as ―a filmmaker with an obvious fixation on things 
Chinese‖ (Ho "Introduction Swordsman" ix). The martial arts genre is the best vehicle for 
Tsui Hark to deal with issue of Chineseness and modernity, a recurrent concern in his 
oeuvre. His perspective has gradually shifted from emptying out Chineseness in order to 
realize modernity, to affirmation of the peculiarity of Hong Kong Chineseness. Chen 
Pingyuan, in his study of martial arts novels writes that the cultural value of the martial 






refers to the martial arts world). His analysis of jianghu as an idealized alternative realm 
also applies to the film version of the genre. Chen Pingyuan writes jianghu suggests an 
alternative realm in relation to the imperial court. The court has its law and jianghu has 
its rules. In reality the law of the court is supreme but in the martial arts novel the heroes 
are above the law. Chen Pingyuan writes jianghu in fact is a reconstruction of the old 
Chinese dream of a utopia where one escapes from the imperial court, and injustice under 
the rule of imperial law can be corrected. This is particularly attractive to Chinese people 
who have long been under the repression of feudal ethics. The knight‘s putting his fate in 
his own hands is a representation of Chinese people‘s longing for freedom. More 
interestingly Chen Pingyuan also points out that the martial arts novel can provide us 
with a new perspective on women‘s status in ancient Chinese society. In the Chinese 
martial arts novel, the stories of female knight characters are no less fantastic than those 
of males. Chen Pingyuan concludes that the martial arts novel basically is a ―dream 
writing literature‖. Chen Pingyuan‘s study is useful for reading Tsui Hark‘s Once Upon a 
Time in China series, a martial arts genre film set at the turn of the century, where the 
hero faces both the law of the Qing imperial court and the challenge of Western 
civilization. The hero‘s love interest is an idealized Chinese ―new woman‖ who straddles 
the divide between the old and new, tradition and modernity, East and West. Despite the 
country being on the verge of disintegration, the hero‘s hometown is an idealized 
alternative realm, an affluent hybrid wonderland of ―stability and prosperity‖. 
Working within the censorship rules in the 1980s Tsui Hark‘s films have been 
known for their political metaphors. The political message of his films kept critics 
engaged in his stories and his career moves. In his early years Tsui Hark was conscious 
of the need to make his political undertone explicit enough for his audience. In the 






steered the reporter to the political dimension of his martial arts film. He said, ―My 
character is a straightforward person and has no secret scheme. He has a polit ical status. 
That is, under certain circumstances he has no option. It is just like the governments of 
the world now. They are forced to make certain decisions in a given circumstance. The 
audience should be able to get this political undertone of my film clearly. This political 
dimension is absent in Gu Long‘s martial arts novel. Gu Long‘s character has a lot of 
options to make changes in life‖ (Shu 35). In an interview in 1981 after the commercial 
success of All the Wrong Clues, in response to the reporters‘ mentioning the search for a 
central thesis in an auteur director‘s works, Tsui Hark corrected them, ―I feel that we 
don‘t start with a central thesis when we make films. Our films are not coherent. It is 
because we basically are people with an ambivalent value system. This is very 
characteristic of Hong Kong people‖ (Liu and Li "Tsui Hark" 26). In that 1981 interview 
Tsui Hark was conscious of the lack of a coherent image of Hong Kong culture and Hong 
Kong cinema. He said, ―We say Japanese film has Japanese flavor, but what is Hong 
Kong flavor in Hong Kong films? There is no absolute answer‖ (Liu and Li "Tsui Hark" 
27). In the initial stage of his exploration of Hong Kong flavor, Tsui Hark attempted by 
breaking away from Chineseness. In response to the question of the strange mix of 
Japanese and ancient Rome costume design for his characters in The Butterfly Murders, 
Tsui Hark says, ―I want to create an era that completely breaks away from the Chinese 
martial arts world…the so called Chinese martial arts world is the image we usually see 
in Gu Long and Louis Cha‘s martial arts novel and the conventional wuxia figures…To 
lead the audience to a new martial arts world, I have to change the characters‘ outlook. 
Another method is to add ―futuristic‖ flavor to give it a ‗modern‘ feel‖ (Gao and Deng 
33). Shu Kei said The Butterfly Murders which was hard to fit in existing categories was 






daring director willing to repudiate convention. In 1979 when the industry still had a 
major studio like Shaw and a big company like Golden Harvest dominating the market, 
Tsui Hark saw why some filmmakers hesitated to innovate, ―Creative work takes a lot of 
courage. It‘s because our fellow filmmakers are watching. If your work is not accepted, 
you will be ridiculed. That‘s why some filmmakers would rather take the beaten path‖ 
(Gao and Deng 34). His conception of The Butterfly Murder is a futuristic wuxia sans 
Chineseness. In All the Wrong Clues (for the Right Solution) Tsui Hark said he also 
intentionally ―took out the Chinese elements‖ in the film. He explains, ―When we make a 
movie, we always want to make it representative of Chinese culture. So we use Chinese 
calligraphy and Chinese tableware as props. But these things are superficial. How many 
things in Hong Kong can represent Chinese culture? They are like the oil paintings in flea 
market, merchandizes for tourists. … I want to see if I take away all those things, will we 
feel something lacking in the film? Do we need them to constitute the soul of the film? 
Will it still be a good film without those elements?‖ (Liu and Li "Tsui Hark" 24). Tsui 
Hark‘s repudiation of Chineseness in his conception of modern Hong Kong cinema is 
indicative of the ethos of the era. In the early 1970s, there was an effort by the colonial 
government and private cultural forces that contributed to the formation of a more 
outward-looking and international-oriented local cultural identity. China and Chinese 
culture were associated with economic backwardness and political fanaticism. Hong 
Kong in the 1980s was characterized by rapid economic growth and a buildup of political 
anxiety induced by conflicts in Sino-British talks.   
Hong Kong in the 1990s, in the wake of the traumatic event in 1989, and 
sovereignty change in 1997 as well as China quickening its pace of economic reforms, 
was even more peculiar when political anxiety was commensurate with economic 






Hong Kong cinema is quite awkward. China is big and its boldness of vision gives you 
the impulse to do something grand. Hong Kong is awkward. It is like a city of gamblers. 
People are oriented towards speculation and gimmicks…Hong Kong people are torn 
between accepting and denying Hong Kong. I‘m very engaged. Once I decided to stay in 
Hong Kong, I don‘t want to be a marginal person. When I identify myself with this place, 
I will do something about it. But most people carry with them a marginal mentality. They 
don‘t have their own view and don‘t think their opinions can contribute any help…They 
don‘t want to listen to the problem and face the issue‖ (Law and Lo 28). In 1991 while 
his audience may still have feelings of powerlessness and be fixated in their marginal 
mentality, Tsui Hark has changed his perspective. He said, ―Using the ‗1997 deadline‘ 
mentality to write scripts will not work. I think it‘s more important to overcome Hong 
Kong people‘s marginal mentality. Now I seldom talk about politics in my films, but the 
screenwriters say I have to put some back in otherwise it won‘t look like a Tsui Hark 
film‖ (Law and Lo 28). As we shall see, the Once Upon a Time in China series is less 
about China than about applauding Southern Chinese culture and celebrating the regional 
folk hero. Tsui Hark, in creating the dream of an idealized realm, was performing 
something much like a filmic affirmation therapy for the Hong Kong mass audience.  
The historical stories of Hong Kong‘s past were not serving Hong Kong for its 
future. Creative history writing didn‘t change the past events, but Tsui Hark changed the 
meaning and interpretation of them. He showed us the power to change the way we think 
about Hong Kong‘s past, so that the present can no longer be defined by the past. The 
Once Upon a Time in China series epitomizes Tsui Hark‘s obsession to rewrite the past, 
to reread history. This can be easily seen in his second movie We’re Going to Eat You 
(1980). Tsui Hark started the story with a detective tracking down a former convict who 






only one not carried away by the craziness in the village, and rescued the detective from 
being eaten. When asked if he implied that in our society a person has no chance to 
restart a new life once he has made a mistake, Tsui Hark said, ―Yes. We have this 
obdurate concept in our society: the past defines the present. Even though the ex-convict 
has repented and became a better person, the detective won‘t let him go. The detective 
only focuses on arresting him and ignores the injustice happening in the village‖ (Hou 
23). A Better Tomorrow (John Woo, 1986, produced by Tsui Hark), a remake of Upright 
Repenter (Patrick Lung 1967), is about an ex-convict who repents and tries to reconnect 
with his police officer brother. A Chinese Ghost Story (Ching Siu-tung, 1987, produced 
by Tsui Hark), an adaptation from the Chinese classic Strange Stories from a Chinese 
Studio, is about a female ghost who changes and tries to save her human lover. Green 
Snake (1993) is an adaptation from Lillian Lee‘s popular novel Green Snake which itself 
is a rewrite of the folklore The Legend of the White Snake. Again, Tsui Hark tells the 
story of failed redemption of the penitent. The snake sisters have transformed into 
humans and live as decent human women. But the Buddhist monk won‘t let them go, and 
killed the White Snake. A Better Tomorrow III (1989) is a prequel to John Woo’s A Better 
Tomorrow (1986) set in Saigon in 1974. It‘s a writing of the history of the character Mark 
(played by Chow Yun Fat).
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 As Keeto Lam comments Tsui Hark‘s depiction of 
Vietnam is full of passion and empathy, very different from mainstream Hong Kong 
movies‘ portrayal of a cold and violent country(Cindy S.C. Chan "Chat with Keeto 
Lam"). Such sensitivity for Vietnam can also be seen in the opening sequence of Once 
Upon a Time in China. A Qing court official laments to the protagonist Wong Fei Hung 
that while Hong Kong and Macau were ceded to Western nations, and the country is 
divided, he is sent to Vietnam to fight the French. He looks at the plague on his ship and 






Our People.‘‖ In the Cantonese dialogue the characters call Vietnam ―Annam‖. Annam 
used to be part of the Chinese Empire and now part of Vietnam. It was once a French 
protectorate. Annam, literally meaning ―Pacified South‖, is like Hong Kong, a dependent 
territory that could not block out external intervention in its internal authority. The 
opening sequence of Once Upon a Time in China makes a strong statement. The series is 
not about reasserting the Chinese Empire‘s dominant position in Annam from the French, 
or identifying with China‘s resistance against Western imperialists. It‘s about the voice of 
the margin, the cultural identity of the local. It is an affirmation of Hong Kong islander 
Chineseness and an effort to reorient the perspective on local history in order to restart a 
new chapter for the future. 
REVAMP THE CULTURAL LANDSCAPE 
The cultural environment of the late 1970s provided a favorable precondition for 
the rise of the Hong Kong New Wave filmmakers. There was the rise of what Raymond 
William calls ―cultural formation,‖ a loose association of writers and critics who had 
similar goals, and who developed a body of polemical writing to justify their opinions. In 
Hong Kong in the late 1970s, the critics celebrated a younger generation of filmmakers 
who re-oriented the China-centric perspective of the older generation of Shanghai émigré 
directors. They coined the term Hong Kong New Wave to refer to the generation who 
was born after the wars, most of whom got their film education in the West, whose film 
techniques were more modern and whose films were more locally-oriented and socially 
relevant. The 1970s was a time of re-orientation.   
In the 1970s the Hong Kong government worked on a new direction of cultural 
policy and established or sponsored five local professional performing arts institutions. 
These are the Hong Kong Repertory Theatre, the Hong Kong Ballet Company, the Hong 






Dance Company. These are high art organizations and mostly Western-oriented. The 
Hong Kong Repertory Theatre, for instance, hired Artistic Directors with overseas 
educations only (mostly U.S.) and performed mostly translated adaptations from Western 
dramas (Tao "Birth"). The local film industry continued to be neglected by the 
government. But as Hong Kong‘s society grew more affluent, there was an establishment 
of film-related organizations bringing in a new and dynamic atmosphere. The film 
section of Chinese Student Weekly (1952-1974) introduced foreign films and Western 
film theories, and nurtured a generation of film critics like Law Kar, Shek Kei and Luk 
Lay (Ada Loke). Young John Woo also got his articles published there. There were also 
film clubs showing foreign movies, screening members‘ short films, organizing seminars 
and offering film production courses. Studio One, the Film Society of Hong Kong was 
established in 1962, Da Film Club in 1968, Wei Film Club in 1971, Phoenix Cineclub in 
1974, etc.
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 In the early 1980s there was the Hong Kong Film Culture Centre where 
Fruit Chan worked and learned from Hong Kong New Wave filmmakers like Yim Ho 
and Ann Hui about film production and scriptwriting before entering the film industry 
(Cindy S.C. Chan "Fruit Chan"). The Hong Kong International Film Festival (HKIFF) 
was established in 1977 showing movies from around the world, and the retrospective 
section screened Hong Kong classic movies. Tony Rayns, a British writer, film festival 
programmer and screenwriter, worked as the English editor for the first HKIFF and 
joined the staff for three years (1979-1981) ("20 Years"). Back then Jimmy Ngai noted 
that Tony Rayns made an effort to recommended King Hu‘s Raining in the Mountain 
(1979) and Legend of the Mountain (1979) in the 1980 London Film Festival ("Names"). 
In the 1990s Tony Rayns helped promote Wong Kar Wai‘s name in London. He wrote a 
book and published articles in the British Film Institute's magazine Sight & Sound. Roger 






the role of HKIFF in showcasing the new Chinese cinema. He says it was HKIFF 
programmer Leong Mo-ling who discovered Yellow Earth (Chen Kaige, 1985) and 
brought Chen Kaige to Hong Kong and showed the world premiere of his film. He writes, 
after that premiere many foreign programmers such as Paul Clark from Hawaii made a 
point of attending the HKIFF to secure their year‘s Asian program. The Hong Kong Arts 
Centre was established in 1977. When Taiwan cinema was not invited for screening at 
the HKIFF for unstated political reasons, the Hong Kong Arts Centre played a key role in 
introducing Taiwan New Cinema to Hong Kong. Film Bi-Weekly, established in 1979, 
played a key role in coining the term Hong Kong New Wave and promoting the young 
filmmakers‘ movies. They not only interviewed the filmmakers and reported on their 
productions, but also organized round tables and seminars. The Hong Kong filmmaking 
community was small, and the film critics and writers circles were even smaller. Some of 
the writers and critics were also involved in film production and distribution. Writers, 
critics and filmmakers‘ names who frequently appeared in Film Bi-Weekly were also 
active members at various film organizations. For example, Li Cheuk-to, a prominent 
film critic, who worked at the Film Bi-Weekly writing extensively on the New Wave 
filmmakers and censorship issues, later worked at HKIFF. Wong Ain-ling moved from 
the Hong Kong Art Centre, to HKIFF and the Hong Kong Film Archive. Law Kar, a 
writer for the Chinese Student Weekly, worked at HKIFF and then the Hong Kong Film 
Archive. Stephen Teo worked at HKIFF and is now teaching at university. Sam Ho who 
worked at HKIFF also migrated to the Hong Kong Film Archive. Shu Kei, Law Wai-
ming, Freddie Wong, Jerry Liu, Michael Lam and many others are film buffs who 
crossed multiple organizations and fields.
125
 The Hong Kong Film Awards, established in 
1982, played a key role in supporting the New Wave filmmakers. The first four years‘ 






was Allen Fong‘s Father and Son (1981); 1983 Ann Hui‘s Boat People (1982); 1984 
Allen Fong‘s Ah Ying (1983); 1985 Yim Ho‘s Homecoming (1984).   
The Hong Kong New Wave was not a self-conscious film movement with a 
coherent vision or manifesto to declare its members‘ breakaway from tradition or the 
commercial system. But the young filmmakers did form an informal association. One of 
their interesting practices was the ―peer preview‖. The reporter of Film Bi-weekly 
describes, ―‘Peer preview‘ is the first screening of a director‘s new films to his peers. It‘s 
a chance for the young filmmakers to exchange views and learn from each other. It‘s not 
known if this is because they are humble, or they are trying to be perfect or they lack 
confidence that they normally invite their friends to watch their new films after the first 
edit. Those directors who are more brilliant will be invited to this ‗peer preview‘. Ann 
Hui and Tsui Hark are the most popular guests. The two of them have contributed in 
many Hong Kong productions‖ (Xiao "Gossip 2" 4). The reporter wrote that Allen Fong, 
winning the best film in Hong Kong Film Awards for his Father and Son (1981), should 
thank his peers for watching his film multiple times. Another interesting practice was the 
young filmmakers‘ interviews with each other. The questions they asked each other were 
more in-depth, insightful and industry-practice oriented than those from reporters. For 
example, the interview by Tsui Hark on Ann Hui after the preview of her The Story of 
Woo Viet (1981) covered topics like difficulty in selling new idea to financial supporters, 
Hong Kong society and politics, Hollywood movies, English literature, and the 
awkwardness of young filmmakers getting adjusted to the ingrained traditional practice in 
the industry (C.-t. Li "Tsui Hark"). When Tsui Hark asked how she worked with action 
choreographer Ching Siu-tung, Ann Hui said, ―Once he arrived on the set, I would 
become the second assistant director…He ignored me even when I forced him to tell me 






Once he‘s there, he would take charge of the whole situation. He is a bravo. I always 
agree with his action design because they are really good ideas…Without him telling me 
in advance how he would design the action, I couldn‘t plan the shots. But then he would 
hand me both the action and shots. I feel silly. I am a director but I have to rely on his 
shots‖ (C.-t. Li "Tsui Hark" 11). Tsui Hark also asked about the personalities of three 
cameramen and how she worked with each of them differently, indicating Tsui Hark‘s 
awareness of the significance of personality factors in Hong Kong film production. 
Tsui Hark is a favorite of local film writers. In 1981, he won 5 awards in Film Bi-
Weekly‘s 1980 Top 10 Chinese language films (see table 7.1). He didn‘t win the best 
director at Hong Kong Film Awards until 1992 for Once Upon A Time in China, but he 
always got media exposure. The editor of Film Bi-Weekly notes that on issue 13 Tsui 
Hark had already been interviewed twice (issue 4 and issue 13) and that was even before 
the release of his first film The Butterfly Murders on July 20, 1979 (Shu; Gao and Deng). 
The magazine published the entire script of the film from issue 13 to issue 16
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, covering 
July 5 to August 30. Back then the number of pages of the magazine was only 56 and the 
script took up 3 to 6 pages on each issue, and that did not include the interviews and 
reviews related to Tsui Hark. According to the description in a column in Film Bi-
Weekly the publicity of The Butterfly Murders at first attempted to establish Tsui Hark as 
an auteur. The controversial slogan of newspaper ad was ―The 1960s was King Hu. The 
1970s was Chor Yuen. The 1980s is Tsui Hark‖. It was soon withdrawn. In the new 
poster, producer Ng See Yuan‘s name was bigger than Tsui Hark‘s. The Film Bi-Weekly 
writer was upset that the general public mistook the film as a Ng See Yuan‘s film. He 
asserts, ―The Butterfly Murders is a Tsui Hark Film. Anyone reading Film Bi-Weekly 
should know‖ ("Butterfly Murders" 15). The writer tried to reorient his readers‘ to the 






Serge Daney, the editor of Cahiers du Cinema, visited East Asia in the summer of 
1980 and published ―a Hong Kong Journal‖ about the films and people he saw in Hong 
Kong on Cahiers du Cinema. Leung Noong-kong, scriptwriter of The Butterfly Murder, 
showed him movies of Hong Kong young filmmakrs. Zhang Qian, studied film at Censier 
University, and introduced him to director Allen Fong. Serge Daney was not impressed 
and he doubted if Hong Kong cinema could create a new wave. He wrote, ―My 
conclusion is it is depressing. On the one hand the film industry has achieved nothing 
other than making a profit. And they don‘t care about film quality. On the other hand, this 
generation trained in television has no orthodox Chinese cinema tradition to rely on. In 
fact, their identification with China is open to question. They were born in post-war Hong 
Kong and studied films in the West. It wasn‘t until the 1970s with major events like the 
Cultural Revolution, Nixon visiting China and China joining the UN that many rushed to 
identify with the motherland. They started anew to be Chinese. Today‘s Hong Kong is 
characterized by political apathy…‗A house is not a home. A colony is not a country‘. As 
a colony Hong Kong has all the defects (an arrogant British government, lack of elections 
and political life). Hong Kong does not even have the hope of gaining independence‖ 
(19). Daney‘s comment of The Butterfly Murders is, ―The plots are all in jumbled. I 
couldn‘t follow shortly after the film started.‖ (20). Evaluating Hong Kong cinema with 
the assumption of a national cinema paradigm, Daney could only see lack and inadequacy 
in the works by the young filmmakers. He could not appreciate their new perspectives 
and contributions in the tradition of Hong Kong cinema, which in his view is less than 
satisfactorily Chinese.   
While the Hong Kong New Wave cinema was snubbed by the editor of Cahiers 
du Cinema, it was well received by a prominent film critic from the neighboring islander 






introduced Taiwan film critic Peggy Chiao to other Hong Kong critics. Peggy Chiao had 
also received a film school education in the U.S.
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The writer of the Film Bi-Weekly 
describes Peggy Chiao‘s excitement, ―Chiao admires Hong Kong young directors and 
film critics. She is impressed that there is no noticeable conflict between the older and 
younger generations. The new generation is free to express itself and this is exciting. She 
also appreciates our magazine and says she will establish a similar film magazine in 
Taiwan‖ (Xiao "Gossip 1"). In that meeting Peggy Chiao invited Hong Kong critic Li 
Cheuk-to to write articles for her. She later published a film magazine and a few dozen 
film books in Taiwan. She was the producer of Tsai Ming-liang‘s film and played a key 
role behind the rise of Taiwan New Cinema, which led her to be dubbed the ―godmother 
of Taiwan New Cinema‖. She was also involved in the screenplay (with Chiu Kang-
chien) of Stanley Kwan‘s Centre Stage (aka Actress) (1992) in which Maggie Cheung 
won her best actress Silver Berlin Bear. She later chaired the Taiwan Golden Horse 
Awards. Her book The Scene of Hong Kong Cinema 1975-1986 published in 1987 in 
Taiwan collected articles from two dozen Hong Kong writers, covering various 
dimensions of the Hong Kong film industry, including the rise of the Hong Kong New 
Wave, the transformation of the industry, the peculiar market mechanisms, new concepts 
of professionalism, market research, the distribution system, genre, star systems as well 
as writing reviews of the films by Hong Kong directors, whom she addresses as 
―authors‖. In the article titled ―Tsui Hark: a neurotic absurd world‖ she perceptively 
points out Tsui Hark‘s style and vision that he carried with him to the next decade. She 
was impressed by Tsui Hark‘s breathless fast-paced editing style, neurotic energy and 
dazzling visual effects. She claims that within Tsui Hark‘s entertainment comedies, there 
is still the same absurdity and anxiety he exhibited in his early dark films. He still set his 






―When he is at his best performance, he always captures well the feeling of being 
stranded in Hong Kong society‖ (64). It takes a perceptive film critic from another 
islander Chinese society to appreciate the cultural sensibility of the orphan island in Tsui 
Hark‘s film world, instead of dismissing his films as un-Chinese or generalizing the 
inherent sensibility as Diaspora marginality. These two islander Chinese film industries 
have been forging ties since the post-war years. There was a common cultural factor for 
the popularity of Hong Kong cinema in the Taiwan market. The anthology ends with Li 
Cheuk-to‘s article ―An era of compromise‖ written in 1985. Li Cheuk-to concluded that 
in 1984 there was no fundamental change in the Hong Kong film industry and the films 
in general oriented towards compromise. The commercial film institution was further 
consolidated. New movies of the young directors like Tsui Hark, Ann Hui, and Yim Ho 
became less radical than their earlier works. But Li Cheuk-to thought Tsui Hark was the 
best performer in straddling the divide between art and commerce. His Shanghai Blues 
was the most mature and touching among the many ―political films‖ of that year that 
touched on the issue of 1997 and Hong Kong-China relationship. But Li Cheuk-to also 
lamented that while many filmmakers were trying hard to fit into the commercial system, 
maintaining personal styles but failing in the box office time after time, filmmakers like 
Wong Jing were making big profits. He wrote, ―The current situation is filmmakers with 
passion and sincerity are knocked down again and again. ‗Film as commercial product‘ 
becomes an unbeatable trend‖ ("Era" 64). Li Cheuk-to was right. In the next decade, 
Wong Jing and Tsui Hark stayed while most of the sincere filmmakers he mentioned 
faded out. Film is always a commercial product in Hong Kong cinema. 
REINVENT THE SYSTEM 
The unbreakable rule of Hong Kong cinema is its commercial constraints. Tsui 






accoutrements of commercial filmmaking). He played an important role in modernizing 
the Hong Kong film industry by promoting its technology, and many special effects 
technicians were trained through his productions. He was Hong Kong cinema‘s pacesetter 
and modernizer. Despite his training in an American film school, his work experience in 
major companies, and his advocacy for modernizing Hong Kong cinema, he made 
movies in traditional way: the artisanal mode of production. Like many filmmakers in the 
1990s, he owned a film production company, worked as writer-director-producer and had 
great creative control over his projects. In his productions, he insisted on not having a 
clear division of labor. He might have asked whomever he trusted to write the script, 
whether they are as low-ranked as a technician, or as irrelevant as a restaurateur (Ho 
Keeto Lam). Keeto Lam, his long time protégé and colleague, started as a special effects 
technician, then as his scriptwriter, then as a multi-function assistant in overseas 
shooting. In the production of Legend of Zu, Keeto Lam was responsible for research, art 
direction and script advice, amongst other responsibilities. His title was ―World of Zu‖—
hardly a typical job title in a film crew. In Tsui Hark‘s productions it was normal not to 
have completed the script before shooting. Constant improvisation on the set or even in 
the editing room and dubbing room was the norm. A tight budget and frantic schedule 
were the rules. In his production house there were no modern film business enterprise 
practices such as bank loan financing, vertical integration, conglomeration, franchising or 
merchandizing. Despite his prolific output, he had made no attempt to build an asset base 
– a film library – to heighten his bargaining power in business deals. Hark said that he 
was content to have the chance to keep making movies (Cindy S.C. Chan "Tsui Hark"). 
To him, the system of the Hong Kong film industry was about interpersonal relationships, 
rather than about the structure of the organization. He admitted that he was a difficult 






him. He said the system of the Hong Kong film industry was more about who clicked 
with whom, ―There is not an applied method. It totally depends on whom you are 
working with‖ (Law and Lo 26). Art director Bill Lui, a relative newcomer to Tsui 
Hark‘s team, said that he had to make an effort to figure out what Tsui Hark had in mind, 
as he rarely stated his intentions explicitly (Cindy S.C. Chan "Bill Lui"). Like many 
Chinese patriarchs, Tsui Hark was stoic and reticent, rarely expressing his feelings. His 
protégé-colleagues, Keeto Lam and Liu Damu, often had to act as middlemen for him. 
What is surprising is that none of these men said that Tsui Hark‘s way of communication 
was old-fashioned, a nuisance, or even inefficient. Instead, they tried to adjust themselves 
to his ways. Over the years, those who worked closely with Hark have had to make an 
effort to understand him, and get used to his traditional ways of communication (Cindy 
S.C. Chan "Tsui Hark"). Nevertheless, in Tsui Hark‘s production house, there was no 
alienation or greed as in a typical sweatshop of late capitalism. There was something 
beyond monetary rewards that motivated the co-workers to do things for each other. Tsui 
Hark was very paternal, loyal and caring towards his colleagues. In the seminar dedicated 
to Tsui Hark (The Celluoid Swordsman 2001) at the Hong Kong Film Archive, Yuan Bin 
said that it was Tsui Hark who revitalized the martial arts genre, and thus gave job 
opportunities to many action choreographers and stuntmen who otherwise would have 
vanished, like other group of deskilled flexible workers at the fading of that genre. Tsui 
Hark‘s patronage was felt throughout recent Hong Kong film history: his scriptwriters 
Keeto Lam and Yuen Kai-chi were his students at the Hong Kong Film Culture Centre, a 
film club established by film buffs in the 1980s. Keeto Lam and Liu Damu had worked 
with him since the early 1980s, and their relationship was so close that they got involved 
in each other‘s personal lives. Tsui Hark offered to financially support Liu Damu when 






relationship between employer and employee, so much so that Liu Damu said he felt 
guilty for not working for Tsui Hark (Ho Liu Damu).
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 Tsui Hark‘s business sense was 
different from the assumption of profit maximization of a typical entrepreneur. For 
instance, Tsui Hark once made composer James Wong lose money by revising a film‘s 
music multiple times. When later the film became a hit and the music sold well, James 
Wong felt grateful and wanted to give Tsui Hark some of his profit, but Tsui Hark 
wouldn‘t take it (Ho James Wong).
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 Tsui Hark‘s long time editor Marco Mak 
volunteered to attend a pre-production meeting in order to better understand the director‘s 
ideas and the production, and Tsui Hark frequently taped movies at home for Mak, even 
going to the trouble of indicating which parts were good and explaining why (Ho Marco 
Mak). In their studies of the Hong Kong film industry, David Bordwell (Planet Hong 
Kong) and Michael Curtin ("Industry on Fire") are impressed by the high productivity 
level of Hong Kong filmmakers despite the fact that there was no monetary reward for 
them from the ancillary markets. In Tsui Hark‘s productions and Hong Kong film 
productions in general, it took more than the motive of profit maximization for people to 
stay in this industry.  
HOUSEKEEPER-IN-CHIEF 
Notwithstanding the bonding and warmness in this community, one can imagine 
how frustrating and suffocating it must be for women working in this industry, given 
their limited role. Liu Damu, Keeto Lam and the others who hung around with Tsui Hark 
always watched movies and had dinner together. They named Tsui Hark‘s brainstorming 
group ―Club BBoss‖, the name of a night club in Hong Kong. They said it was because 
they were like the club girls who worked the night shift and kept the boss company.  
Keeto Lam said when he was working as a location scriptwriter with Tsui Hark in the 






conjugal relationship to describe the close relationship between the director and the 
scriptwriter, explaining that this was because in Hong Kong filmmakers rarely have 
completed scripts and have to revise the script constantly during shooting for any 
contingency. The close relationship was a remedy for the defects in the system of the 
Hong Kong film industry in which the scriptwriter has to humble himself so that the 
director could fully actualize his ideas (Ho Keeto Lam). From the metaphors they used – 
club girl, slave girl, wife – one can tell how traditional their thinking is regarding gender 
roles.   
In the work place, Tsui Hark‘s wife Nansun Shi took up a traditional maternal 
role. Sharon Hui mentioned Nansun Shi‘s role as the boss‘s wife and maternal figure in 
Film Workshop. She said Tsui Hark and Nansun Shi were a perfect team. Tsui Hark took 
care of the creative production, and Nanshun Shi took care of management. Hui said 
Nansun Shi‘s communication skills helped Tsui Hark retain a lot of relationships and 
networks. Their parental role in the office helped create a harmonious atmosphere, and 
this helped maintain close relationships (Ho Sharon Hui). According to Mingpao 
Weekly‘s interview with Tsui Hark, Nanshun Shi has taken care of Tsui Hark for more 
than twenty years as if he were her son (Shum). On various occasions James Wong also 
mentions how attentive Nanshun Shi was to Tsui Hark. She took care of his daily life, his 
personal finances, and internal and external affairs of the company. She contacted 
overseas film distributors, film companies, foreign press, etc. (James Wong). Raymond 
Wong addressed Nansun Shi as the ―housekeeper‖ of Cinema City and called her a 
talented lady (―cainü‖). He also acknowledged that Nansun Shi was a great help in Tsui 
Hark‘s career (R. Wong "Here Comes"). Tsui Hark himself on various occasions 
acknowledged Nansun Shi‘s contributions to his career, and more importantly her 






almost to the point of self-torture. ―I am scared of dealing with this kind of attitude. Since 
at young age I thought that life was full of struggle…. It wasn‘t until I met Nansun that I 
gradually opened up. She made me realize that life could be very happy‖ (D. Wei 65). 
But Nansun Shi was not a faceless woman behind the successful man, or an 
inconspicuous housekeeper working quietly in the team. In a book published in Britain 
titled Hong Kong Portraits of Power, Tsui Hark was interviewed, and photographed 
together with Nansun Shi as a power couple (Huang and Jeffery). In an interview back in 
1980, Jimmy Ngai already noticed Nansun Shi had star quality as an executive, even 
though she worked behind the screen and kept a low profile. Nansun Shi‘s background 
made her stand out in those years. She studied in an elite secondary school, and learned 
French after school. And then she studied computer science in Britain for 8 years. She 
returned to Hong Kong and worked as a consultant at the Michael Stevenson public 
relations company. Ngai notes that the clients of Michael Stevenson included major 
corporations. Nansun Shi described, ―To feel the social pulse of Hong Kong, Michael 
Stevenson is a good choice. It‘s a very Hong Kong company. There you can reach people 
from different classes‖ (Ngai "Nansun Shi" 14). Later she moved to the television 
industry. Despite her elite background she described: ―TV is a good industry. It is very 
important in people‘s lives. It provides entertainment for many people and this is 
significant.‖ She described her job in TV, ―I feel like I‘m a fire engine. I always have to 
stand by to put out fires‖ (Ngai "Nansun Shi" 15). In the next decade she worked in the 
rapidly changing film industry, where every day was a crisis management day for 
executives like her. Nansun Shi‘s peers were also executives with star quality. In an 
interview in 1990 when asked to list friends she admired, Nansun Shi named: Winnie Yu, 
Eunice Lam, Cheung Man-yee and Selina Chow (Xia). All of them later became 






Lam founded the successful advertising company Wong Lam, which later was acquired 
by Saatchi and Saatchi. Cheung Man-yee became the first Chinese Director of 
Broadcasting. Selina Chow entered politics, and became a member of the Executive 
Council of Hong Kong and the Legislative Council of Hong Kong, and vice chair of the 
Liberal Party. Despite her commanding status, Nansun Shi maintained a low profile, 
always supportive of Tsui Hark and never overshadowing him. To James Wong, Nansun 
Shi was an impossibly perfect modern woman. He wrote, ―Where can you find a modern 
woman, educated in the U.K., highly competent and resourceful, linguistically talented, 
willing to call her husband ―laoye‖ (master)?...I have to crown this 20th century good 
woman the founder of the ―husband praising sect‖ (59). As we shall see the female 
protagonist in the Once Upon a Time in China series is the projection of this impossibly 
perfect modern woman. However, the rest of the women characters in the series are 
faceless. Like the female scriptwriter who was recruited to the team to give some 
feminine (but not necessarily feminist) balance the assigned role for women was at most 
supplementary (Ho Liu Damu). Women were not a driving force in the production or in 
the narrative of the film. Tsui Hark‘s productions maintain the traditional Chinese social 
hierarchy of gender and seniority. Liu Damu describes Tsui Hark as very Confucian: he 
is paternal and takes his staff‘s loyalty seriously; he gives guidance and support to the 
young; and he appreciates his wife‘s competence and filial piety (Ho Liu Damu). This 
Confucian social value is readily apparent in the Once Upon A Time in China series. 
However much star quality Nansun Shi has as an executive, in Hong Kong cinema‘s 
director-centric production approach. and in Tsui Hark‘s productions in particular. She 






TSUI HARK’S REINVENTED STARS 
Tsui Hark is good at creating heroine characters. His female protagonist often 
stands out amongst Hong Kong‘s action movies. She is usually pretty and gentle but also 
has masculine qualities like intelligence, cool-headedness, and most importantly she 
honors the traditional yi (the code of brotherhood or ethical code in general). Tsui Hark‘s 
Peking Opera Blue (1986) was made as a female version in response to John Woo‘s A 
Better Tomorrow (1986). In Peking Opera Blue (1986) the Brigitte Lin character is an 
undercover for the revolutionary army, but her father is a warlord. She is often dressed in 
a man‘s clothing. Brigitte Lin used to play a pretty and innocent girl in romance novel-
adapted films in Taiwan. Tsui Hark reinvented her star image. Her role as the cross-
gender Asia the Invincible in Swordsman II (1992) was so impressive that a spinoff The 
East is Red was made the following year. From then on Brigitte Lin repeatedly played the 
cross-gender role in various productions until the fad subsided. Female protagonists in 
Tsui Hark films often have a masculine quality even when not obviously cross-dressing 
like Brigitte Lin. For example, Anita Mui in A Better Tomorrow III (1989) is described as 
a female hero with a masculine quality by critics (Feng Cai; W. He "Demythisize"). 
Maggie Cheung plays a pretty and innocent girl in Wong Jing‘s romance comedy 
Romancing Star (1987). But in Tsui Hark‘s martial arts films like Dragon Inn (1992) she 
is the owner of the Dragon Inn in the middle of the desert. She survives the jungle, wins 
the loyalty of her ethnic worker, and fights for her friend. In Green Snake (1993), 
described as ―a film of alternative female heroism‖ she plays the chivalric Green Snake 
saving her sister, playing out the female version of honoring the code of brotherhood (Lu 
and Dai). As we shall see in the Once Upon a Time in China series, the female 
protagonist Aunt Yee, an impossibly perfect woman possessing both feminine and 






reinventing or reviving his male friends‘ careers. For example, A Better Tomorrow (1986) 
revived John Woo‘s career, and A Chinese Ghost Story (1987) reinvented action 
choreographer Ching Siu-tung as a director. The Once Upon a Time in China series 
revived Jet Li‘s career and reinvented his star image. Jet Li shot to fame with The Shaolin 
Temple (Zhang Xinyan, 1982). But he kept playing the same kung fu kid character, again 
and again, until it was no longer wanted in the market. Tsui Hark reinvented Jet Li‘s 
image as a martial arts master, more mature than his kung fu kid image, but younger than 
the patriarch Master Wong (played by Kwan Tak-hing) in the old Cantonese series. The 
Once Upon a Time in China series not only reinvented the star, but also Chinese history. 
TSUI HARK STORY: ORPHAN ISLAND HYPERBOLE 
As with most commercial films, Tsui Hark‘s films are sensitive to social changes 
(Law and Lo). During the transition period, the Once Upon A Time In China series 
explicitly dealt with issues of nationalism, modernization, colonization and 
westernization. It was made and released between 1991-1996. At this time, on the one 
hand there was the euphoric discourse of Hong Kong‘s achievements as a world-class 
city. On the other hand there was intense political anxiety expressed in a panic migration. 
The series is symptomatic of the ethos of Hong Kong during the late transitional period. 
In the protagonist‘s reflection on Western challenges, Western civilization is shown as 
having a redeeming and modernizing effect on this particular Chinese society. 
Westernization is presented as the cure for a backward society in this association of 
colonization with modernization. The protagonist‘s hometown Fu Shan is a stand-in for 
Hong Kong. On the screen, the Hong Kong Self is a hybrid wonderland, and the China 
Other is xenophobic. In the series Tsui Hark‘s criticism of feudal Chinese culture is much 
more poignant than his censure of the Western powers‘ imperialism. The central conflict 






Westerners—it is more about the open-minded Chinese in opposition to the xenophobic 
Chinese.   
There is a significant difference between the Chinese villain and the foreign 
villain in characterizations and treatments of action sequences. The Western imperialists 
(British, American, Russian and German) are cardboard characters without much 
psychological depth and dialogue, whose action sequences usually take place in the first 
few reels, and are finished off swiftly, never to return. The Chinese villains, on the other 
hand, are treated with psychological depth, occupy more screen time and have more 
dialogue. Most important of all, in these action films, their action sequences are more 
elaborate, better designed, and are set at the climatic moment. The Western villains fight 
with Master Wong‘s subordinates, his students, and in those scenes the sophistication of 
the action choreography cannot compare to the scenes with the Chinese villains. Each 
Chinese villain has his own action style and weapon tailored for his character, and only 
the Chinese villains have a chance to fight with Master Wong one on one. A review of 
the six films in the series will show how the series is in fact less nostalgic about the China 
of the past, than congratulatory about Hong Kong as a hybrid wonderland at the present.  
In part I, the Chinese villain is Yan Zhendong, a disfranchised Northerner 
wandering in the South. The most memorable sequence is the spectacular bamboo ladder 
fight scene which takes up almost ten minutes.
130 
The action sequence is well integrated 
in the narrative. In the midst of the spectacle and frantic pace of action and editing, there 
is complex characterization going on: the metaphor of Yan Zhendong‘s vain efforts in 
trying to climb up the social ladder; the use of a secret weapon by a master of martial arts 
– indicating his corruption and loss of faith; the symbol of humiliation by having his hair 
cut by his opponent; letting his hair down and its loss as symbol of his loss of dignity. 






while Yan Zhendong is a mess. Master Wong‘s integrity is contrasted with Yan 
Zhendong‘s corruption. Yan Zhendong‘s protégé cannot stand his mentor‘s moral 
downfall. He struggles between loyalty to his mentor, and staying away from the triad 
gang who offers them wealth. After Yan‘s death, he voluntarily transfers allegiance to 
Master Wong and becomes a key member of the ensemble cast. In part II the Chinese 
villains are the members of the xenophobic and superstitious White Lotus Society, and a 
single Qing court official who tries to foil Dr. Sun Yat-san‘s revolution. The finale action 
sequence is set in a blind alley. The lethal weapon the Manchurian villain brings is a 
seemingly harmless soft object, a piece of cloth. This is an apt metaphor for the 
Manchurian mollification policy to assimilate the Han people. The weapon Master Wong 
ends up using is a bamboo stick, a symbol of nobility and integrity. Much thought has 
been put into designing the action to work out the metaphor of this finale sequence: 
fighting one‘s way out of a cul-de-sac by harnessing the enemy‘s power. Part III is set in 
Peking. The Chinese villain is a wealthy man who has hired a hit man to wipe out his 
opponents in a dragon dance competition. Much screen time is spent on the action, skill, 
and psychological struggle of the hit man who is later healed by Master Wong. The hit 
man is moved by Master Wong‘s forgiveness. He later becomes Master Wong‘s protégé 
and joins the ensemble cast, also happily ever after. Again in Peking, the opening shot of 
Part IV is the sign of the Cantonese clansman association in Peking. The villains are 
people of the eight major foreign powers which invade China, but we hardly see the 
foreigners‘ faces. Instead there are elaborate action sequences of Chinese villains. One 
group is the all-women Red Lantern Society, another superstitious xenophobic group 
with its slogan ―support the Qing to exterminate the Westerners.‖ The other one are two 
Chinese men who collaborated with German militarists. Their slogan is ―destroy the 






against the Westerners, while the men are against the Qing and collaborate with the 
Westerners. They fight with each other, and the finale action scene is between Master 
Wong and the two Chinese men. In part V the story is set in Canton. The opening shot is 
the shop sign of the South China Barn. The Chinese villains are Cheung Bo Tsai, his son 
and his mistress, a bad woman with a blind eye. The ruthless pirates disturb the lives of 
people in the South. The Qing court appeases Cheung by offering him a high official 
post. There is collusion between the triad and the government in the North at the expense 
of the people in the South, and the finale action sequence is between Master Wong and 
Cheung‘s son. In part VI (Once Upon A Time in China and America) the story is set in 
America‘s wild west, not modern cities. Interestingly, the villain is a Mexican, but again, 
he is a cardboard character. The people who distrust and discriminate against the Chinese 
workers are American, but the people who betray Master Wong and his students are the 
Chinese migrant workers who are ready to surrender Master Wong to the sheriff for 
execution, in order to save their own lives. The one who frames Master Wong and 
betrays other Chinese workers for money is a Chinese. The central conflict of the story is 
not between the Chinese and the Americans, but amongst the Chinese.  
One detail on the use of languages needs to be noted. In part VI on the Mandarin 
sound track, all Chinese workers‘ lines are dubbed in Mandarin.
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But the only Chinese 
worker who stands by Master Wong, uncle Hong, speaks Cantonese on the Mandarin 
sound track. In Part III, on the Cantonese sound track the Empress Dowager and Qing 
court officials speak Mandarin, whereas all Northerners in Peking speak Cantonese with 
Master Wong. The difference of the Northerner and Southerner is foregrounded. In part I, 
on both the Mandarin and Cantonese sound tracks, the villain Yan Zhendong speaks both 
languages with an obvious Northerner accent, and is thus singled out as the inassimilable 






(Cantonese and Mandarin on respective soundtracks) without accent. Although the 
context of the story is the foreign invasion of China, the use of language shows that the 
key conflict is more about the divergence among Chinese, than between Chinese and 
foreign invaders. These examples show how the conflict dramatized in the series lies 
along the North-South axis than the East-West one. In part I, in a Western restaurant, 
Master Wong gives a speech about Western imperialists exploiting China‘s resources. In 
the next few minutes, the Qing court official explodes and demands that Master Wong 
shut up and discipline his protégés. In the story, there is no incident depicting how the 
Chinese suffered under the Westerner‘s exploitation. More story time is spent on 
depicting the xenophobic Chinese people and the imbecilic government. In the narrative, 
the threat from other Chinese is always more imminent than that from the Westerners. 
Throughout the series, there is no in-depth exploration of the impact of Western 
domination on Chinese people‘s lives. The Westerners recede into the background, their 
impact distant and containable. In the last scene of part IV, there is a moment of 
reflexivity. News about the imperial palace being taken by invaders and the Empress 
Dowager‘s flight comes immediately after Master Wong‘s team has won the lion dance 
competition. Master Wong sighs about the futility of winning the medal when the country 
falls into the hands of foreigners. That pessimistic moment is very brief. The ending is 
Master Wong‘s family deciding to go back to the South, and preparing to recover the 
country. In part V, the story is instantly moved back to the South, but it is not shown 
what they do to recover the country from the foreigners. In part VI, the story is set even 
further away, the Western US. The story is never set in the North during the occupation 
by Western powers—direct confrontation with the West is avoided in the narrative. With 
Master Wong saving historical figures like Li Hongzhang, exchanging medical 






dance in Peking, the playing of Cantonese nanyin music, the display of Cantonese opera 
and Cantonese customs, the series is more a commemoration of Southern Chinese 
culture, celebration of Southern folk heroes and Southerners‘ openness to foreign cultural 
influences. 
THE MODERN CHINESE WOMAN 
Another important topic in modernization discourse that gets diverted throughout 
the series is gender. Instead of problematizing the woman as the one who lags behind in 
modernization as many older Leftist movies did, this series presents a model modern 
Chinese woman. One of the most noteworthy revisions of this series from the old 
Cantonese movies version is the insertion of a completely new character, Aunt Yee, the 
only female lead in the ensemble. Even though she is addressed as Aunt Thirteenth, she 
has no blood ties with Master Wong.
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 She later becomes Master Wong‘s fiancée, 
seemingly breaking the ancestral taboo against cross-generational marriage (especially 
when the woman is senior to the man). In each sequel Master Wong has to fight with 
ethnocentric, xenophobic and superstitious Chinese, but the threat from the West, if not 
receded into the background, is contained in the female body of Aunt Yee. 
Aunt Yee is a fantasy of impossibly perfect, impossibly non-problematic, 
impossibly modern womanhood: the mysterious, awesome and threatening Western 
science and technology is somehow miraculously mediated and contained in this 
subordinate and affable woman. She introduces Western knowledge and technology to 
the Chinese, and thus is the enlightener, a role usually played by a man. She bears no 
trace of the illiterate peasant-woman character, who is usually used as a symbol of 
China‘s backwardness, a representation of the ignorance of the masses, and the object of 
intellectual enlightenment. Aunt Yee is educated in Britain at a time when many 








 while no other Chinese woman in this series has a proper name. 
She can switch swiftly between languages and costumes such as man, woman, Chinese, 
Victorian dress and cowboy outfit, and is a master of disguise. When she puts on a man‘s 
clothing, no one ever suspects that she is not a man, but none of the male characters can 
pass as a woman even with heavy makeup and costumes on stage. She knows everything, 
from sewing, cooking, and playing music to translating, operating a camera and running a 
newspaper, even though it is never specified what she learned and did within her two year 
stay in Britain. She is always a typical object of rescue in this action film, but she has no 
problem dodging bullets. When needed, she can instantly learn Master Wong‘s seizing 
fist and shadowless kick for self-defense, and is never a burden to the man, and never 
bound by social custom—her feet are not bound and her activities are not confined in the 
domestic sphere. As an unmarried woman, she has no moral barrier in accompanying the 
man in his journey everywhere. Knowledge facilitates one acquisition of power. Despite 
her possession of useful knowledge, Aunt Yee is not there to usurp the patriarchy or 
disrupt social order. She willingly returns to China in order to be with her man. Her 
knowledge is completely at the service of Master Wong.   
In contrast to the men, Aunt Yee crosses gender, cultural and social borders with 
ease. The leading male characters all have various physical, linguistic, cultural or 
personality defects and barriers: in this film about modernization, Master Wong is 
stubborn and slow to change. In Po Chi Lam, the Chinese clinic-cum-martial arts school, 
Porky Lang is fat, hot tempered, clumsy and illiterate. As Master Wong‘s medical 
assistant, Buck Teeth Sol cannot read the Chinese on the medicine bottles. And worst of 
all, he does not know martial arts in this action film. Club Foot,
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 known for his magic 
kick, has a broken foot and crooked neck. Leung Fu, whose look and name is the most 






does not have any luck in romance, and is not very good at martial arts. The male 
characters have their problems, struggles, constraints, defects, conflicts, desires and 
ideals, and thus in this dynamic society they can go through changes in the narrative. 
Compared to these male characters, Aunt Yee is already in a state of perfection. Aunt 
Yee is also contrasted with young Chinese girls. The opening scene of part II has a young 
girl chanting in the White Lotus Society, who returns in the ending to be shot to death for 
claiming invincibility. The first conflict starts with a group of girls on the street harassing 
Aunt Yee for wearing a Victorian dress. These girls never reappear in the narrative, and 
while they are portrayed as xenophobic and ignorant, a group of young boys from various 
provinces leaves home to a boarding school in Canton to learn Western knowledge. This 
group of male children, as the revolutionist character says, is ―the hope of the country‘s 
future.‖   
In the narrative, Aunt Yee, a modern Chinese woman, does not seem to need a 
future nor have a past. She does not have a life, a dream or a vision of her own. Her only 
mission in life is maintaining her man, Master Wong. We never see things from her 
perspective. The men go through struggles and the negotiation of their roles in the course 
of social transformation, whereas Aunt Yee‘s characterization is almost as static as the 
Western villains. Unaware of the spectacle caused by her foreign outfit, she wears a 
Victorian dress and takes pictures as if she were a tourist in Chinese towns. She 
unknowingly eats dog because she is not aware of the practice, and the other name for 
dog meat. While the American-born Chinese Buck Teeth Sol has difficulty speaking 
Chinese fluently, he does not make cultural misunderstanding mistakes like Aunt Yee 
does. The flashback story says she grew up with Master Wong in China, but she does not 
have a lived experience in this culture. While Master Wong has a father, ancestors, the 






nowhere and goes nowhere. She has no history and no future. She is the embodiment of 
modernization fait accompli for women.     
TSUI HARK IS A MASTER 
Tsui Hark reinvents stars and genres, but still matches the star and genre with the 
market. He was educated in American film school and introduced new technology to the 
Hong Kong film industry, but he operated his production house like a mom-and-pop 
shop, and continues the industry‘s apprentice system by mentoring his writers and editors 
like protégés. He has fallen out with directors, but maintained strong ties with big 
companies, assuring him financing and distribution outlets. His productions may have 
seemed disorganized, but in reality his orderly production-house was well managed by 
his wife, Nansun Shi. He has constantly improvised the story, but his brainstorming 
group provided substantial research support that not only helped him churn out sequels 
efficiently, but also helped with script quality that outclassed the copycats of other 
productions. He established his image as a regenerator and innovator. His production was 
a continuation rather than a breakaway from the tradition of Hong Kong cinema. He did 
not repudiate the commercial system, reject cultural tradition or challenge the patriarchy. 
In 2000, after sojourning in Hollywood, he made Time and Tide, another allegorical film 
that ―attempts to redefine Hong Kong at the start of the new millennium‖ (Teo "Starting 
Over: Tsui Hark's Time and Tide"). The film was produced by Columbia Asia but the 
domestic box office was only 4 million HKD. On the screen, Wong Fei Hung, a master in 
martial arts is rendered powerless in the face of Western modern artillery. His love 
interest Aunt Yee, an embodiment of modernization, is just an illusory character. Off the 
screen, Tsui Hark kept transforming the Hong Kong film industry, but could not lead it 






Hark was a disciplined rebel. He pushed the envelope within the existing commercial 
system, without exploring and developing an alternative commercial system.    
At the other extreme end of the spectrum are directors who made art films. Wong 
Kar Wai is one of the most successful among them. His directorial debut As Tears Go By 
(1988), starring Andy Lau and Maggie Cheung garnered over 11 million HKD in the 
domestic box office, and is noticeably different from mainstream gangster films of the 
time. It won multiple awards in the Hong Kong Film Awards. Instead of straddling the 
gap between art and commerce, Wong Kar Wai completely leaned towards art film 
production. His second film Days of Being Wild (1990) won even more awards, but the 
box office return was so disappointing that the planned sequel was canceled. 
Surprisingly, Wong Kar Wai continued to get funding for his next production Ashes of 
Time (1994) whose narrative structure was even more complex for the general audience. 
The domestic market of Hong Kong cinema was small. There was no art cinema theater 
for a segmented market, and no government support for award winning films. Wong Kar 
Wai‘s production was known for its unpredictability. How did he work efficiently and 








Table 7.1 Tsui Hark Filmography 1979-2000 
A* = adaptation, remake, sequel, series, spinoff.  
Production company: CC= Cinema City; FW = Film Workshop; GH =Golden Harvest; 
GP = Golden Princess 


















1980 We’re Going 


























y in Film Bi-
Weekly HK 
Film Critics‟ 
Top 10 Choice 
 
1981 All the Wrong 




CC/GP Jul 23 
99 min 




1982 Aces Go 
Places 
Actor CC Jan 6 
93 min 





1983 Zu: Warriors 
from the Magic 
Mountain 
Director GH Feb 5 
93 min 
15,872,222  Y 
1983 Aces Go 
Places II 
Actor CC Feb 5 
99 min 
23,273,140  Y 
1983 All the Wrong 
spies 
Actor CC Mar 31 
102 min 









CC Aug 5 
95 min 
12,946,443   
1983 The Winter of 
1905 
Actor New Art This is a Taiwan film in which Tsui Hark 
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1984 Aces Go 
Places III- Our 
Man from 
Bond Street 
Director CC Jan 26 
94 min 





FW Oct 11 
104 min 
11,625,564   
1985 Working Class Director 
producer 
CC Aug 10 
99 min 
16,931,337   
1985 Yes, Madam! Actor D & B Nov 30 
93 min 
10,019,862   
1986 A Better 
Tomorrow 
Producer CC/FW Aug 2 
95 min 
34,651,324 Best film and 















CC/FW Sept 6 
117 min 
17,559,357   
1987 Final Victory Actor D & B Mar 12 
98 min 




1987 A Chinese 
Ghost Story 
Producer CC/FW Jul 18 
95 min 
18,831,638 Best art direct-
ion, ori-ginal 
score, original 
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CC/FW Dec 12 
104 min 
 
22,727,369  Y 
1988 I Love Maria Producer 
actor 
GP/FW Mar 10 
100 min 
5,259,522   
1988 The Diary of a 
Big Man 
Producer CC/FW Jul 21 
88 min 
19,419,529   
1988 The Big Heat Producer CC/FW Sept 22 
96 min 
4,076,927   
1988 Gunmen Producer GP/FW Oct 22 
88 min 
4,825,777   
1989 The Killer Producer GP/FW Jul 6 
111 min 
18,255,083 Best director, 




1989 Just Heroes Producer Magnum Sept 14 7,913,329   
1989 Web of 
Deception 
Producer CC/FW Oct 5 3,304,768   








CC/FW Oct 20 
119 min 
18,476,116  Y 
1990 Swordsman Producer 
Executiv
e director 
GP/FW April 5 
117 min 
 
























20,991,782 Best original 
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1990 Spy Games Producer FW May 10 
92min 
3,534,548   
1990 A Chinese 
Ghost Story II 
Producer
, story 
GP/FW Jul 13 
103 min 
20,784,824  Y 
1990 The Laserman Producer FW/Peter 
Wang 
Films 
Screened in the U.S. and Japan but never in 
Hong Kong 







3,694,660   
1991 A Chinese 
Ghost Story III 
Producer GP/FW Jul 18 
107 min 
15,018,584.  Y 
1991 Once Upon a 




GH/FW Aug 15 
139 min 
29,672,278 Best director, 
best editing, 
best original 




1991 The Banquet Director, 
script 





















1992 Once Upon a 




GH/FW Apr 16 
120 min 
















 8,096,542  Y 
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1992 King of Chess Producer 
co-
director 
GP/FW Sept 25 
109 min 
1,151,165   









11,248,503  Y 
1993 Once Upon a 






GH/FW Feb 11 
138 min 
27,540,561  Y 
1993 Once Upon a 




GH/FW Jun 10 
102 min 
11,301,790  Y 









8,159,384  Y 







6,977,084  Y 
















1,819,697  Y 
1994 The Lover Producer
director 
script 
GH/FW Aug 13 
107 min 
18,643,478 Best original 




1994 Once Upon a 




GH/FW Nov 17 
101 min 
4,902,426  Y 





87 min Not released in HK 
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5,127,958   






GH/FW Dec 21 
102 min 










25,218,150   
1996 Shanghai 
Grand 
Producer Win‟s/FW Jul 13 
96 min 
20,837,056   
1996 Black Mask Producer
script 
Win‟s/FW Nov 9 
98 min 
13,288,788   
1997 Once Upon a 
time in China 
and America 
Producer Win‟s Feb 1 
92 min 
30,268,415  Y 
1997 Double Team Director Columbia P  93 min 3,798,730   
1997 A Chinese 
Ghost Story – 










8,163,420  Y 
1997 Knock Off Director FW/ Knock 
Films/A.V.
V. & MDP 
Worldwide 












4,465,047   
 
The information of this table is from:  
1. Sam Ho and Ho Wai-leng (ed) The Swordsman and His Jiang Hu – Tsui Hark and 
Hong Kong Film, Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2002  
2. Hong Kong Film Archive – Collection Items Online Catalogue 
(http://www.lcsd.gov.hk/CE/CulturalService/HKFA/en/6.php) 
3. Hong Kong Films Yearbook (From 1989 to 1998), Hong Kong Kowloon & New 
Territories Motion Picture Industry Association (MPIA) 
4. Dangerous Encounter – 1st Kind ―Hong Kong Film Critics‘ Top 10 Choice‖ Film 







Chapter 8 Wong Kar Wai  The Pragmatic Idealist 
Wong Kar Wai is the most award-winning director in Hong Kong and is 
internationally renowned. His first film As Tears Go By (1988), a box office hit with 10 
nominations among the 14 categories in the Hong Kong Film Awards, instantly caught 
the Hong Kong film industry insiders‟ attention. His second film Days of Being Wild 
(1990) won most of the major awards in Hong Kong and Taiwan. With a production cost 
of nearly 40 million HKD and six top stars, the film gained only a 9.5 million HKD in the 
domestic box office. The plan for part II was canceled. Wong Kar Wai continued to get 
funding for his next project Ashes of Time, winning the 51st Venice Film Festival Ozella 
D'oro prize. But with eight major stars, shot for two years and at an alleged production 
cost of 38 million, the film gained only a 9 million HKD in the domestic market. In 1997 
at the 50
th
 anniversary of Cannes, Wong Kar Wai won the best director award for Happy 
Together. In 2000, In the Mood for Love won the best actor (Tony Leung) and technical 
achievement prizes at Cannes, and at present has 21 awards. All of Wong Kar Wai‟s 
films won multiple awards in local and international film awards venues with no 
exception (see table 8.1 and table 8.2). Since his directorial debut, Wong Kar Wai, and 
his films and his productions have been characterized by media buzz.  
Wong Kar Wai came from a film industry known for its kung fu flicks in Western 
markets. The industry had no government support for award winning directors, the 
system was extremely commercial, the domestic market was small and there was no 
segmented market for home-grown art films. Hong Kong cinema did not have a strong 
tradition of art house cinema. King Hu, whose A Touch of Zen (1971) won the Technical 
Grand Prize, and was nominated for the Palme d‟Or at the 1975 Cannes Film Festival, 






four films. Her first film The Arch (1969), a costume drama depicting oppression of 
women in Chinese tradition, was invited to the Cannes Film Festival‟s Directors‟ 
Fortnight Section
135
. Her second film China Behind (1974) focused on the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution, a repressed topic of the time, and was banned by the colonial 
government. Her third film Sup Sap Bup Dap (1975)
136
 is a social comedy on the Hong 
Kong people‟s obsession with gambling, and her fourth film The Hong Kong Tycoon 
(1979) is a melodrama. There is no apparent thematic or aesthetic consistency in her 
oeuvre, a prerequisite quality of an auteur, as Yau Ching comments (Yau). In an article 
studying Tong Shu-shuen‟s career, Lau Shing-hon concludes, “Sad but true, the concern 
over box office and politics puts a formidable constraint on Hong Kong cinema.”(103-05) 
Local film critics saw her socially critical art films‟ influence in the Hong Kong New 
Wave generation. Tsui Hark‟s Dangerous Encounter – 1
st
 Kind (1980), depicting an 
anarchic Hong Kong, was banned by the colonial government and Tsui Hark switched to 
Cinema City‟s mass entertainment for his next project. Ann Hui‟s The Boat People 
(1982), depicting Vietnamese life after the Vietnam War, was withdrawn from circulation 
due to political reasons. The New Wave generation filmmakers either faded out after a 
few films or merged into the mainstream by straddling the gap between art and 
commerce. The New Wave phenomenon lasted for only a few years. Wong Kar Wai did 
not have a peer group of young directors supporting each other like the previous 
generation. As Jimmy Ngai points out, in Hong Kong there was not even a producer like 
Taiwan‟s Chan Hsiung-chih supporting young directors, and Wong Kar Wai had to fight 
the battle by himself (Ngai Four Films). But making movies in Hong Kong during the 
politicized transitional period, Wong Kar Wai obviously was not just some kind of auteur 
living an apolitical intellectual life, and one whose subjectivity transcended history, as is 






generation, Wong Kar Wai leaned completely towards art film production, instead of 
compromising or nudging for small changes. Days of Being Wild, despite the suggestion 
of rebellious youth and action in the title (see table 8.1 for the meaning of its Chinese 
title), deviates drastically from plot-driven action-packed (or verbal gag-packed) 
mainstream Hong Kong cinema. The convolute narrative structure of Ashes of Time is 
even more alienating for general audiences. Fallen Angel was shot completely with wide 
angle lenses distorting the pretty faces of its stars. Happy Together revolves around the 
relationship problems of a gay couple, hardly a topic for mainstream viewers. In the 
Mood for Love, a gloomy wenyi (roughly meaning drama or melodrama) set in the 1960s, 
is not an uplifting entertainment to a Hong Kong audience badly hit by the regional 
financial crisis. Wong Kar Wai is an oddity in the history of, and in contemporary Hong 
Kong cinema.  
Wong Kar Wai‟s role as a square peg in a round hole began before he became a 
director. Raymond Wong described vividly what an oddball Wong Kar Wai was in his 
memoire. Wong Kar Wai was a scriptwriter on the payroll at Cinema City but didn‟t go 
to the office or produce a page for several months. The crew was waiting for his script. 
Wong Kar Wai‟s explanation was that he needed to put aside everything and get away 
from everyone in order to write an excellent story. Raymond Wong responded, “Buddy, 
the one sitting in front of you is not a boss of a garment factory. I‟m also a 
scriptwriter!...You know. I wrote Papa, Can You Hear Me Sing? in 2 days; The Occupant 
in 3 days. Even the record breaking Aces Go Places took me only one week…I am giving 
you two weeks to finish the script.” Wong Kar Wai handed in the script in one month and 
the director said it was useless. Wong Kar Wai was fired ("This Time We Passed a 
Talent" 71-72;  "Our Loss! Our Loss!" 73-74). Nevertheless he worked as a scriptwriter 






Wong Kar Wai‟s first film As Tears Go By was made in 1988 in an era when the 
problem of stars being overbooked was serious and caused chaos in many productions. In 
1988, Maggie Cheung made 11 films and Andy Lau made 9 films, being in the second 
and third places of the top box office actors respectively (Q. Li 5-6). Wong Kar Wai was 
no less chaotic than his stars. His long time collaborators art director William Chang and 
cinematographer Christopher Doyle know best. William Chang described how Wong Kar 
Wai muddled through the first day of shooting of his very first film: “On the first day of 
filming, I got a call from Wong Kar Wai. He said he had overslept and hadn‟t done the 
scene breakdowns! I rushed to him and said, „The crew don‟t have a clue about the film 
and no one knows what you‟re filming today. Just try to get by and make things up 
tomorrow.” William Chang gave director Wong Kar Wai more precise direction. He said, 
it was “(t)he opening scene where Andy Lau gets up to answer the phone. It was a simple 
scene and I assured him, „Just take a few more shots. No one knows how they will be 
used. No need to panic!‟” (Zhang et al. 39) Since then, not letting the cast and crew know 
what he was filming became Wong Kar Wai‟s signature filmmaking style. Wong Kar 
Wai didn‟t divide the work step by step. He wrote the script during the shooting and he 
also started editing the film during the shooting. He was notorious for starting shooting 
with a sketchy script, then steering his actors through a prolonged process of 
improvisation and revision. Christopher Doyle wrote in 1996 in his production journal 
during the protracted shoot of Happy Together, “Christmas in Argentina no longer 
sounds like a crew in-joke. Shirley Kwan and Zhang Zhen (Chang Chen) have arrived to 
join the cast – what we‟re starting to call the „casualty list‟. They idle in their rooms 
waiting for their roles to materialize, while Wong (Kar Wai) hides in nearby coffee shops 
hoping for the same.” (Doyle "To the End" 17) In the release version, the footage of 






Tiger Hidden Dragon (Ang Lee, 2000) and professionally trained in Japan and the U.S., 
when asked how he would work in a Wong Kar Wai‟s production replied, “I love Wong 
Kar Wai‟s films. I would rather just watch his films.” (Cindy S. C.  Chan) 
Wong Kar Wai‟s delay impacted not only the cast and crew in the production 
department, but also caused chaos in the subsequent sectors. On December 14, 1990 at 
9:30 p.m. the premiere of Days of Being Wild was held at A. C. Hall, Hong Kong. After 
various rituals and speeches, Alan Tang, producer and investor of Days of Being Wild got 





 reels are still being processed in the lab. Later if the film is 
interrupted, we may have to invite our stars to do a live performance to entertain our 
guests and audience.” (Ngai Four Films 35) Jimmy Ngai described Alan Tang as 
sounding so calm that it looked like he was just joking. After the premier Wong Kar Wai 
reedited the film for general release. In an interview in 1992, Alan Tang revealed how 
rushed it was, “It was so rushed that I had to roll up my sleeves and help out. Everyone 
had to help out. Golden Princess (distribution company) almost wet their pants. I was 
nervous too. It will be launched in the entire Taipei market with a few hundred copies 
and two theater chains in Hong Kong. All the labs have to put aside everything and just 
do the printing of the 300 copies of Days of Being Wild.” (W.-m. Law 50) Ten years later 
in 2000, Wong Kar Wai finished In the Mood for Love at the last minute and came with 
his print to Cannes. In the 2001 Cannes Film Festival interview by Gilles Ciment, in 
response to that incident, Wong Kar Wai said, “(W)e were the last film showing in the 
festival. We arrived the day before the last day. Our print was still in Paris, (where they 
were) doing the electronic press kit. So even I hadn‟t seen the finished film. It was a 
terrible experience, but very exciting. But I don‟t want to try that again.” (Brunette 129-






at the film festival. Like 14 years ago in Hong Kong, the reels arrived straight from the 
laboratory but this time it caused a delay in the festival schedule and the incident was 
publicized internationally. 
 In the 1990s Wong Kar Wai created a puzzling phenomenon in Hong Kong. He 
had drawn a heated cultural debate between two camps. One camp dismissed his work as 
“boring art cinema” and the other put him on a pedestal. In the tradition of the modest 
financial approach for non-mainstream film production in Hong Kong, Wong Kar Wai‟s 
filmmaking was considered lavish by that standard. In a film industry with a long 
established practice of low budget quickies, the camp dismissing him usually accused 
him of being wasteful for shooting films like draft papers, selfish for overrunning the 
budget and not watching out for his investor‟s interests, self-indulgent for neglecting the 
general audience, and self-centered for not respecting the actors‟ tight schedule, etc. At 
the other extreme, there was the phenomenon of a collective pilgrimage to his film‟s 
premier
137
 and mountains of reviews everyday reading deep meaning into his movies. 
Wong Kar Wai has such a god-like status in Hong Kong cinema, and his thematic and 
aesthetic consistency was so apparent, that there were many young art film director 
wannabes imitating his style. Lin Dake in studying the influence of Wong Kar Wai lists 
the five characteristics of Wong Kar Wai‟s style: 1. Voice over narration from multiple 
perspectives. 2. Non-linear narrative. 3. MTV visual image. 4. Actor‟s incommunicado 
acting style. 5. Cramped space. (D. Lin "Homage") Lin Dake describes that Wong Kar 
Wai‟s influence was so striking that even older filmmakers unwittingly picked up some 
of his style. 
Having a home grown director recognized in top rank international film festivals 
somehow helped elevate Hong Kong cinema‟s status in the world and redeem the city 






cultural identity and international politics in international film festivals. Wong Jing, 
regarding Jackie Chan as the only filmmaker contributing to Hong Kong cinema in the 
international market, has reservations. He said, “Wong Kar Wai also has a contribution to 
Hong Kong cinema. But strictly speaking, his movies are not so „Hong Kong cinema‟. 
They are products of international financing.” (Ernie  Au 37) Besides the charge of the 
films being commercially prompted by international capital, Wong Kar Wai winning the 
best director in Cannes in 1997 also drew suspicion that the votes were being motivated 
by international politics. On May 15, 1997 before the award was announced, Wong Kar 
Wai and Christopher Doyle were interviewed by more than 20 international media in less 
than 24 hours after they arrived at Cannes. Christopher Doyle told a Hong Kong reporter 
in Cannes, “Those foreign media kept asking us about the 1997 issue…They asked me if 
winning the award was important. Of course I said winning was not important and it was 
more valuable to be present and learn from each other.” (X. Wang) After the result was 
announced, amidst the celebratory atmosphere, newspapers in Hong Kong suspected that 
political factors were involved. For example in a newspaper article on May 20, the writer 
reported Wong Kar Wai winning the best director and Ice Storm (Ang Lee, 1997) 
winning the best screenplay, and said that the Chinese directors‟ performance in that year 
was a pleasant surprise (Dai). The writer didn‟t mention James Schamus as the writer of 
Ice Storm, but instead reported the hearsay that the films of Ang Lee and Wong Kar Wai 
success in the competition, was due to the 1997 factor. And The Taste of Cherries (Abbas 
Kiarostami) sharing the Palme d‟Or with The Eel (Shohei Imamura) might also be 
politically motivated because the Iranian film was banned by the Iranian government 
until shortly before the opening of the film festival. A writer from a Hong Kong English 
newspaper further played up the political dimension. After quoting Wong Kar Wai‟s 






banning of the poster from public places in Hong Kong and the banning of the 
homosexually–themed East Palace, West Palace (Zhang Yuan) in China. The Chinese 
authorities confiscated Zhang Yuan‟s passport to stop him from attending Cannes, and 
pulled Zhang Yimou‟s Keep Cool from its world premiere at Cannes to protest against 
the showing of Zhang Yuan‟s film. Taiwan producer and film critic Peggy Chiao is more 
explicit in her political reading of Happy Together. She states that the film is “actually a 
„tale of three cities‟…The underlying truth is about the mass departures from Hong Kong, 
its 1997 anxieties. The love, the desolation and the breaking-up of the lovers contains 
profound significance in the complicated relationship between Beijing – Taipei – Hong 
Kong. Although Wong Kar-wai‟s political message is extremely subtle and intricate, 
nevertheless to present Happy Together on the eve of the 1997 takeover, was 
undoubtedly not an accident.” (P. H.-p. Chiao 17) Chiao described that Hong Kong was 
in a state of impending disappearance and worried about its creative freedom in the 
future. She wrote, “The borrowed time, the borrowed freedom, all these will remain 
seared in one‟s memory after the takeover ceremony. There might not be an opportunity 
to make films on homosexuals.” (P. H.-p. Chiao 20) She also mentioned the problems 
with Wong Kar Wai‟s next film Summer in Beijing because Chinese censor insisted the 
completed film would have to be exactly like the original approved script. 
After the sovereignty change, the international media buzz about 1997 gradually 
faded. In 2000 Hong Kong was slow to recover from the regional financial crisis. Wong 
Kar Wai aborted the Summer in Beijing project, and went back to make a loose sequel to 
Days of Being Wild. In the Mood for Love (2000) premiered at Cannes. With its story of a 
suppressed love affair, and two dozen dazzling cheongsams: the film was like an 
exhibition of Asian femininity and a parade of exotic fashion. The recurrence of the 






Lady in Hollywood. International film festivals have catapulted Wong Kar Wai into 
world-wide fame and sustained his career. In response to Hollywood‟s domination, 
European countries fortify national cinemas and the film festival circuit as an alternative 
system. Art cinema as institution is no less commercial and the movies are no less 
commodities. With his auteur cult status, themes of urban alienation, and non-linear 
narrative, is Wong Kar Wai‟s art film an extension of European art cinema? Is the case of 
Wong Kar Wai an art cinema version of cultural imperialism, that is, with Europe 
dominating major international film festivals where non-European art films have to 
conform to the standards and rules of European art cinemas? Is Wong Kar Wai‟s stylish 
film just empty spectacle, hollow style and pointless formal experiment? With his pattern 
of overrunning both budget and schedule, how did Wong Kar Wai thrive in the 
competitive environment in the 1990s? How did he even survive in the early years? With 
his habitually chaotic way of working, how did he even finish a project? What Hong 
Kong story did he tell?  
Wong Kar Wai, unlike the classic auteur depicted as artist transcending history 
and studio system, is a pragmatic idealist. He is a situated author working inside the 
political parameters and commercial system of Hong Kong cinema and the international 
film festivals. In making commercially viable, politically feasible and culturally 
accessible art films, he balanced between novelty and utility. One the one hand he looked 
at things in a new way, made use of new opportunities beyond the traditional markets, 
explored new dimensions of his stars and pushed his collaborators to new horizons. On 
the other hand, he adopted the think-inside-the-box pragmatic approach. He factored in 
the specific, enduring parameters of Hong Kong film production, to determine what 
different stakeholders would accept, and sought to recognize a variety of the written and 






knowledgeable about his personnel and the status quo, and capitalized on the trust and 
appreciation of his long time collaborators. His cast and crew fell in with his wishes and 
he wrote scripts tailor-made for his stars, and provided creative space and public 
recognition for his collaborators. He has developed a personal style with influences from 
European art cinema, Asian and Latin American literature, as well as the Hong Kong 
mainstream cinema‟s extravagant style and neurotic energy. Beneath his relationship 
dramas of unrequited love and the incommunicado persona, is his story of the orphan 
island vanity: the yearning for home and its disillusion. His characters, nameless or with 
forgettable ordinary names, are delusional in their autonomy like a legless bird, and their 
homes are as undependable as a rootless tree. Wong Kar Wai‟s story is about the sense of 
insecurity in this orphan island in a decade when it was celebrated as a cosmopolitan city 
while ruled as a colony. His oeuvre is his poignant comment on the elusiveness of official 
discourse, and emptiness of mainstream media representation of Hong Kong in a decade 
defined by the sovereignty change, a historical event imbued with the rhetoric of 
European imperialism, national redemption and Asian modernity. 
“KAR WAI” AS GUARDIAN OF HOME   
Wong Kar Wai was born in 1958. He wears sunglasses to enhance his mystique 
but doesn‟t use a pseudonym. Wong Kar Wai is his birth name. “Kar” means home and 
“Wai” means guardian. Unlike the previous New Wave generation directors or his mixed 
race, multicultural, foreign educated stars and crew, Wong Kar Wai was not educated 
overseas and did not have any migration experience in the West. He is locally educated 
and locally trained. He studied graphic design at Hong Kong Polytechnics. In 1981 he 






screenwriter and in 1988 he directed his first film. Despite his local background he is 
mentally a nomad. In explaining the theme of remembrance in his films he described his 
own childhood among the Shanghai émigré community in Hong Kong. He said, “We 
were always prepared, as kids, that we would move on, to someplace else or back to 
Shanghai. There was no sense that you belonged to this place or city.” (Arthur 41) 
Paradoxically, in the official rhetoric of “moving on” in the new millennium, it is this 
mental nomad and his team who guarded the memory of this city, and documented the 
affective dimension of its history on celluloid. His career path also showed such nomadic 
pattern. Wong Kar Wai did not divide his work step by step and did not plan his career 
step by step either. Every time he reached a point of no return, he took up the next role: 
from writer to director, and then set up his company and worked as his own producer. 
From straddling the gap between art and commercial films, to change to lean completely 
to art cinema, and strode forward into international film festivals. Wong Kar Wai‟s 
filmmaking approach and career moves were not planned ahead. At every phase he 
staked everything on a single throw, and there was no holding back or turning back. To 
understand Wong Kar Wai‟s productions, it‟s best to start with his collaborators, who 
gave their all to his projects without holding back.  
WONG KAR WAI’S COLLABORATORS 
The common characteristics of Wong Kar Wai‘s collaborators are they are very close, 
appreciate each other‘s work quality, eccentric work style and need for creative space. 
Each of them is known for being an idealist. The following brief descriptions of financial 






Christopher Doyle, and stars Maggie Cheung and Tony Leung will help us understand 
how Wong Kar Wai worked.  
Alan Tang 
 Alan Tang was a key person in Wong Kar Wai‟s start as a director. In the Hong 
Kong pianhua financing system, there was no requirement for a completed script, 
executive meeting to green-light a project, completion bond or bank executive to guard 
the production from overrunning either budget or schedule. Alan Tang was an important 
factor that enabled Wong Kar Wai to carve out a space in the commercial system of Hong 
Kong cinema. Alan Tang appreciated Wong Kar Wai‟s talents, and supported his 
first and second films. A brief study of his background and personality will illuminate 
for us why he was so supportive of Wong Kar Wai. Alan Tang was addressed as “Big 
brother” in the industry, because of his generosity in helping friends and being protective 
toward his juniors. He once asserted, “Friends are my real biggest assets.” (Chen and 
Law 50) He was a major star in Cantonese cinema in the 1960s and nicknamed “the 
student prince” after the popularity of his first film The Student Prince (Mok Hong-si, 
1964). He continued to play his Prince Charming role after moving to Taiwan. He 
described his days in Taiwan: “For seven years I kept making romance films. I was so fed 
up that I wanted to puke. I returned to Hong Kong and set up my production company.” 
(Chen and Law) He produced mostly gangster films, and he starred in some as a 
masculine gangster, but female characters in his films usually had a bigger role, in 
contrast to John Woo‟s male bonding gangster films. Alan Tang responded, “A masculine 






gay relationship. We like to have a more human touch, even for gangster films. We 
emphasized more on humanity. This film (Return Engagement, Jo Cheung 1990) focuses 
more on a father-daughter relationship. That‟s because the audience likes this theme and 
it‟s more family audience friendly.” (Feng  Cai) As Tears Go By, a relationship drama 
involving the gangster‟s great aunt and female cousin at the opening sequence, obviously 
would catch Alan Tang‟s attention. The big brother Wah (Andy Lau) risking his life to 
protect his little brother Fly (Jacky Cheung) was an expression of yi (the code of 
brotherhood), a value Alan Tang most probably would buy. Critics often question Wah‟s 
blind loyalty to a trouble-making little brother. In an interview in 1988 in response to the 
reporter‟s request for the reason for the two men‟s bonding, Wong Kar Wai explained it 
away with a “time factor”. He said, “There is something very difficult to write, such as, 
why a man likes a woman or the close relationship of two men. But I want to propose that 
time is the most important factor. Say, if in an extended period of time I spend time with 
you. I open my calendar and see traces of you everywhere. That relationship gradually 
builds up. I don‟t know why I want to help you but I did it.” (Le "Wong as Tears") The 
explanation for Wah‟s action may lie outside the text. The film‟s critical and commercial 
success probably motivated Alan Tang to finance his next project. In response to the box 
office fiasco of Days of Being Wild, Alan Tang was protective of Wong Kar Wai. He 
said, “I am the type of person who wants to do things well. I rarely work under budget…I 
was not neglectful. If I wanted to see the rushes, no one could stop me… The story 
constantly changed and they always tried different printing effects. The director hadn‟t 






Wai. Even though this film lost a lot of money, Wong Kar Wai is still a good kid…I went 
through the 1960s. I know better than the younger generation. So if we wanted to make it 
look real, it would take a lot of money. If I didn‟t sign the check, they couldn‟t move on 
with the filming. I wanted to do things well. I know it was not wise and cost effective to 
make a nostalgic film in Hong Kong…. Overseas investors like me because I will only do 
things better and make their money‟s worth. This is my principle.” (Chen and Law 50) 
Alan Tang emphasized his trust of Wong Kar Wai as his motive for letting the team 
continue the filming.  
Patrick Tam 
Patrick Tam edited Days of Being Wild and Ashes of Time. It was no easy job 
since Wong Kar Wai had no preconceived notion of what the films would be during the 
shooting. Patrick Tam was one of the leading members of the Hong Kong New Wave. 
Wong Kar Wai described how he worked with Patrick Tam, “For most people, I think 
editing is like building up a film. For me it is the reverse. I discount a lot of material, 
break it down. I shoot a lot and throw a lot away…I‟m not sure what I want to find…I 
only know the things I don‟t like, what has to go. At the end, I discover the solid 
materials, put them in order, and finally seek out the thing that I want to say. This way of 
working came from my second film, Days of Being Wild. We have to release the film at 
Christmas and I was still shooting on December 17
th
. So I asked one of my best friends 
Patrick Tam to edit for me. I told him to treat the film as if he hated it, to throw 
everything he didn‟t like away. We didn‟t have any contact while he was editing. At the 






film.‟ I was very happy with it. It was a very memorable moment.” (Havis "Interview 
Wong Kar-Wai – One Entrance Many Exits" 16) Patrick Tam stated that editing Wong 
Kar Wai‟s films was an enjoyable experience because of the high quality of his visual 
material (art direction, lighting and cinematography) and the freedom. Wong Kar Wai 
didn‟t give him any absolute guidelines. Tam said, “He only gave me the films and told 
me to fix it. The good thing is for an action he would take various versions of shots. For 
example in the scene of the Leslie Cheung character entering the kiosk, he had taken a 
wide shot, a close up and a hand-held shot from the back…altogether from 8 different 
angles. I have a lot of options. It was like I was doing the scene breakdown and structured 
the scene for him. He had different takes for an action. My choice will affect the mise-en-
scene and the overall feel of the movie. I usually follow my intuition.” (Pun) Patrick Tam 
relished how he connected the disconnected sequences. He said Wong Kar Wai shot 
many random sequences which were unrelated to the plot such as the close up of a clock, 
the lowering of the store gate, the Leslie Cheung character idling on bed, and dancing the 
Cha Cha in front of the mirror, and he had no idea where to put them in the film when he 
shot them. Later Wong Kar Wai gave Patrick Tam the now famous “legless bird” 
monologue. Patrick Tam connected the shots with the monologue, and showed the erratic 
behavior and contrast of this character: one moment he was so decadent idling on a bed, 
and the next moment he was enjoying life. The ending sequence was Tony Leung‟s 
gambler character preparing to go out. The sequence was not related to the plot. Patrick 
Tam explained, “Back then the film was sold under the pianhua system. Wong Kar Wai 






whatever means. Wong Kar Wai liked that shot and I liked it too because Tony Leung‟s 
acting was very precise. Wong Kar Wai suggested putting it at the end as a promo, trailer 
or teaser. I said to him, „No need to do the promo. Just put it at the end of the 
film.‟…This sequence is like a repudiation of all the events and characters before him. 
His appearance signals a new start: this man lives alone and he was preparing to start 
anew.” (287) William Chang said it was a bold decision for Patrick Tam to end the film 
this way, “It became very special when we knew there wouldn‟t be a sequel – imagine a 
completely new character stealing the show in the last scene! It was Patrick Tam‟s editing 
touch, never seen before in Hong Kong.” (41) Patrick Tam said during the filming of 
Ashes of Time, whenever an actor could go to the desert location in China, Wong Kar 
Wai would instantly write a sequence for him or her to do the shooting. In dealing with a 
tremendous amount of material without a preconceived structure, Patrick Tam said, “The 
guild line I gave myself was to follow the character: should the character do this? Does 
the editing match the character‟s emotion?” (Pun 288) It is hard to imagine how anyone 
outside Wong Kar Wai‟s inner circle could edit his films and accommodate his work 
style. It took Patrick Tam about a month to edit Days of Being Wild and one year for 
Ashes of Time. Patrick Tam didn‟t edit for Wong Kar Wai after that. He said, “He 
(Wong) has asked me to edit Fallen Angel. But I‟m not interested to go on. Firstly, it 
dragged on for too long. Secondly, after I finished editing Ashes of Time, he asked 
William Chang to do some fine cuts. William Chang added the opening desert ambient 
shot. I think if you want me to do it, you have to let me be responsible from the beginning 






tuning, it‟s better to let me do it. Maybe he needed the other people‟s perspectives. You 
can say that I am a perfectionist. I can do the editing for you frame by frame, very 
detailed. I will spend a lot of time to reflect on it. But if you want me to change according 
to another person‟s point of view, I feel uncomfortable…” (289)     
William Chang 
William Chang, having enlivened many works of the Hong Kong New Wave 
directors, is regarded as “the single most influential art director/production designer in 
Hong Kong.” (Jacob Wong 3) He worked not only as an art director in Wong Kar Wai‟s 
star studded productions, but sometimes also as editor and more importantly as a partner 
in the conception of the projects. He was born in Hong Kong in 1953 and his parents 
came from Shanghai. His career has been steady with no major ups or downs. He worked 
as Tong Shu Shuen‟s assistant director on Sup Sap Bup Dup (1975) and The Hong Kong 
Tycoon (1979), a useful experience when Wong Kar Wai asked him to take over the 
editing of his first film.  He said, “I‟d tried my hand at most things working under Shu 
Shuen and learned a bit about editing watching over her shoulder” (Zhang et al. 40) In 
1978, when film was still perceived as an illegitimate business, he went to study film in 
Canada. There was neither enthusiastic parental support nor a young rebellious struggle. 
He said, “I didn‟t like school but would go to the cinemas four or five days a week. When 
I told him (father) I wanted to enroll in a film studies course, he said fine but told me not 
to tell the other relatives.” (34) After returned to Hong Kong, he worked as designer. His 
cover designs for City Magazine were described as legendary for creating a Hong Kong 






and celebrities probably enriched his experience in handling stars. A writer of the 
magazine described William Chang as an easy-going person, and yet also an extreme 
perfectionist (Deng). In 1981 William Chang worked in Patrick Tam‟s Love Massacre, a 
film that established the art director post in Hong Kong cinema (Zhang et al.). He was 
introduced to Wong Kar Wai by Patrick Tam and they instantly became friends. The two 
met for five-days-a-week in the same coffee shop from 11 pm to 5 am for a few years. He 
said, “We could talk on almost anything and everything: films, books, a pretty dress, and 
liked the same scene of a movie. Turns out he too was a regular of the cine clubs in his 
teens. I suspect we actually sat at the same screening of some films though we didn‟t 
cross paths.” (39) They share favorite directors and life experiences. William Chang said, 
“Godard, Pier Paolo Pasolini, Satyajit Ray, some Japanese masters. Each time, we would 
choose a different director from a different country for discussion. We also talked about 
New Wave in France, Italy, Germany, and Japan in the 1960s.” (39) “My parents didn‟t 
let me go out so I stayed at home most of the time. Wong Kar Wai lived in Tsim Sha Tsui 
and he could go out freely. He saw and knew so much more than I did…We had some 
different experiences to share and talk about. Days of Being Wild was as much his 
brainchild as mine.” (41)   
William Chang, an important partner in Wong Kar Wai‟s creative process, said, “I 
treat Wong Kar Wai no differently than others but there is a magical spark not found in 
others‟ films.” (40) Being there for Wong Kar since his first film, he described how they 
worked in the beginning, “He had the plot thought out before discussing it with me. The 






ending. The years of watching films, our likes and dislikes…were all poured into this 
debut film. There were so many possibilities to explore. When I work for other films, I 
don‟t get involved in the screenplay. It is different with Wong Kar-wai. We talk the story 
through. In the preparation of each shoot, he usually comes up with several stories for us 
to discuss and choose. We keep discussing the script while shooting the film.” (39) That 
probably was the most organized production of Wong Kar Wai. 
They shared not only a Shanghaiese immigrant family background, but also 
values, a world view and a mode of working. William Chang is professional and yet 
playful. On the one hand he said, “I think art direction is a service. When the director 
needs you, you have to provide varieties of things for him to select.” (C. Li 50) But on 
the other hand, he said, “I see filmmaking as a game and don‟t treat it too seriously. If a 
director gets too serious, I‟ll lose interest in no time.” (Zhang et al. 40) He admitted that 
he was known for being stubborn and had dropped out of a film. He describes himself: 
“I‟m not a practical person, naïve and idealistic even, but I give every film my best shot.” 
(48) In response to the comment of Wong Kar Wai‟s filming style as “extravagant”, he 
said, “I never ask him about production costs. I don‟t think it matters even if the film 
goes over-budget or you pay out of your own pocket so long as you have a film.” (45) 
William Chang emerged at a time when the industry was booming and 
transforming and thus allowed for a brief period for experimentation.  He said, “When art 
directors first came onto the scene, directors didn‟t know how to deal with the situation. 
They gave you all the freedom as long as you got things done within budget. I‟m used to 
this working style. I‟m a man of few words, never attend meetings or tell people how I do 
things. Changes are the norm.” (48) The industry was flexible enough to accommodate 
his absurd way of thinking. William Chang said he usually started his work with a 






As Tears Go By, I demanded only two things that I absolutely needed. One was the white 
ceramic tile and the other one is a black round neck short sleeve knit top. I didn‟t know 
why. I just wanted these two things.” (Y. Yan 62) “I can‟t explain. Each time I work on a 
film, something special will pop up in my mind, and the art design will develop from it 
naturally. Why? I don‟t know, but my experience proves it can‟t be wrong” (Zhang et al. 
40) Wong Kar Wai‟s flexible way of working further indulged him. “Working with 
Wong (Kar Wai) I‟m free to try almost anything,” said William Chang quoting Brigitte 
Lin‟s birdcages in Ashes of Time as an example, “It may not be relevant to the plot but 
gave me the chance to try out new ideas.” (48)   William Chang shared Wong Kar Wai‟s 
habit of not letting others know what he was doing. He said, “When I worked with Wong 
Kar Wai, he had no idea what I wanted to do. But we understood each other and didn‟t 
have to verbalize it. He was easy going. I would try out something and then he would 
shoot some films to see the effect. Usually half way through the filming I still didn‟t 
know what I was doing or what I want.” (Y. Yan 62) Director Wong Kar Wai is no more 
disciplined. William Chang described, “Unpredictability is our name. Wong (Kar Wai) 
would tell me to think up something only hours before shooting started, and I would tell 
him I would try. But it seems he has changed for the worse recently, making his requests 
at the eleventh hour…Maybe I have spoiled him.” (Zhang et al. 49) They spoiled each 
other. 
Nevertheless, they have some regularity. William Chang said, “Preparation and 
shooting go side-by-side…Wong (Kar Wai) knows how to use the art director‟s 
achievements. He sees it if he likes it, and ignores it if he doesn‟t.” (48) In regard to his 
designs being abandoned William Chang said, “That‟s alright. I‟ll bring it up next time. I 
always put in more than is actually needed for him to choose. It‟s his film and I trust his 






well. They always know what‟s best and I respect their choices.” (48) He thought of all 
the choices before making them available for their selection, “I offer only what I think is 
best, setting a boundary and limiting their selection, and mixing and matching within it.”  
(48) William Chang, as production designer, set the parameters for the director and 
cinematographer to work within. 
Like Wong Kar Wai, he also did his drafting on film. He said, “The world itself is 
full of color. I never set a color scheme for the movie. I‟ll wait till the filming is done 
about a week to know which color appears most frequently. Then I‟ll use that color; that 
might be the result of light, environment, street scene etc. I didn‟t purposely set the color 
scheme. Even if you set a color scheme, you may not be able to find it on the location. 
Besides, I don‟t like fixating on a color scheme.” (C. Li 51) He also prefers to work 
within parameters naturally presented on the set. “I usually need to know what the scene 
is about and how it will be shot. It‟s only via the actor‟s acting, movement, camera 
position that I know how the character should look like. So I always have a hairstylist by 
my side. I only start the image design on the set. I don‟t like preparing it one month 
beforehand. I can‟t do it. If I am forced to prepare it one month or two weeks beforehand, 
I will fake it and make up something. And then when I‟m on location, I will follow my 
feeling to work on it.” (51) William Chang has his rationale for using elements naturally 
presented on the set. He said, “We will see what‟s available nearby. In fact, I always want 
to use the other people‟s used stuff as props. I don‟t like buying a new thing or creating a 
new thing. Because once it‟s bought or created, it loses the natural feeling it conveys.” 
(52) It‟s natural that he likes the filmmaking style of Chungking Express. He said, “I like 
the improvisation approach in Chungking Express. It‟s leisurely. We don‟t start working 
until the last minute. For example, if we need a top, the call time is 6 and we‟ll start 






suitable and I‟ll borrow it. It‟s simple and we don‟t need to stress ourselves out.” (52) By 
the mid-1990s William Cheung had worked in the industry for one and a half decades on 
over 50 films. His improvisation built on that experience. Despite his “disorderly” way of 
working, William Chang didn‟t create anxiety for the crew members. He said, “I like 
trying out luck. Sometimes I purposely did not plan anything and worked things out on 
the set. And I seldom exchange opinions with the crew. The crew members didn‟t worry 
because of that. If I didn‟t worry, why should they?” (52) 
Wong Kar Wai, William Chang and Christopher Doyle were dubbed by the local 
media as “the magnificent trio” but they did not hang out 24/7 like other Hong Kong 
filmmakers. William Chang said, “We don‟t see ourselves as the „magnificent trio‟. We 
seldom see each other outside the set.” (Zhang et al. 49) “We don‟t talk much, just 
concentrating on our own part. Any chemistry among us will be revealed during the 
shooting. They arrived on a set only after it has been constructed to discuss how the scene 
will be shot. I observe from the sidelines to see which angles they‟ll use more, and which 
less, though I never ask why. I look to the film for answers. This is the best way of 
getting things done. I dress a set and leave it to them to find the way to capture the most 
interesting images.” (48) In fact, they kept some distance after production. William 
Chang said, “Because the entire process is so long, more than a year from pre-production 
to post-production, I need to go far away from him after each film and do something 
else.” (49) 
Wong Kar Wai‟s movies are often star-studded. William Chang played an 
important role as the star tamer. Jimmy Ngai in his journal of the making of Ashes of 
Time describes the tremendous difficulty being art director of this film with eight major 
stars who could add more chaos to Wong Kar Wai‟s already chaotic filmmaking (Ngai 






desired not to be overshadowed by the others. Jimmy Ngai described that every time the 
actors tried out their costumes and makeup, it was like a military operation that had to be 
done discreetly to avoid each star seeing the other‟s costume. In my interview with him in 
August 2000, William Chang calmly recounted the endeavor. He said, Maggie Cheung, 
after putting on her costume, turned to him and asked, “What is Brigitte going to wear?” 
(Berenice) The interview was done shortly before In the Mood for Love was released and 
Maggie Cheung‟s cheongsam look became the center of attention. When William Chang 
and Brigitte Lin first met in 1981, Brigitte Lin was already a big star and the producer 
reminded him to watch what he said to her, but they became fast friends after the shoot. 
In the 1990s William Chang‟s name appeared on the credits of many of Brigitte Lin‟s 
films. William Chang explained, “She (Brigitte Lin) would press film companies to hire 
me for her films, so in the 1990s I was either art directing or designing her wardrobes and 
the images in all her films. It was a clause written into her contract, which meant extra 
expenses. Brigitte Lin is such a perfectionist that she won‟t even let a single hair be out of 
place or her mood would change, and that‟s why she only trusts people she knows well to 
design her wardrobe or do her hair or makeup.” (Zhang et al. 38-39) But sometimes 
things didn‟t work out for William Chang. In 1995, there was rumor of Leon Lai (the 
killer in Fallen Angel) not getting along with him. Wong Kar Wai explained that William 
Chang wanted to transform Leon Lai‟s appearance into a completely different look, but 
Leon Lai was concerned about his image as an idol singer (X. Xu). In Fallen Angel 
Michell Reis, a former beauty queen usually cast in the nice girl role, played the killer‟s 
agent wearing fishnet stockings and fondling herself on his bed and became “the tackiest 
of super-slut characters.” (Havis "Angels") In the beginning of the shooting, Wong Kar 
Wai asked the cameraman for an extra-wide-angle lens. The cameraman reminded him, 






an interview in Toronto the interviewer intuitively asked Wong Kar Wai, “Did you ask 
the actress first?” Wong Kar Wai answered, “No. I didn‟t have to.” (Brunette 116) The 
stars‟ trust of William Chang‟s professionalism must have helped. 
Christopher Doyle 
Wong Kar Wai‟s films are known for their sensuous quality and visual 
expressivity. Christopher Doyle‟s cinematography helps the films speak to the audience 
at a more visceral level: a more physical, emotional, and sensual level. Doyle was born in 
1952 in Sydney Australia. He worked as a sailor at age 18 and had traveled around the 
world. Picking up languages whereever he worked or lived, he is multilingual.
138
 He 
described himself as “mischievous” (Cinnie) and his playfulness is in contrast to William 
Chang‟s calm and steady demeanor. He studied Chinese at the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong, and his Chinese teacher gave him an elegant Chinese name “Du Kefeng” 
from a Chinese poem. His Chinese name sounds so authentically Chinese that Doyle said 
people didn‟t know that he‟s not Chinese when they only read his name.
139
 In an 
interview in 1989 conducted in Chinese, the reporter was impressed and wrote in the 
introduction, “Du Kefeng, a very local and stylish Chinese name. He is unambiguously a 
foreigner, yet he speaks fluent Putonghua.” (X. Wei 13) His integration into Chinese 
culture can be seen in his adoption of a special Chinese cinema aesthetic practice. In his 
journal on the production of Happy Together he wrote, “I don‟t know what to call our 
„trademark‟ shots in English. In Chinese we say „kong jing‟. They‟re not your 






space. The only thing they „establish‟ is a mood or totally subjective point of view. They 
are clues to an „ambient‟ world we want to suggest but not explain.” (Doyle Empty Shot)  
He later moved to Taiwan and worked on Taiwan‟s experimental film and 
government TV. When New Taiwan Cinema director Edward Yang invited him to shoot 
his first feature film That Day on the Beach, he had never used 35 mm film before and he 
said “I knew very little about lighting because I‟d only shot some of my own stuff before, 
in available light” (Vasudev 23) Being able to keep things simple and use available light 
became his advantage when the situation required him to be flexible without 
compromising the quality, such as shooting in the desert in Ashes of Time or in his own 
apartment in Chungking Express (Zhou). He later moved to France, married a French-
born Chinese woman, and experienced the life of many East Asian immigrant families of 
the era: splitting his time between his home base in the West and his workplace in the 
East. He lived in Paris but flew back and forth to make films in Hong Kong and Taiwan 
for three to four years. In the 1990s he worked mostly in art films or non-mainstream 
films with directors from Hong Kong, Taiwan and China. Despite his sailor background, 
Doyle didn‟t carry a sojourner‟s mentality. Instead, he made an effort to integrate into 
local life. In a 1989 interview he said, “Now I have to learn Cantonese. Even though the 
creative space in Hong Kong is not as wide as in Taiwan, it gives me more training in 
technical aspects. Therefore I choose to work in Hong Kong. I know there is a limitation. 
I will try hard to push myself forward within this limitation and reach a more ideal work 
environment…I need to learn to live. A person who knows how to live can be more 






cooperation with Taiwan and Hong Kong directors and his production notes he explained 
how his thinking worked, “My way of thinking is similar to Chinese. I need to circle 
round and round before getting to the core of the question. It‟s different from the 
foreigner‟s linear way.” (12) By 1995 his identification with local film industry can be 
seen in his use of the world “we” and his comment on the local government‟s approach to 
the industry. He said, “I think the biggest difference between Hong Kong and the world is 
we look down upon our own cinema…the Hong Kong government does not regard 
filmmaking as significant and doesn‟t give any support. From their point of view, 
filmmakers are no different from prostitutes. Even the Hong Kong Film Awards was 
founded by the Film Bi-Weekly. This is impossible in other countries…Even Macau has 
a film bureau. Only the Hong Kong government didn‟t do anything to recognize Hong 
Kong cinema.” (Gary "Doyle Post-Mtv" 57) 
Despite his complaint about the government, it is easy to see why Doyle fitted 
well into the Hong Kong filmmakers‟ personal and informal way of working. In a 1989 
interview, He said, “When I work with other people, first of all I have to make sure if I‟m 
familiar with him and if we can get along. This is very important to me.” (X. Wei 11) His 
emphasis on feeling foretold that he would click with William Chang and Wong Kar 
Wai. He said, “In the process of communicating with the director, I asked a lot of 
questions. The important thing is I want to know how the director feels about these 
incidents…I need to know what our relationship is and if the director shares my view.” 
(11)He described how Patrick Tam shared his view about cinematography. He said 






tell stories. He said, “From my standpoint, we should tell stories with the structure, 
camera movement and its relationship with the actors…Patrick Tam is also bold to 
foreground the existence of the camera. Some people think that the camera should be 
transparent. This is one way of working. But more and more people feel that noticing the 
camera‟s existence is not necessarily a bad thing.” (11) He concluded that looking for a 
work partner was more important than looking for a project. He could learn and improve 
himself via cooperating with others. 
Like Wong Kar Wai‟s actors, Doyle experienced an epiphany during the filming 
of Days of Being Wild. He said, “I realized it‟s OK to just do your thing, do it as well as 
you can and it will work itself out. That happened in the middle of Days of Being Wild. 
Since then filmmaking for me has been very relaxed, it‟s been a sport. Before this it was 
an occupation, an aspiration. I was impossible on the set, I was uptight, I was over-
serious, and now it is a game, relaxed, and quite an enjoyable process…Now what 
happens is we talk about music more than anything else. It‟s true that location and music 
are the most important elements. We have done six films together (up to Happy 
Together) and now there is such understanding. We have a common attitude of 
filmmaking and toward life. There is trust, there is faith, and from there we just go on.” 
(Vasudev 24-25) Wong Kar Wai described his cooperation with Doyle as exciting. He 
said, ―Doyle originally worked in Taiwan and participated in the birth of Taiwan New 
Cinema. His Chinese is very fluent. We have no communication problem. Besides, I 
don‘t treat him as a cameraman, but a partner at work. He also helps out in buying beer, 






most cameramen, I need to push them to work, supervise them to get to my demand. But 
Doyle is always overdoing things, so that I have to hold him back.‖ (Peng 44) 
Doyle learned the importance of space from Wong Kar Wai. He said, “It (the 
space) has to be familiar, it has to say something to you, that when we go to look for a 
location whether it's in Argentina, or now in Shanghai…that the space actually informs 
the film.... We don't know the film until we find the space…once the actors have their 
hair, once they have the costumes, once they have a space to relate to…they feel more 
confident… So basically, the space actually informs the film, the space tells you this is a 
place where this kind of person could live.” ("Meet Chris Doyle" "Meet Chris Doyle") 
The existing space is the starting point for Doyle‟s creative work. He said, “We spend a 
lot of time looking for spaces, doing location research. If you find a space that says 
something to you – to me that implies a certain kind of light, certain colors, and to the 
director it implies a certain kind of personality, a certain kind of person that would be in 
this space. That is actually how the character is developed…Basically it is very intuitive. 
We work off the implications of the space.” (Vasudev 25) But in Happy Together, 50-
60% of the film takes place in the small space of a room. Even the scene of a back alley 
looks like Hong Kong. The team was always asked why they travel all the way to 
Argentina to make a chamber drama. He said, “We went halfway round the world to 
discover that where you are is in your heart. In the film these two guys recreate a space of 
their own in an alien environment. Their world is really in their heart. People said we 






to Buenos Aires. I think a lot of people discover that when they immigrate, or travel. That 
was the great revelation of the film to us.” (25) 
The space in Happy Together is peculiar. In his production journal, Doyle 
described, “This film and its character are all out of Time and out of Space. In their world 
it‟s emotions that colour a context or a scene, not my gels or filters…” (Doyle "Out Of") 
“I light for „neither here nor there‟. We can wait till Post Production to decide if it‟s day 
or night!” (Doyle "Sun") In the paragraph titled “The Future” Doyle wrote, “Our interiors 
are consciously „timeless‟, they‟re not „logically‟ lit. Time of day is not a concern in this 
film. Tony and Leslie‟s world is out of space and time…Wong (Kar Wai) says that it‟s 
only as he edits the film that he finds the meaning of much of what we have shot. We 
didn‟t really know what certain details or colors or actions meant at the time. They 
anticipated where the film would take us. They were images from the future at that time 
that we‟ve only just arrived at now.”(Doyle "Future")  To Doyle filmmaking in Wong 
Kar Wai‟s project is a journey rather than a destination. 
Wong Kar Wai also led his actors in a journey of self-revelation. He capitalized 
on his stars‟ sense of vanity, insecurity, sensitivity, and emotional quality to develop his 
characters. He said, “I always look for people to talk with me. It‟s not that I need people 
to give me an opinion or suggestion. It is because I need to borrow their lives. When I 
know their views, I can model after their view and create a character. Sometime the call 
time is 7 am but at 4 am I will still be brainstorming with someone. That person may not 
know what I‟m doing and doesn‟t know that I‟m borrowing his life.” (Ngai Four Films 






characters show Wong Kar Wai‟s mastery of the star system in his commercially viable 
art films. 
Maggie Cheung  
 Maggie Cheung played a fantastic dream girl in Wong Jing‟s romance comedy 
(e.g. Romancing Star). She was masculined up as a marginal woman surviving adversity 
in Tsui Hark‟s martial arts films (e.g. Green Snake, Dragon Inn). But in Wong Kar Wai‟s 
movie she became a melancholy and vulnerable woman who is romantically challenged. 
Maggie Cheung was born in Hong Kong and moved to England at age 8. Her parents 
speak Shanghaiese and she is multilingual. She worked as a TV commercial model by 
chance in her visit to Hong Kong at age 17. In 1983 she was the first runner-up in the 
Miss Hong Kong Pageant. When asked why she entered the beauty contest she said 
directly that it‟s vanity. She said, “Yes. I wanted to be a star (she didn‟t say „actress‟). I 
didn‟t have a detailed plan but thought that a beauty contest provided a shortcut. But I 
didn‟t want it so bad to get there by foul means. If I didn‟t win, I would just go back to 
England. It is no big deal.” (Murong 39) Then she started in television and film. Her 
career was relatively stable with no major ups or downs. She used to be one of the most 
prolific actors in the 1980s. She gradually transformed her image as a beauty queen into 
that of a serious actress. She always got into conflict with the local media who called her 
“the lovelorn movie queen” and depicted her as arrogant and uncooperative. Despite her 
returning to Hong Kong for more than 10 years, she was still a square peg in a round 
hole, not fitting into the existing informal way of operation of the entertainment news 






her personal life private. She said, “I think the system of Hong Kong media is 
problematic. The reporters don‟t follow the procedure of arranged interview and still 
prefer to do it the personal way and then make things up in their writing…You shouldn‟t 
say that I hate the media because I don‟t want to meet people. When I don‟t have 
something to say or I don‟t think I can lead an interesting conversation, I prefer to be left 
alone. I live an ordinary person‟s life when I‟m not making movies or doing publicity.” 
(J. Lau) She explicitly said she preferred to act in art films that gave her greater sense of 
satisfaction whereas directors of commercial film often rushed her. She said, “Like in 
Days of Being Wild, many people say the tempo is too slow. But this is real life. This is 
acting with life experience. So I enjoy working in this kind of film.” (Jin 37) Nonetheless 
she did not oppose commercial cinema. She said, “I absolutely do not discriminate 
commercial films. And we shouldn‟t. They are just a different type of films.” (J. Lau 48) 
She described Wong Kar Wai as an actor‟s director. She said, “I enjoy working with 
Wong Kar Wai because as an actor I can work out things with him. He gave actors a lot 
of creative space. He didn‟t mind using a lot of time and film until you get a perfect 
result.” (48) Getting recognized is another source of satisfaction. She said, “That is why 
actors in Wong Kar Wai‟s films always got nominated for awards. He is absolutely a 
director who makes movies for the actors.” (Jin 37) In 1993 Maggie Cheung revealed that 
at that point she was tired of making frivolous movies and wanted to be more selective in 
her future projects. Otherwise she would hate acting. She acknowledged that As Tears Go 
By was a major turning point in her career and Wong Kar Wai enlightened her on acting 






acting…the movies I made before As Tears Go By are failures…that might be because I 
didn‟t stop and do some introspection and think how to improve myself.” (Murong 39) 
She said she liked to leave things to fate and believed in luck. 
Tony Leung 
 Tony Leung is also a private person and went through the point of wanting to quit. 
His career was also relatively stable with no major ups or downs. He attended the TVB 
actors training class in 1982. Despite his quiet outlook, he stood out in the crowd for 
playing an introspective introvert side-character so well that the TV producers added 
more scenes for him. From his first film Young Cops (Yau, Kar-hung, 1985) to In the 
Mood for Love (Wong Kar Wai, 2000) he has acted in about 51 movies, including 
Taiwan director Hou Hsiao Hsien‟s City of Sadness (1989), Vietnamese-French director 
Tran Anh Hung‟s Cyclo (1995), and for Hong Kong directors like John Woo, Tsui Hark, 
Stanley Kwan, Peter Chan, as well as in many less than quality movies. Tony Leung had 
said Maggie Cheung was like his alter ego. He was also sensitive and serious about his 
acting in an era when overbooking and the unprofessionalism of stars was common. For 
example, Wong Kar Wai asked him to play in the sequel of Days of Being Wild, but he 
already promised Tsui Hark to play the monk in A Chinese Ghost Story III.  He insisted 
on authenticity of the body form and shaved his head to play the monk. He refused to put 
on a wig to play the gambler. He said, “I will not play in the sequel until my hair grows 
back. It is because I won‟t believe myself being a gambler. We have never seen a bald 
gambler. Body form is very important in acting.” (C. Feng) He was insecure and 






played a mute character in Hou‟s City of Sadness. Instead of seeing this as an assurance 
of his performance, he suspected that it was based on a commercial calculation, and that 
the investor wanted a Hong Kong star to help sell the movie overseas (C. Feng). He got 
emotional after seeing his performance in Bullet in the Head (John Woo, 1990). He said, 
“I locked myself up for 7 days and cried at least 3 days.” (17) It was Wong Kar Wai who 
rebuilt his confidence. He said, “In Hong Kong‟s environment it is hard for actors to 
improve their acting. We have to work 7 to 8 or even 10 years in order to make a little 
progress. I can‟t learn much from the one-year training class at TVB. After that there was 
no one to guide me…I couldn‟t work better. I felt bored. Even though I have only one 
shot in Days of Being Wild, but it rebuilt my confidence.” (17) In a 1994 interview article 
titled “Tony Leung is a melancholic boy” he was described as melancholic, 
unapproachable and unpredictable (H. Huang "Tony Leung Melancholic"). The winning 
of the best actor award for the first time for Chungking Express didn‟t help him feel 
better about himself. He said, “In filming Chungking Express I didn‟t do any preparation 
or character study. I just improvised on the set. It was like playing at work. It was so easy 
that I didn‟t feel like I contributed anything. Now that I got the award, I feel anxious.” 
(Gary "Tony Leung Fulfills" 39) Tony Leung was one of the few actors in that era who 
would spend a tremendous amount of time doing research and reading books. His effort 
showed in the roles in which he was cast: he often played the intellectual type: a quiet 
introvert with complicated feelings. He admitted that in real life he was also emotional, “I 
can suddenly feel unhappy and depressed. It has nothing to do with something or 






he won best actor at Cannes, Tony Leung revealed to a magazine the impact on him 
growing up in a single parent family, how he became quiet, have difficulties 
communicating with others and his longing for a harmonious family. He said, “I really 
don‟t like talking. I only like listening to others…it‟s the influence of my family since 
childhood. I used to be feisty and happy. But at age 8 to 9 years old after father left the 
family, my childhood became defective…I became quiet and kept a distance from 
others.” (M. Wang 68) He maintained a stable and close relationship with his mother and 
girlfriend, but he was described as uptight. He said, “After working together all these 
years, Wong Kar Wai still feels that he can‟t push down the wall in my heart.” (C. Wong 
"Tony Leung – Everything Is About Feeling" 20) He went through a self-destructive 
period. He used drinking to help his emotional pain. He said, “I drank a lot to escape 
from the pain of hiding a lot of secrets. Later I found out that acting can help me let my 
emotions out. I can cry my heart out without feeling inferior or embarrassed.” ("Tony 
Leung – Everything Is About Feeling" 37) Wong Kar Wai integrated Tony Leung‟s 
attributes (quiet, introspective, insecure, self-destructive, has difficulty in 
communication, yearns for home and a stable relationship) into his character and made 
the filming process a personal journey for him. Carina Lau was complimented for her 
performance in Days of Being Wild. Wong Kar Wai talked to her and helped her to play 
the scene where she swallowed her pride and went back to the man. She said, “I now 
realized that Wong Kar Wai knows me better than I do. I will say I won‟t go back to the 
man but my actions will be otherwise. I was not familiar with Wong Kar Wai before. But 






within such a short time. I‟m very impressed.” (Le "No Longer") Carina Lau also 
mentioned the 46 NG takes that Wong Kar Wai used to “naturalize” his star‟s established 
pattern of acting. Tony Leung also got more than 20 NG takes and yet he was grateful. 
He said, “He (Wong) spent 400,000 feet of film and 300,000 feet of it was for me to 
practice acting…in the process the character gradually gets in shape. This is easier than 
giving me a script, study it for a month and then transform myself into the character from 
this abstract description.” (C. Wong "One Cannes Best Actor and Three International 
Auteur Directors" 32) In working with Wong Kar Wai, actors gained knowledge in 
acting, or in themselves and that probably made Wong Kar Wai attractive to actors who 
needed career therapy or self-introspection. 
WONG KAR WAI’S FILMMAKING 
Despite the chaotic way they worked and their perfectionist personalities, Wong 
Kar Wai‘s collaborators remained calm, supportive and maintained their zeal in 
filmmaking. William Chang, when asked if he thought of working as a director, said, ―I 
was an art director from day one and got stuck with it…I think the most important quality 
of a director is that he/she has something to say. I lost my desire to express my thoughts 
when I reached my thirties. Being a screenwriter and a director is too tough these days.‖  
(Zhang et al. 49) Christopher Doyle admitted that he tended to load his own film with his 
message and could better express himself in light and color (X. Wei). Among them Wong 
Kar Wai was the one who has something to say and was trained to say it well. He said, 
“The reason I went into filmmaking had more to do with geography than anything else. I 
was born in Shanghai, but my parents moved to Hong Kong when I was five years old. 






able to talk with people there; I couldn't make any friends. And my mother, who was in 
the same situation, often took me to the movies because it was something that could be 
understood beyond words. It was a universal language based on images. Like a lot of 
people in my generation, therefore, I discovered the world through films and later on 
through TV. Twenty years earlier, I might have chosen to express myself through songs. 
Fifty years earlier, it might have been books. But I grew up with images, and it felt rather 
natural for me to go and study visuals.” (Tirard 194) But Wong Kar Wai admitted that 
he has no ulterior goal in filmmaking, ―Filmmaking is a job to me. But other than that, 
the biggest fun of filmmaking is I can live a few lives. I can create a world and arrange 
how the characters live their lives. It‘s like playing God. I can get inside the characters 
and experience their lives.‖ (Yang and Liu 46) Nevertheless, he does not take film too 
seriously. He said, ―I remember I joked with Patrick Tam. I asked him which films he 
would bring with him if his house were on fire. People‘s lists of favorite films always 
change. It‘s only at that moment you know which films are most important to you. But in 
the end you might rather take the passport than those videos and laser discs. It is because 
in the end we can do without film.‖ (46)  Unlike Wong Jing, Tsui Hark and many Hong 
Kong filmmakers to whom quitting filmmaking is not an option, Wong Kar Wai, when 
asked what he would do if he didn‘t make movies, replied, ―I will open a bar and be a 
bartender, or the breakfast manager of a restaurant.‖ (J. Pan A21) He was not thinking of 
eternal fame or laying the foundation for a future enterprise. In a conversation with his 
friend Jimmy Ngai in 1995, Wong Kar Wai predicted that his popularity wouldn‘t last for 
long (Ngai Four Films). From Jimmy Ngai‘s point of view, Wong Kar Wai was so 
familiar with the existing system that he was able to break out from it and establish 
something new. But Wong Kar Wai described that his career path was more like getting 






Wai said, “All I could think of is how to save myself…I can only care about staying alive 
in the messy battle. I never thought of winning a beautiful war…I just want to keep 
working when there is still opportunity.” (Four Films 165) Jimmy Ngai was correct that 
Wong Kar Wai was insightful of the game in the Hong Kong film industry. Wong Kar 
Wai pointed out the most essential skill in surviving the Hong Kong film industry: telling 
a story. Ng See Yuen, chairman of the Federation of Hong Kong Filmmakers and 
Honorary Permanent President of the Hong Kong Film Directors' Guild, once said, “If 
you cannot tell an attractive story in one minute, then forget about it…a good script is 
only the basic requirement. I don‟t need a good script. What can you give me besides a 
good script? You need to present something that catches the audience‟s attention. If you 
can find that point, then go ahead and shoot the film. Otherwise just save your breath. 
There are already a few thousand Chinese films in existence. Yours won‟t make a 
difference in this ocean, right?” (W. He "Ng Business Slow" 54) It is also important to 
sell the story to the star. Tony Leung explained why he kept working with Wong Kar 
Wai, “Wong Kar Wai is excellent in telling a story. Every time after listening to his story 
I would feel, ‗Oh! I will regret it if I don‘t work in his film! It will be a big loss!‘…I think 
a good director should be good at telling a story. A story coming from Wong Kar Wai‘s 
mouth is particularly attractive.‖ (C. Wong "One Cannes Best Actor and Three 
International Auteur Directors" 133) In his speech for best actor award for Happy 
Together at the Hong Kong Film Awards, Tony Leung said, ―Thank you to Wong Kar 
Wai who used a fake script to lure me to leave Hong Kong and go to Argentina. I 
couldn‘t get back to Hong Kong and had to finish the film with him.‖ In response to a 
question about what he would teach in a screenwriting class, Wong Kar Wai took the 
pragmatic perspective and said, ―A lot of people think that a screenwriter is someone who 






because you depend on this skill to sell your story. Those distinctive writers that I know 
do not spend much time writing. Instead they spend a lot of time talking. You have to tell 
your story clearly. Some screenwriters like to ask people to let him go home and write 
and explained that what he writes will be different. But the problem is such difference 
may not be relevant. This type of screenwriter usually does not have high success 
rate…success rate means the level of their popularity. What a successful screenwriter 
wrote may not be good but what he tells is very good. He can lead you to envision a 
picture. Whether his material can be used is another matter. But at least it is fun. That guy 
may have cheated you to pay for his meal by giving material not useful to you. But the 
material is entertaining.‖ (Ngai Four Films 159) Wong Kar Wai pays a lot of attention to 
people and is an industry-savvy writer. He said, ―When you first start as a screenwriter, 
you might have a lot of questions. But once you understand this industry more, you will 
understand why this person thinks this way and that person thinks that way. You will 
observe more and more and understand how the industry works. You will know more 
about distribution. You will understand the interpersonal relationship…then you will not 
ask questions like this one, ―This idea is not bad. Why didn‘t he use it?‘ By then, you will 
no longer feel vexed. You start to understand why things happen in certain way. You 
understand people‘s mentality better.‖ (Four Films 158) He was aware of the dominant 
role of distribution in shaping the game of Hong Kong cinema and his films all have the 
apparent façade of a genre, such as gangster, martial arts, romance, comedy, etc. Wong 
Kar Wai said, ―Now everybody says we don‘t have good scripts. How can there be good 
scripts?...Who dares to try out new things? We all depend on the distributors who dictate 
the genres to us…It is a business calculation behind everything…The characteristic of 
Hong Kong cinema is: the movies are made for export. Most films are independent 






And the index for overseas selling are firstly cast and secondly types of film. Everybody 
follows the same proven films. That means there will be a lot of similar films in the 
market at the same time.‖ (Four Films 161-63) But Wong Kar Wai‘s As Tears Go By, 
with Maggie Cheung and Andy Lau, two of the most prolific actors of the year and at the 
peak of gangster film era, stood out in the crowd.  
In that year there was an extra theatre chain to provide more outlets for 
independent productions. Wong Kar Wai described that his first film, made in 1988, was 
produced at ―the golden time in Hong Kong cinema. In that year, there were a lot of new 
filmmakers becoming directors because we were producing three hundred films a year in 
Hong Kong. In those days Hong Kong films were financed by pre-selling the film to the 
traditional market, that is, the Asian market. The producer needed only a story, a genre, 
and the name of the cast.‖ (Brunette 126-27) Maggie Cheung has said As Tears Go By 
was a mind-opener and made her a better actress. William Chang described, ―She 
(Maggie Cheung) didn‘t want to take the role but had to because of a contractual 
obligation. But she was soon working with the same level of enthusiasm as we were.‖  
(Zhang et al. 40) As Tears Go By proved Wong Kar Wai‘s ability to survive as a director, 
mastering the genre and star system in the commercial system of Hong Kong cinema  
(even though he had been fired as a writer by a major film company only a year before). 
The multiple nominations, awards and the stars‘ word of mouth of Wong Kar Wai‘s 
special directing caught the industry insiders‘ attention and heightened expectations for 
his next project. 
Wong Kar Wai‘s second film Days of Being Wild (1990) was much more 
personal, and drastically different from mainstream Hong Kong films. The production 
created a media buzz, not yet a common phenomenon back then and not expected and 






supportive the investor Alan Tang was, ―The boss Alan Tang put aside all other business 
and went with the crew (to the Philippines) to do preparation work for Days of Being 
Wild. Alan Tang‘s contribution went beyond financial support. Wong Kar Wai thought 
Alan Tang put a lot of heart in Days of Being Wild. He was there not just for making a 
profit but also wanted to make a good movie. Wong Kar Wai said he must give him a 
credit.‖ (Tian 36) With six top stars and taking two years to finish (unusually long by 
Hong Kong standards back then), Days of Being Wild turned out to be a box office fiasco 
and was widely reported so. In 2004 William Chang described what went wrong in the 
process, “(Days of Being Wild is) certainly more personal and closer to his heart. As 
Tears Go By did well in the box office. We did emphasize the commercial values of Days 
of Being Wild but they somehow evaporated as shooting went on. Perhaps the boss 
thought we wouldn‟t mess up with all the big names in the cast. We didn‟t go to the 
extremes for the sake of it. The story dictates how things should be done. If forced to, we 
can make our films more commercial. But given a choice, it‟s only natural I‟d do it my 
way.” (Zhang et al. 40-41) 
The local film magazine City Entertainment (aka Film Bi-Weekly), circulated 
mainly among industry insiders and film buffs, covered Days of Being Wild from its 
production, to release, to its being cut from theaters, to it winning multiple Hong Kong 
films awards over a course of 10 issues (from issue 305 to issue 315 i.e. covering from 
Dec 6, 1990 to May 15 1991). Such extensive coverage had never happened before or 
after to other films. On issue 308 after the film was released there were interviews of 19 
filmmakers and film critics about their views on the film. The interviewees included 
directors John Woo, Tsui Hark, Stanley Kwan, Alfred Cheung, Hong Kong international 
film festival programmer Li Cheuk-to, Wong Ain-ling and Law Kar, critics like Leong 






was unprecedented for a new director for his second film. At the 10
th
 Hong Kong Film 
Awards it had 9 nominations and won 5. With Christopher Doyle winning the best 
cinematography, Agfa film also used the opportunity to put ads in the magazine to 
congratulate the production team. With such overwhelming media attention, fellow 
directors‟ enthusiastic complements, actors‟ expectations of his Midas touch in his next 
project, it‟s hard to imagine that Wong Kar Wai could go back to a modest project like 
his first film that maintained a balance between art and commerce. This was Wong Kar 
Wai‟s first point of no return as a director. There was a report that Wong Kar Wai 
reedited the film for a foreign film festival (Anonymous "Wong Kar Wai Reedit"). 
In an industry concerned with instant success and short term profit, it was to the 
industry outsiders‟ surprise that Wong Kar Wai got financing for his next project Ashes of 
Time, which is Days of Being Wild transposed from the desolate urban setting, to a 
desolated desert with the characters in costume, also with Leslie Cheung as the central 
character with others revolving around him. Years later Wong Kar Wai explained how 
such aberrant projects attracted investors, ―From the investor‘s point of view, Days of 
Being Wild is a very attractive object. Ashes of Time is also very attractive. With such a 
title and such a cast list…Every investor wants to see if there is the color of money…It‘s 
hard to predict whether it will win or lose, but it‘s worth the bet. Even for me in the 
position of director, there are a lot of uncertainties. Sometime you‘ll find the project plain 
without much excitement. But there are some elements that let you know that it will be 
very exciting. I think for most projects we cannot tell if it will make profit or not. It‘s like 
gambling.‖ (Ngai Four Films 167) The Chinese title of Days of Being Wild (―The True 
Story of a Teddy Boy” see table 8.1) is the same as the translated Chinese title of Rebel 
without a Cause, (Nicholas Ray, 1955) starring James Dean. The Chinese title of Ashes of 






Shooting Heroes, a classic and popular martial arts novel translated into multiple 
languages. Ashes of Time is a creative adaptation of the novel imagining the heroes‘ lives 
when they were young. Obviously besides the impressive cast list, Wong Kar Wai‘s 
pitching skill must have played a role in attracting the cast and financiers. Again, with 8 
stars and protracted shooting the production of Ashes of Time became talk of the town. 
Local film critics were enthusiastic about Wong Kar Wai‘s daring projects but 
local audiences were not. The followers in the domestic market were far too few to 
support Wong Kar Wai‘s production. Local film awards and critics‘ support was not 
translated into material backing. Back then Wong Kar Wai had to defend against his film 
being labeled as art film. In a 1994 interview he said, ―I don‘t agree with people calling 
my films art films. There is always the art of film. There is no art film. If only I can find 
my position, this is a good thing…I always emphasize finding a space. I have to figure 
out how many audience followers I have and work out a budget. I will make films I like 
within that budget. I don‘t have to force myself into doing things I don‘t like…My wish 
is to finish the film within budget and have the audience who accepts me find the film 
okay. I keep testing the market until one day everyone knows what Wong Kar Wai‘s film 
is like. By then people won‘t oppose my film. They know I make this type of film and 
accept it. That way I feel less pressure. No one loses. This is the best scenario. ‖ (Yang 
and Liu 46) On another occasion Wong Kar Wai went further to say there was no such 
thing as art film in Hong Kong. He said, ―Don‘t regard yourself as making art. You have 
to see yourself as a craftsman. There is basically no art film in Hong Kong. The overall 
environment is not encouraging for the existence of art film. Right now wenyi (roughly 
meaning drama or melodrama) is in. But it just means a successful commercial product 
sale.‖ (J. Pan A21) Wong Kar Wai was conscious of branding his films and building 






At a time when Chinese films from Taiwan and China were criticized for being 
made for film festivals and neglecting the domestic audience, Ashes of Time was planned 
to be sent to the Venice film festival. In response to the accusation that he was making a 
film for the festival and for gaining awards, Wong Kar Wai replied, ―It is the boss‘s plan 
to attend the film festival because it can help make money. In fact, there is another 
advantage of attending a film festival. It can help open up more overseas markets so that 
we don‘t have to be led and tied up by a few markets.‖ (A21) Wong Kar Wai still had to 
defend himself and prove that he was money conscious. Wong Kar Wai‘s good friend 
Jeff Lau in a 1994 interview also defended him, but not by denying his films were art 
films. Jeff Lau‘s thinking was ahead of his peers. Instead of framing the issue as 
balancing art and commerce, he was thinking of commercially viable art film. He said, 
―Wong Kar Wai in fact is the most commercial director. Don‘t you know that the name 
‗Wong Kar Wai‘ is valuable in France and his income is counted in US dollars?‖ (H. 
Huang "Jeff Lau" 28) He went on to quote the examples of other money-making Chinese 
art film directors like Ang Lee, Zhang Yimou, Chen Kaige and Hou Hsiao-Hsien and 
said, ―Films with their names sell at a good price. They won international awards and 
have international fame. Buyers in Europe and the U.S. are going after their films. The 
film owners actually make a lot of profit.‖ ("Jeff Lau" 28) Tony Rayns in 1981 already 
wrote about opening up the international market for Hong Kong cinema in a new way 
(Rayns "From Father and Son to Be the Key for Opening up International Market"). He 
reported the screening of 6 Hong Kong films (mostly Hong Kong New Wave directors‘ 
films) in the South-East Asian Panorama of the Berlin Film Festival, and called the film 
critics‘ attention to Ann Hui‘s The Spooky Bunch and Allen Fong‘s Father and Son in the 
Edinburgh and London film festivals. Tony Rayns points out that film critics there liken 






Rayns was optimistic that Western film critics‘ recognition of Hong Kong new cinema 
would help expand the international markets for the Hong Kong film industry beyond 
King Hu‘s exotic martial arts genre and mass-produced kung fu flicks. So the next step 
for Wong Kar Wai was to expand his overseas market by getting recognition in Western 
markets. Ashes of Time won the 51st Venice Film Festival Ozella D'oro prize. This was 
another point of no return for Wong Kar Wai: the international film festival award. If he 
wanted more creative autonomy he needed to diversify his markets and not be led by a 
few. Therefore he did not confine himself to traditional markets in Asia. And if he didn‘t 
want to be pigeonholed in the exotic martial arts genre in film festivals, he needed 
something modern and urban. 
With the track record of losing big for two films in a row, it is hard to imagine 
Wong Kar Wai could still use the old system, the existing pool of investors in Asia and 
rely on the old markets. After Ashes of Time, perhaps to give himself more administrative 
autonomy, Wong Kar Wai set up his own production company and worked as his own 
producer. During the postproduction of Ashes of Time he directed Chungking Express, an 
absurd but light-hearted funny short piece starring Faye Wong, the diva in the Asian 
market but with no film acting experience. This time Wong Kar Wai made a profit but 
was criticized by local media for being selfish and not considerate of his investors, 
because it took him two years to shoot Ashes of Time, but for a film he invested in with 
his own money, he finished it in only two months (Anonymous "Do It Slow"). Wong Kar 
Wai explained this must be because of others‘ prejudices toward him, because he also 
made As Tears Go By quickly, and it made a profit but no one mentioned it. Chunking 
Express sold well in Japan, France and South Korea (Xiuhui Yang) and Quentin 
Tarantino would distribute it in the U.S. market. After winning awards at the Hong Kong 






how he maintained a balance between art and commerce. This time Wong Kar Wai 
answered differently, ―First of all I want everyone to know that a lot of people 
dichotomize art and commercial films, assuming that the two cannot be integrated. But 
now if you look at many good movies, you will find that art and commercial films are not 
incompatible and in conflict with each other. The path that I‘m walking now is to provide 
a particular type of film in the film market.‖ (Gary "Wong Film Awards" 36) Wong Kar 
Wai was consolidating his type by making a sort of sequel to Chungking Express, and 
made it more accessible to more audience. 
Fallen Angel, described by Doyle as the most accessible of Wong Kar Wai‘s work 
up to that point, was shown in the Toronto International Film Festival. In response to 
comments about absurdism and dystopian vision of the world in his films, Wong Kar Wai 
described the production of Chungking Express after the grueling process of filming 
Ashes of Time. He wanted to make a film like making a student film, simple and 
straightforward. He had a two-month time slot and didn‟t have a script. He said, “So I 
just started shooting this film in chronological order. And I sat in the coffee shop writing 
during the day, and then the shooting at night. We didn‟t have any permits, we didn‟t 
have any setups; we just went to places we already knew well. We worked like hell, like 
thieves, and it was fun. So the working style already dominated the look of the film.” 
(Brunette 116) Chungking Express and Fallen Angel entered the international market with 
an urban motif that Asian and Western cities dwellers could relate to. But as a writer 
described, in Hong Kong “Wong Kar Wai”, just as Wong Kar Wai himself described, 
became an object of debate with no middle ground or objective review. But the writer 
was optimistic that Wong Kar Wai would not be like the directors of Taiwan New 
Cinema who had to depend on reputations gained in the international film festivals in 






a different path (Xiuhui Yang). By mid-1995, Wong Kar Wai‟s previous four films were 
shown in art theaters in Europe and the U.S. His movies were catering not only to Hong 
Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. In the press conference in Hong Kong, Wong Kar Wai 
said Fallen Angel would not attend a European film festival because the Western 
audience only categorized Hong Kong cinema as Chinese cinema. He thought Hong 
Kong cinema did not have to walk that path. He said, “The attraction of Hong Kong 
cinema is its energy. The revelation of the European and American market is that we 
don‟t have to make kung fu movies. We have more options.” (Z. Shan) As a non-action 
film director, Wong Kar Wai had to find his own path and explore new markets for his 
type of films. 
In a 1995 interview by the local film magazine City Entertainment, he put forward 
the concept of the supermarket. He said, ―I think these people‘s conception of 
commercialism is too narrowly defined. I want to make clear that filmmaking is a 
commercial act. There should be different packaging and types of customers. It should be 
like a supermarket that can accommodate different business practices and different 
products.‖ (Mai "Double Wongs" 25) In 1995 he grew more conscious of the importance 
of building up his brand and image in order to consolidate his niche space in this 
supermarket. He said, ―If I want to make personal films, I should find a space for 
survival. This is especially so in the past few years. I feel stronger and stronger the need 
to let people know that I will only make this type of film and not other types. If you like 
them, I welcome your business. If you don‘t give me business, it‘s also okay. I feel that if 
I have to cater to overseas markets, I can‘t please everyone and I can‘t do things I want to 
do.‖ ("Double Wongs" 27) Wong Kar Wai realized the paradox of surviving in a 
commercial system: instead of presenting himself as a multifaceted director, he had to 






creative autonomy. In mid-1995, Hong Kong cinema was at its ebb. Wong Jing and 
Wong Kar Wai were often posed as the two extremes of Hong Kong cinema. Wong Jing 
was blamed for bringing down the Hong Kong film industry with his low quality films, 
and Wong Kar Wai was put on a pedestal. To consolidate his image and film type, next 
he had to be consecrated as an auteur by a major European film festival. At the premier of 
Fallen Angel in Hong Kong, Wong Kar Wai hoped that Hong Kong cinema would 
recover in two years. He predicted that there would be some revival before 1997 because 
the Hong Kong 1997 issue was a concern in the world (Fan). In 1997, he brought his film 
to international attention at Cannes.  
A few days before the announcement of the results, in a media meeting in Cannes, 
Wong Kar Wai admitted that in drafting the story of Happy Together he had thought of 
relating the story to 1997 (J. Huang). He said, ―In the beginning of the writing, I did think 
of the protagonists‘ background related to 1997. In Happy Together, one character did go 
to Argentina because of the 1997 issue…when I started I had thought of expressing my 
view on 1997. But as the filming went on, the feeling faded…the two protagonists went 
back to Hong Kong in the end…whether this film is still related to 1997 is up to your 
interpretation. I didn‘t purposely make it that way.‖ (C5) That might be true. Back in 
1994 July, before his films were released in the West, in a local media interview Wong 
Kar Wai had said, ―I don‘t like talking about politics because politics can expire. Your 
view today will be different from that of tomorrow. I would rather focus on human 
feeling and relationships.‖ (J. Pan A21) However, in an interview after the announcement 
of the result in Cannes, Wong Kar Wai brought up the 1997 issue to the reporter of a 
Hong Kong English newspaper. He said, ―This award has special meaning to us in 1997; 
I hope we can work in the same way in the future and make the kind of films we want to 






really believe in something and you want to do it, make the film – legally or illegally.‖ 
(Halligan) He added, ―There are new rules in China now where you have to submit a 
script and it has to be identical to the completed film. As everybody knows, I never have 
a script…But I am not afraid. If Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou can still make films, why 
can‘t I?‖ (Halligan) It is hard for the Western media not to find a political reading in his 
film. The newspaper writer described the Cannes‘s tradition ―as a star-studded event 
which nonetheless awards the anonymous and uncommercial.‖ (Dai) She also mentioned 
Wong Kar Wai strode onto the stage to receive his prize while wearing his trademark 
sunglasses and reported him saying that he ―only removed his sunglasses in bed.‖ (Dai) 
But in the Hong Kong Chinese media, it was not hard to find a picture of him not wearing 
sunglasses and not in bed. In 2000 In the Mood for Love won more than a dozen 
international awards and Wong Kar Wai was no longer asked how he balanced art and 
commerce. The Maggie Cheung character was a cheongsam-wearing repressed Chinese 
woman. But the parade of her outfits (23 cheongsams in a 98 minute film) and the art 
direction were so excessive that it felt more like self-mockery than selling out to the 
West. The cheongsam became a talking point that, as usual for Wong Kar Wai‘s films, 
was subsequently parodied by fellow Hong Kong filmmakers.
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 In the end, Wong Kar 
Wai had proved his supermarket theory: he was producing a commercially viable art film 
for Hong Kong and for the international markets. 
WONG KAR WAI’S STORY: ORPHAN ISLAND VANITY 
The very first shot of Wong Kar Wai‘s first film is a blank video wall. Wong Kar 
Wai‘s oeuvre revolves around this theme: vanity, the illusive nature of a movie. In 
Chinese language cinema it is called ―electric shadow‖. It‘s a shadow play, a 
reconstruction rather than a re-presentation of reality. Wong Kar Wai‘s Hong Kong story 






glamorous on the outside, but feel insecure and empty on the inside. They are ordinary 
people, delusional in their freedom and oblivious to their captivity. Not only are they 
mostly orphans with no family ties, their homes are either imaginary or unreliable like a 
rootless tree. They are more connected by a shared experience of loneliness than by 
affective bonding. Wong Kar Wai adopted an extreme style to convey the falsehood and 
hollowness in their lives. 
As Tears Go By was made in 1988. The producer thought it was safe for Wong 
Kar to make a gangster film. Wong Kar Wai said, ―But by that time, we already had more 
than two hundred gangster films, and they were at their peak.‖ MTV was popular then. 
Wong Kar Wai thought of borrowing the form of MTV to make a gangster film and went 
beyond that, ―…because gangster films are so vague, everything seems fake. Everybody 
has already said the same thing, and I didn‘t think people would believe it any more. So I 
was trying to do it with the form of MTV, which just made it more fake, you know. You 
don‘t have the feeling that I‘m trying to tell you a really serious story.‖ The interviewer 
Peter Brunette responded, ―Right. So it gets so fake, so totally artificial that a core of 
truth kind of comes out after all. A core of reality.‖ (Brunette 119-20) And Wong Kar 
Wai agreed with his inference. In the story, gangster Tony cares more about face and 
dignity than making money. He is played by Alex Man, an actor known for his 
expressive acting style. Fly (Jacky Cheung) is delusional about being somebody one day 
and feels embarrassed to let Tony see him working as a street peddler. Jacky Cheung and 
Alex Man‘s over the top acting styles are in contrast with Maggie Cheung and Andy 
Lau‘s subtle performances. In Days of Being Wild and Ashes of Time Jacky Cheung‘s 
acting style is completely toned down. There is also a subtle humorous moment to 
foreground the artificiality of the film world. Before Wah looked for Fly in his home, 






eyes and faces were all swollen. But in the next shot, they are all cleaned up with 
matching white colored band aids on their foreheads, while they are talking seriously 
about the death risk of their next job and how Wah took settlement money (a reparation 
for the family if he dies on the job) at age of 14.  The conversation topic is serious but the 
visual suggests a comedy. Since this film, Wong Kar Wai‘s characters always long for a 
home but are disillusioned. Wah (Andy Lau)‘s home, with its minimal furnishings, was 
more like a temporary hideout than a home that could accommodate his new woman. 
Ngo (Maggie Cheung) works as a waitress in a hotel in Lantau Island, an outlying island 
with no frequent transport connection then. Fly came from Rennie‘s Mill (its English 
name is changed to Tiu Keng Lan after 1997), a place which used to be called ―the Little 
Taiwan‖: a temporary settlement area for retreated KMT soldiers who couldn‘t go to 
Taiwan in 1949. Fly‘s mother remarried and he doesn‘t get along with his stepfather. The 
three long for a home, but remain homeless in this city. 
In a review of Days of Being Wild Jimmy Ngai listed all the dialogues that 
mentioned the word ―home‖. He wrote: ―In Days of Being Wild, considering the scarcity 
of dialogues and the high frequency of the mentioning of ‗home‘, we can almost jump to 
the conclusion that Wong Kar Wai is obsessed with ‗home‘‖ (Ngai "Romance" 109) The 
protagonist Yuddy (Leslie Cheung)‘s home, with the bed as the only prominent piece of 
furniture, is a rented place which is more a den for luring girls than a home. He has the 
illusion of himself being free like a bird and dumped two women. He thought of himself 
as self-sufficient but in fact is the most emotionally needy. He is abandoned twice by his 
birth mother and his foster mother. He thinks he can fly to a faraway place. In fact he 
only flies back to his birthplace in the Philippines and dies. His birth mother is a 
Philippine woman. He is not even a pure Chinese in this Chinese dialect-speaking 






In Ashes of Time, Ou-yang Fang (also played by Leslie Cheung)‘s home is a 
shack in a desolate desert. The romantic world-travelling martial arts heroes from Louis 
Cha‘s novel are dressed more like the homeless than kung fu masters. In Chungking 
Express, Cop 633 (Tony Leung)‘s home, located next to a public elevator, is flooded. The 
Faye Wong character has sneaked into his home to recreate a space of her own. Cop 233 
(Takeshi Kaneshiro) never sits on a chair for dining like at a real home. In Fallen Angel, 
the killer (Leon Lai)‘s home is a seedy balcony-like room next to the mass transit 
railway. His getaway vehicle is a public mini-bus where he runs into an old school friend. 
The killer is disillusioned and wants to give up the life of the gun. Wong Kar Wai 
explained the use of wide angle lens throughout the film, ―…the twisted faces (a result of 
shooting close up with a wide-angle lens) showed the psychology of the characters, their 
insecurity.‖ (Halligan) The mute (Takeshi Kaneshiro), sneaking into other people‘s shops 
to recreate his business, also longs for appreciation and a place of his own. In Happy 
Together the gay couple flies all the way to Argentina, and recreates a space of their own 
in an alien environment. In In the Mood for Love the few families are all cramped into 
adjacent apartments and lived unhappily together. The landlady smells something and 
lectures So Lai-chun (Mrs. Chan) to discipline herself. In the ending, the male protagonist 
Chow Mo-wan told his secret in a hole of a big tree, as if the tree won‘t betray his secret 
like his gossipy neighbors. None of Wong Kar Wia‘s characters‘ homes provided 
emotional security like a deep-rooted tree. These people are all emotionally homeless.    
Wong Kar Wai‘s characters are not free as birds in the age of a borderless world 
either. In As Tears Go By, Wah comes from nowhere and goes nowhere. He has no 
family ties and can‘t form one. In Days of Being Wild, Yuddy came from the Philippines 
and dies there. He doesn‘t get anywhere. In Ashes of Time, Ou-Yang Feng comes from a 






Chunking Mansion, a place for South Asian families and business, located in the tourist 
area Tsim Sha Tsui, is like a low-end version of globalization in Hong Kong. The fast 
food stall (where the film title ―Express‖ is from), located in the hang-out area of a 
Western expatriate in Lan Kwai Fong in Central, which is like a high-end version of 
globalization in Hong Kong. The protagonists do not belong, and are not connected to 
either of these two groups. In Fallen Angel, the old Wanchai district was captured on 
celluloid before they disappeared. In In the Mood for Love Thailand is dressed as Hong 
Kong in the 1960s, just like Hong Kong was dressed as a town in Shanghai in old 
movies. In movie magic, it is all about how it looks on the outside. William Chang 
described the image design for the So Lai-chun character: ―Shanghai immigrants of the 
time were fashion-conscious. Rich or poor, they put on the nicest clothes and tried to look 
their best. So Lai-chun was one such character, always wearing full makeup and nice 
clothes. You may say she is a plebian kind. I think the flashy outfits actually underscore 
the characters‘ weaknesses and conflicts. For this reason alone, the qipao (cheongsam) 
should be made ever more flowery…I was aiming for a plebian vulgarity...‖ (Zhang et 
al.) The Chinese title of the film, Huayang Nianhua, derived from a popular Shanghai 
Mandarin Song of the 1940s, roughly means to be in the prime of life. The audio and 
visual of the film is characterized by excessive varieties of languages, music styles, 
colors and patterns. It was an era where there were plenty of choices in cheongsams and 
consumer goods, but so few options in life. Inside the film text, the infidel husband 
ordered the song Huayang de Nianhua performed for his wife on local radio. Outside the 
text, the song was banned on radio in the 1960s and 1970s in Hong Kong for political 
reasons (K. C. Wong 29). Inside the film text, we see an emotionally starved man holding 
tight onto a rice cooker, a symbol of Asian modernity while listening to the (supposedly) 






Fly is a face-conscious gangster and So Lai-chun is a fashion-conscious secretary. 
From the ―Little Taiwan‖ (Tiu Keng Lang in As Tears Go By) to the ―Little Shanghai‖ 
(the Shanghaiese émigré community in In the Mood for Love), Wong Kar Wai‘s 
characters are concerned about their appearance on the outside. They, recreating their 
homes in an alien environment, did not get anywhere. The city is colorful but the 
ordinary people‘s lives are humdrum. Wong Kar Wai‘s Hong Kong story is about the 
vanity of this city. 
WONG KAR WAI IS A GAMBLER 
The ending sequence of Wong Kar Wai‘s most personal film Days of Being Wild 
focuses on a gambler (Tony Leung). Like gambling, Wong Kar Wai‘s filmmaking 
process is full of randomness. He did not have a strong idea of the end result when he 
was shooting. In an interview explaining his filmmaking methods Wong Kar Wai said, 
―I‘m not so sure what I want to find. It‘s like a building with a lot of exits but only one 
entrance. When you walk inside, you have to choose your exit.‖ (Havis "Interview Wong 
Kar-Wai – One Entrance Many Exits" 16) Brian Tse associates Wong Kar Wai‘s 
filmmaking to a more specific building - Antoni Gaudi‘s Sagrada Familia, a catholic 
church which commenced construction in 1882, and is now still a work-in-progress. He 
wrote, ―Wong Kar Wai never knows what his next scene will be – he doesn‘t even know 
what he is filming now. Chungking Express is a series of inevitable outcomes and 
changing conditions. It‘s like life and it keeps happening over and over again.‖ (Tse 1) 
Instead of filming one film at a time, Wong Kar Wai was always working on a few 






real movie, or like a circus in the old times. So we work together with a team, and then 
we can keep shooting. I have always dreamed of making ten films in eighteen months. 
You know, traveling along. People ask, ‗Do you ever take a vacation?‘ Making a film for 
me, the actual process of production, is a vacation. I enjoy the process very much.‖ 
(Brunette 128) Like Gaudi‘s cathedral, Wong Kar Wai‘s films have that work-in-progress 
touch. In respond to the question of why the shooting lasts so long, Wong Kar Wai said: 
―Yeah, sometimes it‘s because you just fall in love with the film. You don‘t want to let 
go.‖ (128) Like gambling, it‘s the process, rather than the end result, that got him 
addicted to the game. In response to his friend Jimmy Ngai‘s question about his views on 
money, Wong Kar Wai admitted his gambler mentality and revealed his desire for a 
better home. He said, ―Maybe you can‘t tell. I‘ve been thinking day and night of hitting 
the jackpot…I think having a certain amount of money is important. It gives you more 
sense of security. Few days ago when I was at the gas station in New York I saw the lotto 
ticket sales. The prize was over 10 million US dollars. Everybody was buying them. I 
was thinking what I will do if I win the prize. What should I do next? Probably not much. 
Ten million dollars won‘t help much. Maybe I‘ll buy a better home and then I won‘t have 
the motivation to do anything else.‖ (Ngai Four Films 203) In explaining how the 
projects Days of Being Wild and Ashes of Time attracted financiers he probably projected 
his own gambler mentality onto his investors. He said, ―I always say that I have the 
personality of a gambler. If I gamble, I will not do horse racing or Mark Six lottery 
because I cannot control anything. To be more classy I will play Blackjack.‖ Jimmy Ngai 






―You can decide to accept it or pass, right?‖ (Four Films) Like his characters, Wong Kar 
Wai also has the illusion that he has the freedom to choose. 
Wong Kar Wai made an analysis of the problem of the system of the Hong Kong 
film industry. He said, ―In our field at present, there are always the same few people…I 
don‘t think the people participating in the game have a problem. Who will join the game 
depends on if the game is attractive. I think it‘s the game that has a problem…The 
problem is we are no longer a big film company that hires 8 to 10 screenwriters to 
brainstorm ideas. And then after half a year, suddenly one day one person says something 
and his idea is adopted to make a movie. Under the system of the big company, we can 
afford to support a group of people like that. And then one day they decide to use one of 
the ideas to make a bet. Why do they dare to bet? It is because they are big enough. They 
already have 9 films that certainly make a profit. They don‘t need to worry about the 10
th
. 
However, at present, who will dare to try out new things? Everyone capitalizes on instant 
success. Whenever a film makes a hit, they will hire the screenwriter of that hit 
movie…The major problem is, no one is willing to do the hard work of cultivation. They 
see the sweet potato on the ground and they will eat the sweet potato. They don‘t even 
care if the sweet potato is ripe or not. They will eat it first without thinking about the 
future.‖ (Four Films 162-63) Paradoxically, it is the lack of planning for the future and 
the absence of organizational structure that enabled a filmmaker like Wong Kar Wai to 
carve out a space, and do his own thing in this industry in this era. Like the Maggie 
Cheung characters (in As Tears Go By, Days of Being Wild, Ashes of Time, and In the 






home out there (the big company with 9 sure things) and that he can just move in, fit in 
and be happy together with the other 9 tenants. But the Hong Kong film industry, like his 
male protagonist, was not a deep-rooted tree that could provide a dependable home base. 
The Hong Kong film industry was like bamboo. It survived by bending with the wind, 
not by growing roots. The gambler lives in a dream. 
The year 2000 was a turning point in Hong Kong cinema. Wong Jing killed the 
prototype of his gambler character Luo Shihai (played by himself) in My Name is Nobody 
and ended the gambler genre. Time and Tide is an indication of Tsui Hark‟s “re-
engagement with the Hong Kong environment and his glee in fighting a fresh cinematic 
battle on home ground after a stint in Hollywood…” as Stephen Teo described (Teo 
"Starting Over: Tsui Hark‟s Time and Tide (2000)"). Wong Kar Wai described In the 
Mood for Love is about the end of an era. He said, “It took me a long time to decide what 
the end should be. Is it basically a love story about these two characters? Finally I think 
it‟s more than that. It‟s about the end of a period. 1966 marks a turning point in Hong 
Kong‟s history. The Cultural Revolution in the mainland had lots of knock-on-effects, 
and forced Hong Kong people to think hard about their future. Many of them had come 
from China in the late 1940s, they‟d nearly 20 years of relative tranquility, they‟d built 
themselves new lives – and suddenly they began to feel they‘d have to move on again. So 
1966 is the end of something and the beginning of something else.‖ (Rayns "In the Mood 
for Edinburgh" 16) What is the story of Hong Kong cinema 1990s about? Is it simply a 
legend about a petit industry surviving and thriving in the harsh colonial conditions and 






had to perch on different systems like the Hollywood studio, Asian co-production, or the 





Table 8.1 Wong Kar Wai Filmography 1988-2000 
 




Stars Crew Awards 
































































HK film of 
















Roel. A. Garcia 





Best Editor,  




9,023,583 Leslie Cheung 
Tony K.F. 
Leung  















Franky Chan, Roel 
A. Garcia; Martial 
51st Venice 
Film Festival : 
Ozella D'oro 
prize. 










Sammo Hung; Art 
Director, William 
Chang       




















Wong Ming-lam ; 
Music, Frankie 
Chan, Roel. A. 
Garcia 
The 15th HK 



























The 17th HK 
Film Awards: 
Best Actor 






















The information of this table is from:  
1. Hong Kong Film Archive – Collection Items Online Catalogue 
(http://www.lcsd.gov.hk/CE/CulturalService/HKFA/en/6.php) 
2. Hong Kong Films Yearbook (From 1989 to 1998), Hong Kong Kowloon & New 





Table 8.2 Wong Kar Wai awards and nominations  
Awards and nominations for As Tears Go By (1988) at 1989 Hong Kong Film Awards  
Won: Best Supporting Actor (Jacky Cheung)  
Won: Best Art Direction (William Chang) 
Nominated: Best Picture 
Nominated: Best Director (Wong Kar Wai)   
Nominated: Best Actor (Andy Lau)   
Nominated: Best Actress (Maggie Cheung)  
Nominated: Best Supporting Actor (Alex Man)   
Nominated: Best Cinematography (Andrew Lau)  
Nominated: Best Film Editing (Cheong Pi-tak) 
Nominated: Best Original Score (Danny Chung) 
Awards for In the Mood for Love
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2000 Asia-Pacific Film Festival: Best Cinematography & Best Editing  
2000 Cannes International Film Festival: Best Male Performance (Best Actor) & Grand 
Prix de la Technique (Technical Achievement Prize) Best Editing & Cinematography  
2000 Edinburgh International Film Festival: Closing Night Film  
2000 European Film Awards: Best Non-European Film  
2000 Filmfest Hamburg: Douglas-Sirk Preis  
2000 Golden Horse Awards: Best Leading Actress, Best Cinematography & Best 
Costume & Make Up Design  
2000 Hong Kong Film Critics Society Awards: Films of Merit & Best Director  
2001 British Independent Film Award: Best Foreign Film  
2001 Cesar Award: Best Foreign Film  
2001 German Film Awards: Best Foreign Film  





Table 8.1 cont. 
2001 Hong Kong Film Awards: Best Actor, Best Actress, Best Art Direction, Best  
Costume & Make Up Design & Best Film Editing  
2001 New York Film Critics Circle Awards: Best Foreign Language Film & Best 
Cinematography  
2001 Uruguayan Film Critics Association Awards: Best Film  
2001 Valdivia International Film Festival: Best Film  
2002 Argentinean Film Critics Association Awards: Best Foreign Film  
2002 Chlotrudis Awards: Best Movie & Best Cinematography  
2002 Cinema Writers Circle Awards: Best Foreign Film  
2002 Fotogramas de Plata: Best Foreign Film  
2002 National Society of Film Critics Awards: Best Foreign Language Film & Best 
Cinematography  




















Chapter 9 Conclusion: Be Water 
 “Empty your mind, be formless, shapeless - like water. Now you put water into a cup, it 
becomes the cup, you put water into a bottle, it becomes the bottle, you put it in a teapot, 
it becomes the teapot. Now water can flow or it can crash. Be water, my friend.”  
               Bruce Lee 
 
This dissertation is about how Hong Kong cinema and its filmmakers survived  
through adversity. Hong Kong cinema survived and thrived by being flexible, developing 
a peculiar system well adapted to its particular insecure habitat. The history of the Hong 
Kong film industry was characterized by crumbling down and rebuilding and its system, 
which was characterized by amoeba-like change between a “studio system” of production 
and independent production. Like the bamboo blossom, Hong Kong cinema often came 
back to life in a different form. When the national market was closed, it changed from a 
sub-national dialect cinema in Southern China to a Diaspora cinema for overseas Chinese 
communities in Southeast Asia and North America. When the traditional market in 
Southeast Asia collapsed, Hong Kong cinema changed to a transnational cinema aiming 
at East Asia and the West. The industry in the 1990s was populated by more than 170 
independent production houses headed mostly by filmmakers that came and went. Some 
filmmakers stayed and those that had maintained relatively long careers and thrived in the 
local or international markets were those who adapted to and were enabled by the system 
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of Hong Kong cinema. Hong Kong cinema, without the form of a national cinema or the 
structure of an integrated studio system of production, adapted to its environment like 
bamboo;  its filmmakers, adapting to this changing system, were like water, formless and 
accommodating. The case studies show how each of the typed directors at various market 
positions developed his personal mode of production that helped him to produce films 
efficiently and to meet the market demand. Like the creative producer of classical 
Hollywood, they were the human agents in the system, balancing the art and business 
dimensions. But unlike the Hollywood producer, they were not at the apex of power in a 
hierarchical organization that conferred them authority. As industry-savvy auteurs, they 
were situated authors in a situated industry in a situated city selling particular dreams to a 
particular target audience in an era when Hong Kong had a particular discursively 
constructed positive image as a modern Chinese city, especially in relation to China. 
In the 1990s Hong Kong filmmakers operated in an industry that was in a survival 
mode. The industry was not expected to last much longer beyond the city‟s sovereignty 
change. The very promise of “no change for 50 years” after 1997 by the Chinese 
government indicated the very uncertain character of life in this non-sovereign city. The 
signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 started the 13-years transitional 
period. However accomplished Hong Kong cinema was during this period, it was not 
expected to last. In a 1984 interview Ng See Yuen said, “Movie is a speculative business. 
There is no long term planning. We can at most predict the trend of the next few 
months.” (Luo et al.) (In a 1994 interview he plainly said Hong Kong cinema would soon 
disappear (W. He "Ng See Yuen Says"). In 1994, Eric Tsang, a veteran filmmaker and 
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one of the founders of United Film Organization (UFO), pointed out the two major 
factors that contribute to the instability of the industry during the transitional period: first, 
the absence of deep-pocketed investors willing to back the Hong Kong film industry; 
second, the 1997 deadline factor (Xiaowen Yang "Eric Tsang"). UFO was a co-op-like 
film production company founded in 1993 that rose quickly to prominence. But the five 
filmmaker-founders only planned for the company to operate for five years regardless of 
its performance. This showed the filmmakers‟ count-down mentality towards 1997. The 
sense of impermanence shaped the filmmakers business decision. The year 1984 
confirmed the return of Hong Kong to China and eliminated any chance of extending the 
British lease or maintaining the status quo. Hong Kong filmmakers started to think 
seriously about their future. It started an era of a Hong Kong cinema. Filmmakers who 
stayed in the game usually worked with a count-down mentality, trying to make more 
movies when they still could before the sovereignty change. In 2003 the signing of the 
Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) marked a 
new chapter in the history of Hong Kong cinema, with the target market of the industry is 
now clearly in China. This signaled the disappearance of Hong Kong cinema with 
distinctive cultural flavor. In between the traumatic event of 1989 and the 1997 
sovereignty change, Hong Kong cinema in the 1990s represented a distinctive period in 
the history of the industry. The system of Hong Kong cinema that developed during this 
transitional period, with no government or major company steering its direction, was not 
designed for long-term development. It was just a pragmatic survival strategy in a dire 
situation. Political uncertainty and economic insecurity were the two determining factors 
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that shaped the Hong Kong film industry in the 1990s. A horizontal organization 
structure and small- to medium-scale company size helped Hong Kong cinema to be 
more adaptable to unpredictable changes in the markets. 
Hong Kong cinema was neither a producer cinema like Hollywood nor a director 
cinema like most national cinemas. Despite the lack of the industrial form of a coherent 
studio system, Hong Kong cinema was like the classical cinema described by Bordwell, 
Staiger and Thompson. It was also a capitalist machine in which the mode of production 
was connected with film style. And like Thomas Schatz‟s description of the genius of the 
system of classical Hollywood, the system of Hong Kong cinema was also autonomous. 
It balanced various historical forces and sustained a productive industry producing films 
with consistent style. It survived in a harsh environment for almost a century; it allowed 
for the coexistence of art films and mass entertainment and provided an outlet for 
collective cultural expression of dimensions not covered by Hollywood or Chinese 
cinema. It allowed for auteur directors to exercise their personal vision, making them a 
presence even as Hollywood dominated the region. Like Newcomb and Hirsch described 
of American television, it served as a cultural forum for discussion of common concern, 
anxieties and dreams in East Asia.  Despite its status as a colony, Hong Kong benefited 
from the world‟s asymmetrical power structure. Being a Chinese society under British 
colonization gave Hong Kong cinema material and cultural advantages. As the trade port 
for the British Empire, Hong Kong‟s commercial and transnational cinema benefited 
from the infrastructure built for international trade. The overseas Chinese financial 
network and the practice of cash-based pianhua financing method enabled the Hong 
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Kong film industry to circumvent the control of the dominant British banks. Situated at 
the junction of the two major network civilizations, the Anglosphere and Chopstick 
Culture, legacies of the British Empire and the Chinese Celestial Empire, Hong Kong 
cinema was able to be culturally accessible to a large part of the world‟s population 
familiar with the narratives from both civilizations. But more importantly the peculiar 
colonial discourse of Hong Kong being modernized via Western colonization helped 
form a favorable myth for Hong Kong. As a colony of a Western power closely 
associated with Western modernization and achieved economic miracle while 
maintaining Chinese cultural practice, Hong Kong was regarded as a model of modern 
Chinese city, one that was between China and the West. The crackdown of the 
democratic movement in Beijing in 1989 and Hong Kong‟s role in supporting the 
students‟ movement further accentuated Hong Kong‟s association with Western liberal 
thought. Imperialist and nationalist policies in East Asia region were characterized by 
discourse of economic development and soft authoritarian rule justified in the name of 
national development. The Chinese government, insisting on maintaining the colonial 
governmental feature after 1997 to ensure Hong Kong‟s “stability and prosperity,” 
implicitly endorsed and acknowledged the contribution of British colonization. A 
favorable cultural myth is important for an export-oriented entertainment film industry 
like Hong Kong cinema. Hong Kong cinema was thus situated in a privileged discursive 
position to export cultural products to the West and the East, to audiences that agreed 
with the linear model of modernization and the leadership role of Western power. Even 
though Hong Kong was situated in the interstitial space between Chinese nationalism and 
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British colonialism and under the pressure of global capitalism, in popular discourse and 
mainstream Hong Kong cinema, the city was depicted as a postmodern hybrid 
wonderland. Michal Curtin‟s media capital theory recognized that film industries 
originated mostly in cities. Curtin‟s study on Hong Kong cinema recognizes it as a city 
cinema. To borrow Koichi Iwabuchi‟s cultural odor theory which claims that a cultural 
product is conferred positive cultural image from its country of origin, Hong Kong 
cinema was considered desirable because of its place of origin. Hong Kong was regarded 
as a modern city and yet retained its Chinese cultural essence. Hong Kong cinema of the 
1990s was branded as an urban Chinese cinema characterized by its neurotic energy 
while maintaining its Chinese cultural flavor. It was at once resistant and acquiescent to 
Western supremacy and adopted a cultural strategy that was complicit and self-
conflicting. The transnational genres of Hong Kong cinema were the embodiment of the 
conflicting issues of colonial modernity in East Asia. The transnational stars were 
embodiment of the desirable mythologized image of Hong Kong. To borrow Thomas 
Schatz‟s notion of the implicit contract between industry and audience in Hollywood 
genre filmmaking, the stars and genres of Hong Kong cinema were essential to the 
contract between Hong Kong filmmakers and their audiences. They represented the 
idealized cultural self-image of Hong Kong that was agreed upon by three partners: the 
domestic audience, the overseas audience and Hong Kong filmmakers. 
To borrow and combine Timothy Corrigan‟s idea of “the commerce of auteurism” 
and John Caldwell‟s industrial auteur theory, the typed directors of Hong Kong cinema, 
situated in a commercial system, were commercially constructed auteurs who were savvy 
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about how the industry worked, and were adept in matching star and genre with particular 
markets and in consciously cultivated their images. Each of these industrial auteurs took 
advantage of the director-centric production approach in the system of Hong Kong 
cinema and developed a personal mode of production suitable to his personality, persona 
and training background. They explored the local condition of orphan island anxiety, the 
paradoxical phenomenon of political anxiety commensurate with economic achievement. 
Their films told a distinctive local story and thus exhibit a strong Hong Kong cultural 
sensibility despite being export-oriented, catering to foreign tastes. 
Given the Hong Kong film industry‟s director-centric production approach, the 
director was the major factor for the choice of cast and crew, genre, filmmaking method 
and style of films. The three cases of the typed directors illustrate how each of these 
commercially constructed industrial auteurs positioned and differentiated himself in 
relation to the marketplace. The auteur directors, as situated authors, balanced various 
forces within the system. Wong Jing was the top box office director in the domestic 
market in the 1990s. His target markets were Hong Kong‟s domestic market, Taiwan and 
mostly Southeast Asia. He adopted the traditional apprentice system, and the traditional 
pianhua mode of financing. He became known for efficient production and for using 
traditional Chinese story-telling.  He developed a distinctive script-writing approach in 
which he finished a script in a few days, creating characters from prototypes that he 
developed during his television years. The leading stars of his gambler films were 
different versions of his alter ego: one who honors the traditional Chinese ethic code, was 
extremely hardworking and became the champion of his field. His gambler films 
 
 428 
represented his fantastic imagination of Hong Kong as a Chinese cosmopolitan space 
which suspended the inherent conflict between cosmopolitanism and nationalism. And 
his world-traveling protagonist was a gambling champion who transcended his base 
profession and the random fate of life. 
Tsui Hark‟s initial career path was characterized by his zigzag moves between 
radical, socially relevant films on the one hand and formulaic mass entertainment on the 
other. Later he founded with his wife Nansun Shi a production house, Film Workshop, 
which operated for a quarter of a century, longer than many big companies. Tsui Hark 
and his wife acted as parental figures to their staff. Tsui Hark maintained close tie with 
his brainstorming group and formed a surrogate family in the office. Film Workshop was 
like a satellite company to big companies like Golden Harvest and Golden Princess but 
without a formal tie, and thus Tsui Hark retained his creative autonomy. Tsui Hark‟s 
films sold in Asian and Western markets. With his brainstorming group on payroll and 
big companies‟ support in financing and distribution, Tsui Hark could churn out sequels 
quickly when Once Upon a Time in China became a hit. The series of martial arts genre 
films focused on the heroic acts of the regional folk hero, Wong Fei Hung, providing an 
affirmation of Southern Chinese culture, one that was more about modern Hong Kong 
reflecting on modernization than about China in the past resisting Westernization. 
Wong Kar Wai‟s films did not have a broad audience base in the domestic or 
Asian markets. But Wong Kar Wai had a strong following in the art cinema and film 
festival markets in both Europe and Asia. He worked with a small circle of close friends. 
He along with production designer William Chang and cinematographer Christopher 
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Doyle were called the “magnificent trio,” and their films were known for their visual 
expressivity, a prominent characteristic of European art cinema. The discursively 
constructed image of Hong Kong as a Chinese cosmopolitan city may have conferred 
symbolic meaning to Hong Kong cinema as a liberal and lively Chinese culture industry. 
This may be the appeal of the Hong Kong film industry to talents and filmmakers from 
various parts of the world. Wong Kar Wai‟s cast and crew were more diversified than 
other productions in terms of race, languages, and cultural backgrounds. Wong Kar Wai 
movies are influenced by European art cinema, Latin American literature and music, 
Japanese and Hong Kong literature, old Mandarin cinema and contemporary Hong Kong 
cinema. His oeuvre has the most hybrid and cosmopolitan outlook. He started in his first 
films to straddle the gap between art and commerce. The art-house cinema cult following 
in the Japanese market and the international film festival market sustained and catapulted 
his career. Wong Kar Wai‟s star-studded art films expose the vanity of life in Hong 
Kong. By adopting the mainstream genre like gangster and martial arts, he paradoxically 
deconstructed the mythical representation of Hong Kong in those genre films.  
The case of Hong Kong cinema illustrates how a small industry, by adapting to its 
habitat and balancing various historical forces, survived and thrived in the world even 
without the material power of Hollywood or the state protection of national cinema. Its 
typed directors, as industrial auteurs, adapted to the peculiar system of Hong Kong 
cinema, balancing various material and cultural forces and capitalizing on Hong Kong‟s 
favorable cultural myth. They survived and succeeded in the local and international 
markets, even without the backing of well financed studios or state support. The Hong 
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Kong film industry was flexible like bamboo and the industrial auteurs were 
accommodating like water. 
The case of Hong Kong cinema was peculiar. Current film criticism and 
scholarship, dominated by approaches geared either to national cinema or to the 
Hollywood studio system, have not treated Hong Kong cinema as a distinctive industrial 
form. Hong Kong cinema simply does not fit in existing theoretical models which were 
developed to explain industrial form of a cinema situated in a nation state that has the 
political might to enforce protective measure for its national cinema, or situated in 
powerful nation like the U.S., where Hollywood benefits from strong banking and 
finance sectors to underwrite its high-stakes production. Existing theoretical models on 
auteur and authorship have not extended to study the relationship between the industrial 
auteur and the film industry‟s organizational structure. Hong Kong filmmakers came 
from a film industry which did not have the form of a studio and was neither a producer‟s 
cinema nor a director‟s cinema. Being heavily dependent on overseas markets, the system 
of the Hong Kong film industry was nomadic and the filmmakers were itinerant. Despite 
the lack of the physical site of a studio and the absence of a creative producer at the apex 
of its organization, however, the Hong Kong film industry nonetheless was locally 
successful and internationally influential, and its filmmakers were able to devise their 
own efficient mode of production. 
The system of Hong Kong cinema was developed within a territory which did not 
have sovereign power like a nation but enjoyed considerable autonomy. Situated in a 
peculiar colony with economic achievement and soft authoritarian rule, and located 
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between British colonialism and Chinese nationalism, Hong Kong cinema was one 
manifestation of a distinctive political economy and cultural context. It was a condition 
commonly shared in East Asia, however. East Asian cinemas in nations like South Korea, 
Taiwan and Singapore were often located in a sub-sovereign entity or in a country whose 
internal authority was heavily influence by external powers. Soft authoritarian rule was 
combined with rapid economic growth and people‟s lives were heavily impacted by 
global capitalist forces. With the rise of East Asian cinemas, the model of Hong Kong 
cinema might provide a useful reference for comparison. This dissertation is an attempt to 
find new ways to study Hong Kong film industry and its filmmakers that might help 















                                               
1 In 1997, Hong Kong‟s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated at US$26,600.  It was the 
second highest in Asia after Japan and surpassed Canada, Australia and Britain. Hong Kong‟s per capita 
income was the sixth highest in the world. 
2 The headline on the front cover of Mingpao Monthly is “Hong Kong Cinema is Already Dead”, Mingpao 
Monthly is an intellectual magazine on politics and economics targeting educated readers (Fu Lie, Chiu 
Wing Lam, Chi Ma, Herman Yau, Ching Wai Chan and Thomas Shin, "The Death of Hong Kong Cinema," 
Mingpao Monthly Nov 1995. Film Bi-weekly (aka City Entertainment) also had a few paragraphs or 
articles here and there in 1995 describing the dire situation of Hong Kong cinema. 
3 Siao won the best actress award in 1995 Berlin Film Festival. 
4 King Hu was known for re-inventing the martial arts genre, dubbed as the “new epoch of wuxia”.  His 
best known works are Come Drink With Me (1966), Dragon Gate Inn (1967), and A Touch of Zen (1975) 
which won  a technical prize at the Cannes film festival. 
5 Cecile Tang is known for her socially critical art cinema.  At present, the only book-length study on her is 
Ching Yau, Filming Margins: Tang Shu Shuen, a Forgotten Hong Kong Woman Director (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong UP, 2004). 
6
 Bauhinia was adopted as the floral emblem of Hong Kong in 1965. Since 1997 the flower appears on 
Hong Kong's flag and coins, replacing the British flag and Queen‟s head.  Bauhinia blakeana is a hybrid 
and is sterile flower.  It does not produce seeds. 
7Even as late as the 1980s, film was still regarded by many as an illegitimate business.  There were still 
distinctive division between the “red trousers” (veteran filmmakers trained in the industry) and those 
hailing from college film education.   
8 Illiteracy and a lack of formal education was common among the older generation of, likely due to the 
long years of war in contemporary Chinese history and low social status of the entertainment profession 
which deterred educated people from joining. 
9The Oral History project began with the priority on very experienced filmmakers who were mostly in their 
70s to 90s.  Around 2002 I proposed to interview the executive producers who are mostly still in their 40s 
to 50s.  I proposed this on the grounds that the important role of the producers was going overlooked, and 
that Hong Kong filmmakers traveled and migrated a lot. There has been no documentation of their works in 
Hong Kong.  Once they retired or moved elsewhere, it would be hard to save this valuable information.  I 
later published a paper on producers of Hong Kong cinema (Cindy S.C. Chan, "Housekeeper of Hong 
Kong Cinema: The Role of Producer in the System of Hong Kong Film Industry," Wide Screen 2 (2010),  
<http://widescreenjournal.org/index.php/journal/article/view/84/127>. See also chapter 5. 
10The Hong Kong Film Archive published two anthologies on the Shaw and the Cathay studios, the two 
major studios in Hong Kong in the 1960s.  Another library source is the Hong Kong collection section of 
Hong Kong University library.  However, Hong Kong cinema is so export-oriented that Hong Kong 
historians like Chung Po-yin have to go to Singapore to collect information on Cathay studio. 
11http://www.tdctrade.com/econforum/tdc/tdc010303.htm 
12 From my interviews and informal chatting with Hong Kong producers, the producers estimated that there 
were about 1,000 active members of the filmmaking community in the 1990s.  
13 “Gossipy” is the term used by producer Jessinta Liu in describing the information flow in the industry.  
14 On the back cover of the reprint in 1978, it was stated that this book is the only film history classic ever 
since there was film industry in China. 
15“Central Plain” view is a peculiarly Chinese world view.  It is an “inner-outer” concentric-circle model of 
hierarchical.  For example, the traditional sense of polity has the emperor at the center.  “(T)hose who fell 
from favor were exiled to the periphery – the more undesirable, the farther from the center.  The periphery 
represented the uncivilized and the weak, whereas political strength and cultural sagacity were concentrated 
in the state capital” Reginald Yin-Wang Kwok and Roger T.  Ames, "A Framework for Exploring the Hong 
Kong-Guangdog Link," The Hong Kong-Guangdog Link: Partnership in Flux, ed. Reginald Yin-Wang and 
Alvin Y. So Kwok (Hong Kong UP, 1995) 8. In history, Hong Kong/Guangzhou is situated at the Southern 
tip of China, which was labeled as the “Southern Barbarian” region  
 
 433 
                                                                                                                                            
16 “Zhuti” means principal part, the subject (vis-à-vis “object”), the Self.(vis-à-vis “the others”) 
17 In Cai‟s word, contemporary Hong Kong cinema is reduced to one mode: “entertainment”. He writes, 
“Undeniably, in contemporary Hong Kong cinema, film mainly is in a „entertainment mode‟; that is, it 
emphasizes its entertainment function to people living in a highly stressful urban life (in some films, they 
provide the function of understanding history and society). Therefore, in Hong Kong, the entire field of 
film is regarded as an “entertainment circle”. Entertainment film is the absolute mainstream of Hong Kong 
cinema….this has advantages and disadvantages. It can produce a lot of creative and edifying films. It can 
also produce harmful trashy movies…” Hongsheng Cai, Jialing Song and Guiqing Liu, eds., 80 Years of 
Hong Kong Film (Beijing Broadcasting Institute P, 2000) 1.  
18In the preface they write with a cultural elitist tone, “Unlike cinema in the Mainland and Taiwan, Hong 
Kong cinema survives and develops in an open market with no protection. The colonial government never 
regarded film as art, not to mention their lack of support and financing of movies. Among the three 
territories (China, Taiwan and Hong Kong), only Hong Kong cinema is really led by market. The 
filmmakers regarded the audience as “god” and they struggle hard to support themselves! The changing 
trend of Hong Kong cinema…is an expression of “the god‟s will”. In this commercial system, film is a 
business.  Hong Kong cinema is ....for the mass audience. It is hard to find niche movies for the cultural 
elitist in Hong Kong cinema. Commercialism is its key ingredient.  Priority is given to entertainment and 
profit making…To cater for the market, they do not care about if it is healthy or not.  There are so many 
sloppy productions and speculative works.” Chengren Zhou and Yizhuang Li, Early History of Hong Kong 
Cinema (1897-1945) (Hong Kong: Joint, 2005) iii.  
19 By 1990, Hong Kong and Taiwan were the largest foreign investors in China.  Over 60% of all Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in mainland China came from Hong Kong.  Hong Kong investment was 
concentrated in the Guangdong Province.  By 1991, there were 20,000 Hong Kong firms employing more 
than 3 million workers in Guangdong.  Taiwan‟s investment in China has been mostly in Guangdong and 
Fujian and it increased to U.S. $2 billion in 1990 and U.S. $4 billion in mid 1992. On-Kwok  Lai and Alvin 
Y. So, "Hong Kong and the Newly Industrializing Economies: From Americanization to Asianization," 
Hong Kong's Reunion with China: Global Dimensions, eds. Gerard A.  Postiglione and James T.H. Tang 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 1997) 112.  
20 Andrew Scobell was born and grew up in Hong Kong.  At the time of the first print of his article, he was 
the Research Assistant in the Foreign Policy Studies Program, the Brookings Institution.  
21 Law cites two prominent examples: Ambrose Y.C. King‟s renowned idea of “administrative absorption 
of politics” and Lau Siu-kai‟s idea of “utilitarianistic familism”.  For King‟s idea read Ambrose Y.C. King, 
"Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass-Roots Level," Hong Kong 
Government and Politics, ed. Ming Sing (Hong Kong: Oxford UP, 2003). For Lau‟s idea on Hong Kong 
democracy, read Siu-kai  Lau and Hsin-chi Kuan, "Partial Democratization, 'Foundation Moment' and 
Political Parties in Hong Kong," Hong Kong Government and Politics, ed. Ming Sing (Hong Kong: Oxford 
UP, 2003).  
22 For more about Northbound cultural imaginary read “section I: preliminary study of Northbound cultural 
imaginary” in Stephen C.K. Chan, ed., Cultural Imaginary and Ideology: Contemporary Hong Kong 
Culture and Politics Review (Hong Kong: Oxford UP, 1997). 
23 For an academic example of China imposing its perspective on Hong Kong history read Wang-chi Wong, 
The Burden of History: A Hong Kong Perspective of the Mainland Discourse of Hong Kong History (Hong 
Kong: Oxford UP, 2000). 
24The original quote is “the American cinema is a classical art, but why not then admire in it what  is most 
admirable, i.e. not only the talent of this or that filmmaker, but the genius of the system. – Andre Bazin, 
1957” 
25 A more elaborate argument on Olson‟s multi-cultural theory and my analysis of Hong Kong‟s specific 
hybrid culture is presented at Global Fusion conference and published on: Shu Ching Chan, "Hong Kong 
Cinema in the Global Market: The Competitive Advantage of Network Civilizations," Global Media 
Journal 3 (2004),  <http://lass.calumet.purdue.edu/cca/gmj/sp05/sp04/graduatesp04/gmj-sp04gradref-
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chan.htm>. 
26 It “emphasizes the fusion between the political economy of globalized Marxism and the discourse theory 
of Foucault” (19). 
27 In Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage, 1978) 7.  
28http:www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/  
29 In the 2000s, Hong Kong economy remains characterized by SMEs.  According to Hong Kong 
government statistics ―Hong Kong The Fact‖: “SMEs are an important driving force in Hong Kong‘s 
economic development. As at December 2009, there were about 282,000 SMEs in Hong Kong.  They 
constituted over 98 per cent of the territory‘s business units and accounted for about 48 per cent of private 
sector employment. The Government attaches great importance in supporting SMEs at various stages of 
development. (http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/trade&industry.pdf) 
30 In 1972, the UN General Assembly removed Hong Kong from its list of colonial territories after China 
insisted Hong Kong political status to be “a Chinese territory under British administration”.  In official 
language, Hong Kong changed from a “Crown Colony” to a “Dependent Territory”.   
31Genre was one of the four basic elements that overseas financiers asked from Hong Kong productions 
(the other three were cast, budget and delivery date.)  Wuxia was the most popular among the Taiwan 
financiers, and filmmakers usually could get more funding if they were willing to make these genre films.       
32 “Hong Kong survived the intense Sino-British antagonism during the transition period (1980s-1997) as 
well as the last 150-year period and “thrived in a spectacularly creative mode by maintaining a precarious 
balance between China and Britain.” Ming K. Chan, ed., Precarious Balance: Hong Kong between China 
and Britain 1842-1992 (New York: East Gate, 1994) 5. 
33 Steve Tsang borrows this term from J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," 
Economic History Review 6.1 (1953).  
34 The whole picture is complicated. Part of Hong Kong was on lease and part of it was permanently ceded 
to Britain. The deal was made after China‟s defeat in the Opium Wars under unequal treaties in which 
China never acknowledged as legitimate. So, the general understanding was that in 1997 Britain had to 
return Hong Kong to China in one piece. 
35 As many scholars have pointed out, this is quite a high percentage of population living in government 
housing in a capitalist city, and only Singapore can compare with it. 
36 In the hearing, it was explicitly stated that the United States would not interfere in Hong Kong because 
Hong Kong was under Britain‟s administration. 
37 C. K. Lau quotes from Frank Welsh (1994) British Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston dismissed Hong 
Kong as “a barren island with hardly a house upon it.” Lau comments that since then, virtually every article 
or book on Hong Kong in the English language has cited the epithet, or “a barren rock” for short as a handy 
description of Hong Kong. 
38 In 1997, “Hong Kong‟s per capita gross domestic product (GDP), estimated at US$26,600, was the 
second highest in Asia after Japan, having surpassed Canada, Australia, and its former colonial master, 
Britain. Expressed in terms of actual purchasing power, Hong Kong‟s per capita income was the sixth 
highest in the world.” C.K. Lau, Hong Kong's Colonial Legacy: A Hong Kong Chinese's View of the 
British Heritage (Hong Kong: Chinese UP, 1997) 58. 
39 In his book Brief History of Hong Kong Liu Shuyong argues otherwise, implicitly against the British 
“barren rock” version of early Hong Kong history. He traces Hong Kong history back to 6,000 years ago 
and asserts that before the British annexation in 1841 China had executed effective administration over 
Hong Kong. And there was certain amount of development in agriculture, fishing, salt, shipping, pearl 
acquisition, incense manufacturing and education. During the Ming and Qing dynasties (1368-1644, 1644-
1911) Hong Kong occupied an important status for military defense. A systematic military defense system 
was established. Liu argues convincingly that Hong Kong was not exactly a terra incognita. But still it was 
minuscule compared to today‟s cosmopolitan juggernaut. Shuyong Liu, A Brief History of Hong Kong 
(Hong Kong: Joint Publishing (H.K.) Co., Ltd., 1998).    
40 There is an entire section “De-Mystifying „Positive Non-interventionism‟” (3.2) in Kam-yee  Law and 
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Kim-ming Lee, eds., The Economy of Hong Kong in Non-Economic Perspectives (Hong Kong: Oxford UP, 
2004). 
41 The rapid economic growth was between 1960 and 1985. 
421945 saw the end of Sino-Japanese war and Hong Kong returned to British colonial rule. The 1945-1959 
period is the time of the Cold War (between the capitalist bloc and communist bloc) and the civil war 
(between the Communist Party and the KMT). 1997 is the year Hong Kong returned to Chinese 
sovereignty.    
43 Even prominent stars and filmmakers would rather work as hawkers selling cigarettes and flowers for 
their livelihood. Zhou and Li, Early History of Hong Kong Cinema (1897-1945).  
44 Most film industry professional associations gradually emerged as late as the 1980s and 1990s. But still 
they have no labor union with a strong organization and bargaining power.  
45 China theater covered China, Indo-China and Thailand. 
46 It was better known in Chinese as Zhonglian (short for Zhonghua Lianhe Zhipian Gufeng Gongsi). Its 
predecessor was the China Movie Company, better known in Chinese as Zhongdian (short for Zhonghua  
Dianying Gongsi). Its successor is the China United Film Company Limited, better known in Chinese as 
Huaying (short for Zhonghua Dianying Lianghe Gufeng Youxian Gonsi). 
47
 His widow Tong Yuejun is still active in Taiwan, and the organization for coordinating and facilitating 
Hong Kong filmmakers to produce or launch their films in Taiwan. 
48 “Ny” is New York on the American continent.  “lon” is London on the European continent and “kong” is 
Hong Kong on the Asian continent.  Michael Eliot, “Tale of Three Cities”, Time Magazine on-line, Thur 
Jan17, 2008.   http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1704398,00.html 
49 http://indexmundi.com/hong_kong/inflation_rate_(consumer_prices).html; Original source: International 
Monetary Fund.   
Hong Kong inflation rate 1980-2000 
Year  Year  Year  Year  
1980 4.444 1985 3.551 1990 10.253 1995 9.043 
1981 9.479 1986 3.579 1991 11.259 1996 6.334 
1982 10.948 1987 5.716 1992 9.544 1997 5.801 
1983 9.961 1988 7.837 1993 8.82 1998 2.834 
1984 8.574 1989 10.187 1994 8.795 1999 -3.947 
      2000 -1.607 
 
50 For example, as pointed out by Ronald Skeldon the “economies of Australia, Canada, and the United 
States are still mired in extremely slow growth, averaging a rates of growth of GDP per capita of 3.4 
percent per annum each in the 1980s. Hong Kong averaged 7.1 percent growth over the same period.” 
(Skeldon 47) 
51 In 2007, the Gini index was 43.4. http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_HKG.html  State 
of the World‟s Cities 2008/2009, released in London on October 22 by UN-HABITAT  
http://www.unhabitat.org/content.asp?cid=5979&catid=5&typeid=6&subMenuId=0   
52 Richard A. Boucher said, ―…what I like to call Hong Kong's genius. When it comes to international 
commerce, this city is truly a creative force, spinning magic from the ether. Hong Kong people have a 
sense for identifying and developing opportunities that otherwise would not exist. They know how to bring 
together a marketing opportunity in the U.S., Europe, or Japan, financing from Asia or outside, the right 
technology, the right manufacturing elements (often in China, but more and more frequently elsewhere), 
and the management capabilities that make a business deal happen, and happen quickly. I don't know of 
any other place where this process repeats itself so often and so efficiently. These qualities have made 
Hong Kong a crossroads of capital and markets, an open city based on open trade. Everything here is 
international, virtually every firm, however small, a multinational‖ February 18, 2011.  
.http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/cg_rb1997110601.html 
53 For example, in 1993-94 I worked at the program acquisition department of STAR TV.  One of the major 
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references we used for buying Hong Kong movies was Hong Kong box office record even though the 
movies would be shown to a few dozen countries.  In the 1980s- 1990s, the link between Hong Kong box 
office figure and selling price to overseas markets was the motivation for producers to boost impressive 
Hong Kong box office by various means. See chapter 5 exhibition sector. 
54
 In ―Hong Kong Film New Action – Business Forums and Promotional Sessions‖ held in Hong Kong in 
2009 Feng Xiaogang was caught cursing in public when discussing overseas market.  He angrily says, 
―…my movie If You Are the One sold 350 million in China but only over 1 million in Hong Kong – was it 
really that bad?‖ March 26, 2009 http://ent.sina.com.cn/s/m/2009-03-26/13222439868.shtml  Interestingly 
Feng attributed the bad box office performance  to Hong Kong audience‘s taste.  He said Hong Kong 
audience found Mainland movies rustic.   ― (Taiwan) Wei Te-Sheng‘s Cape No. 7 sold only 100 million, 
Hong Kong audience knows about this movie and this director.  Why?  Hong Kong audience looks down 
upon movies from Mainland China…My movies sold well for ten years, but my fame is not as big as Wei 
Te-Sheng in last year.  Hong Kong audience does not care about us.‖ “Feng Xiaogang denounce Hong 
Kong audience: You look down upon me and I won‘t come back‖ March 27, 2009. 
http://et.21cn.com/star/zhuixing/neidi/2009/03/27/6056810.shtml 
55 In 2005 Chan Wing-mei was the president of Hong Kong Theatre Association and a government-
appointed member of Hong Kong Film Development Committee. 
56 For the 1984 incident, read Film Bi-Weekly  issue 146 p.4-7, issue 156 p.28-29; for the1992 incident,  
issue 336 p.19-24, issue 454 p.88-89, issue 457 28-29 
57 The full name is Hong Kong, Kowloon and New Territories Motion Picture Industry Association Ltd.  
“The MPIA was established in 1939.  It is a private business organization. In 1979 it was registered as a 
limited company. The organization mission is to protect fellow member‟s interests and serves as a bridge 
between the government and theater business.”  In 1985 it had 91 theaters as its members. Only 4 theaters 
were left out from this organization. In the past, the MPIA was divided into 3 small groups: the first-run 
Western film circuit, the Mandarin film circuit, and second-run film circuit.  But as the business evolved, 
the distinction between the various groups disappeared.  "M.P.I.A.," Film Bi-Weekly 1985.  
58 His Chinese name is Kong Chi-keung.  He is the Executive Director of Edko Films Ltd.  In 2005 he was 
a government-appointed member of the Hong Kong Film Development Committee (FDC).  In FDC press 
releases he is generally recognized as a film producer who has successfully brought Hong Kong and 
Chinese films to the international arena.   
59 Ng See Yuan is currently the Chairman of Federation of Hong Kong Filmmakers and an Honorary 
President of Hong Kong Film Directors‟ Guild. 
60 It was around 2001.  Rita Fung is my friend from college and we studied and made films together. 
61The issues are 166 to 171 and 174 .   
62 In the 1990s Film Bi-Weekly‟s office in Causeway Bay was only a few hundred square feet with 
probably less than ten staff stationed in the office. In the 1990s I wrote a couple of articles for this film 
magazine and visited the office a few times.   
63 In this dissertation, I use “independent film” to refer only to commercial independents, not the genuine 
independent filmmaking with a critical edge. 
64 Spring Festival couplets and huichun are paper strips pasted on gateposts, door panels and walls with 
generic standardized positive greeting words like “kung hei fat choy” (wish for lots of fortune), wish for 
good health, good business, good performance in school, or all wishes come true etc.  
65 The top box office hit that year is Wong Jing‟s God of Gambler starring Chow Yun-fat, which was 
released from December 14 to Jan 25 and shown in the Golden Princess circuit. 
66 Ng See Yuan was then one of the five committee members of the Provisional Committee of Hong Kong 
Film Workers Against the Re-censor System set up in December 1982  
67 “Public order ordinance” is in chapter 245 of the Hong Kong Regulations.  It restricts Hong Kong 
people‟s civil liberties in public assembly and public procession in order for the government to maintain 
public order.  The ordinance was first established in 1967 after the 1967 Riots and stipulated that assembly 
of more than 3 persons needed a permit from the government authority.  In 1971 the ordinance was further 
tightened to restrict legal public assembly to five designated places. In 1980, the regulation was relaxed and 
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required a permit for public assembly of over 30 people and procession of over 20 people. In 1995, the 
ordinance was found to be in conflict with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). Some restrictions were relaxed. The registration system was replaced with a notification system 
and the Commissioner of Police must be notified of a public procession at least 7 days before the 
procession.  However China argued that the 1995 version of the Public Ordinance was in conflict with the 
Basic Law (the mini-constitution for future Hong Kong SAR).  In 1997, the Standing Committee of the 
National People‟s Congress (NPC) of China passed a resolution that reinstated some previously canceled 
regulations, changed the notification system and allowed the authority to reserve the right to object to 
public assembly and procession. 
68 (Barbieri 95)  Original source: Johannes Chan, “Freedom of Expression: Censorship and Obscenity”, in 
Civil Liberties in Hong Kong, edited by Raymond Wacks, second edition (Hong Kong: Hong Kong  
UniversityPress, 1989) 208-242.  The incident was also widely reported in Hong Kong newspapers and 
Film Bi-weekly. 
69
 In 1993, Anson Chan Fang On Sang became the 30th and last Chief Secretary. She mainly oversaw the 
localization of the civil service during her time in this position. Chan was the first woman and the first 
ethnic Chinese to hold the second-highest governmental position in Hong Kong. The highest governmental 
position in Hong Kong, that of Governor, was always held by a British person before Hong Kong's 
handover to China. 
70 An earlier version of this section is published in Widescreen Journal (Chan, "Housekeeper of Hong Kong 
Cinema: The Role of Producer in the System of Hong Kong Film Industry." 
71 Frankel writes: “…Being different from men isn‟t something to change or hide…Women bring a unique 
set of behaviors to the work-place that are needed, especially in today‟s climate. Our tendencies to 
collaborate rather than compete, listen more than talk, and use relationships rather than muscle to 
influence…” (62)   
72 Evans writes, “Once you leave the corporate arena, you don‟t have the same impact on big business, 
which in turn means you don‟t have the same impact on the world.  If we are going to make our marketing 
and our products more female and more family-friendly, we need to be part of the team creating them. It‟s 
important that we inhabit the places of power in as many positions as possible…. Large corporations shape 
our lives. They produce the entertainment shows that we decry…The more we‟re around to make key 
decisions, the more they will go our way.” (156-157) 
73 Schatz writes, “The quality and artistry of all these films were the product not simply of individual 
human expression, but of a melding of institutional forces.  In each case the „style‟ of a writer, director, or 
costume designer – fused with the studio‟s production operations and management structure, its resources 
and talent pool, its narrative traditions and market strategy.  And ultimately any individual‟s style was no 
more than an inflection on an established studio style.” (6) 
74 When I asked Jessinta Liu how she got industry information, she said, “People in our field are very 
gossipy.  Whatever happened in the morning, the whole town will know in the afternoon.” 
75 This casual conversation with my college friend was around summer 2001. 
76 This casual conversation with my college friend was around summer 2001. 
77 The conversation with Liu Damu was around 2001.  Liu was a core member of Tsui Hark‟s brainstorming 
writer group.  He is also my senior in college.   
78 Lorraine Ho is my senior in college and I worked in her student productions a few times. We already 
knew each other but haven‟t met again since college. Ho‟s communication skill is seen in her initiative in 
breaking the ice and warming up the conversation quickly.        
79 And of course I was also warned by a male filmmaker, “However soft those women look, don‟t mess 
with them.”  There are many rumors of woman producers who intimidate a man by verbally bullying him 
and forcing him to back up to the wall. But I am more interested in knowing how these women establish 
their authority and effectively deal with men who challenge them 
80 Rumor has it that Tsui Hark fell out with directors like King Hu, Yim Ho, and John Woo etc.  In the 
interview I asked Tsui what he thought about this, Tsui did not confirm or deny the rumors but insisted that 
“Everyone should look at the end products, the films we finished.” 
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81 Sharon Hui (scriptwriter) mentions Nansun Shi‟s role as the boss‟s wife and a parental figure in Film 
Workshop.  She says Tsui and Shi are a perfect team.  Tsui takes care of the creative aspect of production, 
while Shi takes care of management.  Hui says, „Nansun Shi‟s communication skills helps Tsui Hark retain 
a lot of relationships and networks.  Their parental role in the office helps create a harmonious atmosphere.  
This helps maintain close relationship.” (Ho) 
82 In a casual and friendly chat with a female filmmaker, I was told that there is the unwritten rule that gay 
men cannot be executive producers in the Hong Kong film industry, and my source prefers to remain 
anonymous. 
83 It was around summer 2001 when I visited my friend Rita Fung on a set. 
84 For example, in an interview published in Harvard Business Review on Hong Kong style supply chain 
management Victor Fung of Li & Fung Ltd, Hong Kong‟s largest export trading company, describes how 
his company transforms from a traditional Chinese family conglomerate to an innovative international 
public company (Maretta)  The book-length study is published in Hong Kong in Chinese (Li & Fung 
Research Center)    
85 His film After The Crescent (1997) was funded by Hong Kong Arts Development Council 
86 Hold You Tight won the Golden Horse Award for Best Supporting Actor, the Teddy Award at the Berlin 
International Film Festival and Film of Merit Award at the Hong Kong Film Critics Society Awards.   
87 For example, the It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad World series (1987, 1988); All’s Well End’s Well series (1992, 
1993), It’s a Wonderful Life (1997) etc. 
88 The Plain Jane character was played by Josephine Siao in the TV and movie versions. 
89 But of course, disciplined actors like Michael Hui and Sylvia Chang also happen to be the typical high 
caliber multi-media multi-task executives who can write, direct, produce and act, not to mention their 
filmmaking community service and charity works. 
90 It was released in the US in 1977 and the English title is The Fruit Is Ripe. The Chinese title Lee Lai-
chun The Fruit is Ripe is a blatant rip off.   
91 The income was donated to the victims of the flooding in Southern China that year.  Wong Jing was one 
of the 9 screenwriters. The other three directors besides Ko were Tsui Hark, Alfred Cheung (Cheung Kin-
ting) and Joe Cheung (Cheung Tung-cho) all veteran filmmakers known for being efficient in production.  
92 Herman Yau is my senior in college. He is a prolific filmmaker and speaks from his experience of 
working at various posts from director, writer to cinematographer and varieties of films. His films range 
from the serial killer hit like The Untold Story (aka Human Pork Chop 1993), to horror flick the 
Troublesome Night series (1997-1999), to the award-winning political film From the Queen to the Chief 
Executive (2001).  He also works as cinematographer of Tsui Hark in The Legend of Zu (2001) and Time 
and Tide (2000).  
93 “Juchang” means theater.  According to the interviewer Freddie Wong Juchang was the only serious film 
journal in Hong Kong and Taiwan at that time. 
94 This is a Chinese political and history magazine published between 1970-1998.  In 1984 it was renamed 
The 1990s.  
95 Besides the Diaoyu Island dispute and the tense Cross-Strait relationship, there was also the student- 
spearheaded massive rally protesting widespread corruption and the fight for legalizing Chinese as an 
official language.  It was also the decade when the Hong Kong economy was about to take off. 
96 Joyce Chan has only 15 entries in Hong Kong Film Archive‟s database.  She is the writer of Ann Hui‟s 
The Secret (1979) and The Spooky Bunch (1980) and Patrick Tam‟s Love Massacre (1981), Nomad (1982) 
and Cherie (1984). 
97 According to City Entertainment‟s interview, he has produced more than 1,000 scripts. 
98http://ipac.hkfa.lcsd.gov.hk 
99 The other four consultants are Michael Hui, Raymond Wong, John Woo and Wong Jing. 
100 Today, Louis Cha‟s martial arts novels are translated into almost a dozen languages around the world. 
101 Sammo Hung described, “Barry Wong and I are together for 24/7. We even go to bathroom together. 
Even my wife gets jealous of our close relationship…We dine together, watch movies together, discuss 
together. The four of us (Sammo Hung, his director, assistant director and script writer) communicate very 
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well.” (Liu and Li 24) 
102 For example, The Boys from Fengkuei (1983), A Summer at Grandpa’s (1984); Time to Live and Time to 
Die (1985); Dust in the Wind (1986); Daughter of Nile (1987); A City of Sadness (1989); The Puppetmaster 
(1993); and Good Men, Good Women (1995) 
103 Read Janet Staiger, "Standardization and Differentiation: The Reinforcement and Dispersion of 
Hollywood's Practices," The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of Production to 1960, ed. 
David Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson (New York: Columbia UP, 1985). 
104 John Downing‟s original phrase, “In fact, whenever mainstream media form choose not to represent 
important facets of social or political reality, alternative media flourish.  A poorly photocopied sheet of 
paper may be seized upon and shared by many people if the need is real.” In that article, Downing defines 
and confines alternative media to “politically dissident media that offer radical alternatives to mainstream 
debate.” John Downing, "Alternative Media and the Boston Tea Party," Questioning the Media: A Critical 
Introduction, ed. John Downing, Ali Mohammadi, and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi (Sage, 1995) 240.  
105 Wong Jing is known for criticizing Hong Kong film critics. When asked if he can think of a good film 
critic, Wong Jing‟s answer is Sek Kei. Wong Jing thinks Sek Kei is fair and has his own perspective. Ernie  
Au, "Wong Jing: I Am an Entertainer," City Entertainment April 12-25 2001. 
106
 The Chinese Wikipedia has one of the fan sites that systematically organizes the stock characters of the 
major gamblers films into a “character relationship chart”, Available: 
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ipro/pressrelease/060816e.htm. 
107 Pathological Gambling (PG) is an impulse-control disorder: “The essential feature of Pathological 
Gambling is persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior that disrupts personal, family, or 
vocational pursuits… The individual may be preoccupied with gambling” American Psychiatric 
Association, "Pathological Gambling," Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth ed. 
(Am Psych Assn). 
108 For example, in the press release of Chinese University of Hong Kong Department of Marketing in 2006 
about their findings of “A Survey on Gambling Behaviours of Hong Kong People „Will You Become a 
Gambler?‟”, gambling was framed as a problematic behavior in itself. They stated, “The study aims to help 
the Hong Kong Government, relevant organizations and citizens to realize the potential problems of 
gambling and to identify solutions.” In their list of the ten major research findings, they stated that 
gambling led to the following impacts: a) addiction to gambling and helplessness; b) betting amounts 
increasing; c) psychological damage. Their recommendation to government, the education department and 
parents was to deliver an anti-gambling message, and for parents and senior members of family to “stay 
away from gambling activities to act as a role model.” 
(http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ipro/pressrelease/060816e.htm). 
109 At the Berlin International Film Festival, it won the Alfred Bauer Award, the Teddy best feature film 
award etc. 
110 It won seven awards at Hong Kong Film Awards and Hong Kong Film Critics Society Awards that year 
including best film. 
111 In contrast Yoshiko Yamaguchi (Chinese name: Li Xianglan; English name: Shirley Yamaguchi) a 
Japanese woman playing Chinese in Japanese war propaganda film was exonerated after the war. Her name 
is used as a gag in another Stephen Chow movie From Beijing with Love (1994) 
112 It is said that Yoshiko Kawashima had no picture taken in her life. The character is based on a Hong 
Kong movie Kawashima Yoshiko (Eddie Fong, 1990) with Anita Mui playing the title character   
113 In the 1990s it was common in migrating family that the husband/father going back to work in Hong 
Kong while the family settle in Canada. In Hong Kong, there is a “home without a wife”. In Canada there is 
a “house without husband”.  For more read Roland Skeldon, ed., Reluctant Exiles? Migration from Hong 
Kong and the New Overseas Chinese (Hong Kong: Hong Kong UP, 1994).  
114 Andy Lau won his first best actor award in Hong Kong Film Award for this film. 
115 They are Hong Kong Repertory Theatre, Hong Kong Ballet Company, Hong Kong Philharmonic 
Orchestra, Hong Kong Chinese Orchestra and Hong Kong Dance Company Siu Tip Tao, "The Birth of 
Hong Kong Repertory Theatre: A Product of Rationality,"  (Course paper for Advanced Humanities 
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Seminar, Hong Kong Baptist University, 2008), vol. 
116 Part of this chapter is published in Cindy S.C. Chan, "Organized Chaos: Tsui Hark and the System of the 
Hong Kong Film Industry," The Swordsman and His Jiang Hu: Tsui Hark and Hong Kong Film, eds. Sam 
Ho and Wai-leng Ho (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2002).  
117 Rumor has it that Tsui Hark and Nansun Shi divorced around 2008. They neither confirmed nor denied 
it. They were assumed to be married in the early 1980s but were actually officially married in 1996. In this 
chapter I‟ll refer to Nansun Shi as Tsui Hark‟s wife for convenience of discussion. 
118 See Cheuk-to Li, "Through Thick and Thin: The Ever-Changing Tsui Hark and the Hong Kong 
Cinema," The Swordsman and His Jiang Hu: Tsui Hark and Hong Kong Film, eds. Sam Ho and Wai-leng 
Ho (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Film Archive, 2002), Ping (Lam Mei Nin) Lam, "Tsui Hark Interview," Hong 
Kong Weekly 1989. 
119 In the story, the mentor disciplines the Monkey King by chanting some magic words. The tiara on the 
Monkey King‟s head will be tightened and cause him a headache.  
120 Her name sometimes is also written as Selina Chow Liang Shuk-yee 
121 CTV operated between 1975 and 1978. The rest of the history of Hong Kong television industry was 
between TVB and RTV/ATV until late 1990s. 
122
 Seminar on “The Celluoid Swordsman; Tsui Hark and His Cinema – Creativity and Reinvention – 
Scriptwriting in Tsui Hark‟s production” Hong Kong Film Archive. August 8, 2001. 
123 John Woo made his version of the prequel into Bullet in the Head (1990), also set in Vietnam during 
Vietnam War. 
124 I cannot find the official English names of some of these clubs and thus use pinyin as a substitute. 
125 For a complete HKIFF staff list from 1977 to 1996 read Emily Lo, "Appendix: Festival Staff List," 
Hong Kong International Film Festival 20th Anniversary Souvenir Book, ed. Emily Lo (Hong Kong: Urban 
Council, 1996).  
126 Film Bi-Weekly issue 13, July 5, 1979. p. 35-39; issue 14, July 19, 1979.p.33-38; issue 15, August 2, 
1979. p.48-52; issue 16, August 16, 1979. P.43-45. 
127 Peggy Chiao received her masters degree at Radio-TV-Film department of University of Texas at Austin. 
She studied in the Ph.D. program at UCLA. 
128 Liu Damu described that Tsui Hark felt betrayed when Keeto Lam left him and worked with other 
people. Source: personal chats with Liu Damu around the summer of 2001. 
129 In the interview James Wong talks about Tsui Hark enthusiastically. He says that during the production 
he hated Tsui Hark for driving him crazy. But Tsui did bring out the best in him. 
130 The action sequence of Master Wong and Yan Zhendong in the courtyard is lengthened in the American 
version. In terms of the screen time he has, Yan Zhendong, instead of the Westerners, is the leading villain.   
131 I am using a Hong Kong version VCD for this study. In theatrical release and VCD versions, it is a 
common practice of Hong Kong cinema to have both English and Chinese subtitles.    
132 “Aunt Yee” is used in the English subtitle. In the dialogue, Master Wong addresses her as “Aunt 
Thirteenth”. Later when she becomes his fiancée, he addresses her by her Chinese first name. The 
appellation “Aunt Thirteenth” easily reminds the older Chinese audience of the time in Chinese society 
when fertility was celebrated and it was not uncommon to have more than one dozen siblings. 
133 She is called Peony in English subtitle in part III. But in Part VI she is called Diana. 
134 In the English subtitles of part VI (Once Upon A Time in China and America) he is called Seven. 
135 It was awarded Best Actress, Best Cinematography, and Best Art Direction at Taiwan‟s Golden Horse 
Film Awards. 
136 Its American title is 13 is not much 
137 For example, in a newspaper interview article, the reporter writes in the introduction that his friend 
anticipated the midnight preview of Chungking Express and said he would put on a tie to enter the theater. 
Back then the dress code of midnight preview was usually casual wear. (Pan)  
138 At present, he speaks fluent Cantonese, Mandarin, French and English. 
139 Conversation with Christopher Doyle, in the 1990s. 
140 For example, in My Wife is 18, the Charlene Choi character who is 18 and married to an older man. To 
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present herself as mature and complicated, she put on a flowery cheongsam like the one in In the Mood for 
Love and swayed her hips when walking into the restaurant and introduced herself to her husband‟s friend. 
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